Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J06-00373
RIVERA, J.
Jose G. appeals from a dispositional order placing him on probation. He contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that he committed vandalism because no evidence was introduced that he did not own the vandalized property, an essential element of the offense. We affirm.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On March 9, 2006, a petition was filed alleging that defendant committed the misdemeanors of vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A) (count 1)) and possession of vandalism tools (Pen. Code, § 594.2, subd. (a) (count 2)). The contested jurisdictional hearing was held on October 26, 2006. The evidence at the hearing showed that on the evening of December 18, 2005, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Officer Jones was on patrol in Oakley in the vicinity of Norcross Lane and West Acme Lane. He went by a white wall on West Acme that had continually been the target of gang graffiti. Jones saw defendant standing about three feet in front of the wall with a spray paint can in his hand. Defendant was wearing a knit cap on his head and had a glove on his right hand. Jones saw that “X4 Norte NCL,” signifying a local Norteño gang, had been spray painted in red over blue graffiti that was already on the wall. When Jones drove by the wall 30 minutes earlier, the wall had only blue graffiti, stating “LMT X3,” which he recognized as depicting a Sureño gang. Jones opined that the damage to the wall resulting from the red paint was less than $400. A photograph of the wall showing the graffiti that Jones observed was admitted into evidence.
Jones drove around the wall so that he could contact defendant. Approximately 200 feet from the wall, he saw a maroon and silver car with its lights off parked on Hall Street. When Jones got back to Norcross, he could not find defendant. He proceeded on Norcross and then saw the maroon car on Acme turning right onto Norcross. Jones pursued the car and noticed that it was missing a license plate lamp light. Jones effected a vehicle stop and saw defendant in the back seat of the car. He found a knit cap and a can of paint on the floorboard behind the front passenger seat. Defendant and the two other people in the car were wearing red clothing. Jones testified that the red clothing was commonly worn by Norteño gang members.
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding because the prosecution failed to prove that he did not own the property allegedly vandalized, an essential element of the offense of vandalism. The Attorney General argues that it was reasonable for the court to infer that defendant did not own the wall because the court, through its judicial notice of the petition, was aware that defendant lived at a different address.
At the close of the prosecution’s case, defense counsel moved pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 701.1 (section 701.1) for a judgment of dismissal, arguing, as here, that the prosecutor failed to put forth any evidence of the element that the property allegedly defaced or damaged had belonged to another. The prosecutor argued that the court could infer that the wall did not belong to defendant because the wall was not located at the address defendant gave to the court at his arraignment. The court denied the motion, finding that it could conclude that the wall did not belong to defendant based on reasonable inferences from the evidence.
The prosecutor also urged the court that a different standard of proof, other than reasonable doubt, applied at this juncture in the proceedings. We presume that the court followed the law and applied the correct standard. (Evid. Code, § 664; People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069.)
Section 701.1 is substantially similar to Penal Code section 1118 governing motions to acquit in criminal trials. (In re Anthony J. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 718, 727.) Hence, the rules and procedures applicable to Penal Code section 1118 apply with equal force to juvenile proceedings. (Ibid.; In re Man J. (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 475, 482.) “Thus, the requirement in a criminal case that on a motion for acquittal the trial court is required ‘to weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, and determine that the case against the defendant is “proved beyond a reasonable doubt before [the defendant] is required to put on a defense” ’ applies equally well to motions to dismiss brought in juvenile proceedings.” (In re Anthony J., supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 727, quoting In re Andre G. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 62, 66.) On appeal, “the standard for review of the juvenile court’s denial of a motion to dismiss is whether there is substantial evidence to support the offense charged in the petition.” (In re Man J., supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 482.)
Penal Code section 594, subdivision (a) provides that “[e]very person who maliciously commits any of the following acts with respect to any real or personal property not his own . . . is guilty of vandalism: [¶] (1) Defaces with graffiti or other inscribed material. [¶] (2) Damages. [¶] (3) Destroys.” In order to prove vandalism, the prosecution must show that defendant did not own the property. (See People v. Kahanic (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 461, 463-465 (Kahanic) [to constitute vandalism, the property must be “ ‘not [the defendant’s] own’ ”]; CALCRIM No. 2900 [“To prove that the defendant is guilty of [vandalism] the People must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant maliciously (defaced with graffiti . . . damaged [or] destroyed) . . . property; [AND] [¶] 2. The defendant (did not own the property/owned the property with someone else) . . . .”].) “The essence of the crime [of vandalism] is in the physical acts against the ownership interest of another.” (Kahanic, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 466.)
In Kahanic, the court held that a wife was guilty of vandalizing a car that was community property even though she had an equal ownership interest in it. (Kahanic, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 466.) “Each community property owner has an equal ownership interest and, although undivided, one which the criminal law protects from unilateral nonconsensual damage or destruction by the other marital partner.” (Ibid.) The court also noted that Penal Code section 594’s reference to property not his own “excludes criminality only when the actor-defendant is involved with property wholly his or her own.” (Ibid.)
Here, defendant, a minor, lacked the capacity to execute a contract relating to real property. (Fam. Code, § 6701.) Hence, the juvenile court could reasonably have inferred that he did not own the wall. And there was evidence that defendant lived at an address and locality other than the location of the wall. Even if defendant’s parents owned the wall, that alone would not have provided defendant with a defense because he did not own the property and there was no evidence that he had permission to spray paint the wall. (Kahanic, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 466; see Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (e) [graffiti includes any unauthorized inscription]; see, also In re Rudy L. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1007, 1012-1014 [lack of permission not an element of offense of vandalism but permission is a defense].)
Accordingly, the evidence before the juvenile court was sufficient to establish that vandalism was committed. The court thus properly denied defendant’s motion for a judgment of dismissal under section 701.1.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: RUVOLO, P.J., REARDON, J.