Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Becky Dugan, Judge, Super.Ct.No. RIJ109173
Donna P. Chirco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joe S. Rank, County Counsel, and Anna M. Deckert, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
OPINION
HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
Emily G. (mother) appeals from the termination of her parental rights as to her son, Jose M. (child) under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends that (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in removing the child from the maternal grandmother’s home, and (2) the court should have found, based on mother’s visitation, contact, and “the special circumstances of this case” that a plan of legal guardianship or long term-foster care was in the child’s best interest. We find no error, and we affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (Department) filed a petition on December 28, 2004, alleging that the child (born in April 2002) came within section 300, subdivisions (b) and (g). The petition alleged that mother and father had engaged in acts of domestic violence in front of the child, for which father had been arrested. Father had three previous arrests for domestic violence; mother had failed to obtain a restraining order; and father had a history of substance abuse.
Father is not a party to this appeal, and some facts relating primarily to father have therefore been omitted from this statement of facts.
In the detention report filed on December 28, 2004, the social worker stated that mother had reported father had grabbed mother’s arm during an argument, pulled on her, and yelled at her, but mother denied father had hit her. Mother reported that father had been using methamphetamines for a few months. She had not obtained a restraining order because she wanted to continue the relationship. The maternal grandmother asked to be considered for placement. The juvenile court detained the child and ordered visitation for parents. The court authorized the social worker to place the child with mother if mother was “making progress in alternatives to domestic violence, suitable home eval[uation] and mother in compliance with case plan.”
In the jurisdiction/disposition report filed on January 19, 2005, the social worker stated that mother had admitted being a victim of domestic violence. Mother admitted she and father had used illegal drugs together in the past, and father was still using drugs, but mother had stopped using drugs during her pregnancy with the child, and since then had “‘only smoked weed a couple of times.’” The social worker assessed the maternal grandmother for placement but found that her home lacked sufficient space for the child, in that four adults, four adolescents, and an infant were already living in the three-bedroom home, and three adults and one child lived in the garage.
In an addendum report filed on March 11, 2005, the social worker reported that the maternal grandmother had moved to a new residence with her children and no other adults. Mother had obtained employment at a hotel and had told father she did not want to continue their relationship. She had submitted two clean drug tests and was on a waiting list for domestic violence counseling. Mother was visiting the child consistently every week.
The juvenile court struck the allegations under section 300, subdivision (g), found the remaining allegations of the petition true, and found that the child came within section 300, subdivision (b). The court ordered family reunification services and “frequent and liberal” visitation.
In the report prepared for the six-month review, the social worker stated that the child remained in a foster home. Mother was working as a receptionist and living with the maternal grandmother. Mother had been on a waiting list for a domestic violence program since February 2005. She did not drug test when requested, and she had not enrolled in a drug treatment program or parenting education as required under her reunification plan. Mother had two-hour monitored visits with the child every week, and the visits were positive and loving for mother and the child.
At the review hearing on October 12, 2005, mother testified she was living with her mother and had been employed full time for one week, after having been fired from an earlier job. She had attempted to enroll in a substance abuse counseling program the previous month but had been placed on a waiting list and had only recently enrolled in the program when an opening arose. The court found that mother’s progress in her reunification program had been “completely unsatisfactory.” The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
In the report for the section 366.26 hearing filed on January 24, 2006, the social worker reported that the child remained in non relative foster care, although the maternal grandmother was being assessed as a prospective adoptive parent. The social worker requested a continuance to obtain the results of the assessment. The maternal grandmother visited the child for two hours each week, and the child appeared to enjoy the visits. Mother was residing with the maternal grandmother, and mother also visited the child for two hours each week.
In a review report filed on March 13, 2006, the social worker stated mother was eight months pregnant and was living with that baby’s father. She was not working. Mother visited the child for two hours each week, and mother and child appeared to be bonded. The social worker found grandmother to be an appropriate caretaker, and the child enjoyed visiting with the grandmother. The court authorized mother’s weekly visits to take place at the grandmother’s home.
In an addendum report filed on June 6, 2006, the social worker reported that the child had been placed in the maternal grandmother’s home. The social worker recommended that the case be continued for approval of the maternal grandmother as the prospective adoptive parent of the child. The court granted the continuance.
Mother gave birth to an infant who tested positive for methamphetamines at birth. The infant was removed from mother’s custody and placed in the maternal grandmother’s home.
In an adoption assessment filed on July 26, 2006, the adoption social worker raised several concerns. First, grandmother’s income was insufficient to cover her expenses, and she relied on her boyfriend to supplement her income; however, the grandmother had submitted an application for foster care funding for the infant and child, and grandmother’s 19-year-old daughter had agreed to help financially. Second, grandmother’s 12-year-old son had a condition, hypospadias, that required surgery, for which he had not received medical care since age five. However, grandmother recently had taken the son to the doctor, and the surgery had been scheduled. Third, grandmother’s 14-year-old daughter was doing poorly in school and did not attend summer school because she did not feel like attending. However, grandmother and the daughter had agreed to attend counseling. Fourth, grandmother’s boyfriend had had a DUI (driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs) and had not had his driver’s license reinstated, yet he had been transporting the grandmother and the child.
Based on the concerns in the adoption assessment, the juvenile court removed child from the grandmother’s home and again continued the case. The child was placed in a nonrelative foster home, which was assessed as a prospective adoptive home. The maternal grandmother continued to visit the child twice a month.
At the section 366.26 hearing, mother requested that the child be returned to the grandmother’s home and requested a less restrictive plan, such as legal guardianship. The juvenile court found the child adoptable and found that none of the statutory exceptions to termination of parental rights applied. The court terminated the parental rights of both parents.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Removal of Child from Maternal Grandmother’s Home
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion under section 366.26, subdivision (n) in removing the child from the maternal grandmother’s home because the maternal grandmother qualified as a prospective adoptive parent under that section. The Department argues, however, that mother lacks standing to raise the issue, such a challenge must be brought by a petition for extraordinary writ, and the appeal is not timely.
Section 366.26, subdivision (n)(1) provides that, at a section 366.26 hearing or thereafter, the court “may designate a current caretaker as a prospective adoptive parent if the child has lived with the caretaker for at least six months, the caretaker currently expresses a commitment to adopt the child, and the caretaker has taken at least one step to facilitate the adoption process.”
We agree with the Department that mother has no standing to raise the issue. A prerequisite to standing is that the party who appeals “‘has rights that may suffer some injury, actual or threatened.’ [Citation.]” (Cesar V. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1034.) Stated another way, “only a party aggrieved by the judgment has standing to appeal,” and “‘[o]ne is considered “aggrieved” whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment.’” (In re Lauren P. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 763, 768.)
An appellant “‘cannot urge errors which affect only another party who does not appeal.’” (Cesar V. v. Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1035.) California courts have held that a parent does not have standing to assert that the juvenile court erred concerning relative placement issues. (Ibid.) “The interest of siblings or other relatives in their relationship with the minor is separate from that of the parent. [Citation.]” (In re Frank L. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 700, 703; Cesar V. v. Superior Court, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1035 [holding that a father had no standing to appeal the denial of placement with a relative after reunification services had been terminated]. In In re Devin M. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1538, 1540-1541, the court held that a mother had no standing to seek review of the child’s foster placement after the termination of her parental rights. The court explained, “A parent cannot raise issues on appeal which do not affect his or her own rights. [Citation.] That is, a parent’s interest is in reunification. The interest of siblings or other relatives in their relationship with the minor is separate from that of the parent.” (Id. at p. 1541.)
We conclude that mother has no standing to raise the issue of the child’s removal from the grandmother’s home.
B. Parental Relationship Exception
Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it terminated mother’s parental rights because there was sufficient evidence of a benefit to the child to continue the parental relationship under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A). That section provides an exception to termination of parental rights when “[t]he parents . . . have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).)
Courts have applied both the substantial evidence (e.g., In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 799, 809) and the abuse of discretion (e.g., In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1342) standards of review to a trial court’s rejection of a statutory exception to the termination of parental rights. Regardless of which standard of review we apply, “[t]he practical differences between the two standards of review are not significant” (In re Jasmine D., supra, at p. 1351), and either standard leads us to the same result.
We will assume for purposes of argument that mother has established the first prong of the statutory exception under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) – that mother participated in “regular visitation and contact” with the child. However, to establish the second prong – that the child “would benefit from continuing” the parent-child relationship (ibid.), mother was required to demonstrate the child would suffer great harm if that relationship were severed. (In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, 853.) The statute requires “the parent to show that he or she has a parent/child relationship with the child, rather than a friendship.” (Id. at p. 854.) In other words, the parent must show that the “‘benefit from continuing the [parent/child] relationship’ . . . promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
To support her argument that the parental relationship exception applied, mother pointed to evidence that during her weekly two-hour visits with the child, she brought him food and toys, and mother and child watched movies and played. The foster mother believed mother loved the child very much, and vice versa. In addition, mother encouraged the child to listen to the maternal grandmother.
This evidence falls far short of establishing that the benefit to the child from continuing the relationship with mother outweighs the benefit to the child from the permanence and stability of an adoptive home. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575. We conclude mother has failed to establish the parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights. s
IV. DISPOSITION
The orders appealed from are affirmed.
We concur: MCKINSTER J., RICHLI J.