Opinion
NUMBER 13-13-00573-CV
03-06-2014
IN RE J. R., A CHILD
On appeal from the 156th District Court
of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Longoria
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
This is an accelerated appeal of the trial court's judgment granting the Department of Family and Protective Services' petition to terminate the parental rights of appellant J.T. over her minor son J.R. The trial court found that there was clear and convincing evidence of four of the statutory grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interests of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(1)(D), (E), (I), (O), 161.001(2) (West 2008). We affirm.
We refer to appellant and her son by their initials in order to protect their privacy. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b).
I. ANDERS BRIEF
Appellant's court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a brief in the style of Anders v. California stating that, after a thorough review of the record, he found no non-frivolous issues to advance on appeal. See 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). The Anders procedures were once limited to civil cases, but the Texas Supreme Court extended them to civil proceedings when it permitted appointed appellate counsel to file an Anders brief in an appeal of a juvenile delinquency proceeding. Porter v. Tex. Dep't of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 105 S.W.3d 52, 55-6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (citing In re D.A.S., 973 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. 1998)). "In permitting appellate counsel to file an Anders brief, the supreme court recognized that counsel, though appointed to represent the appellant, had no duty to pursue a frivolous matter on appeal." Id. at 56. This Court, following other Texas appellate courts, has applied the Anders procedures to appeals of orders terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. (concluding that "when appointed counsel represents an indigent client in a parental termination appeal and concludes that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal, counsel may file an Anders-type brief" and collecting cases from other Texas appellate courts that came to the same holding).
To that end, appellant's brief meets the requirements of Anders because it presents a professional evaluation of why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) ("In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.") (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Counsel has informed this Court that he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel's motion to withdraw on appellant; and (3) informed appellant of her right to review the record and to file a pro se brief. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se brief.
II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988); Porter, 105 S.W.3d at 55. We have reviewed the entire record, including counsel's appellate brief, and we have found no reversible error. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1."). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court terminating appellant's parental rights.
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW
In accordance with Anders, appellant's attorney requests this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel for appellant. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.)) ("[I]f an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous." (citations omitted)). We grant counsel's motion to withdraw. Within five days of this Court's opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this Court's opinion and judgment to appellant and to advise her of her to right to file a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court.See In re K.D., 127 S.W.3d 66, 68 n.3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.); see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Supreme Court, she must either retain an attorney to file a petition for review or file a pro se petition for review. Any petition for review must be filed within forty-five days after the date of either this opinion or the last ruling by this Court on all timely-filed motions for rehearing or en banc reconsideration. TEX. R. APP. P. 53.7(a). Any petition for review must comply with the requirements of Rule 53.2 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. R. 53.2.
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__________________________
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice