Opinion
No. 01-08-00729-CV
Opinion issued March 18, 2010.
On Appeal from the 412th District Court, Brazoria County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 48287.
Panel consists of Justices JENNINGS, HANKS, and BLAND.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Danny L. Jones, is an inmate at the Darrington Unit of the Texas Department of Corrections in Rosharon, Texas. In this appeal, Jones contests the district court's dismissal of his lawsuit against prison employees. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On July 16, 2008, Jones filed a lawsuit in Brazoria County district court against Kelly A. Guidry and Mariangelina Martinez, two employees at the Darrington Unit. Jones's complaint arose out of his removal from the Darrington Unit's craft shop, the apparent result of Jones being subject to a previous disciplinary action and thus having the privilege of his access to the craft shop revoked. His petition alleged claims under Section 1983, claiming that Guidry and Martinez engaged in racial profiling and racial discrimination against him, and that his constitutional rights to equal protection and due process had been violated. Jones also alleged that Guidry and Martinez had committed "theft and destruction" of his belongings.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2009).
The clerk's record does not indicate whether Guidry and Martinez were served or appeared in the lawsuit. Five days after Jones filed his petition, the district court dismissed the lawsuit. The district court's order stated that "Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action as a matter of law" and therefore ordered that the lawsuit be dismissed with prejudice. Jones subsequently filed a "Rebuttal to Order of Dismissal" in which he urged the district court to reconsider its dismissal with prejudice. Jones then timely filed a Notice of Appeal.
Neither Guidry nor Martinez filed a brief in this appeal.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Jones contends that the district court erred by (1) dismissing his lawsuit; (2) dismissing his lawsuit with prejudice; (3) denying him the opportunity to amend his complaint; and (4) failing to provide him with notice of its intent to dismiss the lawsuit. Jones raises four additional issues by which he continues to complain of the conduct of Guidry and Martinez. We construe these as supporting his argument that the trial court erred by dismissing his lawsuit.
Jones has filed two, substantively different, appellant's briefs in this appeal. We consider the latter a supplement to the first, and address all of the issues Jones raises on appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.7 ("A brief may be amended or supplemented whenever justice requires, on whatever reasonable terms the court may prescribe.").
A. Standard of Review
Chapter Fourteen of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to lawsuits filed by an inmate in district court and in which the inmate files an affidavit or unsworn declaration of an inability to pay costs. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002(a) (Vernon 2008). Under Chapter Fourteen, a trial court may dismiss an inmate's lawsuit for failing to comply with the Chapter's procedural requirements; it may also dismiss a lawsuit that is malicious or frivolous. Id. § 14.003; Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. App.-Houston 2006, no pet.). The trial court need not rely upon a defendant's motion to exercise its discretionary power to dismiss under Chapter Fourteen. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN § 14.003(a) (suit may be dismissed before service of process); Wilson v. TDCJ-ID, 107 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tex. App.-Waco 2003, no pet.).
Review of a dismissal under Chapter Fourteen is generally controlled by the abuse of discretion standard. Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. App.-Waco 1996, no writ). However, the issue as to whether there is an arguable basis in law is a legal question that we review de novo. In re Humphreys, 880 S.W.2d 402, 404 (Tex. 1993). To determine whether the trial court properly decided there was no arguable basis in law for the plaintiff's suit, we examine the types of relief and causes of action pleaded to determine whether, as a matter of law, the petition stated a cause of action that would authorize relief. Jackson v. TDCJ-ID, 28 S.W.3d 811, 813 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. denied).
We review and evaluate pro se pleadings by standards less stringent than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Denson v. TDCJ-ID, 63 S.W.3d 454, 459 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1999, pet. denied). We take as true the allegations in the inmate's petition and review the types of relief and causes of action set out therein to determine whether, as a matter of law, the petition stated a cause of action that would authorize relief. See Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 266; Harrison v. TDCJ-ID, 164 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.). A claim has no arguable basis in law if it is an indisputably meritless legal theory. Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 266-67. Further, a claim has no arguable basis in law if the inmate has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.-Houston 2002, pet. denied).
B. Did the District Court Err By Dismissing Jones's Claims?
Jones's pleading is difficult to decipher, but read broadly, Jones complains that Guidry and Martinez are responsible for his being excluded from the "old craft shop" after he received a verbal reprimand. Jones's petition alleged a claim under Section 1983 against Guidry and Martinez in their individual capacities.
The petition is entitled "Complaint pursuant to Section VIII; Cause of Action under Act 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 In District County Courts Action Under Color of State Law With In [sic] Individual Capacity."
Jones brings an equal protection claim, arguing that he has been the subject of racial discrimination by Guidry and Martinez. Jones, who is black, alleged that Martinez — "for no other reason than discrimination" — removed him from the craft shop "in a racial manner supported by [Guidry]." Jones also alleges that the craft shop is "very racially imbalanced." Jones alleges that he attempted to resolve the issue that had led to his removal from the craft shop, but that "none of the facility's supervisors wanted to get involved with any craft shop issues." Jones also alleges that "none of the [white] inmates . . . have this type of problem with getting any of their matters they have resolved." Jones also alleges that Guidry and Martinez retaliated against him and harassed him by using racial slurs and demoting him from his position in the craft shop. According to Jones, "Guidry and Martinez intended to place [him] in fear of imminent serious bodily injury because they knew he must stay stress free because of an aneurysm he had."
Jones also alleges that Martinez hit him with a door while opening it. However, he raises this allegation as part of his retaliation claim and does not allege any other constitutional or legal injury resulting from this alleged act.
In addition, Jones's petition claims that he was deprived of due process because he was not able to defend himself against the allegations that led to his termination from the craft shop. Finally, Jones's petition asserts that Guidry and Martinez, acting in their individual capacities, committed theft by depriving Jones of tools and items he made in the craft shop.
1. Jones's Equal Protection Claim
A cause of action under Section 1983 involves two essential elements: (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) the conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution, or the laws, of the United States. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1913 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-33, 106 S. Ct. 662, 664-66 (1986); City of Fort Worth v. Robles, 51 S.W.3d 436, 443 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied), disapproved on other grounds, City of Grapevine v. Sipes, 195 S.W.3d 689, 695 n. 5 (Tex. 2006). Neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are "persons" under Section 1983. See Harrison, 915 S.W.2d at 889 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989)); see also Thomas v. Brown, 927 S.W.2d 122, 125 (Tex. App.-Houston 1996, writ denied). To the extent that Jones brings Section 1983 claims against Guidry and Martinez in their official capacities, the district court properly dismissed those claims. We next turn to Jones's claims against Guidry and Martinez on an individual basis.
Jones first complains that Guidry's and Martinez's actions in excluding him from the craft shop constituted a denial of his right to equal protection under the law. However, Jones has not pointed us to any authority establishing that he has a right of access to the craft shop. Accordingly, he has not adequately alleged an equal protection violation under Section 1983. Compare, e.g., Thomas v. Arthur, 836 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ) (reviewing prisoner's argument that he had cause of action under Section 1983 arising out of his alleged right to daily shower). The district court therefore properly dismissed Jones's equal protection claim under Section 1983.
2. Jones's Retaliation Claim
To prevail on a retaliation claim brought under Section 1983, an inmate must establish (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the defendant's intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his exercise of that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation. Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1038, 127 S. Ct. 596 (2006); see also Vacca v. Farrington, 85 S.W.3d 438, 441-42 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no pet.) (applying facts to retaliation test). The inmate must allege more than his personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation and must allege a chronology of events from which retaliation may be plausibly inferred. Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1999). Causation requires a showing that but for the retaliatory motive, the complained of incident would not have occurred. McDonald v. Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998).
Reviewing Jones's petition, we find that he has failed to state a claim for retaliation under Section 1983. First, as noted above, he has not established a constitutional right of access to the craft shop. Second, he admits that his disciplinary action was the cause of his demotion and removal from the craft shop. Finally, while he complains of the underlying conditions in the prison, and the actions of Guidry and Martinez, we do not read Jones's petition as alleging a plausible case of retaliation. Thus, the district court properly dismissed Jones's retaliation claim.
3. Jones's Due Process Claim
Jones also complained that the actions of Guidry and Martinez permanently deprived him of his property and constituted a due process violation. The due process clause is not invoked when an unauthorized, intentional act of a state prison official causes the loss of property if there is an adequate post-deprivation remedy, such as a suit for conversion. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533-35, 104 S. Ct. 3194, 3204 (1984); Myers v. Adams, 728 S.W.2d 771, 772 (Tex. 1987); see also Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[D]eprivations of property caused by the misconduct of state officials do not infringe constitutional due process provided adequate state post-deprivation remedies exist."). Moreover, Section 501.007 of the Texas Government Code provides an administrative remedy to inmates whose property has been lost or damaged. See TEX. GOV. CODE ANN.
§ 501.007 (Vernon 2004). Therefore, Jones does not have a cause of action for a due process violation under Section 1983.
4. Jones's Conversion Claim
Jones seeks to recover under Section 1983 for loss of his property, contending that Guidry and Martinez stole the property that he had stored in the craft shop. We construe this as a claim under Section 1983 for the tort of conversion. Section 1983, however, does not impose liability for violations of duties of care arising under tort law. See Spacek v. Charles, 928 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Tex.App.-Houston 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.). Therefore, to the extent Jones seeks recovery under Section 1983 for conversion by Guidry and Martinez, we hold the district court properly dismissed those claims.
C. Did the District Court Err By Dismissing Jones's Lawsuit With Prejudice?
Jones contends the trial court erred in dismissing his suit with prejudice. Dismissal with prejudice constitutes an adjudication on the merits and operates as if the case had been fully tried and decided. Mossler v. Shields, 818 S.W.2d 752, 754 (Tex. 1991). Generally, the proper remedy, when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, is to dismiss the case without prejudice. Mullins v. Estelle High Sec. Unit, 111 S.W.3d 268, 274 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.). However, when the error cannot be remedied, dismissal with prejudice is proper. See Hickman v. Adams, 35 S.W.3d 120, 124 (Tex. App.-Houston 2000, no pet.). Here, Jones's Section 1983 claims against Guidry and Martinez cannot be amended to remedy the error. Therefore, dismissal of these claims with prejudice was proper. See id. D. Did the District Court Err By Denying Jones the Opportunity to Amend his Complaint or By Failing to Provide Jones Notice?
Jones complains that the court dismissed his lawsuit without giving him an opportunity to amend his complaint and without notice of its intent to dismiss. A trial court may dismiss a Chapter Fourteen suit without affording the inmate notice, opportunity to be heard, or opportunity to amend the petition. Aguilar v. Chastain, 923 S.W.2d 740, 745 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1996, writ denied); Kendrick v. Lynaugh, 804 S.W.2d 153, 155 (Tex. App.-Houston 1990, no writ). Accordingly, we overrule these issues.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not err by dismissing Jones's Section 1983 lawsuit against Guidry and Martinez. Accordingly, we overrule Jones's issues and affirm the judgment of the trial court.