Opinion
No. 345013
03-19-2019
In re M. R. J. JONES, Minor.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Montcalm Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 2016-000753-NA Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and MARKEY and LETICA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to the minor child, MJ, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions leading to adjudication continue to exist), (c)(ii) (new conditions supporting jurisdiction arose and continue to exist), (g) (failure to provide proper care or custody), and (j) (reasonable likelihood of harm to child if returned to parent). We affirm.
MJ was removed from his mother's care in May 2016. Respondent became involved in the case in late 2016 after DNA testing showed that he is MJ's father. The trial court ordered respondent to participate in a case service plan in December 2016. Respondent participated in various services throughout the case. Parenting time went well, and respondent was offered unsupervised parenting time. But respondent tested positive for cocaine in January 2017 and again in June of that year, resulting in a discontinuation of his unsupervised parenting time on both occasions. Past domestic violence also became a known issue later in the proceedings. Respondent started a domestic violence program in February 2018. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent had not yet completed his case service plan after approximately 19 months. As a result, the trial court terminated his parental rights to MJ. This appeal ensued.
She voluntarily released her parental rights to MJ and is not a party to this appeal.
On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court clearly erred in ruling that termination of his parental rights was in the child's best interests. We disagree. If a trial court finds that a single statutory ground for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence and that it has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the court is mandated to terminate a respondent's parental rights to that child. MCL 712A.19b(3) and (5); In re Beck, 488 Mich 6, 10-11; 793 NW2d 562 (2010); In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013); In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). "This Court reviews for clear error the trial court's ruling that a statutory ground for termination has been established and its ruling that termination is in the children's best interests." In re Hudson, 294 Mich App 261, 264; 817 NW2d 115 (2011); see also MCR 3.977(K). "A finding . . . is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed[.]" In re BZ, 264 Mich App 286, 296; 690 NW2d 505 (2004). In applying the clear error standard in parental termination cases, "regard is to be given to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared before it." In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The trial court must "state on the record or in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law[,] [and] [b]rief, definite, and pertinent findings and conclusions on contested matters are sufficient." MCR 3.977(I)(1).
Respondent does not challenge the statutory grounds for termination on appeal. "When an appellant fails to dispute the basis of a lower court's ruling, we need not even consider granting the relief being sought by the appellant." Denhof v Challa, 311 Mich App 499, 521; 876 NW2d 266 (2015). Accordingly, respondent has abandoned any claim that the trial court erred with respect to its findings on the statutory grounds for termination.
Nevertheless, having reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in regard to the statutory grounds for termination. --------
Respondent contends that "[i]f a statutory ground for termination has been met by clear and convincing evidence, the termination of parental rights is mandatory unless the [c]ourt finds that the termination is clearly not in the best interest of the child." This is not an accurate statement of the current law. Pursuant to 2008 PA 199, the Legislature amended MCL 712A.19b(5) to provide that trial courts must find, in addition to a statutory ground for termination, "that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests." This change in the law was enacted over ten years ago. So we are troubled by the number of appellate attorneys handling termination appeals who do not appear to be cognizant of the amendment and such a basic tenet of parental termination law.
With respect to a child's best interests, we place our focus on the child rather than the parent. In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 87. In assessing a child's best interests, a trial court may consider such factors as a "child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home." In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations omitted). "The trial court may also consider a parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (emphasis added). A trial court can additionally consider the length of time a child "was in foster care or placed with relatives," and whether it was likely that "the child could be returned to [the parent's] home within the foreseeable future, if at all." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248-249; 824 NW2d 569 (2012).
The trial court concluded that it was obvious that respondent loved his child. The court opined, however, that respondent started to seriously participate in the case service plan "way too late." He did not begin to consistently attend narcotic anonymous (NA) meetings until a year after disposition. Additionally, respondent had the opportunity to have MJ stay and visit in respondent's home in January and June 2017, but respondent tested positive for cocaine both times. According to the trial court, MJ was not much closer to returning home than he was at the commencement of the proceedings. While respondent's interactions with MJ were good, respondent failed to complete the case service plan, and MJ desperately required permanency. He was almost three years old, and he did not have a permanent home. There was no assurance that respondent would successfully complete the case service plan in two or three months. As a result, the trial court found that termination was in the child's best interests.
The trial court did not clearly err relative to its best-interest determination given that respondent failed to successfully complete the case service plan after participating in services for 19 months. At the time of the termination hearing, respondent had at least two months of domestic violence counseling remaining, and then he had to show that he benefited from that service. This was especially important in this case considering respondent's history of engaging in domestic violence. He had attended domestic violence counseling in prison after an assault against his ex-wife, yet domestic violence still occurred in respondent's relationship with the child's mother. Indeed, respondent admitted that he had slapped MJ's mother and held her down during an altercation. Accordingly, it was highly doubtful that MJ, who'd been in care since May 2016, could be returned to respondent within a reasonable time.
Contrary to respondent's arguments, the trial court supported its decision with sufficient specificity; it adequately discussed the testimony and evidence on the issue of the child's best interests; it did not erroneously conclude that barriers to reunification continued to exist, and the domestic violence and cocaine use did serve as valid grounds for the court's ruling. In sum, the trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the child's best interests and in terminating respondent's parental rights.
We affirm.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Anica Letica