Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Ct. No. NJ14104, Blaine K. Bowman, Judge.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
O.S. appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her minor son, Jonathan P., under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. O.S. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding Jonathan was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. She also contends the court erred by not continuing the selection and implementation hearing to ensure Jonathan's adoption by his maternal relatives. We affirm the order.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jonathan was born in December 2009 and remained in the hospital because of medical concerns caused by his premature birth. O.S. was homeless and struggling with mental health issues. She did not visit Jonathan in the hospital or learn to meet his special needs, and was overwhelmed by having to care for her other two children. O.S. had a history of domestic violence. Her whereabouts were unknown at the time Jonathan was ready to be released from the hospital.
Jonathan became a dependent of the court under section 300, subdivision (b). Because O.S. had obtained stable and appropriate housing, the court placed Jonathan with her and ordered family maintenance services.
Less than a month later, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a supplemental petition under section 387 because O.S. had not maintained contact with Agency, she left Jonathan with an unknown male, and she allowed contact between Jonathan and her boyfriend in violation of the court's order. O.S. was pregnant, no longer had a stable home and had not complied with her case plan. The court sustained the allegations of the supplemental petition, removed Jonathan from O.S.'s custody and placed him in licensed foster care. The court ordered O.S. to participate in reunification services.
The maternal aunt, who lived in Washington with her husband and children, expressed an interest in caring for Jonathan. O.S., however, failed to provide Agency with updated contact information for these relatives. Consequently, Agency was unable to initiate an evaluation of their home under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children (ICPC).
According to a report prepared for the 12-month hearing, O.S. had not been participating in services. Jonathan was thriving in his foster care placement. Agency requested a court order for an ICPC evaluation of the maternal relatives' home in Washington. The maternal aunt contacted the social worker to confirm her address and request an evaluation to have Jonathan placed with her. O.S.'s counsel unsuccessfully sought a continuance of the 12-month review hearing until the ICPC evaluation of the maternal relatives' home was completed. The court terminated reunification services and set a section 366.26 selection and implementation hearing.
Social worker Norma Orozco recommended adoption as Jonathan's permanent plan. She assessed 21-month-old Jonathan as generally adoptable based on his age, gender, health and development. Although Jonathan was small for his age and had speech delays, he was a healthy, happy and adorable boy. There were 20 or 21 approved adoptive families interested in adopting a boy with Jonathan's characteristics. The ICPC evaluation of the maternal relatives' home was pending. In Orozco's opinion, none of the statutory exceptions to adoption applied to preclude terminating parental rights.
According to an addendum report, the maternal relatives had an approved home study. They remained committed to adopting Jonathan. Agency anticipated placing Jonathan with these relatives in the next few weeks, and travel arrangements were being made.
At a contested selection and implementation hearing, the court received Agency's reports in evidence and heard O.S.'s testimony. O.S. waived her right to cross-examine the social worker. Finding Jonathan was adoptable and none of the exceptions to adoption applied, the court terminated parental rights and referred Jonathan for adoptive placement.
DISCUSSION
I
O.S. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court's finding Jonathan was likely to be adopted if parental rights were terminated. She asserts Jonathan was not generally adoptable because he had asthma, a small stature, speech delays, and other potential developmental delays caused by his premature birth. O.S. further asserts the court could not base its adoptability finding on the existence of 20 approved adoptive homes without some evidence of what these families knew about Jonathan's problems, or the statistical chances that Jonathan would be adopted by any of them.
A
The court can terminate parental rights only if it determines by clear and convincing evidence the minor is adoptable. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) An adoptability finding requires "a low threshold:" the court need only determine it is " 'likely' " the child will be adopted within a reasonable time. (In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1292; accord In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 406; In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1231.) A determination of adoptability focuses on whether a child's age, physical condition and emotional state will create difficulty in locating a family willing to adopt. (§ 366.22, subd. (b); In re David H. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 368, 378.) The possibility a child may have future problems does not mean the child is not likely to be adopted. (In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 223-225.)
The likelihood of adoptability may be satisfied by a showing the minor is generally adoptable, that is, independent of whether the minor is in a prospective adoptive home (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)), or has a prospective adoptive parent " 'waiting in the wings.' " (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649; In re A.A. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1313.) Nevertheless, "the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minor's age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parent's willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family." (In re Sarah M., supra, at pp. 1649-1650.)
We review a court's adoptability finding for substantial evidence. (In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732; In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not pass on the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or reweigh the evidence. Instead, we view the record favorably to the juvenile court's order and affirm the order even if there is substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 52-53.) The appellant has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B
Here, the evidence showed Jonathan was adoptable because he was less than two years old, generally healthy and had a pleasant personality and mild temperament. Although Jonathan had asthma, a small stature and speech delays, these characteristics do not create an impediment to adoption. (See In re I.I. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 857, 871; In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400; cf. In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 512 [sibling set of three was not adoptable because the children had emotional and psychological problems and there were no approved families willing to adopt children with similar characteristics]; In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1058, 1061 [eight-year-old boy with cerebral palsy, seizure disorders and other disabilities requiring intensive care for life was not generally adoptable].) Further, any risk of future problems does not render Jonathan unadoptable. (In re Jennilee T., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 224; In re Helen W. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 71, 79 [neither statutes nor case law require certainty of a child's medical condition before court can find adoptability].) Contrary to O.S.'s position, the court did not base its adoptability finding solely on the social worker's personal opinion or unsupported conclusion.
Jonathan's asthma was not serious enough to require medication.
Jonathan compensated for his delayed speech by learning sign language to let his caregivers know what he needed. Nothing in the record indicates Jonathan had any other developmental delays.
The evidence also showed Jonathan was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time by his maternal relatives. The relatives had an approved home study and were committed to adopting him. Although Jonathan was not yet placed with the relatives at the time of the selection and implementation hearing, arrangements were being made to transport him to their home in Washington. Were this placement to fail, there are at least 20 other approved adoptive families willing to adopt a child with Jonathan's characteristics. Thus, the maternal relatives' willingness to adopt Jonathan indicates he is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by them or by some other family. (In re Sarah M., supra, at pp. 1649-1650.)
O.S. asserts the court's adoptability finding was speculative because the social worker did not specify which of Jonathan's characteristics the 20 prospective adoptive families "were willing to accept" or how many other children were being considered by these 20 families. O.S., however, cites no authority for the proposition this type of specific evidence was required to support an adoptability finding. In assessing Jonathan as adoptable, Agency's task was to identify families willing to adopt a child of Jonathan's age, physical condition and emotional state. (§ 366.22, subd. (b); In re David H., supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 378.) Presumably, the 20 families identified were interested in adopting a child with Jonathan's particular characteristics as outlined in Agency's report. Nothing more was required. Substantial evidence supports the court's finding Jonathan was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time.
II
O.S. contends the court abused its discretion when it did not continue the selection and implementation hearing to ensure Jonathan would be adopted by the maternal relatives. She asserts Jonathan could have been considered difficult to place for adoption, thus warranting a continuance under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3).
A
Under section 352, the juvenile court may grant a continuance of any hearing only on a showing of good cause and only if the continuance is not contrary to a minor's best interests. In considering the minor's interests, "the court shall give substantial weight to a minor's need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements." (§ 352, subd. (a); In re Ninfa S. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 808, 810.) Because "time is of the essence" for dependent children, continuances in juvenile cases are disfavored. (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 674; Jeff M. v. Superior Court (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1242.) We reverse an order denying a continuance only on a showing of an abuse of discretion. (In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 605; In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 585.)
B
Preliminarily, we note O.S. did not ask for a continuance at the selection and implementation hearing, and thus, she has forfeited this issue on appeal. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293 [parent's failure to object or raise certain issues in the juvenile court prevents the parent from claiming error on appeal].) In any event, O.S. did not meet her burden of showing good cause for a continuance. Because Jonathan was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time, he was not at risk of becoming a " 'legal orphan.' " Delaying the selection and implementation hearing until Jonathan could be placed in an adoptive home was not in his best interests. A continuance would serve only to prolong Jonathan's temporary placement, and would impact his need for prompt resolution of his custody status and the need to provide him with a stable environment. (§ 352, subd. (a).)
The fact that O.S. unsuccessfully requested a continuance at the 12-month review hearing so the ICPC evaluation could be completed does not excuse her from renewing the request for a continuance at the selection and implementation hearing.
The record does not support O.S.'s argument that any delay in Jonathan's permanency was caused by Agency's failure to promptly initiate the ICPC evaluation of the maternal relatives' home. Agency was unable to initiate the ICPC evaluation because O.S. did not provide accurate contact information for the maternal relatives. Once Agency received that information, the ICPC proceeded in due course.
O.S. claims she was entitled to a continuance under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3). That statute, however, applies to minors, unlike Jonathan, who are "difficult to place for adoption." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(3); see In re B.D., supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 1239 [children who had special needs and challenging behaviors were difficult to place as sibling group of five].) As we previously discussed, Jonathan was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time based on his personal characteristics and the maternal relatives' commitment to adopting him. Thus, a continuance under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(3) was neither required nor in Jonathan's best interests.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: NARES, J., O'ROURKE, J.