Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County Super. Ct. No. J208454, Amalia L. Meza, Judge.
McDONALD, J.
The juvenile court continued Joseph R. as a ward (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after sustaining a petition alleging he possessed methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)). The court placed Joseph with his mother under supervised probation by the probation officer. Joseph appeals, contending the court erred because it relied on facts not presented at the adjudication hearing in making its true finding.
FACTS
On October 19, 2005, Joseph was declared a ward of the court after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging he possessed a knife on school grounds, a misdemeanor (Pen. Code, §§ 626.10, subd. (a), 17, subd. (b)(4)).
On November 2, 2006, San Diego Police Sergeant Rudolph Tai and other officers were conducting a juvenile probation compliance check at a residence near Joseph's residence. Joseph and other youths were outside the residence. They saw the police arrive and began walking away.
Sergeant Tai approached Joseph, who was on probation for the earlier offense. In response to Tai's questions, Joseph said he did not have weapons or drugs on his person. Joseph consented to a search. Tai found a small plastic baggie containing a white crystal substance in the coin or watch pocket of Joseph's jeans. Joseph appeared surprised and denied the methamphetamine was his.
The parties stipulated that the plastic baggie contained .03 gram of methamphetamine, and this constituted a usable amount.
Joseph testified that he did not know there was methamphetamine in the coin pocket of his jeans. Initially, he thought either someone put the methamphetamine in his jeans pocket or he was wearing someone else's jeans. Joseph explained that he often had friends at his house after playing sports, and the friends would bring extra clothes, including jeans. Joseph suggested his friends might have left jeans that looked like his own jeans and he must have put on such a pair that morning.
When Joseph removed the jeans to change clothes at juvenile hall, he noticed the name "Escajeda" was printed on the inside of the jeans. Joseph did not know anyone with that name. At that point, Joseph testified, he realized the jeans were not his.
From December 2005 until May 22, 2007, the day of the adjudication hearing, Joseph took monthly drug tests. Joseph tested negative for drugs each time except for the July 2006 test, when he submitted a diluted sample.
On cross-examination, Joseph said he had not changed clothes on the day he was arrested. Joseph put his hairnet, lunch money, Chapstick and a pencil in his jeans pockets that day. Joseph's testimony concerning whether he attended school that day was contradictory.
DISCUSSION
The four elements of possession of methamphetamine are: "(1) defendant exercised control over or the right to control an amount of methamphetamine; (2) defendant knew of its presence; (3) defendant knew of its nature as a controlled substance; and (4) the substance was in an amount usable for consumption." (People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 956.) "[E]ach of these essential elements may be proved by circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence." (Ibid.) The parties stipulated the substance found in Joseph's jean pocket was .03 gram of methamphetamine and was a usable quantity. Therefore, at issue in this case was whether Joseph knew of the presence of methamphetamine on his person.
Joseph contends his due process rights were violated because the juvenile court relied on evidence not presented at the adjudication hearing and on unreasonable inferences drawn from evidence of his past history that was presented. Joseph challenges the following two statements made by the court when it found Joseph had the requisite knowledge and sustained the petition: (1) "[T]he minor obviously had some prior offense involving drugs because he is being drug tested . . . ."; and (2) "[N]ot only does he have the drugs on him, but he has used before."
We agree the first of these statements was based on a faulty assumption and is incorrect. Joseph's prior offense was possessing a knife on school grounds, which is not a drug offense. Although a condition of Joseph's probation was to periodically submit to drug tests, in a delinquency case it does not necessarily follow from imposition of that condition that the minor committed a drug offense. To the extent the court considered Joseph had a prior drug offense, the court erred.
We reach a different conclusion as to the court's second statement. Evidence of the diluted test sample submitted by Joseph was presented at the adjudication hearing. The court could reasonably infer from the diluted test result that Joseph had ingested drugs on or near the day of the test; there was no explanation as to why the sample was diluted. Even if different inferences can reasonably be drawn from the evidence, we cannot substitute our own inferences or deductions from those of the trial court. (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1373.)
Although Joseph couches his assignment of error as a due process claim, he essentially is contesting the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the petition. We review true findings in delinquency proceedings for substantial evidence. (In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1328.) Our function is "to determine whether the record contains any substantial evidence tending to support the finding of the trier of fact, and in considering this question we must view this evidence in the light most favorable to the finding." (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 808.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is "reasonable, credible, and of solid value -- such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the [appellant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) " 'Before the judgment of the trial court can be set aside for insufficiency of the evidence . . ., it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support it.' " (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372, quoting People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
Disregarding the court's two comments about Joseph's past drug involvement, the record contained substantial evidence that Joseph knew the methamphetamine was in his jeans pocket. Joseph wore the same pair of jeans for 12 hours. During the day he placed his hairnet, lunch money, Chapstick and a pencil in his jeans pocket. As the juvenile court noted in rejecting Joseph's claim that he did not know about the methamphetamine: "Normally, people know . . . what they have on their person. Normally, people own the clothes they are wearing. That's a stretch [that] they could put on some jeans that belonged on somebody else, wear them for 12 hours and still don't figure out they belong to somebody else." The juvenile court further explained its rejection of the notion that Joseph inadvertently put on someone else's pair of jeans left in his bedroom:
"That's taking it a little further in terms of stretching; but then that . . . somebody would just leave their jeans with meth lying on the floor. Meth is pretty expensive. Someone would leave something of value out there and not claim it and not approach the minor and say, 'hey, did you get my jeans, and you've got my meth, give me my meth back.' So, no. I don't have a reasonable doubt."
Moreover, the juvenile court, sitting as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of witness credibility. Joseph's testimony contained inconsistencies. It is not our purview to reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of a witness. Further, we are "bound by the findings of the trier of fact where it has rejected a hypothesis pointing to innocence and there is evidence to support its implied finding that guilt is the more reasonable of the two hypotheses." (In re Ryan N., supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 1372.)
The record contains substantial evidence supporting the true finding without consideration of Joseph's past involvement with drugs. We find the court's erroneous consideration of Joseph having a prior drug offense to be harmless under any prejudicial error standard. There was no due process violation and there is sufficient evidence to support the true finding.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., McINTYRE, J.