Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. JD18227 & JD18228
Rushing, P.J.
I. Statement of the Case
After a post-permanency planning status review hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3, subdivision (e), the juvenile court entered an order that continued the placement of minor J.S and his sister M.S with the G.s, their maternal relatives, appointed the G.s as the minors’ educational representatives, limited parental rights to make educational decisions, and maintained the visitation schedule of S.S., the minors’ father. (Welfare & Inst. Code, §§ 361, subd. (a), 366.3, subd. (e)(5), 395.)
The order was also applicable to M.S. and the minors’ mother, J.M., who is not a party to this appeal.
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Father appeals from the order claiming the court failed to comply with the requirements of section 366.3, subdivision (e).
We conclude that father forfeited this claim and affirm the order.
II. Background
In February 2007, the juvenile court in Butte County sustained section 300 petitions on behalf of J.S. and M.S. and assumed jurisdiction over them based on findings that parents’ had failed to protect them and that M.S. had been sexually abused by a friend of the mother. At that time, father was incarcerated and had been for a significant period of the minors’ lives. He had never provided any care or support, the minors had no relationship with him, and M.S. was afraid of him. After assuming jurisdiction, the court placed the minors in a foster home in Butte County that specialized in emotionally fragile children. The court ordered reunification services for father, who was due to be released in April 2007. Father’s case plan included counseling, parenting classes, substance abuse treatment, enrollment in Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) or Narcotics Anonymous (NA), and drug testing.
After father’s release, the case was transferred to the Santa Clara County Juvenile Court, which accepted it in June 2007. Father had not seen the minors in seven years, and although he looked forward to visiting them, he understood that they were afraid of him. Father received referrals for court-ordered services, including counseling.
By the six-month review hearing in August 2007, father had not begun counseling, he had tested positive for drugs, and he was mostly concerned about his busy work schedule. He had started visitation, but it was proceeding slowly at the recommendation of the minors’ therapists. After the hearing, the court renewed its previous orders and continued reunification services.
A contested 12-month hearing was held in February 2008. Father did not attend but was represented by counsel. By that time, father had not completed any of his case plan. He had seen the minors only twice. The social worker had located Brian and Amanda G., the minors’ maternal great-aunt and uncle, who had not met the minors or seen father in years. They were very interested in establishing a relationship with the minors and perhaps taking care of them. After the hearing, the court terminated father’s reunification services and scheduled a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26.
In the report for that hearing, the social worker stated that the minors were living in separate foster homes but saw each other daily. The G.s had visited them and spoke to them frequently. They were eager to provide a permanent home and were in the process of becoming licensed foster parents. The minors said they wanted to be together and live with the G.s. The social worker planned to place the minors with them sometime after the permanency planning hearing. Father had not visited the minors since September 2007, he was rarely available when the minors called him, and when he did speak to them, he sometimes made inappropriate comments. The report recommended a planned permanent living arrangement with the G.s.
Father did not attend the hearing but was represented by counsel. The court adopted the recommendation in the report and allowed father in-person supervised visitation at least once per month and supervised telephone contact. The court also scheduled a post-permanency review hearing. In November 2008, before the review hearing, the court granted the social worker’s ex parte request, over father’s objection, to move the minors to the G.s.
The review hearing was held in January 2009. Notice had been sent to the address father had given the social worker. However, the social worker had great difficulty trying to communicate with father and had been able to do so only once in November 2008. At the review hearing, father’s attorney reported that she had called father, but the number he had given her was disconnected. She did not know how to reach him.
At the hearing, the social worker reported that the minors had lived with the G.s since November 2008 and were very happy, making new friends in school and meeting and having frequent contact with members of their extended family. Father had not visited them despite the social worker’s offer of assistance, and telephone contact had been sporadic. The G.s were committed to providing a permanent home and were willing to consider legal guardianship or adoption. The social worker recommended the minors’ continued placement with the G.s, the G.s’ appointment as their educational representatives, the limitation of parents’ rights to make educational decisions, and the continuation of father’s visitation. Neither father’s nor the minors’ counsel voiced opposition to the recommendations or raised any other issues. As noted, the court adopted the recommendations.
III. Discussion
Father contends that the court failed to comply with certain provisions of section 366.3, subdivision (e) and seeks to have the order reversed and the matter remanded for a new hearing.
Section 366.3, subdivision (e) provides, in relevant part, “[A]t the review held every six months..., the reviewing body shall inquire about the progress being made to provide a permanent home for the child, shall consider the safety of the child, and shall determine all of the following: [¶] (1) The continuing necessity for, and appropriateness of, the placement. [¶] (2) Identification of individuals other than the child’s siblings who are important to a child who is 10 years of age or older and has been in out-of-home placement for six months or longer, and actions necessary to maintain the child's relationship with those individuals, provided that those relationships are in the best interest of the child. The social worker shall ask every child who is 10 years of age or older and who has been in out-of-home placement for six months or longer to identify individuals other than the child’s siblings who are important to the child, and may ask any other child to provide that information, as appropriate. The social worker shall make efforts to identify other individuals who are important to the child, consistent with the child's best interests. [¶] (3) The continuing appropriateness and extent of compliance with the permanent plan for the child, including efforts to maintain relationships between a child who is 10 years of age or older and who has been in out-of-home placement for six months or longer and individuals who are important to the child and efforts to identify a prospective adoptive parent or legal guardian, including, but not limited to, child-specific recruitment efforts and listing on an adoption exchange. [¶] (4) The extent of the agency’s compliance with the child welfare services case plan in making reasonable efforts either to return the child to the safe home of the parent or to complete whatever steps are necessary to finalize the permanent placement of the child. If the reviewing body determines that a second period of reunification services is in the child’s best interests, and that there is a significant likelihood of the child’s return to a safe home due to changed circumstances of the parent, pursuant to subdivision (f), the specific reunification services required to effect the child’s return to a safe home shall be described. [¶] (5) Whether there should be any limitation on the right of the parent or guardian to make educational decisions for the child. That limitation shall be specifically addressed in the court order and may not exceed what is necessary to protect the child. If the court specifically limits the right of the parent or guardian to make educational decisions for the child, the court shall at the same time appoint a responsible adult to make educational decisions for the child pursuant to Section 361. [¶] (6) The adequacy of services provided to the child. The court shall consider the progress in providing the information and documents to the child, as described in Section 391. The court shall also consider the need for, and progress in providing, the assistance and services described in paragraphs (3) and (4) of subdivision (b) of Section 391. [¶] (7) The extent of progress the parents or legal guardians have made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care. [¶] (8) The likely date by which the child may be returned to, and safely maintained in, the home, placed for adoption, legal guardianship, or in another planned permanent living arrangement. [¶] (9) Whether the child has any siblings under the court’s jurisdiction, and, if any siblings exist, all of the following: [¶] (A) The nature of the relationship between the child and his or her siblings. [¶] (B) The appropriateness of developing or maintaining the sibling relationships pursuant to Section 16002. [¶] (C) If the siblings are not placed together in the same home, why the siblings are not placed together and what efforts are being made to place the siblings together, or why those efforts are not appropriate. [¶] (D) If the siblings are not placed together, the frequency and nature of the visits between siblings. [¶] (E) The impact of the sibling relationships on the child's placement and planning for legal permanence. [¶] The factors the court may consider as indicators of the nature of the child’s sibling relationships include, but are not limited to, whether the siblings were raised together in the same home, whether the siblings have shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds, whether either sibling expresses a desire to visit or live with his or her sibling, as applicable, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best emotional interests. [¶] (10) For a child who is 16 years of age or older, the services needed to assist the child to make the transition from foster care to independent living. [¶] The reviewing body shall determine whether or not reasonable efforts to make and finalize a permanent placement for the child have been made. [¶] Each licensed foster family agency shall submit reports for each child in its care, custody, and control to the court concerning the continuing appropriateness and extent of compliance with the child’s permanent plan, the extent of compliance with the case plan, and the type and adequacy of services provided to the child.” (Italics added.)
Section 366.3, subdivision (e) provides that when the court conducts a post-permanency planning review, it shall “inquire about the progress being made to provide a permanent home for the child, shall consider the safety of the child” and “shall determine” a number of enumerated factors. In particular, the section directs the social worker make an effort to identify individuals who might be important to the minor and requires the court to determine whether there are any such individuals and whether their relationships with the minor should be maintained. (§ 366.3, subds. (e)(2) & (3), fn. 2, ante.) The section also requires the court to determine whether a parent has made progress in alleviating or mitigating the reasons for foster placement. (§ 366.3, subd. (d)(7), fn. 2, ante.) Rule 5.740(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court requires the court to enter its findings on these matters.
Rule 5.740(b)(1) of the California Rules of Court provides, “Following the establishment of a plan other than those provided for in (a), review hearings must be conducted at least every 6 months by the court or by a local administrative review panel. [¶] (1) At the review hearing, the court or administrative review panel must consider the report of the petitioner, the report of any CASA volunteer, the case plan submitted for this hearing, and any report submitted by the child’s caregiver under section 366.21(d); inquire about the progress being made to provide a permanent home for the child; consider the safety of the child; and enter findings regarding each item listed in section 366.3(e).” (Italics added.)
Father contends that the social worker and the court did not comply with these requirements. He notes that the social worker’s report for the review hearing does not state that the social worker asked the minors about important individuals—e.g., their former foster mother, friends, teachers or other adults in the Oroville area where they resided before being placed in Kern County with the G.s—or address whether those relationships should be maintained; and the court did not make any determinations or enter findings concerning whether there were any such relationships, whether they should be maintained, or whether father had made progress in alleviating or mitigating the causes of the minors’ foster placement—i.e., whether he had entered any treatment programs, had drug testing, or participated in or completed the other aspects of his former reunification plan.
County counsel points out that father failed to attend the post-permanency planning hearing and his attorney, who did attend, did not challenge the adequacy of the social worker’s report, request findings concerning possibly important relationships, or object to the court’s decision on the ground that it had failed to make required determinations or comply with the statute. For these reasons, county counsel argues that father has forfeited his appellate claim. We agree.
As a general rule, claims of procedural error or challenges to rulings are forfeited on appeal if it is not raised in the trial court. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185.) “The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected.” (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338.) As the court opined in Caminetti v. Pac. Mutual L. Ins. Co. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 386, 392, “ ‘It would seem... intolerable to permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware and thereby permitting the proceedings to go to a conclusion which he may acquiesce in, if favorable, and which he may avoid, if not.’ ” (Id. at p. 392, quoting Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court (1920) 182 Cal. 315, 338 [conc. opn. Olney, J.]; accord, People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1207.) In other words, “[a] party should not be allowed to gamble on a favorable decision and then raise such an objection in the event he is disappointed in the result.” (Rohr v. Johnson (1944) 65 Cal.App.2d 208, 212.)
There is an exception to the rule where the claim on appeal is sufficiency of the evidence to support a ruling or decision. (People v. Butler (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1119, 1126 [a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a factual finding is an “ ‘obvious’ ” exception to the appellate rule of forfeiture by failing to object in the trial court]; e.g., In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 623 [“while a parent may waive the objection that an adoption assessment does not comply with the requirements provided in section 366.21, subdivision (i), a claim that there was insufficient evidence of the child’s adoptability at a contested hearing is not waived by failure to argue the issue in the juvenile court”]; In re Gregory A. (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1561 [a party does not forfeit a claim of insufficient evidence to support a factual finding by failing to make the specific objection in the trial court].) This exception is not applicable here.
“Dependency matters are not exempt from this rule.” (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) Thus, for example, it is settled that the failure to raise a timely objection to the adequacy or completeness of a social worker’s report forfeits such claims on appeal. (In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886; In re Aaron B. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 843, 846; In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411.)
Concerning whether the failure to object to alleged noncompliance with the finding requirements of section 366.3, People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107 (Stowell) provides a pertinent application of the rule. There, on appeal, the defendant challenged an order requiring him to submit to HIV testing, arguing that the sentencing court had failed to comply with Penal Code section 1021.1, which requires a finding of probable cause to justify the testing. Although it was undisputed that the trial court had not made an express finding of probable cause and entered it in the minute order, the California Supreme Court declined to address the claim because the defendant had failed to make a timely objection below. (Id. at pp. 1111, 1113, 1117.)
Under Penal Code section 1202.1, the court must order every person convicted of enumerated sexual offenses “to submit to a blood... test for evidence of antibodies to the probable causative agent of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS),” but with certain offenses the statute testing shall be ordered only “if the court finds that there is probable cause to believe that blood, semen, or any other bodily fluid capable of transmitting HIV has been transferred from the defendant to the victim: [¶]... [¶] For purposes of this paragraph, the court shall note its finding on the court docket and minute order if one is prepared.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.1, subds. (a), (e)(6)(A), (B).)
The court explained, “The forfeiture doctrine is a ‘well-established procedural principle that, with certain exceptions, an appellate court will not consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—raised in the trial court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Strong policy reasons support this rule: ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “The law casts upon the party the duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal.” ’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] [¶] This rationale applies with equal force to claims under Penal Code section 1202.1, subdivision (e)(6), that the trial court failed to make an express finding or notation of probable cause. Any deficiencies in this regard are easily remedied upon timely objection. [Citation.] And such procedural defects do not implicate any fundamental or constitutional right that might excuse the failure to object. [Citation.] [¶] Moreover, the statute neither requires an express finding [citations]. In this circumstance, we apply the general rule ‘that a trial court is presumed to have been aware of and followed the applicable law. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] This rule derives in part from the presumption of Evidence Code section 664 ‘that official duty has been regularly performed.’ Thus, where a statement of reasons is not required and the record is silent, a reviewing court will presume the trial court had a proper basis for a particular finding or order. [Citation.] We see no reason to disregard these principles here. With respect to notation of the probable cause finding in the docket, nothing in the statutory language or the legislative history indicates the Legislature intended to make validity of HIV testing dependent on an essentially ministerial act. Nevertheless, we admonish trial courts that legislative directives are to be observed even when not mandatory. To the extent a notation in the docket, particularly when accompanied by an express finding of probable cause, focuses the court’s attention on the relevant facts, it ensures the ensuing order will be supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1114-1115, fn. omitted, italics added.)
The court also rejected the claim that because the requirement of a finding and notation on the minute order “implicates the interests of third parties (the victims who might be exposed to HIV infection), an express finding of probable cause and docket notation are mandatory, from which it follows that appeal is not subject to forfeiture. [Citation.] Defendant cites no authority that this consideration is relevant under the general forfeiture principle. On the contrary, third party interests do not constitute a recognized exception, which is limited to deprivation of certain fundamental constitutional rights or acts in excess of jurisdiction. [Citations.]” (Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 1116-1117.)
Here, despite father’s knowledge of and prior participation in the ongoing dependency action and the termination of reunification, father failed to maintain contact with the social worker and his attorney or even give them accurate information concerning how to reach and communicate with him. Father had been given notice of the post-permanency review hearing and had access through his attorney to the social worker’s report prior to the hearing, but he failed to attend or even talk to his attorney about it. Father’s attorney reviewed the report, but at the hearing, she did not raise any omissions or deficiencies in it. She did not inquire about any important relationships the minors might have. She did not offer any information concerning father’s progress that the social worker and court might not be aware of. She did not request a continuance so that supplemental information on these issues could be obtained and included. And she did not object when the court adopted the recommendations in the report without making determinations or entering findings concerning important relationships and father’s progress.
Given Stowell, we find it proper and appropriate to apply the forfeiture rule to father’s claim that the court failed to comply with some of the finding requirements of section 366.3. Concerning father’s progress, if any, (§ 366.3, subd. (e)(7)), father and his attorney would have had the most current information and certainly had the strongest interest in having the court make a determination. Thus, father could have easily prevented the alleged omission in this regard, and we see no reason that he should be excused from not doing so in a timely fashion.
As to any important relationships the minors may have, the absence of a discussion in the hearing report does not necessarily mean that the social worker failed to make an appropriate inquiry. And, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court could presume that the social worker had done so. (See Evid. Code, § 664.) Thus, the court could have interpreted the lack of a discussion in the report about any such important relationships to mean there were none. Clearly, an objection below could have clarified the situation.
Futhermore, whether the minors had important relationships with others does not implicate father’s interests or rights; it implicates the minors’ interests, and at the review hearing, the minors’ were separately represented by their own attorney. Given the social worker’s report, the minors’ relatively recent move to the G.s’ and their progress with them, and the periodic reviews that would ensue every six-months, the minors’ attorney apparently was not concerned that the minors’ important relationships, if any, would not be maintained and did not consider this factor to be a particularly relevant consideration for the court in determining whether to continue the minors’ placement with the G.s and give them the authority to make necessary educational decisions. Again, a timely objection could have clarified the subject.
Section 366.3, subdivision (e) does not require the juvenile court to make express findings on the record or reflect a legislative intent that the court do so. And although rule 5.740(b)(1) requires the entry of findings, claims that a court failed to make findings required by statute or a rule of court are generally subject to the forfeiture rule. (E.g., People v. Tillman (2000) 22 Cal.4th 300, 302 [failure of sentencing court to make findings required by statute is forfeited if party fails to bring error to sentencing court’s attention]; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353 [defects in statement of reasons forfeited by failure to object].)
Finally, the lack of findings concerning father’s progress and existence of important relationships do not preclude review of the actual decisions made by the court at the review hearing, decisions which father does not challenge.
Father concedes that the forfeiture rule applies. However, he urges this court to exercise its discretion to consider his claim because it implicates the minors’ substantial rights and the integrity of the review hearing.
The application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic, and the court has discretion to consider forfeited claims. (In re S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293.) However, the “discretion to excuse forfeiture should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.” (Ibid.; see id. at pp. 1293-1294 [excusing forfeiture in order to reach “an important issue of law: whether a juvenile court in a dependency case may delegate to the child’s legal guardian the authority to decide whether a parent may visit the child”]; In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081 [discussing parents’ contentions in order “to foreclose any other auxiliary claims”]; In re Crystal J., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 411 [discussing a forfeited claim where the mother asserted a violation of her constitutional right to procedural due process].)
The circumstances here do not outweigh the important policy reasons for the forfeiture rule or convince us that it is necessary or appropriate to exercise our discretion.
Where, as here, father’s reunification services have been terminated, the juvenile court is guided by the minor’s best interests, and its primary obligation is to ensure permanence and stability in the child’s placement. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) Here, father complains of omissions concerning only three of the 10 factors listed for determination by the court in section 366.3, subdivision (e), omissions that could have been cured by a timely objection. (See fn. 3, ante.) Moreover, the focus of the post-permanency review hearing was to decide whether to continue the minors’ current placement with the G.s and give the G.s authority to make educational decisions for them. Neither of the factors underlying father’s claim was particularly relevant to that decision. Indeed, given the history of the minors’ placements, their improvement with the G.s, and father’s failure to attend hearings and comply with his reunification plan, we cannot conceive of any facts or circumstances related to those factors that might have affected, let alone altered, the court’s decision to maintain the current placement and allow the G.s’ educational authority. And even if we assume that the minors had important relationships to be maintained, there is no evidence that the social worker, the G.s, and the minors themselves would be prevented from doing so.
Under the circumstances, we do not find that father’s claim implicates the minors’ substantial rights and interests or the integrity of the review hearing. Nor does it raise important legal issues or questions of statutory interpretation that are likely to recur and thus demand resolution. On the contrary, issues concerning the minors’ relationships and father’s effort to mitigate the reasons for their placement are subject to review at the next hearing, which the court scheduled for July 2009.
Father’s reliance on In re Jeremy S. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 514 (Jeremy S.) (overruled on other grounds in In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396,413-414) and In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032 (Maria S.) is misplaced.
In Jeremy S., the juvenile court terminated parental rights and freed the minor for adoption. The parents appealed from the order, but the minor did not. However, in his respondent’s brief, the minor claimed that as a matter of law, he was not adoptable and, therefore, the court erred in freeing him for adoption. (Jeremy S., supra, 89 Cal.App.4th at pp. 518, 526.) Because the minor’s own appellate attorney considered the issue important and because freeing the minor for adoption substantially changed the minor’s circumstances and would directly affect his future placement, the court exercised its discretion to reach the merits of his claim notwithstanding the minor’s failure raise the issue below. (Id. at p. 527.)
In Maria S., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, the juvenile court approved a case plan that called for the mother to receive reunification services in state prison that would be continued after her release. However, upon her release, the mother was deported and was unable to complete the case plan. Thereafter, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that reunification services had been provided, but that the mother had refused to comply with the case plan. It then terminated her parental rights. On appeal, mother challenged the termination, claiming that the court erred in finding that she had received but failed to comply with reunification services. (Id. at pp. 1034-1038.) Before addressing her claim, the court stated, “As a preliminary matter, we note, and respondent concedes, that the court failed to advise appellant of her right to writ review to challenge termination of reunification services and setting of the section 366.26 hearing. As such, ‘appellant’s claims of error [relating to reunification services] are cognizable on appeal....’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1038.) As in Jeremy S., the order in Maria S. changed the relationship between the minor and her mother and thereby implicated the minor’s substantial interests.
Jeremy S. and Maria S. are distinguishable. Unlike the orders freeing the minor for adoption and terminating parental rights in those cases, the order here did not cause a permanent or significant change in the status quo or have a substantial effect on the minors’ future placement. It was part of an interim review and addressed the minors’ immediate concerns. Thus, Jeremy S. and Maria S. do not suggest that it is either necessary or appropriate to exercise our discretion to address father’s forfeited claim.
We point out that the forfeiture rule is not designed to punish the litigant, it is designed to insure that the trial court has the opportunity to cure errors of law before they can taint the proceedings. “ ‘[F]airness is at the heart of a waiver claim.’ ” (In re Marriage of Harris (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 430, 440.) This case warrants application of the rule, and applying it will serve the policy reasons underlying it and encourage father to participate more actively in the dependency action and raise issues in the juvenile court in a timely fashion so that they can, and should, be corrected or avoided.
The table of contents in father’s opening brief lists as a claim, “Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the lack of [pertinent] information in the court report and in failing to object to the order without the required findings.” However, father presents no supporting authorities or argument in either his opening or reply briefs. Under the circumstances, we need not address it. (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106 [“An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties.”]; Badie v. Bank of America (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 779, 784-785 [“When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”].)
IV. Disposition
The order from which father appeals is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: PREMO, J., ELIA, J.