Opinion
F041771.
10-7-2003
In re JONATHAN D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JONATHAN D., Defendant and Appellant.
Janice Wellborn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Cross and Angelo S. Edralin, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J.; Levy, J.; and Gomes, J.
Appellant, Jonathan D., admitted to assaulting another by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and was adjudged a ward of the court. Appellant had previously been adjudged delinquent on numerous other charges and violations of probation. He had previously been placed in various group homes and juvenile hall. Ultimately, the trial court committed appellant to the California Youth Authority (CYA) for a maximum period of five years and two months.
All further references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial courts finding that the minor is not a child with exceptional educational needs is supported by the evidence. We conclude that it is and affirm the order.
DISCUSSION
Prior to filing his report, the probation officer requested an "exceptional needs screening for cya recommendation" from the Fresno County Office of Education. The request noted that the probation officer had been unable to determine whether appellant had exceptional educational needs and listed the last three schools appellant attended. The registrar of the court/community schools responded that appellant was not an individual with exceptional needs, noting that no special education files for appellant were found at appellants last school. In the report filed by the probation officer, the officer recommended the court find appellant was not an individual with exceptional educational needs. At the hearing the trial court found appellant was not an individual with exceptional educational needs. Appellant challenges this finding, arguing that it is unsupported by the evidence. We disagree.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the court reviews the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 758; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence, including reasonable inferences based on the evidence and excluding inferences based on speculation or conjecture. (People v. Tran (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 759, 771-772.)
Appellant supports his argument by citing to the educational history portion of the probation officers report. In that section, the probation officer explained that appellant had attended only six days of school over a three-week period at his last school. Appellant had been suspended numerous times over an eight-month period at his previous school and school officials had considered expulsion due to appellants many behavioral referrals. Furthermore, the report noted that appellant had earned only 1.5 high school credits during a 12-month period. Appellant argues this information, coupled with appellants long history of disciplinary and behavioral problems, supported a finding that he was an exceptional needs student. Not so.
Under California law, an "individual with exceptional needs" is defined as a person (1) who meets certain age requirements; (2) who has been identified by an individual education program team as a "child with a disability" as defined by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; (2) whose impairment requires instruction or services or both that cannot be provided with modification of the regular school schedule; and (4) who meets certain prescribed eligibility criteria. (Educ. Code, § 56026, subds.(a), (b), (c)(2), (d).) Subdivision (e) of Education Code section 56026 carves out those who do not have exceptional needs as follows:
"Unless disabled within the meaning of subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive, pupils whose educational needs are due primarily to limited English proficiency; a lack of instruction in reading or mathematics; temporary physical disabilities; social maladjustment; or environmental, cultural, or economic factors are not individuals with exceptional needs." (Emphasis added.)
Nothing in the record established that appellant was a child with a disability. Indeed, the registrar of schools indicated that appellant was not an individual with exceptional educational needs based upon the fact that no special education files existed for appellant. Although appellant had a lengthy history of disciplinary and behavioral problems, such problems did not require a finding that appellant was an exceptional needs student. Social maladjustment is not a basis for finding a student is a child with exceptional educational needs. (Educ. Code, § 56026, subd. (e).) Therefore, we conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the trial courts finding.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.