Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK71139 Marguerite Downing, Judge.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Tracey F. Dodds, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
BOREN, P.J.
W.T. (Mother) appeals orders from the dependency court terminating her parental rights and issuing a restraining order. Mother contends that the court failed to account for cultural differences when finding a lack of beneficial relationship between her and her son. According to Mother, the court’s alleged failure to adequately recognize culturally engrained Chinese parenting characteristics resulted in a violation of her due process rights and an unsupported termination of parental rights. She separately contends that substantial evidence did not support the issuance of the restraining order against her.
We find that the dependency court did not err in terminating parental rights, and that Mother’s due process rights were not violated. Furthermore, there was substantial evidence supporting the issuance of the restraining order. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
The initial referral
Joshua T. was born in November 2003.
Joshua’s birth certificate shows a different spelling for his name. Since he is referred to as “Joshua” throughout the record, however, we will use this spelling.
In December 2007, the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging that Joshua was the victim of emotional abuse and general neglect by Mother, who was raising Joshua on her own. Mother had entered into a voluntary family maintenance agreement with DCFS in May 2007 to prevent the removal of Joshua from her care. In the weeks prior to the December 2007 referral, Mother contacted DCFS. In the presence of Joshua, Mother told a social worker that she did not want him. DCFS began developing a plan to assess possible caregivers, and requested that Mother be patient.
During her discussions with social workers regarding her son, Mother’s comments repeatedly and incongruously centered on a failed relationship she had with a judge, Judge H. Mother was, and apparently still is, extremely upset that Judge H. ended the relationship. Mother stated that while she was in the relationship with Judge H., she was raped by an acquaintance, Allan I., and that Joshua was conceived as a result of the rape. Mother also stated that Judge H. might be the father of the child. She further stated that she was suing Judge H. for the rape and the pain and suffering.
Following the early December contact with Mother, the social worker telephoned Mother. The social worker again requested that Mother be patient, but Mother told the social worker that if she did not come immediately to pick up Joshua, Mother would put him out on the street for the police to pick up. Mother stated she was too depressed to feed her son and, even though it was 8:15 p.m., he had not been fed his dinner.
The social worker cautioned Mother not to put her son out on the street, but Mother hung up. The social worker tried calling back several times, but Mother never answered. The social worker called the police.
That night, the police went to Mother’s apartment. When the officer arrived, Mother stated, “Oh, someone is finally coming to take my son from my home.” Mother acted erratically and stated that she wanted the child to go. Joshua was taken into protective custody, transferred to DCFS, and eventually placed in a foster care.
On December 26, 2007, DCFS filed a dependency petition alleging Joshua needed the protection of the dependency court because Mother suffered from mental and emotional problems. Mother appeared at the detention hearing and stated that Allan I. was Joshua’s father and that a DNA test showed that Judge H. was not the father. Mother requested that her case be transferred out of DCFS’s Asian Pacific unit, but the dependency court informed her it had no control over that assignment. The court ordered monitored visits for Mother and for DCFS to provide reunification services
On February 11, 2008, DCFS submitted a jurisdiction/disposition report. Mother had been late for all of her scheduled visits with Joshua. When she did arrive she used most of the time discussing business matters on her cell phone. During one of the visits she pulled two chairs together to lie down and took a nap. Mother stated she was well enough emotionally to care for Joshua and asked for him to be returned.
The report stated that, according to Mother and despite her previous acknowledgment, any references to Allan I. being the father were incorrect. Mother said that Judge H. should be listed as the presumed father because he had promised to marry her and take care of the child. While being interviewed by a Mandarin-speaking social worker, Mother threw down the DCFS documents and stated: “Who wrote these false documents? Who wrote these false reports, I want to know. I want to change my social worker. I want to see the supervisors. I do not want to stay with the Asian Pacific Project. You know why? Because Judge [H.] is well known in the Asian Community and you guys are all on his side. No one supports me. Otherwise, how could you guys know about Judge [H.’s] offer to pay me $100, 000 for settlement and $3, 000 per month for Joshua’s support. I told Judge [H.] I want at least $300, 000 so that I can put in a down payment on a house. I said Allan [I.] is not the father. Why does your department always put his name as Joshua’s father. That guy has no money. He is ‘dead meat.’ How can he help me? He told me he was just a sperm donor and I should do what’s best for the child and be with Judge [H.] I know some Family Laws and I asked around already. Judge [H.] is the presumed father because we were planning to get married and he promised to take care of my child.”
Mother stated that when she got the results of the DNA test she was shocked that Judge H. was not the father. Allan I. told her that he had a vasectomy and she had been with Allan for years and never got pregnant. She stated she had slept with nobody other than Judge H. and Allan. I. She further stated that the FBI had been recording her phone calls.
The social worker interviewed Judge H. He stated that he had dated Mother for three months and that they had never lived together. He said he ended the relationship in 2003 when he realized she was very unstable, and that he had never promised to give Mother any money or to support Joshua. He told the social worker that Mother had been stalking him and leaving life-threatening voicemails. Judge H. obtained a restraining order against Mother and Mother was arrested in May 2007 for violation of the restraining order. The social worker also spoke with Allan I.’s stepfather. He stated that he obtained a restraining order against Mother in September 2004, and she violated the restraining order the same day it was filed. An investigator in the office of the City Attorney told the social worker that Mother had been harassing people since 1998 and had had people fired from their jobs due to the harassment. Numerous people obtained restraining orders against her.
A March 27, 2008 interim review report related how Joshua had a minor accident on the slide at school and scraped his nose. During her next visit with him, Mother saw the scrape and became irate. She went to the school to complain and had to be escorted off school grounds by the police. She requested that Joshua be transferred to a private school and stated that Judge H. could be billed for the fees.
On April 28, 2008, DCFS reported that Joshua was doing well in foster care, though he was moved to a new foster home on April 25 due to a request by his former foster mother, who stated she was unable to work with Mother. Mother refused to attend parenting classes or counseling, and she refused to visit Joshua unless her visits were changed to unmonitored. She also refused to provide DCFS with her new home address. The report noted that Mother’s focus remained on Judge H. rather than Joshua’s well-being. Mother also continued to insist that her case be transferred out of the DCFS Asian Pacific unit. Additionally, Mother called a social worker and threatened to harm her. The social worker reported the incident to the police. That same day, Mother constantly called the social worker, about every five seconds, forcing the social worker to move to a new cubicle with a new telephone number.
A June 2008 interim review report stated that the move to a different foster home was very traumatic for Joshua. He had bonded well with his new foster parents, but had extreme fears of being left alone or taken away from his new foster family. The foster father reported that Joshua did not know basic things a child his age should know, such as colors and shapes. Furthermore, a new social worker reported that Mother repeatedly called to yell and scream at her, once telling her, “You are going to die on your way home! Your children or husband will never see you again!”
On August 25, 2008, DCFS filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to change the court-ordered visitation, requesting that Mother’s visitations cease until she had received psychiatric treatment. The petition stated that Mother had barricaded a door at the foster care office, trapping two social workers for 30 minutes, and had further intimidated them by slamming the door, charging at them, and verbally abusing them. The petition noted that Joshua was only five years old and was already having difficulties during the visits with Mother. The juvenile court set the matter for a hearing.
Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
A further report noted that Mother stated she had done nothing wrong and did not understand why Joshua was not returned to her. She continued to assert that Judge H. should be listed as the father and should help her in providing care for Joshua. She stated she did not need parenting classes or counseling, because she was not “crazy.” She also stated that she was not being treated fairly because DCFS and the courts were working for Judge H. As for Joshua, he was generally improving. When he first arrived at his new foster home, he did not understand how to use utensils or drink from a glass, but he had learned both those tasks in the prior five months. His therapist noted that Joshua was developmentally delayed since he had been neglected when he was younger, and described him as a troubled little boy who had issues with depression and anxiety.
On September 23, 2008, the dependency court conducted the jurisdictional hearing and a hearing on the section 388 petition filed by DCFS. Mother’s counsel requested that Judge H. be present so he could be examined, but the court denied the request, noting that the record contained a DNA test indicating a zero percent chance that he was the biological father of Joshua. Mother then testified, stating that Judge H. “should be” the father of Joshua because they were planning to marry and have a family. Mother also reiterated her belief that that the Asian Pacific unit of DCFS was conspiring with Judge H. and stated that Judge H. had tapped her phone. The court found that Mother’s “emotional situations have affected her to such a degree that the court feels that there is a relationship between those and the safety issue for Joshua.” The court ordered Mother to participate in parenting education and individual counseling, and to undergo a psychological evaluation. It further ordered that Mother be provided with monitored visitation in a therapeutic setting. Mother filed a notice of appeal from the jurisdictional and dispositional orders, but the appeal was abandoned.
DCFS had difficulties locating a therapeutic setting for the visits. Joshua’s therapy center indicated it was not willing to provide the visits because Joshua clearly stated to his therapist that he did not want to see Mother. DCFS provided visits with the assistance of security staff. After one visit, Mother confronted the foster father, threw a soda bottle at him, and started screaming. The next week, the foster father stated that Joshua was extremely scared of going to the DCFS office. While Joshua was in the DCFS waiting room, he hid under a display tree and would not come out until after he was told repeatedly that Mother was not coming to the office that day. Joshua’s school records stated he was achieving below grade level and demonstrated behavioral problems. Meanwhile, apparently through placing phone calls to banks in the area, Mother managed to identify the foster mother’s workplace. The foster mother was afraid that Mother would come to her workplace and cause a scene. Mother actually did visit her workplace and left only after repeated requests. The foster family agency notified DCFS that it was considering requesting the removal of Joshua to protect the foster family. Mother continued to request unmonitored visits with Joshua, and continued to request that the case be transferred to a different DCFS office because of Judge H.’s supposed interference. She had made no effort to enroll in counseling or parenting classes.
On November 17, 2008, counsel for DCFS filed an application for a temporary restraining order on behalf of the foster parents. The dependency court granted the application. After a further hearing, the court granted a six-month restraining order, but still allowed visitation in a therapeutic setting.
A December 2008 status review report noted that Joshua was comfortable and affectionate with his foster parents. The report further stated that Mother continued to speak compulsively about Judge H. and that she believed he was tapping her phone lines. Mother’s dislike of the DCFS Asian Pacific unit had also not abated. She filed a complaint with the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors about the unit. Mother continued to refuse to enroll in individual counseling and parenting classes and would not complete a psychological evaluation. A psychologist who observed interactions between Mother and Joshua described their emotional connection as “nebulous at best.”
The dependency court held a contested review hearing on February 17, 2009. Mother introduced three letters from therapists into evidence. The first stated that Mother had attended one counseling session in December 2008, the second stated that she had attended counseling in February 2008, and the third stated she had attended four sessions in May and June 2008. Mother testified that she had begun parenting classes in March 2008, that she had attended about eight classes, and that she would complete the program after about five more classes. She also testified that she had attended four anger management classes, and while she did not understand why she was ordered to take the classes, she was participating. She also stated she completed the psychological evaluation and that her visits with her son were going well. The psychological evaluation, which was completed in January 2008, stated that Mother’s symptoms qualified her as having borderline personality disorder. The court found that Mother had not substantially complied with her case plan, but that visits were going better and Mother had started to participate in at least some court-ordered services. It ordered reunification services and visitation in a therapeutic setting to continue.
A March 2009 status review report stated that Joshua continued to have positive attachment with his caregivers and showed continued improvement in school. The foster family was not willing to provide a permanent home for Joshua but was committed to Joshua’s placement with them until identification of an adoptive family or reunification with Mother. Mother refused to meet with the social worker or provide her with information relating to the court-ordered parenting classes and individual counseling. Mother had a monitored visit with Joshua in February 2009 which went well. However, in a meeting with his therapist after the visit, Joshua expressed nervousness about visiting with Mother again, asking if he had to go. Mother had not directed any recent disturbances or outbursts at DCFS, but continued to talk obsessively about Judge H. and minimally about Joshua.
A follow-up report stated that a DCFS team explained to Mother that she needed to disclose the agency providing her services so her progress could be monitored. Mother refused to provide the information, and instead talked about Judge H. and accused the social worker of writing false reports. The next day, however, Mother provided information to the social worker regarding her parenting instructor and counselor. The social worker confirmed that Mother had been attending individual counseling and had completed a parenting skills training program. Mother’s therapist believed that Mother’s symptoms matched the diagnosis of paranoid personality disorder and referred Mother to receive treatment by a licensed psychologist, but Mother declined this referral.
The contested 18-month hearing was held on August 13, 2009. According to the DCFS report, Mother had not been seeing her therapist and had not contacted the referred psychologist. Mother had two monitored visits with Joshua which went generally fine. Joshua had been placed in a different foster home in June 2009, but was adjusting well.
Mother testified at the hearing that her life was changing for the better because her job was more stable and she had a stable relationship with a nice man. She stated she was not presently in counseling because her counselor had been approached by Judge H. and the counseling had been tapped. Mother’s prior therapist testified that he had a total of six sessions with her. He further testified that though Mother appeared to have paranoid personality disorder, he was not the best person to make that assessment, so she should be referred to a specialist. He stated that Mother’s and Joshua’s visits went well and they appeared to enjoy each other’s company.
After hearing testimony and closing argument, the dependency court terminated reunification services. The court found, based on her testimony, that Mother had not moved on from her focus on Judge H., which had prevented her from participating in counseling. The court stated she had not progressed, she had not completed the counseling as ordered, and Joshua could not be safely returned to her. The court set a hearing to select a permanent plan pursuant to section 366.26 and advised all parties that to preserve any right to review on appeal of the order setting the hearing, they must seek an extraordinary writ. Mother filed a notice of intent to file writ petition, but her petition was ultimately deemed nonoperative.
A December 2009 DCFS report stated that Mother had been visiting with Joshua once per week. The visits were monitored by Joshua’s therapist, who described Joshua as “indifferent” to Mother. Joshua repeatedly stated he did not want to see Mother. Joshua’s relationship with his prospective adoptive parent was much better. He had been living with his prospective adoptive parent since June 2009 and was doing well with him. Joshua liked his prospective adoptive parent and home.
On January 11, 2010, Joshua’s therapist filed a caregiver information form. The therapist explained that Joshua had no relationship with Mother and did not want to see her. Mother was displaying unstable and inappropriate behavior toward Joshua, saying such things as “Who do you want to live with, tell me now. If you don’t pick me you’ll never see me again.” Mother’s harassment of Joshua made him cry and scared. Mother also acted inappropriately toward staff.
DCFS filed a section 388 petition requesting termination of Mother’s visitation rights. The dependency court temporarily terminated visitation and set a contested hearing. Mother filed an appeal from this order, which was dismissed due to a failure to raise cognizable issues.
Thereafter, Mother filed a motion of recusal of the hearing officer based on “a conspirator relationship with [J]udge [H.].” The motion was denied because it was untimely and did not present proper grounds for disqualification. Mother filed a section 388 petition requesting that reunification services and visitation rights be reinstated. The petition was set for hearing. She also made a motion, pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, that her count-appointed counsel be replaced. This motion was denied.
After a hearing on March 30, 2010, the social worker and Joshua were walking out of the courtroom when they encountered Mother. Mother followed them and repeatedly asked the social worker why she was requesting that visits be terminated and told her, “You are evil.” Mother then repeatedly asked Joshua who he wanted to live with. Joshua started to cry and asked her, “Why are you doing this?” The social worker and Joshua walked toward the front of the courthouse and Mother caught up and nudged the social worker’s arm. A security guard intervened and separated Mother. Joshua was visibly scared.
Mother was not supposed to know of Joshua’s residence or school location, but on April 2, 2010, the prospective adoptive parent informed the social worker that Mother had shown up at Joshua’s school. As the prospective adoptive parent was picking Joshua up from the cafeteria, Joshua saw Mother in the cafeteria and started screaming “Chinese mom! Chinese mom!” Mother was holding an Easter basket. She followed Joshua and the prospective parent as they walked toward their car. Once in the car, the prospective parent asked Joshua if he would like to take the Easter basket, and he said no. As the prospective parent drove away, he looked in his rearview mirror and saw Mother writing something down. Joshua was shaking in the car and throughout the day asked the prospective parent how Mother had figured out where he went to school.
DCFS filed an application for a restraining order requesting that Mother be prohibited from contacting Joshua or his caretaker. At the hearing, Mother testified that she did not know where Joshua went to school and did not go to the school. The dependency court issued a temporary restraining order, noting that the location of the school was supposed to be confidential, and finding that a restraining order was appropriate to protect Joshua’s safety.
Mother then filed another Marsden motion. The court told her that she could hire another attorney if she wished, but until then the court-appointed attorney would continue to represent her.
In a June 2010 status review report the DCFS noted that Joshua was very relaxed and comfortable with his prospective adoptive parent, who he had started to refer to as “dad.” The caregiver was very attentive to Joshua’s needs. Joshua continued to state that he did not want to see Mother. It was reported that Joshua pulled his hair out after seeing Mother at the school.
Mother filed a series of section 388 petitions. Among the evidence Mother presented was a letter from a marriage and family therapist, who stated that Mother had completed nine counseling sessions and appeared to be a stable, competent, and mature adult. The dependency court denied the section 388 petitions because they did not state new evidence or change of circumstances. The court noted, however, that it still had Mother’s original section 388 petition pending.
A report submitted by DCFS stated that on September 11, 2010, Mother appeared at the previous caregivers’ home and attempted to obtain information regarding the whereabouts of Joshua. The previous caregiver closed the door on her, and Mother yelled and screamed outside the house. When contacted by a social worker, Mother denied the incident occurred.
The section 388 petition was heard on September 22, 2010, in conjunction with the section 366.26 and restraining order hearing. A court-appointed special advocate had interviewed Joshua using a previously proposed list of questions. The advocate testified that Joshua stated he knew who his Mother was but did not enjoy the visits with her and did not want to see her. He also said he was not willing to speak on the phone or exchange e-mails with Mother, and did not want to go places with her. Joshua’s therapist, who had monitored visits with Mother, testified that he believed Joshua’s visits with Mother should stop. The opinion was based on the therapist’s observations of a lack of bonding between Joshua and Mother, of Joshua’s becoming very anxious before and after visits, of Joshua’s stating he did not want the visits to continue, and of Joshua’s pulling his hair out when told he had to visit. The dependency court found that visitation was not in Joshua’s best interest and terminated visitation rights.
The court then attempted to turn to the section 366.26 hearing, but was not able to immediately do so because of another Marsden motion made by Mother. After the motion was denied, the hearing was continued to the next day. The next day, Mother again made a Marsden motion. It was denied. Mother requested a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing, which was also denied because the hearing had been continued many times previously. After argument, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Joshua was adoptable, found it would be detrimental to return him to Mother, and found no exception to adoption applied. The court stated it had given Mother “the benefit of the doubt” because Mother loved Joshua, but Joshua did not want to have any contact with her and there was no bond. Adoption was ordered as the permanent plan. The court issued a restraining order prohibiting contact with Joshua and his adoptive father for three years.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mother argues that she was deprived of constitutional due process because of a lack of “cultural competence” on the part of DCFS and the dependency court, and that this lack of competence also resulted in a failure to find that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption applied. Mother further asserts that the termination of parental rights must be reversed because DCFS failed to give Judge H. notice of the proceedings. Finally, Mother contends that substantial evidence did not support issuance of the restraining order.
I. There Was No Due Process Violation.
Mother argues that the statute used to terminate Mother’s parental rights was not reasonably applied because the dependency court failed to take into account Mother’s Chinese cultural heritage. According to Mother, this constituted a denial of her substantive due process rights. We find no due process violation.
“The essential characteristic of due process in the statutory dependency scheme is fairness in the procedure employed by the state to adjudicate a parent’s rights.” (In re James Q. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 255, 265.) “[D]ue process... is a flexible concept, whose application depends on the circumstances and the balancing of various factors. [Citations.]” (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 757.) “In dependency proceedings, due process violations have been held subject to the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard of prejudice.” (In re Justice P. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 181, 193.)
Mother’s argument that the dependency court improperly failed to account for cultural differences primarily rests on “standards” gleaned from “Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother, ” a book written by Amy Chua, a professor at Yale Law School. Drawing on passages from the book, Mother states that Chinese parenting does not address the child’s happiness; that Chinese parents must not compliment their children in public; that it never occurs to Chinese children to question, disobey, or talk back to their parents; that Chinese parents believe it is crucial to override a child’s preferences; and that Chinese parents believe their children owe them everything and must spend their lives repaying their parents. In presenting this argument, Mother essentially asks us (1) to consider standards never presented to the trial court, (2) to take these “standards” at face value, (3) to assume that any court which does not explicitly follow such standards is culturally incompetent, (4) to decide that someone who complies with these standards is necessarily a fit parent, and (5) to decide that Mother fits within these standards.
We deny the DCFS motion to strike the portions of Mother’s briefs that cite to this book and other works. (See Balesteri v. Holler (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 717, 720.)
If there were authority that would compel us to conduct such an analysis, “Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother” is not it. This “memoir” has been described as “one little narcissist’s book-length search for happiness.” (Maslin, But Will It All Make “Tiger Mom” Happy?, N.Y. Times (Jan. 19, 2011) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/20/books/20book.html > [as of July 22, 2011].) There is no evidence that Ms. Chua is an expert on Chinese parenting standards, assuming that a monolithic set of standards applies to the 1.3 billion people in China or the many people of Chinese ancestry living elsewhere. Furthermore, there is no indication that the book is or was intended to be used as persuasive authority in a dependency case or any other setting, and it is not a source of “reasonably indisputable accuracy” containing facts or propositions suitable for judicial notice. (See (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h).) Mother’s reliance on other works describing Chinese parents as “abusive” is similarly dubious.
Moreover, the premise of Mother’s argument is obviously flawed. While Mother is correct that dependency proceedings can present circumstances that require recognition of differing cultural values (See Nahid H. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1072), the record does not indicate any sort of culture clash in this case. Mother never argued to DCFS or the dependency court that it failed to consider her cultural values. In fact, Mother repeatedly requested that her case be transferred out of the Asian-Pacific unit of DCFS, the unit presumably most likely to employ the cultural “lens” she asks for now.
Even if we could blindly accept the stereotyped and demeaning depictions of Chinese parents relied on by Mother, Mother does not explain how that would compel reversal. Instead, the standard for cultural competence pressed by Mother appears to be based solely on witnesses’ perceptions of her. If a witness found some of Mother’s interactions to be appropriate, that witness possessed cultural competence. On the other hand, as stated in the reply brief, “the fact that [Mother’s] visits were terminated, the professionals involved did not believe she shared a beneficial parent-child relationship with her son, and then her parental rights were terminated were evidence that the Department and the court were not culturally sensitive in this case.” This self-serving, circular reasoning has no basis or application in the law. We therefore find there was no violation of due process.
II. The Dependency Court Did Not Err in Terminating Parental Rights.
On appeal of an order terminating parental rights, we determine if there is any substantial evidence to support the conclusions of the dependency court. All conflicts are resolved in favor of the prevailing party and all legitimate inferences are drawn to uphold the lower court’s ruling. (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732; In re Brison C. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1373, 1378-1379.) We cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. (In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 774.)
At the selection and implementation hearing under section 366.26, subject to certain exceptions, the court must select adoption as the permanent plan and terminate parental rights if it finds that the child is likely to be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 49; In re Jamie R., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p. 773.) Adoption, when possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826; In re Ronell A. (1995) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.) A parent may avoid termination of parental rights by showing that termination would be detrimental to the child. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
Mother contends that the dependency court erred because it did not rule in her favor pursuant to the “beneficial relationship exception” found at section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), which applies when “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” Mother’s argument essentially tracks her due process argument. She contends that if the dependency court were culturally competent, it would have found a beneficial mother-child relationship. Mother bears the burden of showing that this statutory exception applies, and that termination would be detrimental to the child. (In re Derek W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 826; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1252.)
We affirm the dependency court’s decision to select adoption as the permanent plan and terminate parental rights and its ruling that no exception applied. Substantial evidence supported this decision. Mother generally maintained regular visitation and contact with Joshua, but she still had to establish that Joshua would benefit from continuing the relationship. Even frequent and loving contact between parent and child may be insufficient to establish the required benefit. (In re Teneka W. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 721, 728; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419; In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108-1109.) A parent must show that she or he occupies “‘a parental role’ in the child’s life.” (In re Andrea R., at p. 1108.) The parent must show that “the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
Mother failed to demonstrate how severing her relationship with Joshua would deprive him of a substantial, positive emotional attachment and cause him great harm. On the contrary, the evidence supported the conclusion that terminating parental rights was in Joshua’s best interest. Joshua was described as developmentally delayed due to neglect, and being a “troubled little boy” who had issues with depression and anxiety. The dependency court noted that Mother’s “emotional situations, ” particularly her extremely unhealthy fixation on Judge H., affected her to such a degree that they presented a danger to Joshua’s safety. Mother frequently displayed unstable and inappropriate behavior toward Joshua. Joshua repeatedly stated he did not want to see her. He was very scared of her, and at times would cry, shake, or pull his hair out when coming into contact with her. At times when he was not visibly scared, Joshua was observed as being “indifferent” toward Mother, and their relationship was described as “nebulous at best.”
We cannot just ignore the evidence of a detrimental relationship, and ascribe it to Chinese cultural traits. Even if we were to take Mother’s descriptions of Chinese parenting at face value, Mother did not adequately demonstrate how her relationship with Joshua promoted his well-being to such a degree that it outweighed the well-being he gained with his prospective adoptive parent. The dependency court therefore properly terminated parental rights.
Mother’s motion for Order Settling Record on Appeal or to Vacate Section 366.26 Findings and Orders, which is brought on the basis that the record does not contain photographs of Mother and Joshua which may have been presented to the court on May 13, 2010, is denied. Nothing in the record indicates that the dependency court judge reviewed or considered the photographs, particularly at the time of the section 366.26 hearing. The photographs were marked for identification only on May 13. Their absence in the record is not relevant to the issues on appeal.
III. The Claimed Lack of Notice to Judge H. Does Not Compel Reversal.
Mother’s obsession with Judge H. has caused Mother nothing but a great deal of problems. Unfortunately, based on the content of Mother’s opening brief, it appears that she may still harbor some of the same obsessive thoughts. Mother’s brief continues to refer to Judge H. as a “potential parent” of Joshua and claims that he should have been notified of the proceedings, including termination of Mother’s parental rights.
We find that Mother lacks standing to challenge the alleged lack of notice. A parent must establish that he or she is an aggrieved party to obtain a review on the merits of a particular ruling. (In re Carissa G. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 731, 734.) To be aggrieved, a party must have a legally cognizable immediate and substantial interest which is injuriously affected by the court’s decision. (Ibid.) The interest must not be nominal or a remote consequence of the court’s decision. (Ibid.) Mother has not demonstrated any injury she suffered due to the alleged failure to notify Judge H. of the proceedings.
In any event, it appears that Judge H. was at least made aware of the initiation of the dependency action and had no interest in participating. Given that he was not the biological father and did not meet the criteria of being a “presumed” father (see Fam. Code, § 7611), no prejudice resulted from the alleged failure to give him continued, formal notice of the proceedings.
IV. Issuance of the Restraining Order Was Supported by Substantial Evidence.
Mother argues that the dependency court erred because it issued the restraining order based on the single incident of Mother’s visiting Joshua’s school carrying an Easter basket. DCFS argues that the restraining order was appropriate based on numerous acts committed by Mother and because Mother had a long history of harassing people. We agree with DCFS that issuance of the restraining order was warranted.
Section 213.5 provides for the issuance of a restraining order by the dependency court. A person need not have engaged in violent behavior to be subject to a restraining order. (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 211.) “Specifically, section 213.5 includes ‘molesting’ or ‘stalking’ in the conduct the juvenile court may enjoin, neither of which necessarily involves violent behavior or the threat of violence.” (Ibid.) “Molesting” does not refer exclusively to sexual misconduct, but includes “conduct designed to disturb, irritate, offend, injure, or at least tend to injure, another person.” (Id. at p. 212, quoting People v. Carskaddon (1957) 49 Cal.2d 423, 426.) The term “stalking” “refers broadly to conduct that is designed to ‘follow’ a particular person in a more general sense, as in to pursue, monitor, watch or keep that person under surveillance for no legitimate purpose, and with the consequent effect of seriously harassing, alarming, annoying, tormenting, or terrorizing the person being followed, pursued, monitored, watched or kept under surveillance.” (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1511.)
We find that substantial evidence supported issuance of the restraining order against Mother. Mother’s sudden appearance at Joshua’s school was disturbing in itself. Joshua was visibly tormented by her visit. Mother was not supposed to know of the location of Joshua’s school and never explained how she discovered it. Mother followed Joshua and his prospective adoptive father out to their car, and was seen writing down information while they drove away. In her testimony, Mother denied even going to the school, a denial that was not credible in light of the evidence before the court.
Moreover, this was not the only evidence of Mother’s behavior that could reasonably be characterized as molesting or stalking and, contrary to Mother’s assertions, it appears that the restraining order was not issued just because of the one incident at the school. By making phone calls to banks in the area, Mother discovered the workplace of Joshua’s then-foster mother and confronted her, leaving only after repeated requests. Mother also went to the foster family’s doctor and attempted to obtain the family’s address and phone number. The foster parents later obtained a restraining order against Mother. Shortly before the incident at Joshua’s school, Mother followed and harassed a social worker accompanying Joshua in the courthouse, leaving only after a security guard intervened. Mother’s conduct left Joshua crying and scared. Additionally, months after the incident at school and shortly before the section 366.26 hearing, it was reported that Mother went to Joshua’s former foster parents’ home and attempted to obtain the address of Joshua’s prospective adoptive parent.
Thus, Mother exhibited stalking or molesting behavior throughout the dependency proceedings. She also had a history of harassment and numerous restraining orders against her, and continually harassed DCFS staff. Similar behavior directed toward Joshua and his adoptive parent was likely to continue absent a restraining order. The dependency court therefore did not err in issuing the restraining order prohibiting contact with Joshua and his adoptive father.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order terminating parental rights) and issuance of the restraining order are affirmed.
We concur: DOI TODD, J., ASHMANN-GERST, J.