We stated that “[a]lthough W.R. was taken into custody for truancy, rather than a criminal offense, the search is valid ‘because custodial seizures on any ground inherently pose a danger.’ ” Id. at 821 (quoting In re J.O.R., 820 A.2d 546, 548 (D.C.2003)). We also rejected W.R.'s claim that “the District of Columbia's truancy scheme is unconstitutional because truancy is not a criminal felony or misdemeanor.”
Ct. App. D. C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 820 A. 2d 546.
Under Knowles, then, the search-incident-to-arrest exception is rooted in the existence of an arrest—in Robinson 's phrasing, “the fact of custodial arrest,” 414 U.S. at 236, 94 S.Ct. 494—not in the existence of probable cause to arrest. See also In re J.O.R., 820 A.2d 546, 547–48 (D.C.2003) (upholding the search of J.O.R.'s coat pockets as “valid under Robinson,” even though police were taking J.O.R. into custody under a neglect order and not for a crime, because the danger to police officers “flows from their prolonged exposure ... while taking the person into custody and transporting him, and not from the ground for the arrest”). The Supreme Court affirmed this reasoning in Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 177, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 170 L.Ed.2d 559 (2008), stating that a search incident to arrest “enables officers to safeguard evidence, and, most critically, to ensure their safety during ‘the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station,’ ” id. (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 234–35, 94 S.Ct. 467), and further stating that because “[o]fficers issuing citations do not face the same danger,” under Knowles, “they do not have the same authority to search,” id.
In In re J.O.R., we observed that a search conducted during a custodial arrest is permissible, not only because of the risk that evidence may be destroyed, but because of the danger to the police officers involved. 820 A.2d 546, 547–48 (D.C.2003) (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)). The danger to the police officers “flows from their prolonged exposure ... and not from the ground for arrest.”