Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2014-0062
10-08-2014
IN RE J.S.
COUNSEL M. Lando Voyles, Pinal County Attorney By Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Appellate Bureau Chief, Florence Counsel for State Paula M. Cook, Interim Pinal County Public Defender By Mary Dreyer, Deputy Public Defender, Florence Counsel for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(c); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100JV201300231
The Honorable Brenda E. Oldham, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
M. Lando Voyles, Pinal County Attorney
By Rosemary Gordon Pánuco, Appellate Bureau Chief, Florence
Counsel for State
Paula M. Cook, Interim Pinal County Public Defender
By Mary Dreyer, Deputy Public Defender, Florence
Counsel for Minor
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Howard authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kelly and Judge Vásquez concurred.
HOWARD, Judge:
¶1 J.S. appeals from the juvenile court's orders adjudicating him delinquent for the offense of sexual conduct with a minor under the age of fifteen and placing him on Juvenile Intensive Probation Supervision (JIPS) until his eighteenth birthday. He argues there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding of delinquency. We affirm.
¶2 We view the evidence and resolve all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile court's ruling. In re Jessi W., 214 Ariz. 334, ¶ 11, 152 P. 3d 1217, 1219 (App. 2007). So viewed, the evidence establishes that one night in April, May, or June 2012, J.S.'s fourteen-year-old sister, K.S., was asleep on a couch in their grandmother's house when she was awakened by a sensation of pain; she discovered her legs had been propped up and J.S. was putting his fingers in her vagina. K.S. testified she had yelled at J.S. at the time, but she did not tell anyone about it until February 2013, when she reported the incident to a female security guard at her school. She said she had not told anyone before that because she was "scared of [J.S.] all the time" and afraid "he would come after [her]." She said J.S. had threatened her with a knife, a gun, and by pinning her against a wall.
¶3 In addressing claims of insufficient evidence, we test the evidence against "the statutorily required elements of the offense." State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, ¶ 8, 104 P.3d 873, 875 (App. 2005). To prove sexual conduct with a minor as alleged in its delinquency petition, the state was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that J.S. had "intentionally or knowingly engag[ed] in sexual intercourse . . . with a minor who is under fifteen years of age." A.R.S. § 13-1405(A), (B). A.R.S. § 13-1401(3) defines "sexual
intercourse" as "penetration into the penis, vulva or anus by any part of the body or by any object or masturbatory contact with the penis or vulva."
¶4 On appeal, J.S. argues the evidence was insufficient to support his delinquency adjudication. He acknowledges that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim is sufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt "'unless [her] story is physically impossible or so incredible that no reasonable person could believe it.'" State v. Herrera, 232 Ariz. 536, ¶ 26, 307 P.3d 103, 113-14 (App. 2013), quoting State v. Munoz, 114 Ariz. 466, 469, 561 P.2d 1238, 1241 (App. 1976) (alteration added). But he notes there was evidence that K.S. had lied in the past—about having taken some of her aunt's makeup and failing to complete assigned chores—and he appears to argue K.S.'s testimony was "incredible" because she "provided very few details, . . . could not pinpoint a specific date . . . , and . . . waited 8-10 months before reporting the alleged incident." Without citing any record evidence of the juvenile court's assessment of the facts, he asserts "the trial judge failed to consider" K.S.'s "credibility problems." He thus contends his adjudication should be overturned because "the only evidence against [him] was the vague, incredible and uncorroborated testimony of K.S."
¶5 In addressing claims of insufficient evidence, we review de novo whether the quantity of evidence was sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jessi W., 214 Ariz. 334, ¶ 11, 152 P.3d at 1219. But "[t]he juvenile court is in the best position to assess witness credibility," and "we will not reweigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses on appeal." In re James P., 214 Ariz. 420, ¶ 24, 153 P.3d 1049, 1054 (App. 2007). Thus, we will not disturb the juvenile court's order unless "there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the judgment or . . . the judgment is contrary to any substantial evidence." In re John M., 201 Ariz. 424, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 772, 774 (App. 2001).
¶6 The state presented sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency. To the extent J.S. argues K.S.'s testimony was in conflict with his own, or less credible
than his own, "[t]he resolution of such conflicts in the evidence is uniquely the province of the juvenile court as the trier of fact." Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278, ¶ 12, 53 P.3d 203, 207 (App. 2002). Based on the record before us, we cannot say the court erred in adjudicating J.S. delinquent.
¶7 Because sufficient evidence supported the juvenile court's order adjudicating J.S. delinquent for sexual conduct with a minor, we affirm the court's adjudication and disposition orders.