Permissible terms and conditions of an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal may include "supervision by the probation service" (Family Ct Act § 315.3[2]). "The Family Court has broad discretion in determining whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal" (Matter of Jonathan M., 107 AD3d 805, 806). Although a juvenile is not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his or her "first brush with the law" (Matter of Melissa B., 49 AD3d 536, 537; see Matter of Jesus S., 104 AD3d 694, 695), a juvenile's particular circumstances—including his or her criminal and disciplinary history, history of drug or alcohol use, association with gang activity, academic and school attendance history, and ability to accept responsibility for his or her acts—are nevertheless relevant to a court's discretionary determination of whether or not to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal, as are the consideration of the seriousness of the underlying offense and the extent to which the juvenile is adequately supervised by his or her parent or guardian (see Matter of Jonathan M., 107 AD3d at 807). Here, the Family Court improvidently exercised its discretion in imposing a period of probation.
An adjournment in contemplation of dismissal is an adjournment of the proceeding, for a period not to exceed six months, with a view to ultimate dismissal of the petition in furtherance of justice" ( Family Ct Act § 315.3[1] )." ‘The Family Court has broad discretion in determining whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal’ " ( Matter of Nigel H., 136 A.D.3d 1033, 1034, 26 N.Y.S.3d 301, quoting Matter of Jonathan M., 107 A.D.3d 805, 806, 966 N.Y.S.2d 522 ). Factors that are relevant to a court's discretionary determination of whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal include a respondent's criminal and disciplinary history, history of drug or alcohol use, academic and school attendance record, association with gang activity, acceptance of responsibility for his or her actions, the nature of the underlying incident, recommendations made in a probation or mental health report, the degree to which the respondent's parent or guardian is involved in the respondent's home and academic life, and the ability of the parent or guardian to provide adequate supervision (seeMatter of Nijuel J., 169 A.D.3d at 682–683, 93 N.Y.S.3d 379 ).
lthough a juvenile is not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his or her first brush with the law, a juvenile's particular circumstances—including his or her criminal and disciplinary history, history of drug or alcohol use, association with gang activity, academic and school attendance history, and ability to accept responsibility for his or her acts—are nevertheless relevant to a court's discretionary determination of whether or not to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal, as are the consideration of the seriousness of the underlying offense and the extent to which the juvenile is adequately supervised by his or her parent or guardian" ( Matter of Nigel H., 136 A.D.3d at 1034–1035, 26 N.Y.S.3d 301 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted] ). "[A]ny recommendations made in a probation or mental health report" are also relevant to the court's decision as to whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal ( Matter of Jonathan M., 107 A.D.3d 805, 807, 966 N.Y.S.2d 522 ).Here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion by, in effect, denying the appellant's request for an ACD (seeMatter of Dasean M., 170 A.D.3d 839, 93 N.Y.S.3d 881 ; Matter of Nigel H., 136 A.D.3d at 1034, 26 N.Y.S.3d 301 ).
tation marks omitted] ). "Although a juvenile is not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his or her first brush with the law, a juvenile's particular circumstances—including his or her criminal and disciplinary history, history of drug or alcohol use, association with gang activity, academic and school attendance history, and ability to accept responsibility for his or her acts—are nevertheless relevant to a court's discretionary determination of whether or not to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal, as are the consideration of the seriousness of the underlying offense and the extent to which the juvenile is adequately supervised by his or her parent or guardian" ( id. at 1034–1035, 26 N.Y.S.3d 301 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted] ). "[A]ny recommendations made in a probation or mental health report" are also relevant to the court's decision as to whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal ( Matter of Jonathan M. , 107 A.D.3d 805, 807, 966 N.Y.S.2d 522 ). Here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in denying the appellant's request for an ACD (seeMatter of Dasean M. , 170 A.D.3d 839, 93 N.Y.S.3d 881 ; Matter of Nigel H. , 136 A.D.3d at 1034, 26 N.Y.S.3d 301 ).
l quotation marks omitted] ). "Although a juvenile is not entitled to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal merely because this was his or her first brush with the law, a juvenile's particular circumstances—including his or her criminal and disciplinary history, history of drug or alcohol use, association with gang activity, academic and school attendance history, and ability to accept responsibility for his or her acts—are nevertheless relevant to a court's discretionary determination of whether or not to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal, as are the consideration of the seriousness of the underlying offense and the extent to which the juvenile is adequately supervised by his or her parent or guardian" ( id. at 1034–1035, 26 N.Y.S.3d 301 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]. "[A]ny recommendations made in a probation or mental health report" are also relevant to the court's decision of whether to adjourn a proceeding in contemplation of dismissal ( Matter of Jonathan M., 107 A.D.3d 805, 807, 966 N.Y.S.2d 522 ).Here, the Family Court providently exercised its discretion in placing Dasean on probation for a period of six months (seeMatter of Nigel H., 136 A.D.3d at 1034, 26 N.Y.S.3d 301 ). BALKIN, J.P., AUSTIN, LASALLE and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.
This proceeding constituted the appellant's first contact with the court system, he took responsibility for his actions, and the record demonstrates that he learned from his mistakes. During the pendency of the proceeding, the appellant readily complied with the supervision imposed by the court and his father's supervision in the home, and he garnered praise from the Probation Department and school officials. Under the circumstances, including the appellant's commendable academic and school attendance record, his mentoring of fellow students at his school, and the minimal risk that he poses to the community, an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal was warranted (see Family Ct. Act § 315.3 ; Matter of Eric M., 114 A.D.3d 489, 979 N.Y.S.2d 808 ; see also Matter of Narvanda S., 109 A.D.3d 710, 972 N.Y.S.2d 1 ; Matter of Jonathan M., 107 A.D.3d 805, 966 N.Y.S.2d 522 ). MASTRO, J.P., LASALLE, BARROS and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.
The imposition of probation was the least restrictive alternative consistent with the needs and best interests of the appellant and the need for protection of the community. The disposition was appropriate in light of, inter alia, the recommendation in the probation report, the appellant's minimization of and failure to accept responsibility for his conduct, and his need for increased supervision (see Matterof Anthony W., 152 A.D.3d 708, 709, 59 N.Y.S.3d 101 ; Matter of Tanaja F., 147 A.D.3d at 936–937, 47 N.Y.S.3d 120 ; Matter of Elijah G., 138 A.D.3d 839, 840, 29 N.Y.S.3d 504 ; cf. Matter of Jonathan M., 107 A.D.3d 805, 807, 966 N.Y.S.2d 522 ). LEVENTHAL, J.P., AUSTIN, MALTESE and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.
The court could have required the Probation Department or another agency to monitor the appellant's school attendance and curfew without adding the stigma of a juvenile delinquent adjudication ( see Matter of Jeffrey C., 47 A.D.3d 433, 434, 849 N.Y.S.2d 517; see also Matter of Ellery C., 32 N.Y.2d 588, 590, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51, 300 N.E.2d 424; Matter of Jeanette P., 34 A.D.2d 661, 661, 310 N.Y.S.2d 125). Under the particular circumstances of this case, the appellant should have been adjudicated a person in need of supervision rather than a juvenile delinquent ( see Matter of Jeffrey C., 47 A.D.3d at 434, 849 N.Y.S.2d 517; cf. Matter of Jonathan M., 107 A.D.3d 805, 807, 966 N.Y.S.2d 522; Matter of Sheifa R., 57 A.D.3d at 678, 868 N.Y.S.2d 540; Matter of Michael OO., 53 A.D.3d at 710, 861 N.Y.S.2d 458; Matter of Rosemary R., 29 A.D.3d 309, 813 N.Y.S.2d 300), and we exercise our discretion under Family Court Act § 311.4(2) to modify the order of disposition accordingly. The 12–month period of probation imposed by the Family Court is an appropriate means to ensure that the appellant continues to attend school regularly and comply with his curfew.
The disposition was appropriate in light of, inter alia, the seriousness of the incident which led to the appellant's adjudication as a juvenile delinquent, his subsequent arrest for a similar incident, his poor school attendance record, and the recommendation of the New York City Department of Probation ( see Matter of Antoine H., 81 A.D.3d 646, 915 N.Y.S.2d 869;Matter of Eunique B., 73 A.D.3d 764, 899 N.Y.S.2d 852;cf. Matter of Jonathan M., 107 A.D.3d 805, 807, 966 N.Y.S.2d 522). SKELOS, J.P., DILLON, ROMAN and MALTESE, JJ., concur.
The Family Court has broad discretion in determining the appropriate disposition in a juvenile delinquency proceeding, and its determination is accorded great deference ( see Matter of Racheal M., 108 A.D.3d at 771, 970 N.Y.S.2d 249; Matter of Paul T., 107 A.D.3d 726, 727, 966 N.Y.S.2d 223). Here, in light of the seriousness of the appellant's conduct, as well as his refusal to take responsibility for it and his need for monitoring, the Family Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in adjudicating the appellant a juvenile delinquent ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 352.2), rather than directing an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal ( see Matter of Chakelton M., 111 A.D.3d 732, 975 N.Y.S.2d 95; Matter of Racheal M., 108 A.D.3d at 771–772, 970 N.Y.S.2d 249; Matter of Leighton F., 108 A.D.3d 669, 670, 969 N.Y.S.2d 514; cf. Matter of Jonathan M., 107 A.D.3d 805, 807, 966 N.Y.S.2d 522). RIVERA, J.P., BALKIN, HALL and SGROI, JJ., concur.