Opinion
No. F04-CP03-006006-A
September 30, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On July 27, 2004 the petitioner, the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families, (DCF) filed a petition pursuant to Section 17a-112 of the Connecticut General Statutes to terminate the parental rights of Glendaly G. and Eugene C. to their minor child, Joshua G. In its petition and subsequent amendments to the petition, DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of the mother, Glendaly G., on the grounds of abandonment, failure to rehabilitate and no ongoing parent to child relationship. DCF seeks to terminate the parental rights of father, Eugene C., on the grounds of abandonment, failure to rehabilitate and no on-going parent to child relationship.
The court finds that notice of this proceeding has been provided in accordance with the provisions of the Practice Book. The court further finds that the Superior Court, Juvenile Matters Division, has jurisdiction over the pending matter and that no action is pending in any other court affecting custody of the child. "The termination of parental rights is defined as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his [or her] parent . . . [As such, it] is a most serious and sensitive judicial action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 231 764 A.2d 739 (2001); In re Bruce R., 234 Conn. 194, 200, 662 A.2d 101 (1995). The termination of parental rights is governed by statute. C.G.S. § 17a-112. In a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the petitioner must prove a ground alleged in the petition, as of the date of filing the petition or the last amendment, by clear and convincing evidence. In re Joshua Z., 26 Conn.App. 58, 63, 597 A.2d 842 (1991), cert. denied, 221 Conn. 901, 599 A.2d 1028 (1992); In re Teresa S., 96 Conn. 18, 29, 491 A.2d 355 (1985); Practice Book § 32a-3(b), 35a-7. Only one ground need be established for the granting of the petition. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984); In re Karrlo K., 44 Conn.Sup. 101, 106, 669 A.2d 1249 (1994), aff'd, 40 Conn.App. 73, CT Page 12640-cv 668 A.2d 1353 (1996). Termination of parental rights trials proceed in two stages: the adjudication and the disposition. The adjudicatory stage invokes the issue of whether the evidence presented established by clear and convincing evidence the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds as of the date the petition was filed or last amended. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-AB), 192 Conn. 254, 264, 471 A.2d 1380 (1984). "Pursuant to Practice Book § 35a-7 in deciding the adjudicatory phase of the hearing for the termination of parental rights, to trial court's inquiry is limited to the events and facts preceding the filing of the petition for the termination of parental rights [or last amendment]." In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 357, 776 A.2d 487 (2001). However, "[i]n the adjudicatory phase, the court may rely on events occurring after the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights when considering the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time." In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000) (emphasis in original); see In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002). If at least one pleaded ground to terminate is found, the court proceeds to the disposition stage. The court must consider whether the facts, as of the last day of trial, establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child's best interest. Procedurally, the evidence as to both adjudicatory and dispositional phases is heard at the same trial without first determining if the state has proven a statutory ground for adjudication before consideration of the dispositional question. In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 688-89 741 A.2d 873 (1999); In re Juvenile Appeal (84-BC), 194 Conn. at 258; State v. Anonymous, 179 Conn. 155, 172-73, 425 A.2d 939 (1979); In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 102, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000); In re Emmanuel M., 43 Conn.Sup. 108, 113, 648 A.2d 904, (1993), aff'd, 35 Conn.App. 276, 278, 648 A.2d 881, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 915, 648 A.2d 151 (1994); In re Nicolina T., 9 Conn.App. 598, 602, 520 A.2d 639, cert. denied, 203 Conn. 804, 525 A.2d 519 (1927).
On September 30, 2003, DCF invoked a 96-hour hold in regard to Joshua G. On October 2, 2003, an Order of Temporary Custody and of neglect petition were filed in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters. The Order of Temporary Custody was granted on October 2, 2003 and subsequently sustained on October 9, 2003. On February 11, 2004, Joshua G. was adjudicated as a neglected child and committed to the Department of Children and Families.
I. FACTS
The credible evidence admitted at trial established the following facts CT Page 12640-cw by clear and convincing evidence:
A. MOTHER — GLENDALY G.
Glendaly G. is a single mother of four children, however none of her children are under her care and custody. Mother lives a transient lifestyle, relying on friends and family to provide her with shelter. DCF records reflect that since 1997 Glendaly G. has resided at fifteen different locations and at one point, was living out of her car. She has not maintained any type of housing for any reasonable period of time.
Glendaly G. has a long history of substance abuse. She began abusing marijuana and alcohol at the age of thirteen and began the use of PCP at age nineteen. While mother has not admitted to the use of cocaine, a hair test indicated that she abused that substance as well. Glendaly G. has been offered a variety of substance abuse treatment programs, but her history reflects that she repeatedly fails to complete such programs satisfactorily. Mother's conduct establishes that she is unable or unwilling to recognize that her substance abuse issues directly affect her ability to parent her children appropriately.
In addition to her substance abuse issues, Glendaly G. has a history of anger management problems. She has repeatedly threatened and verbally abused social workers with the Department of Children and Families. Mother, herself, reported to DCF that she threatened to choke one of the foster parents who was caring for her son. Glendaly G. has failed to engage in any form of counseling to assess and address her issues regarding her inability to control her anger.
Since June 2004 mother has had virtually no contact with her son, Joshua. While she did contact DCF regarding visitation, Glendaly G. failed to follow up on that contact or cooperate with DCF's efforts to arrange for visitation. Mother has not sent any cards, letters or gifts to Joshua, nor has Mother inquired as to the health, well being or development of Joshua.
B. FATHER — EUGENE C.
Little is know about the father, Eugene C. Other than a single telephone call to DCF and a single appearance in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, father has not participated in any of the proceedings regarding Joshua. Counsel for father reports that he is unaware of father's whereabouts. Father has never attempted to contact DCF to arrange for visitation with Joshua and has no contact, of any kind, with Joshua during the pendency of these proceedings. Glendaly G. reports that CT Page 12640-cx Eugene C. was abusive to her during their relationship.
C. CHILD — JOSHUA G.
Joshua was born on September 28, 2003. At birth he tested positive for PCP and subsequently has exhibited developmental delays in the areas of fine and gross motor skills, expressive communication and self-help/adaptive skills. To address these delays, Joshua receives in-home services from the Birth to Three Program twice per month. Joshua has had two placements since he was committed to the care and custody of DCF. On October 1, 2003 Joshua was discharged from the hospital and placed in a DCF licensed foster home. He remained in that home for six months. On April 23, 2004 Joshua was placed in a new home and he adjusted quickly and very well to this new placement. His current foster parents are committed to adopting Joshua. Joshua attends a daycare center on a regular basis and his daycare providers report that he has adjusted well to their program and that he is a happy child.
II. FINDINGS A. Finding regarding the timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by a child-placing agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.Glendaly G. was offered DCF casework services as well as referrals to: the Bridgeport Hospital; Southwest Community Health Center; Connecticut Valley Hospital; Regional Resource Group; Child Guidance Center; Norwalk Emergency Shelter and the STARS Program. The referrals included efforts to address substance abuse, housing, parenting classes, individual counseling, trauma group, life skills training, woman's support group and employment assistance. Glendaly G. failed to cooperate with or complete all of the referred programs. While DCF offered to arrange weekly supervised visits with her son, mother has failed to arrange for any visitations.
Eugene C. has failed to cooperate with DCF in any manner. Father was offered casework services after his one telephone call to the Department. Although various attempts to contact father have been made by the Department, he has failed to contact DCF. Eugene C. has not displayed any interest in Joshua nor offered any plan for the child. Eugene C.'s present whereabouts are unknown.
B. Finding regarding whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family CT Page 12640-cy pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.In addition to the findings of paragraph A of this decision, it should be noted that the court on August 5, 2004 found that further efforts to reunify the father and the child were no longer appropriate.
C. Finding regarding the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or child-placing agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order.While the court ordered Specific Steps on October 3, 2003, there is no indication in the court file that the respondents ever agreed to such order. Among the terms of that order were provisions which included: that the parties keep all appointments with DCF; that DCF be kept advised of the whereabouts of the parties; that the parties participate in counseling and make progress toward treatment goals; that the parties submit to substance abuse treatment; maintain adequate housing; avoid involvement in the criminal justice system and visit the child as permitted. As noted previously in these findings: the father has failed to stay in contact with the department and failed to have any contact with the child; the mother has failed to keep appointments with DCF and service providers, is homeless and living a transient lifestyle, failed to cooperate in counseling, demonstrates no insight into her substance abuse problem, has tested positive for illegal substances, been arrested on criminal charges on April 12, 2004, and has failed to take advantage of the opportunity to visit the child.
D. Finding regarding the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of the child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.Neither parent has an emotional tie to the child. Joshua has no emotional bond with either parent. He has been out of his parents' care since birth. Father has never visited his son and mother has not had contact with her son since June of 2004. Joshua has an emotional tie to his pre-adoptive parents with whom he has lived since April of 2004.
E. Finding regarding the age of the child
Joshua was born on September 28, 2003. This two-year-old child needs a sense of permanency. Given the parents' failure to take advantage of CT Page 12640-dz casework services and their failure to have any contact with their child, it is not appropriate to allow the parents further time to rehabilitate. Such a delay would be detrimental to the development of the child.
F. Finding regarding the efforts the parents made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return the child to the parents' home in the foreseeable future, including but not limited to: the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the childThe parents have made no effort to change their circumstances for the benefit of the child. Mother has failed to cooperate or complete any of the recommended programs. Father has failed to make himself available to DCF. Both parents have failed to have any contact with their child.
G. Finding regarding the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parentNeither parent has been prevented by the other or any other person or agency from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child. Each has chosen to abandon the child. Each has failed to have even minimal contact with the child.
III. CONCLUSION
The clear and convincing evidence presented compels the findings that:
1. Each parent has abandoned the child in the sense that the parents failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.
2. Each parent, after the child had been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable CT Page 12640-da amount of time, considering the age and needs of the child, that they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child; and
3. Each parent has no ongoing parent-child relationship with the child that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a continuing, day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral or educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment of the parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interests of the child.
Based upon all of the foregoing, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Glendaly G. and Eugene C. is in the best interest of the child. Permanency, consistency and stability are crucial for Joshua. He is now in a foster home where he is very well cared for by foster parents who wish to adopt him. Joshua is benefitting from the permanency and stability of that placement. Both parents have not achieved rehabilitation or made sufficient improvements in their abilities to care for their child and are not in a position to provide day to day care for the child. The father has never indicated to DCF that he would like the child placed with him or put himself in a position to be able to care for the child. Given mother's failed attempts in services and at treatment programs, there is little, if any, likelihood of her improving to the point where she could be a responsible parent in the future. In finding that termination of the respondents' parental rights would be in the child's best interest, the court has examined multiple relevant factors including the child's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of his environment; his length of stay in foster care; the nature of his relationship with foster parents and biological parents; the degree of contact maintained with his biological parents; and his genetic bond to respondents. In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000); In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000); In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999). The court has also balanced the child's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of CT Page 12640-db maintaining a connection with his biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that termination of respondents' parental rights is in the child's best interest. Joshua is entitled to a resolution, without delay, of the period of uncertainty as to the availability of respondents to serve as his parents by terminating respondents' parental rights. The court also notes that counsel for the child recommends termination. After considering the child's sense of time, his need for a secure and permanent environment, the need to avoid future placements, and the totality of circumstances, the court concludes that termination of parental rights of respondent mother and father is in the children's best interest. It is accordingly, ORDERED that the parental rights of Glendaly G. and Eugene C. are hereby terminated as to the child Joshua G. The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is hereby appointed the statutory parent for the child. With regard to the permanency plans for the child, the court hereby approves the plan of termination of parental rights and adoption as to the child and finds that such plans are in the best interest of the children. The court also finds that DCF has made reasonable efforts to effectuate the permanency plans. A permanency plan shall be submitted within 30 days of this judgment, and that such further reports shall be timely presented to the court as required by law. Judgment may enter accordingly.
It is so ordered this 30th day of September 2005.