Opinion
Case No. 95-13940-AM, Adversary Proceeding No. 95-1484
July 11, 1996
William E. Findler, Esquire, Arlington, Va, for Plaintiff, pro se
Mr. Pierre Joligard, Arlington, Va, for Defendant, pro se
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff, who has sought a determination that fees ordered paid to him as guardian ad litem for the debtor's minor son are nondischargeable.
Facts
Certain of the facts are undisputed; others are hotly controverted. The undisputed facts may be briefly stated. The debtor and his former wife, Christina Joligard, were divorced on October 8, 1993 by a final decree of divorce entered by the Circuit Court of Arlington County, Virginia. Among other provisions, that decree awarded the parties joint custody of their minor child, Mischa B. Joligard. The decree concluded by referring "all further matters" in the "proceedings" to the Arlington County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Christina Joligard subsequently brought a motion in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Arlington County, seeking a change of custody. That court granted her sole custody of Mischa and ordered the debtor to pay her child support. The plaintiff here, William E. Findler, a practicing attorney, was appointed as guardian ad litem for Mischa by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The debtor took an appeal to the Circuit Court of Arlington County, which heard the matter de novo. Mr. Findler continued to represent Mischa as guardian ad litem before the Circuit Court. The Circuit Court, after three days of hearing in January 1995, entered a final order dated April 14, 1995, nunc pro tunc to January 25, 1995 granting Christina Joligard sole custody of Mischa and, relevant to the present controversy, ordering the debtor to pay Mr. Findler $4,200 as guardian ad litem fees by April 25, 1995.
On September 7, 1995, the debtor filed a voluntary petition in this court under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. On November 27, 1995, the plaintiff filed the complaint that is presently before the court seeking a determination that the guardian ad litem fees owed to him by the debtor as a result of the April 14, 1995, order were excepted from discharge under §§ 523(a)(5) Bankruptcy Code. The debtor filed an answer and motion to dismiss, as well as a "supplementary answer," and the parties are now at issue.
He had previously filed a chapter 7 petition on May 2, 1995, (Case No. 95-11838), which was dismissed based on the debtor's failure to appear at the meeting of creditors.
The motion to dismiss — most of which would have required consideration of matters outside the four corners of the complaint — was never set for hearing. For the purposes of the present motion, the court treats it as a cross-motion for summary judgment.
Those are the undisputed facts. The disputed facts are the correctness of the underlying dispute litigated in, and adjudicated by, the Circuit Court of Arlington County. Specifically, the debtor and his former wife disagreed over the appropriateness of the medical care being provided to Mischa, and in particular the administration of psychotropic drugs to Mischa. The debtor strongly opposed, and continues to oppose, the use of such drugs. He asserts that the administration of such drugs constituted child abuse and was ultimately found to be improper by doctors at Fairfax Hospital. The debtor further asserts that Mr. Findler — presumably because he did not oppose the medical treatment advocated by the former wife — did not faithfully represent Mischa's interests in the state court litigation.
Conclusions of Law and Discussion I.
This court has jurisdiction of this controversy under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and 157(a) and the general order of reference entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia on August 14, 1984. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
II.
Under § 523, Bankruptcy Code, a chapter 7 discharge does not discharge an individual debtor from certain kinds of debts, among them the following:
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent that —
(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned to the Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision of such State); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support;
III.
A motion for summary judgment in an adversary proceeding is governed by F.R.Bankr.P. 7056, which incorporates Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court should believe the evidence of the non-moving party, and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Nevertheless, not just any factual dispute is sufficient to bar summary judgment; the dispute must be as to a "material" fact. This means that the fact must be one which, if established, would defeat an required element of the moving party's case or constitute an affirmative defense.
Here, the debtor makes essentially two arguments. The first is that, as a pure matter of statutory construction, the guardian ad litem fees do not in literal terms constitute a debt " to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for . . . support of such . . . child," since under the terms of the April 14, 1995 decree the debt is owed directly to Mr. Findler rather than to the child or his mother. This argument was considered and rejected in Kellerman v. Laing (In re Laing), 187 B.R. 531 (Bankr. W.D.Va. 1995) (Krumm, C.J.), which this court finds persuasive. In particular, this court agrees "that it is not the identity of the payee that determines dischargeability but the nature of the debt owed," id. at 532-533, and that "in proceedings involving custody of children, the court ordered fees for services of a guardian ad litem . . . are debts of the parents to their children for purposes of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) unless there is a clear finding of fact and ruling of law in the state court proceedings to the contrary." Id. at 533.
The debtor's second argument is that the services of the guardian ad litem not only did not benefit, but in fact harmed, the child, since the outcome of the state court action resulted in the continuation of an inappropriate course of medical treatment. There is no assertion or showing of any underlying impropriety in Mr. Findler's representation, such as actual malice or conflict of interest. The issue of Mischa's medical treatment was the central controversy before the Circuit Court of Arlington County. The debtor vigorously participated in the three-day hearing before that court and was represented by counsel. Since the issue was actually litigated before a court having both subject-matter and in personam jurisdiction and was necessary to that court's ruling, principles of collateral estoppel prevent the debtor from relitigating in this court the merits of that controversy. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284-5, n. 11 (1991) ("We now clarify that collateral estoppel principles do indeed apply in discharge exception proceedings pursuant to § 523(a)"). In this connection, this court makes no independent ruling on the underlying issue of whether Mischa's medical care was appropriate, or whether sole custody of Mischa should have been granted to the debtor's former wife, Christina Joligard. If the judgment of the Circuit Court of Arlington County was erroneous, it could have been appealed; but it cannot be collaterally attacked in the context of this nondischargeability proceeding. Although it is true that this court is not bound in a nondischargeability proceeding by the labels a state court may use to characterize the debt being adjudicated and may look behind the judgment, this court is not free to ignore factual determinations involving the same parties made by a state court within the scope of its jurisdiction.
For the foregoing reasons, the court determines that the disputed issues involving the appropriateness of Mischa's medical care are not "material" under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 because those issues may not be relitigated in this court. The order of the Arlington County Circuit Court is a final determination by a court of record acting within the scope of its jurisdiction. It is undisputed that fees were awarded to Mr. Findler for his services in representing the minor child of the debtor in matters intimately related to the child's welfare, namely the custody of the child and the amount that should be paid for his support. That the state court's decision was arguably wrong, as the debtor asserts, does not change the nature of the obligation. Accordingly, summary judgment will be entered in the plaintiff's favor determining that the $4,200 guardian ad litem fee is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(5), Bankruptcy Code.
A separate order will be entered.