Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. FJ45837, Robin Miller Sloan, Judge.
Gerald Peters, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Idan Ivri, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
JACKSON, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Josue H. was adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 (section 602), pursuant to a petition filed on July 14, 2009, after the juvenile court found true the allegations that he committed the offenses of possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 12101, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of live ammunition by a minor (id., § 12101, subd. (b)(1)).
After another adjudication on a section 602 petition filed on August 20, 2009, the juvenile court found true the allegations that appellant committed criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422) and attempted extortion (id., § 524) for the benefit of a criminal street gang (id., § 186.22(b)(1)(A)).
A third section 602 petition was filed on May 14, 2010, alleging that appellant committed attempted second degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664). After the adjudication, the juvenile court found the charge true and sustained the petition.
Appellant appeals from the order of the juvenile court declaring him to be a ward of the court and ordering his placement in the Camp-Community Placement Program after sustaining the May 14, 2010 petition. Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the attempted robbery charge. We disagree and affirm the order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The People’s Case
On May 12, 2010, E.V. was walking home from school with his friends, Jeremy and Myra. They witnessed a fight and stopped to watch. E.V. and Jeremy were standing next to one another; Myra was behind them. E.V. was approached and told that Myra’s camera had just been stolen. E.V. looked back and saw Myra lying on the ground. He picked her up, and then he, Jeremy, Jeremy’s brother and Myra pursued the people who had taken Myra’s camera to an apartment building.
As E.V. and his friends were standing across the street from the apartment building, a group of approximately seven individuals approached them. E.V. recognized them from the fight earlier. Jeremy and his brother ran away. E.V. was surrounded by the group and unable to run.
Appellant, who was in the group, approached to within one foot of E.V. E.V. was wearing a gold necklace that was visible. Appellant asked, “What you got?” and attempted to grab the necklace. E.V. pushed appellant’s hand away before appellant could grab the necklace. E.V. ran away while members of the group surrounding him attempted to “jump” him.
E.V. escaped and called the police. After they responded to the scene, E.V. identified appellant in a field showup as the one who tried to steal his necklace. He denied that appellant said, “Get the f--- out of here” during the incident.
The Defense Case
Los Angeles Police Officer Rio Ingram investigated the incident. The report Officer Ingram wrote indicated that E.V. told Officer Ingram that appellant had said, “Get the f--- out of here” during the altercation. The field showup in which E.V. identified appellant took place with E.V. in a police car and appellant standing in the street.
DISCUSSION
Standard of Review
In an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the sustaining of a petition in juvenile court under section 602, we apply the same standard of review applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.)
To assess a claim of insufficient evidence in a criminal case, “we review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict-i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Findings
Robbery requires “(1) a taking of personal property, (2) from the person or immediate presence of another, (3) through the use of force or fear, (4) with an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property. [Citations.]” (People v. Kelley (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1366.) “In order to establish attempted robbery, the People must prove specific intent to commit robbery and a direct unequivocal overt act toward its commission. This act must go beyond mere preparation.” (People v. Vizcarra (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 858, 861; accord, People v. Medina (2007) 41 Cal.4th 685, 694.)
Appellant contends that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding of attempted robbery. Specifically, he argues that there was insufficient evidence he intended to permanently deprive E.V. of his necklace. We disagree.
The evidence shows that appellant with approximately six of his friends surrounded E.V., preventing E.V.’s escape. E.V.’s necklace was visible. Appellant stood about a foot away from E.V., asked him, “What you got?” and tried to grab the necklace. When E.V. thwarted his effort, the group tried to jump E.V. as he made his escape.
“There is rarely direct evidence of [an appellant’s] intent. Such intent must usually be derived from all the circumstances of the attempt, including the [appellant’s] actions.” (People v. Chinchilla (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 683, 690; People v. Edwards (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1099.)
The circumstances here support a reasonable inference that appellant intended to permanently deprive E.V. of his necklace when he attempted to grab it from E.V.’s neck. Appellant clearly was trying to take what E.V. had. Nothing in the circumstances-and specifically the group attack-suggested that appellant was just playing with E.V. and intended to give the necklace back once he had taken it from E.V., like a schoolyard game of “keep away.” Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of intent to permanently deprive. (People v. Chinchilla, supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 690.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J., ZELON, J.