Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 74597
Margulies, J.
Appellant J.R. admitted having raped his girlfriend, part of a pattern of serious verbal and physical violence against her. The juvenile court rejected a psychologist’s recommendation that appellant be committed to a residential camp, instead imposing commitment to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). The juvenile court concluded the programs available at DJJ for treating sexual misconduct were more effective than those available at the camp. Appellant challenges his commitment to DJJ. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 27, 2008, the San Mateo County District Attorney filed a wardship petition for appellant under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, subdivision (a), alleging rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)), assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), and battery against a person with whom appellant had a dating relationship (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (e)(1)). This was not the first wardship petition filed for appellant. In 2005, when he was 14, appellant was alleged to have vandalized a school, and in a second petition, committed assault and battery. He was made a ward of the court in 2006, as a result of the second petition and was subsequently found to have committed two probation violations before being terminated from probation on March 20, 2008. The current petition was filed one week later, based on appellant’s violent, demeaning, and humiliating conduct toward his girlfriend in late 2007 and early 2008, which included insults and death threats, public pushing and slapping, and coerced sexual intercourse under a threat of violence.
After appellant admitted the rape allegations of the petition, the assault and battery allegations were dismissed. A psychological evaluation found that appellant was self-reliant and with relatively high self-esteem, but he “denied or minimized his history of misconduct, expressed little remorse for [his] misdeeds, displayed a poor understanding of his role in getting into trouble, and does not feel that he requires intervention to improve his adjustment.” The psychologist who prepared the report, Dr. Jeffrey Kline, concluded appellant “has generalized conduct problems and is at some risk for future aggressive behavior, [but] he does not present as sexually predatory or dangerous to society” and recommended commitment to Camp Glenwood, a residential ranch.
In its report, the probation department recommended appellant be committed to the DJJ. Like Dr. Kline, the probation officer concluded that appellant had not taken full responsibility for his actions and showed no remorse. The probation officer also noted that appellant was exposed to domestic violence in his parents’ relationship when a child and had poor parental support. The officer recommended DJJ commitment because of the seriousness of appellant’s conduct and his failure to respond to prior intensive counseling services, alcohol and substance abuse treatment, and supervision by the probation department. The probation officer observed that at DJJ appellant would be offered the opportunity to complete his high school education and receive “sexual behavior treatment,” as well as “life skills courses, family dynamics treatment, victim awareness courses, relationship skills courses, substance abuse treatment,... anger management courses.... [and] vocational training.”
Dr. Kline testified for appellant at a dispositional hearing held on August 26, 2008. Dr. Kline explained he recommended “secured residential placement” because appellant had a “conduct disorder” that could lead to further more serious mental health problems. The realistic alternatives were Camp Glenwood and DJJ. Dr. Kline believed Camp Glenwood would be a better choice than DJJ because “I didn’t see that all the local alternatives were exhausted, especially with someone that has an intact family that can provide some support and that he can return to.... [Camp Glenwood] would offer a least restrictive alternative and closer family contact.” Dr. Kline acknowledged that DJJ and Camp Glenwood provided similar behavioral and treatment programs, but he believed that one year at Camp Glenwood would be “sufficient, plus some aftercare” to bring the risk of appellant’s continued misconduct “to acceptable levels.”
The juvenile court expressed some hesitancy with Camp Glenwood “because of all the walkaways.” It concluded appellant was in need primarily of a sexual responsibility program, given his conduct not only toward the victim but also toward female authority figures at school. The court believed the program at DJJ was stronger and directed specifically at the conduct appellant exhibited, compared with the programs provided elsewhere, including Camp Glenwood. The juvenile court committed appellant to DJJ for a maximum period of six years.
According to comments made by appellant’s counsel during argument, Camp Glenwood was not accepting new commitments at the time of the hearing. As a result, appellant would have been detained at the county juvenile hall until a new security fence had been built at the camp.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the commitment order in light of the purpose of the juvenile delinquency laws, which “is twofold: (1) to serve the ‘best interests’ of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and ‘enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community,’ and (2) to ‘provide for the protection and safety of the public....’ ” (In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614–615.) “[T]he statutory scheme contemplates a progressively more restrictive and punitive series of dispositions starting with home placement under supervision, and progressing to foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility, and finally placement at the DJJ. [Citation.] Although the DJJ is normally a placement of last resort, there is no absolute rule that a DJJ commitment cannot be ordered unless less restrictive placements have been attempted. [Citations.] A DJJ commitment is not an abuse of discretion where the evidence demonstrates a probable benefit to the minor from the commitment and less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate.” (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.)
The chief concerns of both Dr. Kline and the juvenile court were appellant’s failures to acknowledge his acts and, to the extent he did acknowledge them, to recognize their wrongful nature. Both were concerned that in the absence of an effective intervention resulting in greater self-awareness, appellant presented a threat of violence to women with whom he formed an intimate relationship. They agreed he needed the type of treatment that was available only in an institutional setting. Dr. Kline chose Camp Glenwood rather than the DJJ because it was less restrictive and appellant had an intact family from whom he could draw support.
We find substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s rejection of Dr. Kline’s recommendation. While a less restrictive alternative is always preferable, the court was not required to select the ranch merely because it was less restrictive, particularly when, as here, there was reason to conclude that the less restrictive alternative would be less effective. Appellant had already been subject to two prior Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petitions, had twice violated probation, and had failed to respond to counseling and other services provided in connection with his previous petitions. (See In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555–556 [DJJ commitment not abuse of discretion where prior placements had been ineffective in changing minor’s conduct].)
The juvenile court also expressed well-founded skepticism about the capacity of appellant’s mother, his primary parental figure, to provide meaningful support. Although her 17-year-old son had admitted a rape and acknowledged significant alcohol abuse, she showed little awareness of his activities and refused to acknowledge he had “a problem.” After hearing her testimony at the dispositional hearing, the court concluded that she exhibited a “pathetic” degree of delusion about the nature of appellant’s problems. In addition, the court believed the programs provided at DJJ would do a better job of addressing appellant’s particular type of misconduct, a conclusion implicitly acknowledged by appellant’s counsel. All of these factors suggest Camp Glenwood would be ineffective or inappropriate.
In argument, counsel stated that the type of services required by appellant were “not part of the regular Glenwood program,” although counsel believed they could be arranged.
There was also substantial evidence that the DJJ commitment would be a benefit to appellant. As the probation officer noted, at DJJ appellant would receive the type of sexual misconduct treatment both the court and Dr. Kline believed to be essential to avoiding similar behavior in the future. In addition, he would be offered the opportunity to complete his high school education and could participate in a variety of other programs aimed at transforming his behavior, including substance abuse treatment. With a DJJ commitment, appellant could be detained for more than the one year that would have been possible at Camp Glenwood. Given the seriousness of his misconduct and his resistance to acknowledging it, there was reason to believe the additional time would be beneficial.
Appellant argues the juvenile court did not give “proper consideration” to less restrictive alternatives. It is clear from the record, however, that the juvenile court considered the possibility of Camp Glenwood and rejected it for articulated, well-founded reasons. Contrary to appellant’s implication, the juvenile court was not required to exhaust less restrictive alternatives before imposing a DJJ commitment, particularly when, as here, there was evidence those alternatives would be ineffective.
Appellant also argues the juvenile court failed to make findings that Camp Glenwood would be ineffective or inappropriate, but he cites no authority requiring the juvenile court to make formal findings regarding a DJJ commitment. In any event, the juvenile court’s reasoning was clear from its comments on the record. (See, e.g., In re Jonathan T. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 474, 486 [“In the instant case, we infer the juvenile court found it was probable minor would benefit from being committed to DJJ, because it anticipated minor’s needs would be addressed by programs offered at DJJ. There is no requirement that the court find exactly how a minor will benefit from being committed to DJJ”].)
Appellant further contends it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to impose a DJJ commitment “for an offense that requires lifetime registration as a sex offender.” Under Penal Code section 290.008, subdivisions (a) and (c), a minor must register as a sex offender if made a ward as a result of a violation of, among other statutes, Penal Code section 261 and committed to DJJ. (See In re G.C. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 405, 410–411.) Appellant argues that while his actions “were unacceptable, disrespectful, and deserved a significant consequence,” they “are more correctly characterized as sexual battery and not rape” and therefore should not have resulted in sex offender registration.
The record demonstrates that appellant voluntarily admitted a rape after being fully informed of the elements of the violation and the possibility it would lead to sex offender registration. We find no legal basis for second-guessing that admission. Even if we were permitted to look behind the admission, however, there is more than substantial evidence in the record to support a violation of Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2).
Appellant cites no authority for his contention that the requirement of sex offender registration should have deterred the juvenile court from committing him to DJJ, and we find none. Penal Code section 290.008 avoids the requirement that all juveniles who commit sex crimes register as sex offenders by reserving registration for those juveniles whose circumstances are sufficiently serious that DJJ commitment is found to be appropriate. If the juvenile court were to reject a DJJ commitment merely to avoid sex offender registration, rather than making the dispositional decision on the basis of appellant’s individual circumstances, this restrictive purpose of section 290.008 would be undermined.
We find substantial evidence to support the conclusions that DJJ commitment will be beneficial to appellant and a less restrictive commitment will be ineffective or inappropriate. The juvenile court therefore did not abuse its discretion in imposing a DJJ commitment.
III. DISPOSITION
The order of the trial court is affirmed.
We concur: Marchiano, P.J., Graham, J.
Retired judge of the Marin County Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.