Opinion
D047609
12-8-2006
In re JONATHAN V., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN V., Defendant and Appellant.
Jonathan V. appeals from a judgment of the juvenile court sustaining an amended petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 and declaring him a ward of the court. He contends the court erred in denying his section 700.1 motion to suppress evidence of a knife found in his possession because school officials lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he intended to commit vandalism at the time of the search. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The initial section 602 petition was filed February 3, 2005, charging then 14-year-old Jonathan with unlawfully possessing and bringing a knife upon school grounds without the permission of school authorities. (Pen. Code, § 626.10, subd. (a).) He filed motions to suppress evidence under section 700.1, alleging a search at the school on January 7, 2005 was not justified at its inception or reasonable in its scope, and to continue the proceedings six months under section 654 while on informal probation supervision. The People opposed both motions, asserting, with regard to the suppression motion relevant to this appeal, that there had been consent to search and that based on the totality of the circumstances, the school search was reasonable.
Before the hearing on the suppression motion could be heard, Jonathan committed new offenses and the matter was continued several times. On June 20, 2005, the following evidence was presented at the motion to suppress. Southwest High School campus supervisor Rene A. Murillo testified that on January 7, 2005, he saw Jonathan "walking the hallways" while he was supposed to be in class. Aware that campus vandalism, especially the "tagging" of the boys restroom daily by students with "Sharpie" felt pens, had become a chronic problem, Murillo followed Jonathan as he entered that restroom. As soon as Jonathan noticed Murillo was following him, he turned and left the restroom. Murillo estimated that Jonathan left the restroom within five seconds of noticing him. No one else had entered the restroom and no one was using the stalls in the restroom at the time Murillo entered. Suspecting that Jonathan was about to "tag" the restroom, Murillo detained him and walked him to the principals office.
An amended petition under section 602 was filed May 26, 2005, which alleged in count 2 that Jonathan had assaulted a person on April 10, 2005, "with a deadly weapon . . . and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury." (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) A second amended petition was filed the day of the suppression hearing, alleging in counts 3 and 4 respectively, that Jonathan had been involved in a vehicle hit and run incident while driving without a license (Veh. Code, §§ 12500, subd. (a), 20002, subd. (a)).
At the office, Murillo told assistant principal Luciano Alvarado what had transpired and recommended a search for Sharpies. Murillo testified he asked Jonathan if he could conduct the search and Jonathan gave consent, denying he had any contraband on him. Murillo then searched Jonathan and found a "Buck-style knife in his right, rear pocket of his jeans. . . ."
On cross-examination, Murillo conceded he had not seen any markers or pens on Jonathan before he entered the restroom, that he had not prepared a written report of the incident until asked to do so by the prosecutor in March 2005, and that he could not remember seeing any vandalism in the restroom when he entered on the day in question. Although Alvarado was in charge of the investigation at that point, Murillo, as well as Alvarado, asked Jonathan questions in the office before the search.
In support of the motion, the defense called Alvarado and campus police officer Cedric J. Green. Alvarado testified that Murillo had come to his office on January 7, 2005, with Jonathan and advised him that "the bathroom had been tagged and that he suspected Jonathan was the person [who] had committed the vandalism in the bathroom." Alvarado reiterated that the bathroom was being tagged every day so that was why "we had the outside monitored as to who was going in and who was going out." Once Jonathan was in his office, Alvarado and Murillo talked to him about the incident and Jonathan denied he had done anything in the bathroom. Alvarado explained that under school policy they normally did not ask students for consent to search and in this case "[w]e had reasons that [Jonathan] had markers, and thats what we are looking for." Although he did not personally ask Jonathan for consent to search, he could not recall whether Murillo had done so and could not speak for him. Alvarado only remembered "he told [Jonathan] he was going to be searched and that if he had anything he was not supposed to have at school, then he needed to take it out of his pockets."
Officer Green then testified he had taken a statement from Murillo when he responded to the incident on January 7, 2005. Murillo told Green he saw Jonathan, "who he had recognized from previous contact at the school," enter a restroom that had several recent tagging incidents and followed him. Green, as campus officer, was already aware of "a lot of vandalism about the campus." When Jonathan turned around and exited the restroom, Murillo contacted him and escorted him to Alvarados office. Murillo then "told [Jonathan] that he suspected that he was going to tag the [restroom] walls, and he was going to check him for any contraband such as markers or other prohibited objects." Murillo did not tell Green that he had obtained consent for the search or Green would have put it in his report.
In closing argument, Jonathans counsel pointed out the inconsistent testimony regarding consent and the fact that Murillo only mentioned consent after the prosecutor had asked him for a statement in response to the suppression motion. Counsel further argued there was no evidence of a reasonable suspicion to search Jonathan because the facts of walking into a restroom and then immediately walking out were insufficient to indicate Jonathan was going to vandalize that room. Counsel thought that some additional evidence like "nervousness [on Jonathans] part or some [sort] of suspicious behavior" was needed to support a reasonable suspicion on Murillos part.
The prosecutor argued that Murillo had unequivocally said he asked and received consent to search, and that the facts additionally showed Murillo had reasonable suspicion to suspect Jonathans involvement in the recent spat of daily vandalism of the schools bathrooms because Jonathan was walking around the halls when he was supposed to be in class and he had quickly walked into the bathroom and then immediately left when he noticed Murillo approaching, "which indicates he didnt intend to use the [bathroom] for its intended purpose." The prosecutor also noted that the search was reasonably related to the evidence used by a "tagger," because Murillo merely "reached into [Jonathans] pocket and emptied [it, because] a pocket is where a tagger would keep evidence of his crime. That is the Sharpies. The minor is a male. And both school administrators [conducting the search] were . . . males. This is in the scope of trying to uncover evidence of Sharpies limited to [Jonathans] pockets."
The court denied the motion, finding "there was reasonable suspicion to do the search [and t]he search was reasonable[.]"
After Jonathan was arraigned on the second amended petition, the matter was continued for further discovery. A third amended petition was filed in August 2005, adding a new charge of vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a)(b)(2)(A)), based on Jonathan allegedly using spray paint to cross out a gang moniker on a fence and adding his own name.
Following a settlement conference on August 8, 2005, Jonathan admitted the count 1 possession of the knife on school grounds, the hit and run alleged in count 3, and the count 5 vandalism, in exchange for the prosecutions dismissal of the remaining two counts of assault (count 2) and driving without a license (count 4). The juvenile court sustained the third amended petition as to the admitted counts and dismissed the remaining counts on the prosecutors motion.
At the October 19, 2005 disposition hearing, the juvenile court declared Jonathan a ward of the court and directed that his care, custody, and control be transferred to the supervision of the probation department. The court also committed Jonathan to the "Breaking Cycles" program for a period not to exceed 150 days, stayed commitment and placed him with his mother on numerous terms and conditions of probation. Jonathan timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Jonathan does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his admissions or point to any error in the disposition. Rather he contends Murillos search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because that school official lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he intended to commit vandalism and the exclusionary rule was the appropriate remedy for the violation. (See In re William G. (1985) 40 Cal.3d 550, 567, fn. 17.) Jonathan, therefore, asserts the juvenile court judge erred by denying his section 700.1 motion to suppress evidence of the knife found in his pocket. We disagree.
"The standard of appellate review of a trial courts ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial courts factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment." (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362; see also People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830.)
With regard to the rights of students on a school campus, public school officials are considered government agents within the purview of the Fourth Amendment, making their conduct subject to the constitutional rights of their students against arbitrary and capricious detentions and unreasonable searches and seizures. (In re Randy G. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 556, 567; In re William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 561; In re Lisa G. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 801, 805.) Greater flexibility is required when examining the Fourteenth Amendment rights of students than other persons in searches and seizures due to the balancing of the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds as against the childs interest in privacy. (New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 469 U.S. 325, 339.)
As the United States Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. 325 concluded:
"[T]he accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law. Rather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search." (Id. at p. 341.)
The reasonableness of a search under this standard is generally determined by a two-fold inquiry: (1) whether the search was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the scope of the search, as actually conducted was reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the initial search. (New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 341.) Ordinarily, a search of a student by a school official will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will disclose evidence the student has violated or is violating the law or school rules. (Id. at pp. 341-342.) "There must be articulable facts supporting that reasonable suspicion. . . . Respect for privacy is the rule — a search is the exception." (In re William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 564.) A search is permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in the context of the age and sex of the student. (Ibid.)
In addition, school officials may detain a student on campus without reasonable suspicion the student has violated the law so long as the detention is not arbitrary, capricious, or for harassment. (In re Randy G., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 567.) The burden is on the People to prove no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. (People v. Sirhan (1972) 7 Cal.3d 710, 741, overruled on other grounds in Hawkins v. Superior Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 584, 593, fn. 7.)
Applying the above standards in this case, we conclude there were articulable facts which gave rise to a reasonable suspicion justifying the search and that the search was reasonable and permissible in scope. Jonathan does not contest the validity of his detention by Murillo, thus conceding his detention was not arbitrary, capricious, or for harassment.
As to the validity of the search that followed Jonathans detention, the undisputed evidence showed that Murillo had had prior contacts with Jonathan at the school from which it could reasonably be inferred he had information suggesting Jonathan had previously engaged in proscribed activity at the school. (See In re Lisa G., supra, 125 Cal.App.4th at p. 807.) Murillo additionally knew there had been daily taggings in the boys restroom and such vandalism was usually done when classes were in session. Further, Jonathans conduct of being out of class, going into the restroom and then immediately leaving the restroom as soon as he noticed Murillo following him, without using the restroom as it was intended, was suspicious behavior. (See In re William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 566.) Thus, based on the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for Murillo to suspect Jonathan of attempting to engage in wrongful behavior, i.e., the tagging of the restroom, which was correlated with the intended findings of the search for felt-tip markers to tag the restroom. (See In re Lisa G., at p. 807 ["[a]correlation between the wrongful behavior of the student and the intended findings of the search is essential for a valid search of the student under the Fourth Amendment."].) The search was, therefore, justified at its inception.
In turn, the search of Jonathans pockets by Murillo was permissible in scope because it was not only reasonably related to the discovery of Sharpies, it was not excessively intrusive in that it was merely the search of a male high school students outside pockets by male administrators. (See In re William G., supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 564.)
Accordingly, we conclude the search of Jonathan was reasonable and the juvenile courts ruling must be upheld as supported by the totality of the circumstances. Having so decided, it is unnecessary to address the issue of consent.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, J.
OROURKE, J.