Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Valeriano Saucedo, Judge., Super. Ct. No. JJD060851
Jackie Menaster, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Carlos A. Martinez and Kelly E. LeBel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
Before Cornell, Acting P.J., Dawson, J. and Kane, J.
The juvenile court adjudged appellant, Joseph R., a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) after it sustained allegations charging Joseph with assault with a deadly weapon (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and possession of less than an ounce of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b)). On October 11, 2006, the juvenile court placed Joseph on probation on certain terms and conditions, including that he serve 30 days on the electronic monitor and that he perform 80 hours of community service. On appeal, Joseph contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s finding that he committed an assault with a deadly weapon offense. We will affirm.
FACTS
On April 15, 2006, Lorenzo C. and his cousin Eddie R. were on Lorenzo’s front porch in Exeter when a car driven by 15-year-old Joseph passed the house, made a U-turn, and double parked on the street next to a truck. Joseph, Jose Acevedo and three other males quickly got out of the car and walked toward Lorenzo and Eddie. Acevedo and a male juvenile went inside the fence surrounding the front yard while Joseph and the other two males stood on the sidewalk approximately 40 feet away from the house. Acevedo and the male juvenile then threw two bottles and some rocks at the house. One bottle and a rock went inside the house through the front window. Another bottle and several rocks hit the outside of the house. During the incident, Joseph stayed with the other males by the curb and did not say anything.
As soon as Acevedo and the male juvenile began throwing the bottles and rocks, Lorenzo and Eddie ran into the house and called the police. Joseph was arrested later that night after he was detained, and Lorenzo and Eddie identified him in an in-field showup.
DISCUSSION
Joseph contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s finding that he committed an assault offense because it shows only his mere presence at the scene (see, e.g., In re Jose T. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1455, 1460), and it fails to show that he was aware Acevedo and the other male juvenile were going to assault Lorenzo and Eddie or that he encouraged, assisted, promoted, or aided them in doing so. We disagree.
“In reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply the following standard of review: ‘[We] consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment. The test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.] Our sole function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] The standard of review is the same in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. [Citations.] The California Supreme Court has held, ‘Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].”’ [Citations.]” (People v. Balkin (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 487, 491-492.
“[A]n aider and abettor’s guilt ‘is based on a combination of the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own acts and own mental state.’ [Citation.] ‘“[O]nce it is proved that ‘the principal has caused an actus reus, the liability of each of the secondary parties should be assessed according to his own mens rea.’”’ [Citations.] Thus, proof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus -- a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea -- knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus -- conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime. [Citation.]” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.)
Moreover, neither failure to prevent a crime nor mere presence at the scene, which does not itself assist the commission of the crime, amount to aiding and abetting. (People v. Swanson-Birabent (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 733, 744.) The record here, however, shows more than Joseph’s presence at the scene of the assault and his failure to prevent it.
Joseph drove Acevedo and three male juveniles to Lorenzo’s house and double parked on the street, which allowed the group to get out of the car quickly to confront the victims and to escape quickly after the assault. Further, although they did not throw anything, Joseph and two of his companions stood at the sidewalk watching as Acevedo and the male juvenile threw rocks and bottles at the victims. The juvenile court reasonably could conclude from the above circumstances that Joseph assisted Acevedo and the juvenile male in assaulting the victims by driving them to the victims’ house and by exiting the car quickly and standing on the sidewalk, thereby discouraging the victims from fighting back. (Cf. People v. Swanson-Birabent, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 744 [defendant’s conduct in standing at the edge of the bed while boyfriend sexually assaulted her daughter assisted the assault by encouraging boyfriend to assault victim and victim to comply].)
The juvenile court also could reasonably conclude from the above circumstances and from Joseph’s failure to do anything to prevent the assault or disassociate himself from Acevedo and the juvenile who assaulted the victims that he shared their unlawful intent and intended to assist them through the conduct discussed above. (Cf. People v. Jones (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 9, 15 [inference of complicity made in part from defendant’s failure to disassociate himself from perpetrator of crime].) Accordingly, we reject Joseph’s contention that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court’s finding that he committed an assault offense by aiding and abetting Acevedo and the male juvenile in assaulting the victims.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.