However, the reviewing court must give deference to the trial court's decision and cannot set that decision aside because it, applying the above standard, would have ruled differently. In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840. Here, the only evidence introduced by the State which tended to prove that respondent could reasonably be expected to harm herself or another in the near future was the testimony of Dr. Bornstein and the letters written by the respondent to the Paynes.
See Zenoff, Controlling the Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA Standards and Beyond, 53 Geo. Wash.L.Rev. 562, 587 (1985). See also Matter of Johnston, 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218-19, 73 Ill.Dec. 743, 746, 747, 454 N.E.2d 840, 843-44 (1983); In re Bobo, 376 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn.App. 1985). DISPOSITION
The elements of section 1-119 must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which requires a high level of certainty before finding one in need of mental treatment and curtailing one's liberty, but it is something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Stephenson, 67 Ill.2d 544 (1977); In re Johnston, 118 Ill. App.3d 214 (1983); Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill.2d 207 (1995). As a reviewing court, we give great deference to a circuit court's factual findings, as it stands in the best position to weigh witness credibility, and its decision will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous.
However, the reviewing court must give deference to the trial court's decision and cannot set that decision aside because it, applying the above standard, would have ruled differently. In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840." In re Mazzara (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 146, 149, 478 N.E.2d 567, 569.
( In re Powell (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 877, 880, 407 N.E.2d 658, 660.) Courts are not required to wait until an individual is harmed by the respondent before ordering hospitalization. In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218, 454 N.E.2d 840, 842; Powell, 85 Ill. App.3d at 880, 407 N.E.2d at 660. Based on the evidence, the decision of the trial court was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
• 4 The decision of the trial court to commit a person to a mental hospital will be affirmed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. ( In re Rogers (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 524, 478 N.E.2d 1198; In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840.) In recommitment proceedings, unanimous and uncontradicted expert testimony that a patient would be dangerous if released justifies continued involuntary hospitalization.
It has been recognized the medical science of predicting future dangerousness is inexact in civil commitment cases so that a commitment order will normally be upheld by a reviewing court if there is a reasonable expectation the respondent might engage in dangerous conduct. ( In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840.)
( In re Brown (1981), 86 Ill.2d 147; In re Harpman (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 504.) "Clear and convincing evidence is stated to be something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. ( In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill.2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273.)" ( In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218.) The findings of the trial court must be given great deference since it has the opportunity to view and evaluate the testimony of the parties and witnesses.
In civil commitment cases, the medical science of predicting the future is inexact, so that a reviewing court would normally uphold a commitment order where there is a reasonable expectation that the respondent might engage in dangerous conduct. ( In re Rogers (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 524, 525, 478 N.E.2d 1198; In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218, 454 N.E.2d 840.) The reviewing court cannot set aside the decision of the trial court because it, applying the requisite standard, would have ruled differently.
In order to prevail on its petition for involuntary admission, the State must establish proof by clear and convincing evidence. In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218, 454 N.E.2d 840. In the case sub judice, respondent contends that the requisite finding that she was unable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard against serious harm was based primarily upon inadmissible hearsay and did not approach the level of clear and convincing evidence.