Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County Super. Ct. No. DL027285, Richard E. Behn, Judge. Affirmed. Remanded for correction of clerical error.
James Jay Seltzer, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, and Jeffrey J. Koch, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
SILLS, P. J.
On July 30, 2007, Joseph S. admitted 13 acts of indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 314, subd. (1)) and 13 acts of annoying or molesting a child (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1)) in exchange for the court’s assumption of jurisdiction over him, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, and grant of supervised probation. In addition to various other terms and conditions of probation, the juvenile court ordered Joseph to “REGISTER PURSUANT TO SECTION 290 OF THE PENAL CODE SECTION 290(d)(3) IF CONVICTED TO THE DJJ (THIS IS A LIFETIME COMMITMENT).”
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
DJJ is the short form reference to the Division of Juvenile Justice of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, formerly known as the California Youth Authority.
On appeal, Joseph challenges the validity of his admission on the ground that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. He contends that he was not adequately advised of and did not understand the rights he was asked to waive, and that he did not understand the nature and extent of the consequences of his plea, particularly the sex offender registration requirement.
The Attorney General concedes that there is an error in the juvenile court’s July 30, 2007 minute order, which records the terms and conditions of Joseph’s probation. We shall direct the clerk of the juvenile court to correct this clerical error as explained below. With this correction, the judgment is affirmed.
I
FACTS
On March 21, 2007, the Orange County District Attorney’s Office filed a two count complaint alleging that on November 27, 2006, Joseph committed one act of indecent exposure and one act of annoying or molesting a child. (People v. Joseph D. S. (Super. Ct. Orange County, 2007, 07WM02962).) On March 26, the district attorney’s office filed a 52-count petition in the juvenile court alleging that during the months of September and October 2006, Joseph committed 26 acts of indecent exposure and 26 acts of annoying or molesting a child.
We granted Joseph’s unopposed motion for judicial notice of the superior court file in case number 07WM02962. (Evid. Code, § 452, (d).)
On July 30, 2007, Joseph, while represented by counsel, admitted committing 13 acts of indecent exposure and 13 acts of annoying or molesting a child. The Tahl form provides the following factual basis: “On and between 9-1-06 and 10-31-06, in Orange County I willfully, unlawfully and lewdly exposed and touched my penis, in a public place, in front of Jane Doe #1 and Jane Doe #2, knowing them to be under the age of 18 with the intent to annoy them and with an unnatural sexual interest.” The form also sets forth several paragraphs explaining Joseph’s constitutional rights to an attorney, to a speedy court trial, to confrontation of witnesses, to testify on his own behalf, and to compel the attendance of witnesses, in addition to an explanation of the immigration consequences of his admission. Joseph initialed lines near the descriptions of his constitutional rights, signifying that he understood and waived these rights.
See Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.
In addition, the juvenile court orally confirmed that it was Joseph who initialed and signed the Tahl form. Moreover, the court explained, “Among the rights you’re giving up, Joseph, is your right to have a trial, your right to have witnesses come in, ask them questions, take the stand and tell me your side or to remain silent and have the D.A. prove the case. [¶] Do you understand those rights specifically and give them up?” Joseph again responded, “Yes, sir.” After a brief discussion of the various counts and custody credits, the court stated, “The court will find the waivers are made knowingly and intelligently and the admission is free and voluntary.”
A separate form set forth the terms and conditions of Joseph’s probation. As a condition of probation, the court ordered Joseph to register under section 290. However, the registration requirement was conditional. It applied only if Joseph was “committed to DJJ.” The district attorney confirmed the conditional nature of the registration requirement: “Just so the minor knows that if he does pick up a felony, he is sent to DJJ on his entire record. It’s a potential.” When the juvenile court asked Joseph if he understood this condition, Joseph again replied, “Yes, sir.”
On August 2, 2007, Joseph, again represented by counsel, pled guilty to both counts of the adult court complaint and received a grant of informal probation. In addition to other terms and conditions, the court ordered Joseph to register as a sex offender, pursuant to section 290. Joseph filed a notice of appeal from the juvenile court proceedings on October 2, 2007. He did not file an appeal in case number 07WM02962.
Although the appeal was not timely filed, we granted Joseph’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and permitted the appeal to proceed under the principle of constructive filing. (In re Joseph S. (Dec. 6, 2007, G039565 [nonpub. opn.].)
II
DISCUSSION
Joseph challenges the validity of his plea in juvenile court on the grounds he was not adequately informed of the penal consequences of his admission in juvenile court. Specifically, he argues the juvenile court failed to fully explain the section 290 registration requirement that was imposed as a condition of his probation. As stated in his opening brief, “Joseph understood at the time of his plea, both in the juvenile and adult court cases, that he would only be required to register as a sex offender if in fact he broke his probation and re-offended. At no time did Joseph know that he would have to register as a result of his pleas in juvenile and adult court.” We find no evidence in the appellate record to support Joseph’s assertion.
In juvenile cases, “admission by a minor of the charges against him in open court is the equivalent of a plea of guilty.” (In re Patterson (1963) 58 Cal.2d 848, 853.) The constitutional requirement for a valid guilty plea is set forth in Boykin v. Alabama, where the Supreme Court held that a valid guilty plea must be intelligent and voluntary. (Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 242.) California interprets Boykin as requiring that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and the rights to confrontation of one’s accusers and a trial by jury be “expressly enumerated for the benefit of and waived by the accused prior to the acceptance of his guilty plea.” (In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 132.) This is relevant to juvenile cases because California finds “[t]he strictures of Boykin reasonably... are equally applicable to juvenile court proceedings where the minor is liable to a substantial term of institutional detention.” (In re Michael M. (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 741, 744.) California courts have held that the constitutional requirements may be satisfied through the use of a waiver form. (E.g. People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80-83; In re Ibarra (1983) 34 Cal.3d 277, 285; In re Patricia T. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 400, 407). Furthermore, the juvenile court must advise the accused of the direct consequences of his guilty plea. (Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592, 605; In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 325). These rules apply with equal force in both felony and misdemeanor cases (Mills v. Municipal Court (1973) 10 Cal.3d 288, 301-302), and are consistent with California Rules of Court, rule 5.778, which governs proceedings covered by Welfare and Institutions Code section 602.
California Rules of Court, rule 5.778(c) states, in pertinent part, that “If the child wishes to admit the allegations, the court must first find and state on the record that it is satisfied that the child understands the nature of the allegations and the direct consequences of the admission, and understands and waives the rights [enumerated].”
Joseph’s primary argument is that the juvenile court and his attorney failed to tell him he might suffer more or different consequences in his adult court case than those imposed in the juvenile court. Cases, such as the In re Birch case to which Joseph refers, have held that the court has a duty to advise the defendant of a sex registration requirement, and failure to do so is error. (See In re Birch (1973) 10 Cal.3d 314, 321; People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 376.) However, in those cases, sex registration truly was a direct consequence of a guilty plea: The proceeding in which the defendant entered the guilty plea was the same proceeding in which the sex registration requirement was imposed and on which the sex registration requirement was based. Here, Joseph admitted to committing offenses in a juvenile case and was advised that he would be subject to sex offender registration only if he violated the terms of his juvenile court probation and was committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice. Nothing in the record suggests Joseph misunderstood this aspect of his plea. Nor is there any evidence that Joseph was led to believe his admission in the juvenile case would necessarily affect the outcome of his adult case, or vice-versa.
As another appellate court has articulated, “While it is true that before a guilty plea can be accepted a defendant must be advised of the direct consequences of his plea... the requirement relates to consequences directly involved in the criminal case itself, and not to collateral consequences.” (People v. Searcie (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 204, 211.) The section 290 registration requirement contained in case number 07WM02962 is collateral to the conditional registration requirement imposed in the juvenile case. It is a collateral consequence that does not “inexorably follow” from the admission of the offense involved in the juvenile case. (See People v. Flores (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 484, 488.) The two cases are entirely separate from each other. Further, Joseph’s failure to appeal from the adult case precludes appellate review of the matter. In any event, the juvenile court was not required to advise Joseph of the possible consequences of his subsequent plea in an adult court case.
Joseph also contends that he was not adequately advised of his rights as a defendant and did not understand those rights as they were explained to him. This contention has no merit, however. Not only did Joseph sign and initial seven pages of a Tahl form that advised him of the constitutional rights he was waiving, but the court specifically told Joseph, “Among the rights you’re giving up, Joseph, is your right to have a trial, your right to have witnesses come in, ask them questions, take the stand and tell me your side or to remain silent and have the D.A. prove the case,” and asked him whether he understood those rights. The fact that the court explained to Joseph the rights he was waiving, coupled with Joseph’s consistent acknowledgement throughout the proceeding that he understood what rights were being waived, indicates to us that Joseph made a voluntary and intelligent admission.
Joseph also complains that he has been wronged because his admission precluded a trial “where he could present a full defense to the allegations made, where he could confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and where a full determination could be made on the merits of the case.” In addition, Joseph now states he would have contested the lawfulness of his arrest and the constitutionality of “the search by police of his person and the subsequent seizure of his possessions.” Nevertheless, his primary concern is the section 290 registration requirement, which the court retained discretion to impose due to the charges admitted. (See People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1196-1197.) However, it was not Joseph’s admission in the juvenile court that triggered this requirement. The mandatory section 290 registration was part and parcel of the adult court proceeding, a proceeding for which he was represented by counsel and chose not to appeal.
We deny Joseph’s request to consider his declaration and those prepared by his parents in support of this appeal. Although the contents of these declarations may be pertinent to a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to this case, they include facts more appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267.)
The Attorney General concedes there is a clerical error in the juvenile court’s minute order and we agree. The court’s minute order currently states Joseph must “REGISTER PURSUANT TO SECTION 290... IF CONVICTED TO THE DJJ.” The parties agree the italicized word should be “COMMITTED.” The Attorney General suggests we clarify the order to state that Joseph is subject to mandatory registration only if he violates a condition of probation that results in his commitment to DJJ. We accept this recommendation and direct the clerk of the court to correct and clarify its July 30, 2007 minute order as stated below. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
III
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court is directed to correct its July 30, 2007 minute order to state the following: “Minor to register pursuant to Penal Code section 290(d)(3) only if he violates a probation condition resulting in his commitment to the DJJ. (This is a lifetime commitment.)” The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: ARONSON, J., FYBEL, J.