Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Ct. No. TJ18377 Charles R. Scarlett, Judge.
Bruce G. Finebaum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ALDRICH, J.
Joshua G., a minor, appeals from the order declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered following the juvenile court’s finding he possessed a firearm (Pen. Code, § 12101, subd. (a)(1)). The court ordered Joshua placed home on probation. Joshua contends the evidence supporting the court’s finding was the fruit of an illegal detention, and his suppression motion should have been granted. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 20, 2009, the People filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that Joshua, a minor, had possessed a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 12101, subdivision (a)(1). Joshua filed a motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5). At a combined hearing on both the suppression motion and the merits, the following evidence was adduced.
We view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 528-529; People v. Strider (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1396.)
On Friday, October 16, 2009, at approximately 7:00 p.m., Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Scott Giles was on patrol in Compton, in the area of Long Beach Boulevard and Schinner Street. Giles had worked patrol in Compton for two years, and was familiar with the neighborhood. The South Side Compton Crips claimed the territory west of Long Beach Boulevard, while the Neighborhood Compton Crips claimed the area to the east of the street. Giles had made arrests in the area previously.
As Giles drove in an alley, he observed 15-year-old Joshua and another young male “sprinting” out of the parking lot of a liquor store at the corner of Schinner and Long Beach Boulevard. Joshua and his companion were dressed “all in black.” They wore black sweatshirts with the hoods over their heads, “like they were covering themselves.” There were few streetlights in the area, and it was quite dark. Deputy Giles knew the liquor store had been robbed several times.
The two youths continued their sprint and entered the alley, stopping approximately 60 feet from the liquor store and within three feet of Giles’s patrol car. Giles was concerned that the duo had possibly robbed the liquor store. While still seated in his patrol car, Giles asked, “Hey, why are you guys running[?]” The youths, who were sweating and out of breath, did not respond. Giles then exited his patrol car and asked the question again. Joshua volunteered, “I’m going to jail because I’ve got something in my pocket.” Giles recovered a black, semiautomatic handgun from Joshua’s right front pants pocket.
At the suppression hearing the prosecutor argued that, on the undisputed facts, there was no detention. Defense counsel contended that Joshua and his companion were detained as soon as Deputy Giles asked why they were running. The defense theory was that the detention violated the Fourth Amendment because the basis for the detention––that the youths were running in the early evening in a high crime area––was not enough to establish reasonable suspicion they had committed a crime.
The juvenile court denied the motion without expressly articulating the basis for its decision. It sustained the petition, declared the offense to be a felony, placed Joshua home on probation, and imposed a restitution fine and a variety of probation conditions. Joshua appeals.
DISCUSSION
The juvenile court properly denied Joshua’s suppression motion.
1. Standard of review.
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement personnel. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8-9; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 384; People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 829-830; In re H.M. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 136, 142.) Challenges to the admissibility of a search or seizure must be evaluated solely under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1141.)
When reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, we defer to the trial court’s express or implied factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 145; People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 384; People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969.)
2. The undisputed evidence established that no detention occurred.
We conclude the suppression motion was properly denied. First, considering the undisputed evidence presented at the suppression hearing, the Fourth Amendment was not implicated because no detention occurred. “Police contacts with individuals may be placed into three broad categories ranging from the least to the most intrusive: consensual encounters that result in no restraint of liberty whatsoever; detentions, which are seizures of an individual that are strictly limited in duration, scope, and purpose; and formal arrests or comparable restraints on an individual’s liberty.” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821.) “Consensual encounters do not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny.” (Ibid.; People v. Garry (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1100, 1106.)
In order to lawfully detain an individual, an officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime. (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821; Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 123; People v. Durazo (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 728, 734.) A “detention does not occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street and asks a few questions. [Citation.] As long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go about his or her business, the encounter is consensual and no reasonable suspicion is required on the part of the officer. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, in some manner restrains the individual’s liberty, does a seizure occur. [Citations.]” (In re Manuel G., supra, at p. 821; People v. Bennett (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 396, 402; People v. Garry, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106; People v. Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1227.)
There is no bright-line distinction between a consensual encounter and a detention, and to make such a determination we examine the totality of the circumstances. (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821; People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4that p. 145; People v. Bouser (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1283; People v. Verin (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 551, 556.) “Circumstances establishing a seizure might include any of the following: the presence of several officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled. [Citations.] The officer’s uncommunicated state of mind and the individual citizen’s subjective belief are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny has occurred.” (In re Manuel G., supra, at p. 821; People v. Garry, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 1106.)
As noted, the People argued below that no detention occurred; the defense argued the contrary. The juvenile court did not state whether it denied the motion because there was no detention, because the People established the deputy had reasonable suspicion, or both. On appeal, Joshua assumes that a detention occurred. The People fail to address the question, arguing instead that the “brief[, ] investigatory stop” was justified. In our view, substantial evidence compels the conclusion that the interaction between Deputy Giles and the youths was a consensual encounter, not a detention, for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Deputy Giles did not do anything to restrain the youths’ liberty until Joshua volunteered that he had an item in his pocket that would result in his incarceration. Giles did not employ words, gestures, or other coercive conduct to detain the boys. Giles encountered the youths when they sprinted into the alley and stopped of their own accord, three feet from the patrol vehicle in which he was seated. Giles did not approach or stop the youths; they approached him, albeit no doubt inadvertently. He did not command that the boys stop or approach him. It is true that the patrol car blocked their path to some extent; Giles testified that they “had to go around it or run into my vehicle.” However, Giles did nothing designed to block the boys’ path; they happened to run down the alley where he was located. Giles did not command either boy to do anything. Until Joshua’s volunteered comment, Giles did not touch or search either boy, and used no physical force. Nor did Giles make any show of authority. He was alone, not in a group of officers, when he encountered the duo. He did not display or use a weapon. He did not shine his vehicle’s spotlight at them. Nothing suggests his queries were made in a hostile or forceful manner. His only communication to the boys was the unremarkable question, “Why are you running?” Nothing about this query, made twice, would suggest to a reasonable person that his liberty had been restrained. The federal Constitution does not prevent a police officer “ ‘ “from addressing questions to anyone on the streets[.]” ’ ” (People v. Bennett, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 401-402.) Like every citizen, police officers are free to address questions to other persons, who are free to ignore the interrogator and walk away. (Id. at p. 402.) While Joshua may have felt he was “the object of official scrutiny, such directed scrutiny does not amount to a detention.” (People v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, 1496.)
Thus, the circumstances that typically demonstrate a detention rather than a consensual encounter were not present. (See generally People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1254 [consensual encounter when officer and his partner engaged defendant in a brief conversation and then asked for his identification]; People v. Franklin (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 935, 938-942; People v. Perez, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1494, 1496 [consensual encounter when officer tapped on the driver’s side window of a parked car with a lit flashlight, and asked the defendant to roll down his window]; People v. Jones (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 519, 523 [detention where police officer pulled patrol vehicle near defendant and commanded him to stop]; People v. McKelvy (1972) 23 Cal.App.3d 1027, 1034 [detention where four armed officers exited their patrol car, spotlighted defendant, and asked him to hand over an object he had placed in his pocket].)
Several cases inform our analysis. In In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th 805, a deputy approached a juvenile whom he recognized as a gang member. The deputy exited his patrol car and the minor continued walking toward him. The deputy asked, “ ‘Hey, can I talk to you?, ’ ” and explained he wished to discuss a gang-related shooting. (Id. at p. 811.) The minor responded that he had no information. The deputy continued to talk to the minor, asking him whether he knew of circumstances involving the case. The minor stated that he was going to complain to authorities about the deputy’s conduct, and that he was tired of the sheriff’s department contacting him. On these facts, the California Supreme Court concluded the deputy had not detained the minor, and the encounter was consensual. (Id. at pp. 811, 820.) The minor walked toward the deputy and answered questions when asked. The deputy “did not draw his gun or deter or stop the minor from continuing what he was doing.” (Id. at p. 822.) “Approaching the minor in a public place and asking him questions were not actions in themselves constituting coercive police conduct that would lead a reasonable person to believe that he or she was not free to leave.” (Ibid.)
In People v. Bennett, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th 396, a police officer saw Bennett speaking with a prostitute. The officer approached Bennett and asked whether he could talk to him for a moment. The officer remembered Bennett from a previous contact and asked whether he was still on parole. Bennett replied affirmatively and the officer asked if he would be willing to wait in the patrol car while the officer “ ‘ran him for warrants.’ ” (Id. at p. 399.) Bennett agreed. The tone of the conversation was calm, and no physical force was required or threatened. (Ibid.) When it was subsequently determined that Bennett had violated parole, he was arrested. (Ibid.) Bennett concluded the initial contact between Bennett and the officer, during which the officer asked whether Bennett was on parole, was a “classic consensual encounter” which did not implicate the Fourth Amendment. (Id. at pp. 401-403.) The officer did not apply any physical or verbal force that might have caused a reasonable person to feel compelled to respond. Bennett’s responses appeared voluntary, and the officer did nothing “to transmogrify the consensual tone of the conversation or stop Bennett from simply walking away.” (Id. at p. 402.)
In People v. Bouser, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, a police officer driving his patrol car saw Bouser, in an alley known for drug dealing, standing near a dumpster looking for something. When he saw the officer, Bouser became nervous and walked in the opposite direction. The officer stopped his patrol car four feet behind Bouser, walked toward him, and said, “ ‘Hey, how you doing? You mind if we talk?’ ” (Id. at p. 1282.) Bouser stopped and agreed to talk to the officer, who inquired regarding Bouser’s name, date of birth, and prior arrest history. He also asked what Bouser was doing in the alley. Bouser stated he had been visiting a friend, but could not provide the friend’s address. The officer queried why, if Bouser had just concluded his visit with the friend, he was unable to provide the address. He ran a records check on Bouser, while making “ ‘small talk’ ” for several minutes. The records check revealed Bouser had an outstanding warrant, and tar heroin was found in his pocket during a search incident to arrest. (Id. at pp. 1282-1283.) The appellate court rejected Bouser’s contention that the encounter violated the Fourth Amendment. The officer’s questions regarding what Bouser was doing in the alley and the request for identifying information did not implicate the Fourth Amendment, and the encounter did not ripen into a detention even when the officer ran the records check. (Id. at pp. 1284, 1287-1288.)
The same is true here. Deputy Giles did little more than ask the boys why they were running. The totality of circumstances does not suggest a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.
At the suppression hearing, Deputy Giles testified that after the boys failed to respond to his first query, he “exited [his] vehicle and detained them.” Giles further testified: “When I detained him, he told me that he had something in his pocket.” Even assuming arguendo these answers demonstrate the deputy believed a detention had occurred prior to Joshua’s volunteered statement, Giles’s understanding is not dispositive. An officer’s intent to detain a subject is not relevant except insofar as his overt actions communicated his intent. (People v. Verin, supra, 220 Cal.App.3d at p. 556.) Here, as we have discussed, Giles’s overt actions did not cause the encounter to ripen into a detention. Moreover, we exercise our independent judgment to determine whether, on the facts found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 384.) As we have explained, in our view no detention occurred until after Joshua’s volunteered statement.
Joshua does not dispute that, once he stated he had an item in his pocket that would result in his incarceration, Giles had reasonable suspicion to detain him. When an officer reasonably suspects that a detainee is armed and dangerous, the officer may perform a pat search for weapons. (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30; In re H.M., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 143.) Guns are readily stored in pockets and common in areas in which gang crime is prevalent (see In re H.M., supra, at pp. 147-148). Deputy Giles could reasonably believe the contraband item hidden in Joshua’s pocket might be a gun or weapon. He therefore had reason to believe, based upon specific and articulable facts, that Joshua was armed and dangerous, justifying a pat search of the pocket. (See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, supra, at p. 30; Giovanni B. v. Superior Court (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 312, 320.)
3. Reasonable suspicion.
Even if the initial encounter between Deputy Giles and the youths had amounted to a detention, the undisputed evidence presented at the suppression hearing demonstrated that Giles had a reasonable suspicion justifying it. As noted ante, “ ‘a detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the detaining officer can point to specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the person detained may be involved in criminal activity, ’ ” even if the officer lacks probable cause to arrest. (People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 145; United States v. Sokolow (1989) 490 U.S. 1, 7; Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 30; People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 231; United States v. Arvizu (2002) 534 U.S. 266, 273-274.) The reasonable suspicion standard “is not a particularly demanding one.” (People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, at p. 146.) The analytical touchstone is reasonableness under all the circumstances. (People v. Foranyic (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 186, 188.) The concept of reasonable suspicion cannot be reduced to a “neat set of legal rules” but must be based upon commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior. (Id. at p. 189; United States v. Sokolow, supra, 490 U.S. at pp. 7-8; People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, at p. 146.)
Here, the totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Joshua was involved in criminal activity. Joshua and his companion were sprinting from a parking lot associated with a liquor store that had been the target of robberies. Neither had shopping bags or other indicia that they had just lawfully patronized the store. Their pace immediately suggested an effort to flee. Both were clad in all-black attire. Both had the black hoods of their sweatshirts pulled over their heads, suggesting to the deputy that they wished to conceal themselves. While not the equivalent of the classic robber’s disguise of a nylon stocking pulled over the face, their attire potentially suggested nefarious goings on. The area was known for gang activity, and the deputy had made arrests in the neighborhood. The boys were sweaty and out of breath, potentially indicating nervousness. (See In re H.M., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 144 [nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion].) Given the totality of these circumstances, in our view Deputy Giles’s suspicion that the boys had been engaged in criminal activity was reasonable. (See, e.g., People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 147-149; People v. Foranyic, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at pp. 188-191; cf. In re H.M., supra, at pp. 144-148.)
Joshua argues that none of the foregoing factors gave rise to a reasonable suspicion he was involved in criminal activity. He points out that the fact a defendant is found in a high crime area is insufficient, by itself, to cast reasonable suspicion on the individual. (See, e.g., People v. Medina (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 171, 177.) He argues that he did not make any furtive movements; Giles was unaware of any recent reports of crime in the area; and Giles saw him run from the liquor store parking lot, but not the store itself. Further, he contends that the sight of “two male youths running through the neighborhood in the early evening” was not unusual or suspicious.
Joshua is correct that the mere fact a person is located in a high crime area when stopped by police does not, by itself, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed. (Illinois v. Wardlow, supra, 528 U.S. at p. 124 [“An individual’s presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime”]; People v. Perrusquia (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 228, 233; People v. Medina, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 177.) Nonetheless, the character of the locale where the stop occurs is a factor to be considered in a Fourth Amendment analysis. “[O]fficers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further investigation.” (Illinois v. Wardlow, supra, at p. 124; see also People v. Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 240 [“An area’s reputation for criminal activity is an appropriate consideration in assessing whether an investigative detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment”]; People v. Medina, supra, at p. 177.) Here, the deputy was aware, not only that the area was known for its gang presence, but also that the liquor store had been the target of prior robberies. (See People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 147-148 [the fact that a nearby car dealership had experienced a vehicle theft a week before the officer encountered defendants was relevant to the officer’s suspicion that the defendants’ car had been stolen from the dealership].) Giles was not suspicious of Joshua simply because Joshua was observed in the neighborhood, but because Joshua’s activities and attire suggested criminal activity was afoot. Although sprinting from a parking lot is not a crime, “[t]he possibility of an innocent explanation does not deprive the officer of the capacity to entertain a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Indeed, the principal function of his investigation is to resolve that very ambiguity and establish whether the activity is in fact legal or illegal....” (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 894; Illinois v. Wardlow, supra, at p. 125; People v. Souza, supra, at p. 233.)Here, it did not appear to the deputy that Joshua was simply out for a relaxing run. “Absent evidence to the contrary, we think an experienced officer is readily able to discern whether such flight is more indicative of innocent behavior or consciousness of guilt.” (In re H.M., supra, 167 Cal.App.4th at p. 145.)
In sum, Deputy Giles’s suspicions were raised not simply because Joshua was running; instead, Giles believed criminal activity was afoot because Joshua was sprinting, in the dark, from the parking lot of a liquor store that had been robbed several times, while wearing all black clothing and a sweatshirt hood. We must consider the totality of the circumstances, rather than employing a “divide and conquer” approach which considers factors in isolation. (United States v. Arvizu, supra, 534 U.S. at p. 274; People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 148.) Employing the former analytical framework, we conclude that facts giving rise to a reasonable suspicion were present.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: CROSKEY, Acting P. J.KITCHING, J.