In re Jones

16 Citing cases

  1. Adams v. Janney (In re Janney)

    CASE NO. 14-11278 (Bankr. M.D. La. Sep. 29, 2016)

    W.D. Tex. 2004). Accord, In re Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1991) (Only "specific and serious infractions" warrant denial of a discharge); In re Jones, 292 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003) ("11 U.S.C. § 727 is to be construed liberally in favor of the debtor and strictly against the creditor in furtherance of the 'fresh start' policy"); In re Reed, 11 B.R. 683, 685 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981) ("In order that effect may be given to the 'fresh start' notion, the provisions of § 727(a) relating to discharge must be liberally construed in favor of the debtors.") Adams found the discrepancies between the debtor's and his companies' books and records and Janney's bankruptcy schedules because of the disclosures on the schedules.

  2. Judgment Factors, L.L.C. v. Packer (In re Packer)

    520 B.R. 520 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2014)   Cited 5 times

    In accordance with the statutory policy, the provisions of § 727(a) are construed strictly against parties seeking to deny the granting of a debtor's discharge. Laughlin v. Nouveau Body & Tan, L.L.C. (In re Laughlin), 602 F.3d 417, 421 (5th Cir.2010) ; Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones), 292 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2003). In the face of a debtor's summary judgment challenge to a § 727(a) complaint, a plaintiff is thus compelled to demonstrate the existence of admissible evidence upon which a factfinder could base an affirmative finding for that plaintiff regarding each and every element required under any § 727(a) subsection.

  3. Denoce v. Neff (In re Neff)

    505 B.R. 255 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2014)   Cited 15 times

    Other support exists for our holding here, but these courts were also short on analysis. See Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones), 292 B.R. 555, 560 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2003) (post-Young case; holding that creditor could not “reach back” to debtor's prior bankruptcy filing to circumvent the one-year period under § 727(a)(2)(A), because the effect of dismissal of the prior bankruptcy case was to nullify it); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Hogan (In re Hogan), 208 B.R. 459, 463 n. 3 (Bankr.E.D.Ark.1997) (pre-Young case; recognizing that no Code provision or nonbankruptcy law “suspended” the one-year period in § 727(a)(2)(A); however, the chapter 7 trustee may still be able to avoid any fraudulent transfers under § 544(b)). DeNoce contends that if courts refuse to apply the equitable tolling doctrine to § 727(a)(2)(A), debtors will inequitably be allowed to take advantage of a “loophole” by filing successive chapter 13 bankruptcy cases, then filing a chapter 7 bankruptcy case after the one-year period has expired.

  4. First United Bank & Trust Co. v. Buescher (In re Buescher)

    Case No. 09-42926 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2013)

    Thus, in order to accomplish that limited purpose, the provisions of §727(a) are to be construed liberally in favor of granting debtors the fresh start contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code and construed strictly against parties seeking to deny the granting of a debtor's discharge. In re Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1991); Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones), 292 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003). As the Plaintiff seeking such relief, First United Bank bears the burden of proving that the Debtor is not entitled to a discharge under §727.

  5. First United Bank v. Buescher (In re Buescher)

    491 B.R. 419 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2013)   Cited 31 times

    Thus, in order to accomplish that limited purpose, the provisions of § 727(a) are to be construed liberally in favor of granting debtors the fresh start contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code and construed strictly against parties seeking to deny the granting of a debtor's discharge. In re Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1991); Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones), 292 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2003). As the Plaintiff seeking such relief, First United Bank bears the burden of proving that the Debtor is not entitled to a discharge under § 727.

  6. In re Jacobs

    Case No. 09-61145, Adversary No. 10-6005 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2011)   Cited 2 times

    Thus, in order to accomplish that limited purpose, the provisions of § 727(a) are to be construed liberally in favor of granting debtors the fresh start contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code and construed strictly against parties seeking to deny the granting of a debtor's discharge. In re Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1991); Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones), 292 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2003). As the Plaintiff seeking such relief, the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Debtor is not entitled to a discharge under § 727.

  7. In re Gamble-Ledbetter

    419 B.R. 682 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009)   Cited 43 times
    Concluding that bookkeeper's debt for embezzlement was nondischargeable even though the bookkeeper did not have check-signing authority

    Thus, in order to accomplish that limited purpose, the provisions of § 727(a) are to be construed liberally in favor of granting debtors the fresh start contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code and construed strictly against parties seeking to deny the granting of a debtor's discharge. In re Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1991); Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones), 292 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2003). As the Plaintiff seeking such relief, the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Debtor is not entitled to a discharge under § 727.

  8. In re Harwood

    404 B.R. 366 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009)   Cited 56 times

    Thus, in order to accomplish that limited purpose, the provisions of § 727(a) are to be construed liberally in favor of granting debtors the fresh start contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code and construed strictly against parties seeking to deny the granting of a debtor's discharge. In re Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1991); Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones), 292 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2003). As the Plaintiff seeking such relief, the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Debtor is not entitled to a discharge under § 727.

  9. In re Harwood

    401 B.R. 782 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2009)

    Thus, in order to accomplish that limited purpose, the provisions of § 727(a) are to be construed liberally in favor of granting debtors the fresh start contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code and construed strictly against parties seeking to deny the granting of a debtor's discharge. In re Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1991); Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones), 292 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2003). As the Plaintiff seeking such relief, the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Debtor is not entitled to a discharge under § 727.

  10. In re Guillet

    398 B.R. 869 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2008)

    Thus, in order to accomplish that limited purpose, the provisions of § 727(a) are to be construed liberally in favor of granting debtors the fresh start contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code and construed strictly against parties seeking to deny the granting of a debtor's discharge. In re Ichinose, 946 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir.1991); Melancon v. Jones (In re Jones), 292 B.R. 555, 559 (Bankr.E.D.Tex.2003). As the Plaintiff seeking such relief, the Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the Debtor is not entitled to a discharge under § 727.