Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DL026420, Donna L. Crandall, Judge.
Daphne Sykes Scott, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey J. Koch and Kelley Johnson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FYBEL, J.
Introduction
The juvenile court declared Jorge M. (the Minor) a ward of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 after finding beyond a reasonable doubt he committed one count of commercial burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 460, subd. (b) [count 1]) and one count of resisting, delaying, and obstructing a peace officer in the performance of his duties (id., § 148, subd. (a)(1) [count 3]). The court dismissed count 2, for grand theft. The court placed the Minor on probation, ordered him to pay a restitution fine, and released him to his parents’ custody.
The Minor challenges the juvenile court’s finding on count 1 on the ground the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of commercial burglary. We conclude substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding on count 1 under an aiding and abetting theory pursuant to People v. Montoya (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1027 and therefore affirm.
Facts
The Orange Housing Development Corporation (OHDC), a nonprofit corporation, acquires and renovates residential apartment units to create affordable housing. As of December 26, 2006, the OHDC owned 20 residential apartment buildings on Minnie Street in Santa Ana. One of the buildings, identified as building 1101, was unoccupied and undergoing renovation. At the end of each workday, the construction crew locked all of the units in building 1101 and locked the gates to the construction fencing along the perimeter of the property.
About 2:00 a.m. on December 26, 2006, Sergio Garcia, an OHDC general manager, received a call from a site manager residing in one of the OHDC buildings on Minnie Street. The site manager told Garcia that buildings 1029 and 1101 were being burglarized. Garcia called Eunice Bobert, OHDC’s chief executive officer, and then called the police.
Shortly thereafter, Santa Ana Police Officer Daniel Padron and Officer Angel, responding to a report of a burglary in progress, arrived in a marked patrol car at building 1101 on Minnie Street. As the officers approached the location, Padron saw four or six men moving drums of paint, extension cords, and various other items of construction equipment back and forth from the apartment building to the perimeter fence. (At trial, Padron testified he saw six men; in the police report of the incident, Padron wrote he saw “a group of approximately four individuals standing near the alley.”) Padron watched the men for about 25 seconds and noticed that at one time or another each of them carried an item from the apartment building to the fence which, Padron noticed, was not locked. When Officer Angel parked the patrol car about 30 yards away from the men, they looked toward the officers and then ran in different directions. As they fled, they dropped a five-gallon drum of paint, an extension cord, and other items they had been carrying.
Padron got out of the patrol car and chased two of the men as they ran between buildings toward Minnie Street. During the chase, the men looked back toward Padron. He recognized one of them, the Minor, from prior encounters. The other man, Pedro O., stopped at Padron’s command and was apprehended. The Minor ignored the command and ran into his family’s nearby apartment.
After Pedro O. was placed in custody, Padron and three additional officers went to the apartment into which the Minor had fled. The Minor answered their knock at the door and invited them into the apartment. The Minor was breathing heavily; he had changed his clothing from a black sweatshirt and gray shorts into blue boxer shorts and a white tank top. After agreeing to speak to the officers, the Minor said he had been asleep and woke up when he heard knocking at the door.
The Minor was placed under arrest and taken to the police station, where he waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 and agreed to speak with Padron. The Minor told Padron he had been walking with Pedro O. in the area of the apartments being burglarized when a friend approached and explained to them “what was going on.” The Minor claimed he did not actively participate in the burglary, but only had been watching as others burglarized the apartments. The Minor said he had run from the officers because he did not want to “get in trouble” and had changed his clothing to avoid being contacted and identified by the police.
At some point, Padron examined the apartment units in building 1101. He noticed the windows to apartment No. 4 had been opened and the door had been pushed in. Bobert arrived at building 1101 about 7:00 a.m. on December 26. He too noticed the perimeter fence was not secured and the doors to apartment Nos. 4 and 5 had been kicked in. Drums of paint and construction materials usually stored in the units were scattered in the parking lot behind the building and beyond an iron fence separating the parking lot from railroad tracks.
Discussion
The juvenile court found true the allegations of count 1 that the Minor had committed commercial (second degree) burglary in violation of Penal Code sections 459 and 460, subdivision (b). The Minor contends the evidence was insufficient to establish (1) he ever entered the burgled apartment building or assisted anyone in entering the building, and (2) he ever carried, or assisted anyone in carrying, items away from the apartment building to the perimeter fence. We do not address the first contention because, we conclude, the evidence established the Minor assisted in carrying items from the apartment building to the fence. The Minor assisted the commission of the burglary; therefore, the evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding on the burglary count under an aiding and abetting theory regardless whether the Minor ever entered the apartment building.
I. Standard of Review
The substantial evidence principles of review applicable in a criminal case are applicable in a juvenile proceeding. (In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 809.) “In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.]’” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089; accord, People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514; People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303.)
The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; for us, “[t]he test is whether substantial evidence supports the decision, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.) The standard of review is the same when the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. (People v. Thomas, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 514.)
II. The Evidence Supported the Trial Court’s Finding on Count 1 Under an Aiding and Abetting Theory.
“All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, . . . whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, . . . are principals in any crime so committed.” (Pen. Code, § 31.) Thus, a defendant who aids and abets the commission of a crime is liable to the same extent as a perpetrator. (People v. Montoya, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1038-1039.) To prove a defendant aided and abetted the commission of an offense, the prosecution must show the defendant acted “with knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or facilitating commission of, the offense.” (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.)
“Under [Penal Code] section 459, a person is guilty of burglary if he or she enters any building (or other listed structure) with the intent to commit larceny or any felony.” (People v. Davis (1998) 18 Cal.4th 712, 715.) An aider and abettor can be guilty of burglary if he or she learns of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and forms the intent to assist the commission of the crime at any time before the perpetrator’s final departure from the building. (People v. Montoya, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1045-1046.) In People v. Montoya, the California Supreme Court explained: “Thus, one who learns that the perpetrator unlawfully has entered with intent to commit a felony or theft, who forms the requisite intent to assist, and who does assist—by independently contributing to the commission of the crime or by otherwise making it more likely that the crime will be successfully completed than would be the case absent such participation [citation]—logically should be liable as an aider and abettor rather than as a mere accessory.” (Id. at p. 1043.) In words pertinent to this case, the court concluded: “Therefore, if an individual happens upon a scene in which a perpetrator unlawfully has entered with intent to commit a felony or theft, and, upon learning of that circumstance, forms the intent to facilitate the perpetrator’s illegal purpose in entering, that individual incurs the liability of an aider and abettor, commensurate with the liability of the perpetrator.” (Id. at pp. 1044-1045.)
In this case, the evidence established, at a minimum, the Minor aided and abetted the commission of the burglary. The evidence established building 1101 on Minnie Street had been burgled during the early morning of December 26, 2006. Padron testified he noticed the windows to apartment No. 4 had been opened and the door to apartment No. 4 had been pushed in. Bobert testified the doors to apartment Nos. 4 and 5 had been kicked in, the perimeter fence was not secured, and buckets of paint and construction materials usually stored in the units were scattered in the parking lot behind the building and beyond an iron fence separating the parking lot from railroad tracks. As the Minor concedes, “there was no dispute that someone had entered the building without permission.”
The Minor was unquestionably at the crime scene and knew of the perpetrators’ intent. Padron chased the Minor from the crime scene and recognized his face from prior encounters. At the police station, the Minor told Padron he had been walking with Pedro O. in the area of the apartments being burgled when a friend approached and explained to them “what was going on.”
Contrary to the Minor’s contention, the evidence established the Minor assisted the burglary by carrying items from the apartment unit to the fence. Padron testified he saw six men moving paint, extension cords, and various other items of construction equipment back and forth from the apartment complex to the fence. All six men wore dark clothing, and the Minor wore a black sweatshirt and gray shorts. Padron testified, “[a]t one time or another, I could see six different bodies, and we were monitoring these individuals going back and forth.” Pardon also testified that “[a]t one time or another” each of the six men carried items from the apartment building to the fence. Before the burglary was completed, the six suspects, including the Minor, saw the police and fled. As one of the six men Padron had been watching was the Minor, Padron’s testimony supported a finding the Minor had carried items taken from the apartment building to the fence.
As the Minor asserts, there were discrepancies between Padron’s police report of the incident and Padron’s trial testimony. For example, Padron stated in his police report he only saw four men at the crime scene, while at trial he testified he saw six men. These discrepancies raised issues of witness credibility of which the juvenile court, as trier of fact, was the sole judge. (People v. Green (1969) 70 Cal.2d 654, 662; Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 778; People v. Barquera (1962) 207 Cal.App.2d 725, 729.)
The evidence thus established the Minor learned of the perpetrators’ unlawful purpose, formed the intent to assist, and did assist, the commission of the burglary before the perpetrators’ final departure from the apartment building. The Minor therefore was liable as an aider and abettor regardless whether he ever entered the apartment building being burgled.
In addition, the Minor fled the crime scene when he saw the police. Evidence of flight immediately after the commission of a crime is relevant to show consciousness of guilt. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1054-1055.) When the police caught up with the Minor at his apartment, he lied, telling them he had been asleep and had awakened when the police knocked at the door. (See People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1740 [evidence defendant lied to police and exhorted friends to lie showed consciousness of guilt].)
Because the prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, the Minor argues the juvenile court erred by rejecting a reasonable interpretation of the evidence establishing his innocence in favor of an interpretation establishing his guilt. The standard of review resolves this argument against the Minor. “‘Although it is the duty of the jury to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. “‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’” [Citations.]’” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 792-793.) Here, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding the Minor committed burglary; therefore, reversal would not be required if the evidence were susceptible of an interpretation supporting the Minor’s innocence.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J. ARONSON, J.