Opinion
F051320
5-25-2007
In re J.S., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. TULARE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. S.S., Defendant and Appellant.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel, John A. Rozum, Chief Deputy County Counsel and Jonna M. Thomas, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
S.S. (mother) contends one of the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings regarding her baby was not supported by substantial evidence. We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the finding. Because that and other findings support the juvenile courts jurisdiction, we affirm.
As the department points out, mother appeals from a jurisdictional finding rather than from the dispositional order, which is the appealable judgment. (In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 112.) However, we shall construe the notice of appeal liberally as incorporating the jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. (Ibid.)
FACTS
The baby was born to mother and her husband, C.S. (father), in April 2006. On May 29, mother and father took the month-old baby to Tulare District Hospital because he was vomiting. The hospital personnel told them the baby was okay and they discharged him the same day. That evening, mother and father left the baby with his maternal grandmother while they went on an overnight fishing trip. On May 30, the maternal grandmother observed the baby experiencing seizures and she took him to Kaweah Delta District Hospital. The medical personnel found a skull fracture, five rib fractures at varying stages of healing, and a recent femoral fracture. The skeletal survey and the MRI suggested the baby had suffered non-accidental trauma consistent with shaken baby syndrome.
All dates refer to 2006 unless otherwise noted.
The Department of Health and Human Services (the department) filed a petition on May 31. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300.) The baby was taken into protective custody on June 1 and the detentional hearing was held the next day. The department filed an amended petition on June 22.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
Evidence presented at the contested jurisdictional hearing on September 22 included statements that mother had dropped the baby once, that father had shaken the baby on two occasions and had dropped him once, that father did not mean to harm the baby, and that mother and father were young and did not know how to care for the baby. Mother said the baby screamed all the time and was recently prescribed new formula. Mother said she and father would fight but they did not do anything to the baby. Father admitted having a temper problem and shaking the baby when he was overcome with anger. He would get angry because the baby always cried and would not stop. Mother said she did not know about the shaking incidents until father told her after the baby had been detained. Mother told father to inform the police, which he did. The doctor testified that the babys rib fractures initially would have caused a noticeable difficulty in breathing and some discomfort while being held. The doctor said the babys femur fracture would have been extremely painful and would have caused the baby to cry inconsolably when its diaper was changed, as it did when the baby was in the hospital. The baby had been having seizures for a few days.
The juvenile court found true the petitions a-2 allegation that the baby had been injured by the father; the b-1 allegation that mother knew or reasonably should have known of fathers severe physical abuse of the baby and that she failed to protect the baby; the b-4 allegation that mother failed to provide the baby with adequate medical care; the b-5 allegation that father failed to provide the baby with adequate medical care; the e-2 allegation that father committed severe physical abuse of the baby, who was under the age of five years; and the e-3 allegation that mother knew or reasonably should have known of fathers severe physical abuse of the baby and that she failed to protect the baby, who was under the age of five years.
Mother participated in various services and, on January 24, 2007, the baby was returned to mothers custody. The juvenile court ordered mother to continue her counseling and other services.
DISCUSSION
Mother does not challenge the juvenile courts jurisdiction over the baby, but she challenges one of the courts jurisdictional findings — that she knew or reasonably should have known that father was physically abusing the baby. To make a jurisdictional finding, the juvenile court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that a child comes within at least one of the subdivisions of section 300. (In re Tracy Z., supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 112-113.) The juvenile court can establish jurisdiction by finding only one of several allegations true. (See § 300 ["Any child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court," italics added].) Similarly, "[t]he reviewing court may affirm a juvenile court judgment if the evidence supports the decision on any one of several grounds[,]" without addressing a claim that substantial evidence does not support another ground. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875; see also In re Athena P. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 617, 630; In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 330.) Because mother challenges only the portion of the b-1 and e-3 allegations that she had reason to know father was physically abusing the baby, and she does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the remaining allegations, we presume those allegations were adequately proved and provide a sufficient basis for affirming the order of the juvenile court. Thus, jurisdiction was proper and we need not address mothers contention regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding she challenges.
Mother nevertheless asks us to address her contention because "the erroneous findings are prejudicial since the jurisdictional findings by the juvenile court, in effect, drive the case, placing an extraordinary premium on the correct adjudication of a petition." We review the juvenile courts jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence — that is, evidence that is reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193; Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.) We draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the juvenile court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile courts determinations; and we adhere to the principle that issues of fact, weight, and credibility are the provinces of the juvenile court. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393; In re Shelley J., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 329.) Where conflicting inferences may be drawn from the evidence, we ordinarily defer to the juvenile courts decision as to which inferences are appropriate. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.)
Accordingly, our review here is limited to whether the record reflects any evidence of a substantial nature that supports the finding of the juvenile court that mother knew or should have know that father physically abused the baby. We conclude there was substantial evidence from which the juvenile court could make this finding. The doctor testified that the babys fractured ribs would have made his breathing noticeably difficult and his fractured femur would have caused him severe pain during a diaper change or other similar physical movement. Mother said the baby cried and screamed all the time and had been having seizures for a few days. It was a reasonable inference that mother should have recognized the babys injuries as serious. And because mother and father lived together and fought, it reasonably could be inferred that mother knew father had a temper problem and should have known he inflicted the babys injuries.
Based on this conclusion and the findings not challenged by mother, we affirm the juvenile courts findings and orders.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile courts findings and orders are affirmed.
We concur:
GOMES, Acting P.J.
KANE, J.