Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court No. J516971 of San Diego County, Laura J. Birkmeyer, Judge.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
Dawn R. appeals juvenile court orders placing her minor sons, Joseph R. and Nathaniel R. (together, the minors), with their father, John R., in Hawaii, and continuing juvenile court jurisdiction. Dawn contends the court erred by finding its continued supervision was necessary, but nevertheless placing the minors with John without the ability to monitor the minors' well-being. She further contends she did not receive reasonable reunification services because: (1) the court's order for supervised visits with the minors undermined her ability to reunify with them; (2) the order for further supervised visits after the minors were placed with John was not designed to meet the unique needs of this family and achieve reunification; and (3) requiring her to obtain a divorce from the minors' stepfather in order to have unsupervised visits violates public policy. We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2008 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed petitions in the juvenile court alleging Dawn had physically abused seven-year-old Joseph and five-year-old Nathaniel by using a paddle to discipline them and forcing each child to watch as the other was hit. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (a).) Joseph's petition also alleged Dawn failed to protect Joseph from his stepfather, Timothy B., who struck him on his buttocks and thigh with a paddle, causing bruises. (§ 300, subd. (b).) Nathaniel's petition alleged Nathaniel was forced to hold Joseph's hand and watch Timothy discipline him. (§ 300, subd. (j).) The court detained the minors in out of home care.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
Dawn did not understand why the juvenile court had intervened, why the minors were so afraid of Timothy, or why they did not want to live with him. She minimized Timothy's abuse of the minors, referring to it as a "one-time mistake." The social worker instructed Dawn to stop talking to the minors about Timothy because they were still afraid of him.
At a jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the court sustained the allegations of the petitions, declared the minors dependents, removed them from Dawn's custody, and placed them in foster care. The court ordered Dawn to comply with the terms of her case plan, which included supervised visits with the minors.
In a parentage questionnaire, Dawn identified her former husband John as the minors' biological father. John had not had contact with the minors in two years, and had not complied with a court order from Washington requiring him to participate in a domestic violence treatment program and a parenting class. He was currently living on the island of Hawaii. The court ordered John to comply with his case plan, which included domestic violence treatment, parenting education and counseling.
Dawn was participating in therapy with Sherry Hummel, who noted Dawn had made some progress in understanding and accepting that Joseph's injuries were not inflicted accidentally. The minors' therapist, Linda Proctor, believed it was not in the minors' best interests to expand visitation with Dawn because they continued to show anxiety about seeing her. The minors' caregiver reported the minors wet their beds at night after visits with Dawn, and they did not want to speak to her when she telephoned. The social worker recommended Dawn's visits remain supervised.
During the next six months, Dawn completed a parenting skills class and an anger management class. She attended individual therapy weekly and visited the minors once a week for an hour and a half. She missed only two visits. The minors usually responded favorably during visits. However, during one visit, Joseph spontaneously told Dawn he wanted to stay with his caregiver because Dawn had hit him. On another occasion, Joseph tensed and began to shake when he saw Dawn.
When completing a questionnaire for a developmental assessment of Nathaniel, Dawn denied there had been any stress-producing events in his life. This caused the social worker to believe Dawn did not understand Nathaniel's behavior or how the minors' removal from her custody impacted them. When Nathaniel received a diagnosis of autism, Dawn reacted with a flat affect.
Social worker Eunice Aguilar reported that although Dawn had made progress with many of her therapeutic goals, she had not shown she was willing or able to protect the minors from contact with Timothy. Aguilar was concerned because Dawn had not been forthcoming about her current relationship with Timothy and had not mentioned that he had moved back into her community. Aguilar recommended six more months of services for Dawn. She also recommended six more months of services for John, who had been cooperative and eager to improve his relationship with the minors after having been out of their lives for several years.
In an attempt to facilitate conjoint therapy between Dawn and the minors, Proctor (the minors' therapist) met with Dawn and provided her with information about the minors' mental health issues. In Proctor's opinion, Dawn did not understand the severity of the physical abuse Timothy had inflicted on the minors.
At a six-month review hearing, the court found Dawn and John had made moderate progress with their case plans, and ordered six more months of services. The court continued the minors' placements with their caregiver.
Aguilar asked the court to order a psychological evaluation of Dawn in order to assess her ability to continue participating in individual and conjoint therapy. Aguilar noted Dawn continued to talk to the minors about the case and to make promises about the future, despite being told repeatedly by all the service providers and the minors' caregiver not to do so. It was unclear whether Dawn intended to remain in a relationship with Timothy. She claimed she no longer communicated with him and he now lived in Nebraska. When Dawn said she had no money to get a divorce, Aguilar referred her to volunteer lawyer programs.
John continued to cooperate with Agency. He told Aguilar he was able to financially support the minors, was willing to obtain housing that met Agency's standards, and would address the minors' medical needs, as well as their behavioral issues. The instructor of John's domestic violence treatment program reported John sincerely wanted to be in the minors' lives and had a lot of insight into the situation that led to his divorce from Dawn and his separation from his children.
Proctor terminated conjoint therapy between Joseph and Dawn because Dawn was not benefitting from it. She was unable to consistently apply the concrete and direct information provided by Proctor about how to manage both children. Although Dawn loved her children, she had difficulty recognizing any of their needs that were at odds with her feelings. Proctor supported Agency's recommendation that Dawn have a psychological evaluation.
The minors' caregiver reported the minors displayed sexualized behavior. On two occasions, Joseph said Dawn had touched his "privates." An evaluation of Joseph showed he had Reactive Attachment disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. Nathaniel had a history of tantrums, defiance, aggression and violence toward others.
When Dawn began visiting the minors daily in their caregiver's home, their anxiety increased and Nathaniel had more frequent night terrors. Proctor believed the minors' anxiety resulted in part from Dawn constantly talking to them about returning home. Aguilar was concerned about Dawn's ability to provide for the minors' safety and well-being. Because Dawn was still married to Timothy, it was possible that she would allow him to have contact with the minors despite the court's no contact order. Aguilar believed it would be detrimental to the minors to allow unsupervised visits with Dawn.
A court-ordered psychological evaluation showed Dawn had limited coping skills, poor impulse control and limited ability to manage stress. She did not have a clear understanding of the minors' diagnoses and problems. When discussing the abuse of the minors, Dawn focused on cultural reasons for using corporal punishment rather than honestly examining the role she played. She shifted responsibility for failing to protect her children to her parents, other family members and southern cultural influences. She told the evaluator she was investigated for child abuse, but was never accused because the investigation was inconclusive. Although Dawn presented herself as a caring parent, she had not practiced appropriate parenting and could not see, on a deeper level, the inappropriateness of her parenting strategies. The evaluator questioned Dawn's ability to safely parent her children "without a reasonable balance between healthy concern for her own integrity and that of others." The evaluator concluded Dawn would benefit from continued therapy in order to gain deeper insight into the consequences of her actions, verbalize and accept responsibility for the abuse she inflicted on the minors, adopt reasonable expectations for the minors' behaviors and abilities, and establish appropriate boundaries in order to eliminate abusive treatment of the minors.
In an addendum report, social worker Anthony Scheri recommended the court place the minors with John and terminate its jurisdiction. John had willingly enrolled in programs that provided him with the skills necessary to properly parent the minors, and he had suitable housing for them. He also researched and arranged for the minors' educational, medical and mental health needs, and reported the school was able to accommodate their Individualized Education Plans (IEPs). Both minors said they wanted to live with their father in Hawaii. In Scheri's opinion, John had gone "above and beyond" for the minors, and had stepped up to satisfy every requirement for placement. Scheri believed John presented no concerns for the safe placement of the minors with him.
Joseph Clem, who supervised visits between Dawn and the minors, reported Dawn did a good job and the minors had a good relationship with her. The minors did not resist going to visits and showed no fear when they were with her. Clem had no concerns about Dawn's ability to care for or protect the minors. The minors said they liked visiting Dawn, and were not afraid of her because Timothy was not around.
Social worker Scheri reported that during a visit between Dawn and the minors in May 2009, Dawn became upset when Joseph mentioned going to live with John. In the minors' presence, Dawn cursed and accused the caregiver of talking to the minors about the case. She eventually regained her composure, but Clem, who supervised the visit, expressed concern because Dawn's reaction had an obvious effect on the minors. Scheri believed Dawn should have been able to show more self-control and flexibility instead of outwardly displaying her emotions.
At a 12-month hearing, social worker Shelly Paule testified her role in the case was to evaluate the appropriateness of Agency's recommendation to place the minors with John. Paule agreed with Agency that it would not be detrimental to the minors to place them with John. John had come to San Diego for the hearing, and the minors were having successful overnight visits with him. He clearly understood the minors' needs and the challenges they presented. Paule was not concerned about John exposing the minors to domestic violence, noting he had no domestic violence history with anyone other than Dawn. John supported Dawn having visits with the minors.
Based on a review of Agency's reports and Dawn's psychological evaluation, Paule believed the level of risk to the minors would be high if visitation with Dawn became unsupervised. Paule noted Dawn minimized concerns about the physical discipline of the minors, and had not taken responsibility for it. Dawn put her own needs before those of the minors. Additionally, Dawn had renewed contact with Timothy even though she claimed otherwise. Dawn's pattern of withholding information from Agency concerned Paule.
John testified he was aware the minors had special needs, and he was willing to administer their psychotropic medication as long as they need it. John would take care of the minors' educational and nutrition needs, and would facilitate contact between the minors and Dawn.
Dawn testified she completed two parenting classes and learned to communicate better with the minors, meet their needs and discipline them properly. She knew corporal punishment was not acceptable, and would never use it again. During therapy, which she had attended for 18 months, Dawn discussed how to properly discipline the minors, address Nathaniel's autism, react to the minors' sexual acting out, and relate to the minors at visits. She volunteered at the minors' school and helped them with their homework. The minors enjoyed their weekly visits with her, and called her "mom."
Dawn further testified the minors were removed from her custody because Timothy used a paddle to "swat [Joseph] on the butt." She acknowledged it was the wrong thing to do. However, she also testified that when Timothy hit Joseph hard enough to leave a bruise, it was an accident. Timothy did not intend to hurt Joseph because he loved the minors. On cross-examination, Dawn admitted the minors were removed from her custody because she, too, used a paddle to discipline them. She chose that form of discipline because it was the way she and Timothy were disciplined by their parents. Dawn discussed this discipline method with family members who also used it.
Dawn said she was committed to reunifying with the minors and would not be in a relationship with someone who would harm them. She believed the minors would be devastated if they were placed with John in Hawaii and could not visit her. She could not support their wish to live with John, and believed it was in their best interests to live with her.
Dawn admitted she continued her relationship with Timothy after the minors were removed, but said he left the area in early 2008, returned to San Diego and then left permanently in August 2008. He now lives in Nebraska. She had not spoken to Timothy for one or two months, and was pursuing a divorce from him.
The court continued the hearing for two weeks. Agency filed an addendum report, noting Scheri conducted a home visit at John's temporary residence in San Diego. Scheri observed a strong parent-child bond, mutual respect between John and the minors, and a willingness by the minors to follow John's directions. Scheri received input from Nathaniel's therapist and another mental health professional, who also recognized John's parenting skills and ability to care for his children. The minors stated they wanted to live with John, and Agency had no safety concerns about placing them with him.
When the hearing resumed, Hummel testified she had had more than 52 therapy sessions with Dawn. In treatment, Dawn worked on an atonement letter to the minors, but never presented it to them because they no longer had conjoint therapy. Hummel disagreed with Paule's assessment that Dawn lacked empathy for her children. She said Dawn was very concerned about the minors' emotional stability and their feelings. Hummel did not discuss relationship issues with Dawn during therapy, and did not know whether Dawn intended to remain in a relationship with Timothy.
Hummel disagreed with the conclusion of the psychological evaluator that Dawn had narcissistic traits and that she shifted blame for the child abuse to others. In Hummel's opinion, Dawn took full responsibility for her actions, she would never again hit her children, and she was able to protect them from future abuse. Hummel believed Dawn's relationship with the minors would benefit from expanded visitation, and she had no concerns about visits being unsupervised.
Clem testified he supervised weekly visits between Dawn and the minors for a year. Dawn was appropriate with the minors, who enjoyed the visits. During one visit, Joseph saw Dawn become agitated, upset and angry when he mentioned seeing John. Clem believed the minors would have benefitted from more frequent visits with Dawn.
Before taking a two-week recess, the court authorized the minors to travel to Hawaii with John for a visit after the school year concluded and after the minors had a supervised visit with Dawn. At the resumed hearing, the court heard additional testimony from John in Hawaii by telephone. After considering the evidence and hearing argument of counsel, the court found there was a substantial risk of detriment to the minors if they were returned to Dawn's care. It further found it would not be detrimental to the minors to be placed with John. However, the court declined to terminate jurisdiction. Finding Dawn had made some progress with her case plan, the court continued services for her and ordered visits with the minors to remain supervised, with the possibility of unsupervised visits when appropriate.
DISCUSSION
I
Dawn contends the court erred by finding ongoing supervision of the minors was necessary, but nevertheless placing the minors with John in Hawaii where no supervision was available. She asserts this created a substantial risk of detriment to the minors.
A
Section 361.2 and Standard of Review
Under section 361.2, subdivision (a), the court must place a dependent child with a previously noncustodial parent who requests custody, unless the placement would be detrimental to the child's safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being. Because the noncustodial parent has both a constitutionally protected interest in custody and a statutory right to custody, there must be clear and convincing evidence of detriment to the child before the court can deny the noncustodial parent's request for custody. (In re Isayah C. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 684, 696; In re Luke M. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1426.) Clear and convincing evidence requires a high probability of proof, meaning the evidence is so apparent that there can be no substantial doubt of the fact established. (In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1205.) Section 361.2, subdivision (a), with its heightened standard of proof, effectuates the legislative preference for placement with the previously noncustodial parent. (In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1132.) Thus, absent clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to the child to be placed with the parent, the law requires placement with that parent. (§ 361.2, subd. (a); In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 169 [parenting is a fundamental right, and is disturbed only in extreme cases of persons acting in a fashion incompatible with parenthood].)
If the court places a child with the previously noncustodial parent under section 361.2, subdivision (a), it may either: (1) grant sole legal and physical custody to the noncustodial parent and terminate jurisdiction, or (2) grant custody to the noncustodial parent, but continue its jurisdiction and provide reunification services to either the offending parent, the noncustodial parent or both parents. (§ 361.2, subd. (b); In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131.)
When the court's findings as to detriment and the need for continuing supervision are challenged on appeal, we consider the record favorably to the order and determine whether there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the findings by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Luke M., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 1426; In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.) In this regard, we may not reweigh the evidence or express an independent judgment on it. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.) Issues of fact and credibility are matters for the trial court alone. (In re Amy M. (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 849, 859- 860; In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1177.) We must affirm the order even if other evidence supports a contrary finding. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B
Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding of No Detriment
Here, the evidence showed placing the minors with John would not be detrimental to them. John, who was a previously noncustodial parent, had fully cooperated with Agency and satisfied every requirement for placement, including successfully completing programs that provided him with the skills necessary to properly parent the minors. He participated in therapy and an anger management/domestic violence program, and now had a great deal of insight into his past negative behaviors. Agency had no concerns that John would expose the minors to domestic violence. John had suitable housing for the minors and he had arranged for their educational, medical and mental health needs. He was willing to administer their psychotropic medications. Both minors wanted to live with their father in Hawaii. John supported the minors having visits with Dawn.
During the time the minors were having overnight visits with John, he showed he clearly understood their special needs and the challenges they presented. There was a strong parent-child bond and mutual respect between John and the minors, and they followed his directions. The social workers and mental health professionals all recognized John's parenting skills and ability to care for his children, and none of them had any safety concerns about the minors' placement with John. Further, during the course of the proceedings, the minors went to Hawaii, and all reports were positive regarding their reactions to John and their living situation, and John's ability to meet the minors' needs.
In analyzing detriment, the court was entitled to find John's present circumstances outweighed any negative inferences to be drawn from his past conduct. The court was also entitled to consider the social workers to be credible and give great weight to their assessments and testimony. In this regard, we cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at pp. 52-53.) Substantial evidence supports the court's finding it would not be detrimental to place the minors with John. (See In re John M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1564, 1570-1571 [minors' need for services, lack of relationship with father, paucity of information about father and other factors were insufficient to support finding of detriment under § 361.2].) This finding, based on the evidence, furthered the Legislature's careful balance of interests reflected in the dependency law to (1) protect the minors; (2) preserve the family and safeguard John's fundamental right to raise his children; and (3) provide a stable, permanent home for the minors in a timely manner. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 446.)
Dawn asserts it was detrimental to place the minors with John as shown by the court's finding that continued supervision was necessary. This argument, however, conflates the issues of detriment and continued jurisdiction. As to detriment under section 361.2, subdivision (a), the court expressly found there was no clear and convincing evidence that placing the minors with John would be detrimental to the minors' physical or emotional well-being. Nevertheless, the court believed that given the minors' special needs, John's absence from their lives for four years, and John's history of not following court orders, ongoing court supervision was warranted under section 361.2, subdivision (b). The court's concerns about John do not undermine its finding there would be no detriment to the minors to place them with John in Hawaii.
Specifically, Dawn claims the court found it was necessary to continue family maintenance services due to John's history, which included domestic violence, a threat to kidnap the minors, seven counts of violating a protective order, a contempt of court finding, placing Joseph in an icy bath, abandoning the minors for four years and being observed by Agency for only a short time before returning to Hawaii where no new information regarding the minors' well-being was known.
C
ICPC Approval Was Not Required for Placement with John
Dawn asserts the court's order placing the minors with John violates the law under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC). To the extent Dawn claims the court erred by placing the minors with John in Hawaii without prior ICPC approval, she is incorrect. As she concedes in her reply brief, an ICPC is not required for placement of a child with an out-of-state parent. (In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1575.) The court did not need an approved ICPC to make its finding of no detriment.
As this court noted in In re John M., supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at page 1572, "nothing in the ICPC prevents the use of an ICPC evaluation as a means of gathering information before placing a child with such a parent. In that situation, however, a favorable recommendation by the agency in the receiving state is not a prerequisite to placement if the evaluation and other evidence show that the placement would not be detrimental." (Italics added.) Here, the court presumably believed it had adequate evidence about John and his circumstances in Hawaii to make its placement decision without an ICPC.
Once the court found no detriment, it then properly considered whether ongoing supervision was necessary. (See In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1131.) The court has broad discretion when, after granting custody to a previously noncustodial parent, it determines whether to terminate jurisdiction or continue its supervision. (In re Sarah M. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1495-1496, disapproved on other grounds in In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204.) Although Agency, John and minors' counsel all argued in favor of the court terminating jurisdiction, the court disagreed based on a "combination of factors." Because the record supports a finding that ongoing supervision was necessary, we cannot say the court abused its discretion. (In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1134.)
Consistent with this position, county counsel argued against initiating an ICPC voluntary agreement to have the Hawaii social services agency monitor the minors' placement because Agency did not believe court oversight was necessary.
Dawn asserts the court properly continued its supervision, but abused its discretion by sending the minors to Hawaii without a mechanism by which it could monitor them in John's care. However, interstate monitoring of placements and services are purely voluntary on the part of the receiving state. (Fam. Code, § 7901, art. 5, subd. (b); In re Johnny S. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 969, 979.) The court cannot be faulted if the Hawaii social services agency declines to monitor the case. The court understood this limitation, and nevertheless believed it had the ability to monitor the minors' well-being without an ICPC. In this regard, the court encouraged Agency to make efforts to obtain information from the minors' therapists, teachers and childcare providers in Hawaii. It also set a special hearing in two weeks to further consider its options with respect to what information is available from Hawaii and how communication with that state could be accomplished. Under these circumstances, there was no abuse of discretion.
II
Dawn contends Agency failed to provide her with reasonable reunification services. Specifically, she asserts: (1) the visitation she received—supervised visits two hours a week—was inadequate and undermined her ability to reunify with the minors; (2) the court's order for more supervised visits cannot be considered reasonable services; and (3) conditioning a parent's unsupervised visits on obtaining a divorce violates public policy.
Agency claims Dawn forfeited this issue on appeal by not raising it in the juvenile court. However, the record shows otherwise. At the 12-month hearing, Dawn argued she had not been afforded appropriate time for visitation and reunification. She also asked for unsupervised visits.
A
Visitation Rights and Standard of Review
The purpose of reunification services is to remedy the problems that led to the minor's removal from parental custody. (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362.) Each reunification plan must be appropriate to the particular individual and based on the unique facts of the case. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) Visitation is an essential component of reunification. (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580.)
The juvenile court defines a parent's visitation rights by balancing the parent's interests in visitation with the child's best interests. (In re Jennifer G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 752, 757.) The court may impose restrictions on parental visitation, consistent with the child's best interests, based on the particular circumstances of the case. (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1009; In re Clara B. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 988, 999.) The state's interest in assuring the best interests of the child justifies any limited intrusion on a parent's right to visitation. (In re Melissa H. (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 173, 175.)
The court has broad discretion in making visitation orders, which we review for abuse of discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351-1352.) The juvenile court's order will not be disturbed on appeal unless the court has exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination. When two or more inferences reasonably can be deduced from the facts, we have no authority to reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319; In re Tanis H. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1226-1227.)
B
The Court Properly Denied Dawn's Request for Unsupervised Visits
Here, the court found Dawn's reunification services were reasonable and visitation should remain supervised. Throughout the dependency proceedings, Dawn's visits with the minors were required to be supervised because she minimized the minors' abuse and failed to take responsibility for it, lacked insight as to how the abuse affected the minors, and was unable to put the minors' needs ahead of her own needs. Dawn also withheld information from Agency, including the nature of her relationship with Timothy. The minors displayed anxiety and negative behaviors during and after visits with Dawn. When Dawn began visiting the minors daily in the home of their caregiver, their anxiety increased. Thus, visits were required to be supervised.
As the court acknowledged at the 12-month hearing, Dawn completed two parenting classes, was attentive to the minors' educational, medical and therapy needs, and was affectionate and appropriate during supervised visits. However, in determining there was some risk to the minors if visits were unsupervised, the court noted the psychological evaluation, as borne out by Dawn's testimony and demeanor on the witness stand, showed she continued to minimize her role in the abuse of the minors, and had limited insight into how the abuse affected them. The court was also concerned that Dawn had not been open and honest about her ongoing contact with Timothy.
Although Hummel believed unsupervised visits would not be detrimental to the minors, other evidence showed Dawn needed further services to assure the minors' safety by addressing her role in the minors' abuse, adopting reasonable expectations for the minors' behaviors and abilities, and establishing appropriate boundaries to eliminate abusive treatment of them. Contrary to Dawn's position, the court did not deny unsupervised visits because she became upset during one visit or because of the friendship between the social worker and the minors' former caregiver. The order to continue supervised visitation was consistent with the minors' best interests and well within the court's broad discretion.
C
The Court's Visitation Order Did Not Violate Public Policy
Dawn asserts Agency improperly sought an order denying her unsupervised visits based on her failure to divorce Timothy. She claims the social worker asked Timothy to leave California, and the court found her current marriage to Timothy was a concern.
The record belies Dawn's assertion. Although the social worker gave Dawn referrals to volunteer lawyer programs when Dawn said she could not afford a divorce, there is no evidence that either the court or Agency conditioned unsupervised visits on her obtaining a divorce from Timothy. What legitimately concerned Agency and the court was Dawn's lack of candor regarding her knowledge of Timothy's whereabouts and the fact Dawn had had contact with Timothy and did not tell Agency. As the court stated, "Whether she's legally married to him... is really a red herring.... [B]ut it's more [Dawn's] failure to give open information about [Timothy] and the fact that he does have the possibility to come back into her life." Dawn's current marriage to Timothy was not the basis for the court's order denying unsupervised visits.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, J., O'ROURKE, J.