In re Johnston

12 Citing cases

  1. In re Mazzara

    133 Ill. App. 3d 146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 11 times

    However, the reviewing court must give deference to the trial court's decision and cannot set that decision aside because it, applying the above standard, would have ruled differently. In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840. Here, the only evidence introduced by the State which tended to prove that respondent could reasonably be expected to harm herself or another in the near future was the testimony of Dr. Bornstein and the letters written by the respondent to the Paynes.

  2. State v. Johnson

    156 Ariz. 464 (Ariz. 1988)   Cited 4 times

    See Zenoff, Controlling the Dangers of Dangerousness: The ABA Standards and Beyond, 53 Geo. Wash.L.Rev. 562, 587 (1985). See also Matter of Johnston, 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218-19, 73 Ill.Dec. 743, 746, 747, 454 N.E.2d 840, 843-44 (1983); In re Bobo, 376 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn.App. 1985). DISPOSITION

  3. In re Bontrager

    286 Ill. App. 3d 226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 5 times

    The elements of section 1-119 must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, which requires a high level of certainty before finding one in need of mental treatment and curtailing one's liberty, but it is something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Stephenson, 67 Ill.2d 544 (1977); In re Johnston, 118 Ill. App.3d 214 (1983); Bazydlo v. Volant, 164 Ill.2d 207 (1995). As a reviewing court, we give great deference to a circuit court's factual findings, as it stands in the best position to weigh witness credibility, and its decision will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly erroneous.

  4. People v. Ferguson

    603 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    However, the reviewing court must give deference to the trial court's decision and cannot set that decision aside because it, applying the above standard, would have ruled differently. In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840." In re Mazzara (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 146, 149, 478 N.E.2d 567, 569.

  5. In re Knapp

    231 Ill. App. 3d 917 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 16 times

    ( In re Powell (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 877, 880, 407 N.E.2d 658, 660.) Courts are not required to wait until an individual is harmed by the respondent before ordering hospitalization. In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218, 454 N.E.2d 840, 842; Powell, 85 Ill. App.3d at 880, 407 N.E.2d at 660. Based on the evidence, the decision of the trial court was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

  6. People v. Lang

    545 N.E.2d 327 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 4 times
    Upholding trial court's commitment order unless manifestly erroneous

    • 4 The decision of the trial court to commit a person to a mental hospital will be affirmed on appeal unless it is manifestly erroneous. ( In re Rogers (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 524, 478 N.E.2d 1198; In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840.) In recommitment proceedings, unanimous and uncontradicted expert testimony that a patient would be dangerous if released justifies continued involuntary hospitalization.

  7. People v. Orr

    176 Ill. App. 3d 498 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 38 times

    It has been recognized the medical science of predicting future dangerousness is inexact in civil commitment cases so that a commitment order will normally be upheld by a reviewing court if there is a reasonable expectation the respondent might engage in dangerous conduct. ( In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 454 N.E.2d 840.)

  8. In re R.G

    165 Ill. App. 3d 112 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 61 times
    Stating that the constitutional right to counsel "has been codified and extended to the parents of a minor who are parties respondent in a proceeding under the Juvenile Court Act"

    ( In re Brown (1981), 86 Ill.2d 147; In re Harpman (1986), 146 Ill. App.3d 504.) "Clear and convincing evidence is stated to be something less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. ( In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill.2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273.)" ( In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218.) The findings of the trial court must be given great deference since it has the opportunity to view and evaluate the testimony of the parties and witnesses.

  9. In re Williams

    151 Ill. App. 3d 911 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 15 times

    In civil commitment cases, the medical science of predicting the future is inexact, so that a reviewing court would normally uphold a commitment order where there is a reasonable expectation that the respondent might engage in dangerous conduct. ( In re Rogers (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 524, 525, 478 N.E.2d 1198; In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218, 454 N.E.2d 840.) The reviewing court cannot set aside the decision of the trial court because it, applying the requisite standard, would have ruled differently.

  10. In re Scruggs

    502 N.E.2d 1108 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 4 times
    Holding the hearsay statement of a building manager that the patient had answered her door in the nude and left her keys in the building office admissible and concluding that the "unreliability of the * * * anecdotal statements * * * does not act to bar their admission, but rather acts merely as a caution as to the reliability of [the expert's] opinion"

    In order to prevail on its petition for involuntary admission, the State must establish proof by clear and convincing evidence. In re Johnston (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 214, 218, 454 N.E.2d 840. In the case sub judice, respondent contends that the requisite finding that she was unable to provide for her basic physical needs so as to guard against serious harm was based primarily upon inadmissible hearsay and did not approach the level of clear and convincing evidence.