It is true the daughter and her children get by far the larger part of the estate, but appellant, during her life, is receiving, and in all probability will continue to receive, upwards of $60,000 a year; and even a court of equity could not well say that this is inconsistent with testator's idea of equity as between his daughter and her children and his second, childless, wife. It is contended by appellant that the courts approving the Massachusetts rule modify it in practice, and in support thereof she cites Wilberding v. Miller, 88 Ohio St. 609, 106 N.E. 665, L.R.A. 1916A, 718; In re Osborne, 209 N.Y. 450, 103 N.E. 723, 823, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 510, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 298; Pratt v. Ladd, 253 N.Y. 213, 170 N.E. 895; Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91, 56 A.L.R. 1276; Estate of James Joy, 247 Mich. 418, 225 N.W. 878; Talbot v. Milliken, 221 Mass. 367, 108 N.E. 1060; Boston Safe Dep. Tr. Co. v. Adams, 219 Mass. 175, 106 N.E. 590; Smith v. Cotting, 231 Mass. 42, 120 N.E. 177;

In turn, the Uniform Act was adopted by the 1947 Pennsylvania Act. See First Nat'l Bank v. Hill, 241 Ala. 606, 4 So.2d 170 (1941); Spooner v. Phillips, 62 Conn. 62, 24 A. 524 (1892); McLane v. Cropper, 5 App. D.C. 276 (1895); DeKoven v. Alsop, 205 Ill. 309, 68 N.E. 930 (1903); Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit Trust Co., 208 Ind. 432, 196 N.E. 324 (1935); Bowles v. Stilley's Ex'r, 267 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1954); Thatcher v. Thatcher, 117 Me. 331, 104 A. 515 (1918); Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101 (1868); In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 225 N.W. 878 (1929); Hayes v. St. Louis Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91 (1927); United States Trust Co. v. Cowin, 121 Neb. 427, 237 N.W. 284 (1931); Langdell v. Dodge, 100 N.H. 118, 122 A.2d 529 (1956); Humphrey v. Lang, 169 N.C. 601, 86 S.E. 526 (1915); Lamb v. Lehmann, 110 Ohio St. 59, 143 N.E. 276 (1924); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Tucker, 51 R.I. 507, 155 A. 661 (1931); Kirby v. Kirby, 68 S.D. 612, 5 N.W.2d 405 (1942); Bergin v. Bergin, 159 Tex. 83, 315 S.W.2d 943 (1958); Kaufman v. Charlottesville Woolen Mills, 93 Va. 673, 25 S.E. 1003 (1896); Security Trust Co. v. Rammelsburg, 82 W. Va. 701, 97 S.E. 122 (1918). The Supreme Court of the United States has made approving use of the rule.

In disposing of counts 1 and 2, the trial judge held as follows: "The language of the paragraph in question [the trust provision heretofore quoted] is plain enough and requires no construction; it says clearly that the plaintiff shall have the `entire net income'; and what that phrase means has been resolved for Michigan by In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418 (72 ALR 973), and subsequent cases. Stock script, stock purchase rights and stock dividends, our Supreme Court has ruled, are principal, not income.

Hauser had merely the right by virtue of the agreement to have credited on his obligation to the company dividends paid by it on the shares of stock evidencing the interest that had been transferred to him for income purposes only. His ownership of the stock issued in his name was not absolute but was limited and qualified by the provisions of the contract between the parties. The inherent nature of a stock dividend was considered by this Court in the case of In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418 (72 ALR 973). The question there at issue was whether such dividends belonged to the life beneficiary under a trust or to the residuary legatee. The decree of the trial court favored the beneficiary.

Professor Scott states that the recent trend of decisions has been in favor of the conclusion reached by this court, commonly called the Massachusetts rule; 2 Scott, Trusts, p. 1300; his statement may be open to question; see 12 Fletcher, Corporations, p. 48; but at least there has been no such preponderating weight of judicial opinion opposing the rule as to lead us to question our adherence to it. Many trusts have probably been established in reliance upon it and many, no doubt, have been and still are being administered under it; it has become a rule of property; In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 433, 225 N.W. 878; Crozer's Estate, 336 Pa. 266, 271, 9 A.2d 535; and it should be maintained unless there are most compelling reasons to the contrary. Indeed, as to trusts created after July 1, 1939, the rule in broad terms has been established by statute.

" The Michigan Court in Re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 225 N.W. 878, 880, 72 A.L.R. 973, states concisely the two rules as follows: "The Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Minot v. Paine, 99 Mass. 101, 108, 96 Am. Dec. 705, early announced: `A simple rule is, to regard cash dividends, however large, as income, and stock dividends, however made, as capital.' This may fairly be said to be the rule adopted by the English courts and by the Supreme Court of the United States (Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U.S. 549, 10 S.Ct. 1057, 34 L.Ed. 525, reaffirmed in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 38 S.Ct. 158, 62 L.Ed. 372, L.R.A. 1918D, 254, and Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 40 S.Ct. 189, 64 L.Ed. 521, 9 A.L.R. 1570), and by the courts of last resort in the following states: Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Maine, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia.

Stock dividends declared out of funds which were earned by the bank after the death of the testatrix, Martha Hill, constitute income. Restatement, Law of Trusts, § 236; In re Gartenlaub's Estate, 185 Cal. 375, 197 P. 90, 24 A.L.R. 9; 42 A.L.R. 448; Old Colony Trust Co. v. Jameson, 256 Mass. 179, 152, N.E. 52, 50 A.L.R. 375; Hayes v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 317 Mo. 1028, 298 S.W. 91, 56 A.L.R. 1277; In re Merrill's Estate, 196 Wis. 351, 220 N.W. 215, 59 A.L.R. 1532; In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418, 225 N.W. 878, 72 A.L.R. 981; 83 A.L.R. 1261; Powell v. Madison Safe Deposit Trust Co., 208 Ind. 432, 196 N.E., 324; 101 A.L.R. 1379; Brown v. Sperry, 182 Miss. 488, 181 So. 734, 735. McQueen McQueen, of Tuscaloosa, for appellees.

The surplus earnings of a corporation are corporate property. In re Joy's Estate, 247 Mich. 418 (72 A.L.R. 973). The stockholders of a corporation are not creditors of a corporation as that word is generally used. Leland v. Ford, 245 Mich. 599; Curtiss v. Wilmarth, 254 Mich. 242. Dividends mean corporate profits set apart for division among the shareholders. Knight v. Alamo Manfg. Co., 190 Mich. 223 (6 A.L.R. 789); Barnes v. Spencer Barnes Co., 162 Mich. 509 (139 Am. St. Rep. 587); Bay City Bank v. St. Louis Motor Sales Co., 255 Mich. 261; Lockhart v. Van Alstyne, 31 Mich. 76 (18 Am. Rep. 156). A stockholder of a corporation has no specific right to any part of the surplus acquired by such corporation, except that he may have an equitable right to a division of the same among the stockholders.

In another case it was said that "going concern" value is a matter that must be considered; that "market value has nothing to do with such distributions; under all the situations which arise only the intact value is to be considered." Jones v. Integrity Trust Co. (1928), 292 Pa. 149, 155, 140 A. 862, 864. Concerning these difficulties, the Supreme Court of Michigan In re Joy's Estate (1929), 247 Mich. 418, 431, 225 N.W. 878, 72 A.L.R. 973, said: "The trustee must, however, under the apportionment rule, make a comparison of values at the inception of the life estate and the declaration of the stock dividend.