Opinion
(5586)
The Commissioner of children and youth services filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the respondent parents with respect to their minor child. The trial court granted the petition, and the respondent mother appealed. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mother's motion to bifurcate the proceeding to prevent evidence to the effect that the child's foster mother wished to adopt him, which was relevant to the issue of a post-termination disposition of the child, from contaminating that court's decision as to whether to terminate parental rights.
Argued June 2, 1987
Decision released July 14, 1987
Petition by the commissioner of children and youth services to terminate the parental rights of the respondents with respect to their minor child, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain and tried to the court, Brenneman, J.; judgment terminating the respondents' parental rights, from which the respondent mother appealed to this court. No error.
Robert B. Katz, for the appellant (respondent mother).
Heather Wilson, assistant attorney general, with whom were Jane S. Scholl, assistant attorney general, and, on the brief, Joseph I. Lieberman, attorney general, and Robert W. Garvey, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
James F. Kane, for the minor child.
The underlying action of this appeal is a petition by the commissioner of children and youth services for the termination of the parental rights of the respondent parents, alleging that their child was uncared for and neglected. General Statutes 17-43a; 46b-120. After a hearing on the petition, pursuant to General Statutes 45-61f, the trial court granted the petition. At that hearing, the trial court also heard evidence relevant to the post-termination disposition of the child. The respondent mother claims that the trial court erred in allowing evidence relevant to both the termination of parental rights and to the post-termination disposition of the child in one hearing.
The respondent asserts that she made a motion to bifurcate the proceeding which should have been granted, in order that the adjudication of whether to terminate the parental rights upon proof of "clear and convincing evidence" would not be contaminated by consideration of the dispositional standard of "the best interests of the child." The respondent claims specifically that the testimony of the child's foster mother about her desire to adopt the child "tainted the perceptions of the court." She has conceded, however, that the bifurcation of the proceedings lies solely within the discretion of the court. See In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn. App. 194, 198-99 n. 6, 504 A.2d 533, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 809, 508 A.2d 770 (1986).
The claim that the court should have bifurcated this proceeding is thus necessarily that the court abused its discretion in not so doing. "In reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discretion `the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness; the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did. . . .' Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 177 Conn. 259, 263, 413 A.2d 854 (1979); see Maltbie, [Conn. App. Proc.] 59." Rokus v. Bridgeport, 191 Conn. 62, 72, 463 A.2d 252 (1983). The trial court in this case concluded, on the respondent's motion for bifurcation made at the hearing, that it could properly distinguish the evidence presented on the distinct issues, and make its determination of whether to grant the petition in accord with the statutory standard of proof.
The respondent has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence which supports the trial court's granting of the petition to terminate her parental rights, nor has she claimed that the findings made would have differed if the motion had been granted. Our review of the trial court's memorandum of decision reveals a thoroughly considered determination in accordance with the statutory mandates. There is no evidence in the record of any abuse of discretion in denying the motion for bifurcation of the proceedings.