Opinion
No. 05-11-01164-CV
07-27-2012
IN RE BRIAN EDWARD JOHNSON
AFFIRM; Opinion Filed July 27, 2012.
On Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District Court
Kaufman County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 83963-422
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Bridges, FitzGerald, and Lang
Opinion By Justice Lang
Brian Edward Johnson, a pro se and indigent inmate, filed in the trial court a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel Kaufman County Sheriff David A. Byrnes to produce certain medical records he requested under the Texas Public Information Act (PIA). See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.001-552.353. (West 2012). Byrnes filed a motion to dismiss in which he argued the suit was frivolous because the PIA did not require him to produce the requested records. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the suit pursuant to Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code chapter fourteen, which governs indigent inmate litigation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 14.002 (West Supp. 2011), 14.003(a)(2) (West 2002). In two issues, Johnson asserts the trial court erred in ruling his petition was frivolous when his records were subject to disclosure. Deciding Johnson's issues against him, we affirm the trial court's judgment. Because the law to be applied in this case is well-settled, we issue this memorandum opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4.
I. BACKGROUND
Johnson requested the records sought in this action in a March 30, 2011 letter addressed to the Kaufman County Sheriff's medical department. The records Johnson sought concerned medical treatment he received at the Kaufman County Jail for injuries he sustained in an accident in May 2008. According to Johnson's petition for writ of mandamus, Johnson was notified by the sheriff's department in April 2011 that his request was being denied pursuant to PIA section 555.028 which provides, in relevant part, that "[a] governmental body is not required to accept or comply with a request for information from (1) an individual who is imprisoned or confined in a correctional facility . . .." See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.028. Johnson wrote to the sheriff's department again and "appealed" the denial, arguing the requested records were "sought for non-commercial purposes" and did "not meet the exemption criteria." He further argued he was entitled to the records pursuant to section 552.023 because they related to him personally. See id. § 552.023.
Johnson relied on the Freedom of Information Act in support of his request. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (2007). That Act governs access to federal agency records. In subsequent correspondence, and in his petition for writ of mandamus, he relied on the PIA which governs access to information collected, assembled, or maintained by a state governmental body. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.001-552.003.
In June 2011, Johnson received a copy of a letter from the Office of the Attorney General of Texas addressed to the custodian of records at the Kaufman County Sheriff's Office. The letter confirmed Byrnes could "decline to accept or comply" with Johnson's request. Johnson asserted in his petition for writ of mandamus that he was unaware until then that Byrnes was requesting a decision from the Attorney General and, although PIA section 552.301 required Byrnes to inform him of the request for an Attorney General decision, Byrnes failed to do so. See id. § 552.301(a),(d). Further, Johnson asserted that as a result of Byrnes's failure, the records he requested were presumed to be subject to disclosure and, under section 552.302, had to be released to him. See id. § 552.302. In asserting that Johnson's suit was frivolous and should be dismissed, Byrnes argued PIA section 552.028 did not require him to release any records to Johnson because Johnson was incarcerated. Byrnes further argued sections 552.301 and 552.302 were inapplicable because they relate to requests for information that fall within the enumerated exceptions in the PIA, and Johnson's request did not fall within any of those exceptions. See id. §§ 552.101- 552.153. Without holding a hearing or stating specifically the basis for its ruling, the trial court dismissed Johnson's suit.
II. INMATE LITIGATION AND THE PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT
A. Applicable Law
1. Inmate Litigation
Other than an action brought under the Texas Family Code, a suit brought by an inmate who files an affidavit of indigency is governed by the civil practice and remedies code chapter fourteen. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.002. Chapter fourteen imposes certain procedural requirements an inmate must satisfy in filing suit and allows a court to dismiss the suit if (1) the requirements are not met, (2) the inmate knowingly filed a false affidavit or unsworn declaration concerning previous suits or his indigency status, or (3) the suit is frivolous or malicious. See id. §§ 14.003(a), 14.004 (West Supp. 2011), 14.005 (West 2002); Hamilton v. Williams, 298 S.W.3d 334, 339 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). The purpose of chapter fourteen is to control inmate litigation and aid the trial court in determining whether an inmate's claim is frivolous. See Hamilton, 298 S.W.3d at 339; Garrett v. Williams, 250 S.W.3d 154, 157 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). In determining whether a claim is frivolous or malicious, the trial court may consider the claim's realistic chance of success, whether the claim has an arguable basis in law or fact, and whether the claim is substantially similar to a previous claim filed by the inmate. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(b); Garrett, 250 S.W.3d at 158. The trial court need not hold a hearing to determine whether an inmate's suit is frivolous. See Hamilton, 298 S.W.3d at 340; Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 266 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). When no hearing is held, as in this case, the issue before the appellate court is whether the trial court properly determined the suit had no arguable basis in law. See Hamilton, 298 S.W.3d at 340; Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 266. A claim has no arguable basis in law if it relies upon an "indisputably meritless legal theory," the inmate fails to exhaust his administrative remedies, or the claim is based on "wholly incredible or irrational factual allegations." Nabelek v. Dist. Attorney of Harris Cnty., 290 S.W.3d 222, 228 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied); Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
2. The Public Information Act
The purpose of the PIA is to provide the public prompt and complete access to information. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.001(a), 552.221(a); City of Dallas v. Abbott, 304 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. 2010). Although the PIA favors disclosure of public information, not all information is subject to mandatory disclosure. See City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 356 (Tex. 2000). Under section 552.028, disclosure of information requested by an inmate is discretionary, even if the information pertains to the inmate. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.028(a),(b); Harrison v. Vance, 34 S.W.3d 660, 663 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). Further, under sections 552.101 through 552.153, specific categories of information are excepted from disclosure altogether. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.101-552.153 (excepting information such as certain personnel information, legislative documents, prosecutorial information, and public power utility competitive matters).
Before denying a request for information it considers exempt from disclosure under sections 552.101 through 552.153, however, a governmental body must (1) ask for a decision from the Attorney General as to whether the requested information is exempt, unless the Attorney General has previously made a determination on the subject; (2) inform the party requesting the records that it is seeking an Attorney General opinion; and, (3) provide that person a copy of its request for an opinion. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.301(a),(d); Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d at 356. If the governmental body does not ask for an Attorney General opinion within ten days of receiving the request for information and does not inform the party requesting records that it is seeking an opinion, the information is presumed public. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §§ 552.301(b), 552.302; Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d at 356. Both the person requesting information and the Attorney General may seek mandamus compelling a governmental body to disclose information if the governmental body (1) considers the requested information exempt from disclosure, but refuses to request an Attorney General opinion and one has not already been rendered on the subject, or (2) refuses to supply public information. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.321(a); Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d at 356.
B. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews de novo both a determination that requested information is not subject to the PIA and a determination that a claim has no arguable basis in law. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d at 357; Parsons v. Dallas Cnty., 197 S.W.3d 915, 921 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). In conducting its review and determining whether the inmate's petition states a cause of action that would authorize relief, the appellate court takes as true the allegations in the petition. Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 266-67. An appellate court will not reverse a trial court's determination that a claim has no arguable basis in law because mandamus relief under the PIA is not appropriate where disclosure of the requested information is discretionary. See Vance, 34 S.W.3d at 663; Moore v. Henry, 960 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (op. on reh'g).
When a trial court grants a motion to dismiss an inmate's suit as frivolous and the motion asserts multiple grounds, the appellate court will affirm on any ground presented in the motion. Retzlaff, 94 S.W.3d at 653. A trial court's failure to specifically state the grounds for dismissal is not reversible error. Id. at 654.
III. APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
In two issues, Johnson complains the trial court erred in dismissing his claim as frivolous when the records he requested were subject to disclosure. Specifically, in his first issue, Johnson contends his records were subject to disclosure, and his claim is not frivolous, because section 552.029 grants a right of access to information about an inmate's health and section 552.028 does not prohibit a governmental body from disclosing records requested by an inmate. In his second issue, Johnson contends his records were subject to disclosure, and his claim is not frivolous, because contrary to the trial court's "conclu[sion] that [Byrnes] fully complied with the terms of the [PIA]," the record reflects Byrnes failed to comply with section 552.301 and this failure resulted in Byrnes "waiv[ing] the right to withhold the requested documents."
Johnson also asserts generally that the court erred in failing to state with particularity the act or omission justifying the dismissal. Johnson, however, provides no authority supporting his contention. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Moreover, a trial court's failure to specifically state the grounds for dismissal is not reversible error. Retzlaff, 94 S.W.3d at 653.
Although he argued to the trial court that his records were subject to disclosure under section 552.023's special right of access to information relating to the person requesting the records, Johnson does not rely on that section in his argument on appeal.
The trial court's order does not contain such a conclusion. In its entirety, the order reads: "This Court having considered the petition for mandamus and the State's answer thereto and motion to dismis and having considered the applicable authorities and statutes has determined that this suit should be dismissed under Tex. Civ. Prac. and Rem. Code Chapter 14, and it is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice."
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In response, the State asserts the same arguments it asserted to the trial court. The State maintains Johnson's petition had no arguable basis in law because section 552.028 does not mandate disclosure and because sections 552.301 and 552.302 are inapplicable on this record. We agree with the State.
Although Johnson contends his records were subject to disclosure because Byrnes failed to comply with section 552.301, Byrnes was not required to comply with that section. By its own terms, section 552.301 applies to situations where the governmental body considers the information requested exempt under sections 552.101 through 552.153. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.301. Taking as true the allegations in Johnson's petition, Byrnes denied Johnson's request for records not because the records fell within one of the enumerated exceptions, but because Byrnes had no mandatory duty to provide them, and he was exercising his discretion not to do so. We decide against Johnson on his second issue regarding his claim that Byrnes "waived" the right to withhold his records.
We also cannot agree with Johnson's contention in his first issue that his records were subject to disclosure under sections 552.028 and 552.029. Although information about the health of an inmate is subject to disclosure under section 552.029 and a governmental body may, under section 552.028, disclose records requested by an inmate, a governmental body is not required to comply with an inmate's request simply because the requested information pertains to the inmate himself. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 552.028(b), 552.029; Vance, 34 S.W.3d at 663; Moore, 960 S.W.2d at 84. A discretionary act is not a mandatory act, and nothing in the PIA required Byrnes to disclose the records Johnson requested. Vance, 34 S.W.3d at 663; Moore, 960 S.W.2d at 84.
Byrnes had no affirmative duty to provide Johnson the records he requested and did not fail to comply with any provision of the PIA. Accordingly, Johnson had no arguable basis in law to support his claim for mandamus relief, and the trial court did not err in dismissing Johnson's petition pursuant to chapter fourteen of the civil practice and remedies code. We decide Johnson's two issues against him.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having resolved both of Johnson's issues against him, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE
111164F.P05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
IN RE BRIAN EDWARD JOHNSON
No. 05-11-01164-CV
Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District Court of Kaufman County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 83963- 422).
Opinion delivered by Justice Lang, Justices Bridges and FitzGerald participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, we AFFIRM the trial court's judgment . We ORDER that appellee DAVID A. BYRNES recover his costs of this appeal from appellant BRIAN EDWARD JOHNSON.
Judgment entered July 27, 2012.
DOUGLAS S. LANG
JUSTICE