Opinion
22-1730
10-25-2023
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF A. IRLENE JOHNSON, Deceased. DANIEL C. ADAMS, Appellant.
David L. Charles, Amelia S. Mapes, and Alexandra M. Cutler of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant. Jay P. Syverson, Randall D. Armentrout, and Spencer S. Cady of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Terry Rickers, Judge.
Daniel Adams appeals the district court's ruling that his grandmother's will was valid. AFFIRMED.
David L. Charles, Amelia S. Mapes, and Alexandra M. Cutler of Belin McCormick, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Jay P. Syverson, Randall D. Armentrout, and Spencer S. Cady of Nyemaster Goode, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Badding, J., and Scott, S.J. [*]
AHLERS, Presiding Judge.
In 2010, Irlene Johnson executed a will granting her son a life estate in her 400-acre Madison County farm, with one-half remainder interest to her grandson and one-half remainder interest to a trust created by the will for the benefit of her great-grandchildren. The will also gave one-half of her forty-acre Dallas County farm to her grandson with the other half going to the great-grandchildren trust.
In 2019, at the age of ninety-six, Irlene executed a new will, devising the residue of her estate, which included both farms, to St. Jude Children's Hospital, leaving nothing to her family. She did so to honor her daughter, who died of cancer. Irlene died later that same year, and her grandson tried to probate the 2010 will. St. Jude then petitioned to probate the 2019 will. The grandson and the son challenged the 2019 will, claiming Irlene lacked testamentary capacity when she executed it.
Following a bench trial, the district court concluded Irlene had capacity to sign the 2019 will and upheld its validity. The grandson appeals. He argues the district court applied the wrong legal standard for evaluating testamentary capacity, and, under the appropriate standard, the district court improperly found Irlene had capacity.
This is an action to set aside or contest the 2019 will, so it is a law action. See Iowa Code § 633.33 (2020); In re Est. of Todd, 585 N.W.2d 273, 275 (Iowa 1998). We review for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907; In re Est. of Kremer, 845 N.W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014). The district court's findings of fact have the force and effect of a special verdict. Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. As a result, we are bound by the district court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. In re Est. of Hoxsey, 225 N.W.2d 141, 142 (Iowa 1975). However, we note that significant portions of the district court's ruling are a verbatim adoption of St. Jude's post-trial brief. While we do not apply a "higher standard of review" in this situation, we evaluate the record more carefully. See In re Guardianship of Radda, 955 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 2021) (when the court adopts a proposed ruling verbatim from the prevailing party "we will scrutinize the record more closely and carefully" (citation omitted)).
The grandson also argues the district court's findings of fact should be given less deference because they are not supported by substantial evidence and because of significant delay in issuing the ruling. Because we give the district court less deference due to its adoption of St. Jude's post-trial brief, we do not address those arguments.
A testator has capacity to execute a will if she (1) understands the nature of the instrument being executed, (2) understands the nature and extent of her property, (3) is able to identify and recall the natural objects of her bounty, and (4) realizes and knows the distribution she desires to make of her property. In re Est. of Adams, 234 N.W.2d 125, 127 (Iowa 1975). Testamentary capacity is determined at "the exact time" the will is executed. In re Est. of Gruis, 207 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Iowa 1973). However, evidence of the testator's state of mind at other times may be considered if there is reason to believe it sheds light on the testator's capacity at the time the will was executed. Id. The contestant has the burden to prove lack of capacity by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Behrend's Will, 10 N.W.2d 651,654-55 (Iowa 1943).
The grandson focuses his attack on the second component of testamentary capacity, arguing Irlene did not know the nature and extent of her property. He bases this argument on his claim that Irlene believed she held a life estate in the Madison County farm when she actually owned the farm outright. Thus, the grandson contends, when she devised all her property to St. Jude, she was unaware she was giving the farm to the charity because she did not understand it was part of her devisable estate. The district court rejected this argument, holding "[k]nowledge of her ownership interest in the Madison County property, regardless of whether she believed it was in a life estate or fee simple, is sufficient to establish testamentary capacity." The district court further determined that Irlene understood she owned the farm at the time she executed the will.
Our case law signals that failure to understand the interest one has in one's property can show lack of understanding of the nature and extent of the property. Those cases conclude that the testator's misunderstanding about the interest the testator had in the property is considered and weighed in the capacity determination. See In re Est. of Rogers, 47 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Iowa 1951) (the fact the testator did not realize she only had a one-third interest in the property tends to show she did not understand the nature and extent of her property); In re Est. of Johnson, 269 N.W. 792, 794, 797 (Iowa 1936) (considering a testator's mistake about whether he had a partial or full interest in his property in determining capacity); In re Linstrom's Will, 175 N.W. 741, 743 (Iowa 1920) (when testator mistakenly believed he had a partial interest in the property, it could show lack of capacity). These cases make clear that courts consider a testator's understanding of the nature of the interest held in their property when deciding whether the testator had capacity. A person does not need to have perfect understanding of the person's ownership interest. Hanrahan v. O'Toole, 117 N.W. 675, 678-79 (Iowa 1908). But if a person does not have at least a general understanding of what that interest is, then depending on the other evidence in the record, that confusion could amount to lack of capacity. See, e.g., Rogers, 47 N.W.2d at 822 (testator's confusion about the size of her interest was sufficient to create a jury question on capacity).
The forementioned cases establish that evidence of confusion over ownership interest generates a fact question about testamentary capacity. See, e.g., id. To resolve that fact question, the grandson points to evidence that Irlene wrongly believed she had a life estate in the Madison County farm. This evidence consists of testimony from three different lawyers around the time the 2019 will was executed. One lawyer Irlene consulted before executing the 2019 will noted that Irlene mentioned having a life estate in the Madison County farm. The lawyer who actually drafted and witnessed the execution of the 2019 will testified that Irlene referenced a life estate in the Madison County farm. However, that attorney also testified that Irlene was adamant that her family members not inherit anything and that she wanted her property to go to cancer research. A third lawyer, who met with Irlene about two months after execution of the 2019 will, testified that Irlene seemed to think she had a life estate in the Madison County farm and the lawyer had to explain to her that she owned it outright.
The highlighted evidence generates a fact question whether Irlene understood the nature of her property ownership. But the factfinder did not have to view this evidence relied upon by the grandson as being persuasive. To begin with, all three lawyers testified that lay people, such as Irlene, frequently are unable to articulate how life estates work or are confused by the concept. The claimed confusion over whether Irlene thought she only had a life estate in the Madison County farm could be explained simply by imprecise articulation of a complex legal concept. Irlene's 2010 will, which she wanted to change, gave a life estate in the Madison County farm to her son, with the remainder to the grandson and a trust for her great-grandchildren. Given that, it is quite possible she referred to a life estate in the Madison County farm not because she thought she only had a life estate, but as her layperson's imprecise way of referring to the existing distribution scheme that she wanted to change.
But even ignoring this possible explanation for the references to a life estate, there is direct evidence that Irlene knew precisely what she owned. Ironically, this evidence exists due to efforts to secretly gather evidence about Irlene's state of mind. About two months after Irlene signed the 2019 will, the grandson's daughter and her mom spent a large part of the day with Irlene. The grandson's daughter and her mom audio recorded over four hours of interactions with Irlene without Irlene's knowledge. During those interactions, Irlene stated, "I own 400 acres at Earlham. I own my house and forty acres here. If I can't make it, nobody can. It all belongs to me." Later in the conversation, she said, "If I've got 400 acres clear in my name, and if I've got forty acres clear in my name, why should I worry? That should be able to keep me. And there should be some left over for cancer research." While not made on the same day as the will signing, these statements made about two months later shed light on Irlene's knowledge of her ownership interest in her property. See Gruis, 207 N.W.2d at 573 ("While it is true that evidence of mental capacity must refer to the exact time of the making of the will, evidence of the condition of the mind of the testator at other times may be received if there is a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it throws some light on his mental competence at the time the will was made."). A reasonable fact finder could find this evidence clears up any confusion over Irlene's knowledge of her ownership interest in her property and demonstrates that she ultimately understood her testamentary authority over all her property.
As Irlene's great-granddaughter, the grandson's daughter was a beneficiary of the 2010 will via the great-grandchildren trust that would have been established by that will.
Referring to the Madison County farm.
Besides the evidence of Irlene's alleged confusion over her ownership interest in the Madison County farm, the grandson also tries to prove lack of testamentary capacity through her medical history and evidence of some strange behaviors. He introduced medical records noting some memory loss. He also introduced evidence that Irlene, who had been living with the grandson for eleven years, unexpectedly walked out of the house to go live with her sister but had no plan or means to get there. Irlene moved in with her sister but eventually left her sister's house and moved back into her Dallas County farmhouse, even though it was in disrepair. Irlene's living conditions were poor and she was not taking care of herself well. Evidence also showed Irlene called up an unknown person at a convenience store and allowed her to move into the farmhouse with her. The grandson's evidence goes back as far as 2015 to an incident where Irlene was taken to the emergency room because of an episode of confusion and unresponsiveness. The grandson also hired an expert. Though the expert had never met Irlene, the expert testified that he diagnosed her with severe Alzheimer's disease and opined she did not have the capacity to make the will in 2019.
Irlene's condition was resolved by a change in medication.
The charity hired a competing expert. Although the charity's expert also had never met Irlene, he testified that Irlene did not have Alzheimer's, had only normal age-related memory loss, and had the capacity to make the 2019 will.
Even with the discrepancies in how Irlene referred to her ownership interest in the Madison County farm and the other evidence the grandson presented, the evidence does not have to be viewed as showing Irlene was incapable of making a will. The evidence the grandson presents could also be viewed as showing, at most, odd behavior and normal aging. See In re Est. of Ransom, 57 N.W.2d 89, 109 (Iowa 1953) ("[B]odily infirmities, the waning of the physical or mental alertness of earlier years, weakening of the memory, forgetfulness, the failure to immediately recognize old acquaintances, impairment of the sight or hearing, repetitious narrative, carelessness in dress, childishness or other eccentricities" will not invalidate a will if the elements of the test for capacity can otherwise be met).
Furthermore, there is direct evidence of Irlene's mental capacity on the day she signed the will. Serendipitously, on the same day Irlene signed the 2019 will, the grandson and his daughter initiated an involuntary mental-health commitment for Irlene. In response, a law enforcement officer picked up Irlene and took her to the hospital for a mental-health evaluation. The medical professionals who examined her found her oriented and alert, with intact memory, appropriate affect, and normal insight. Nothing concerned the medical professionals enough to keep her at the hospital or proceed with commitment.
The grandson and great-granddaughter testified they had no knowledge that Irlene was executing a new will that day and it was coincidental that they initiated mental-health commitment proceedings the same day.
Additional direct evidence of Irlene's capacity comes from those who were present when she signed the will. Those who witness a will signing can provide strong evidence of the testator's capacity through testimony that the testator was competent at the time of signing. See In re Est. of Hayer, 299 N.W. 431,436 (Iowa 1941). Two of Irlene's long-time friends were present when she executed the will, and both believed she was of sound mind that day. The attorney who prepared and witnessed the execution of the will expressed the same opinion. The other witness to the will was the convenience-store employee who had been living with Irlene in the weeks leading up to the day the will was signed. The grandson did not present testimony from her, casting doubt on his argument that Irlene wasn't competent because the store employee would likely have firsthand knowledge of Irlene's state of mind around the time the will was executed. See In re Est. of Secrist, 186 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1971) ("Failure to call witnesses, expert or non-expert, or failure to ask questions of witnesses who are closely and intimately acquainted with testator, as to the question of mental capacity at the exact time of the making of the will, militates against the contestant . . . .").
Medical evidence also supports the district court's decision rejecting the grandson's challenge. Irlene's medical records and testimony from her doctor show that Irlene was never diagnosed with anything beyond age-related memory decline. Each time she went to the hospital over the years, doctors determined she was alert and oriented and her memory was intact. Her doctor performed memory tests several times over the years, and while her scores declined a bit over time, the decline did not concern her doctor.
We also note the animosity that developed between Irlene and the beneficiaries named in her 2010 will-the individuals disinherited via the 2019 will. While Irlene lived with her grandson for approximately eleven years, they had a falling out in the months leading up to the 2019 will signing. The falling out stemmed from the fact Irlene believed her grandson was stealing from her, and she was angry that he and his wife were interfering with her ability to drive. After she moved out of the grandson's house about two months before the 2019 will was signed, the grandson did not try to see her or speak to her at all. Irlene also had a rocky relationship with her son. According to the son's trial testimony, he and his mother had been estranged for almost a decade. Even though Irlene had a better relationship with her great-grandchildren, she believed they had been well-taken care of already, such that she would not need to leave them anything. On the day she made the will she told her great-granddaughter, "Well I gave you a lot of money along . . . and you're well taken care of in [your grandmother's] will."
Even with the less deferential review we conduct due to the district court's adoption of much of the charity's post-trial brief, there is still substantial evidence supporting the district court's decision. The record provides ample support for the conclusion Irlene knew she was signing a will, knew the nature and extent of her property, was able to identify and recall the natural objects of her bounty, and knew the distribution she desired to make of her property. Substantial evidence supports the district court's ruling that Irlene had capacity to make her will, so we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
[*]Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2023).