Opinion
F078503
12-17-2020
In re JAMES JOHNSON On Habeas Corpus.
Lisa A. Smittcamp, District Attorney, Traci Fritzler, Assistant District Attorney, and Douglas O. Treisman, Deputy District Attorney for Appellant the People. Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent James Johnson.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Fresno Super. Ct. No. 18CRWR684319)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order granting writ of habeas corpus. Arlan L. Harrell, Judge. Lisa A. Smittcamp, District Attorney, Traci Fritzler, Assistant District Attorney, and Douglas O. Treisman, Deputy District Attorney for Appellant the People. Robert Navarro, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent James Johnson.
Before Hill, P.J., Peña, J. and Smith, J.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
The People of the State of California appeal from an order granting habeas corpus relief to respondent James Johnson. Respondent had filed his petition in the superior court seeking a Franklin hearing to have an opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing.
People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin).
While this appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court decided In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook), which resolves this matter. We will reverse the superior court's order granting the petition, but without prejudice to respondent's ability to obtain the same relief under Penal Code section 1203.01 and Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th 439. We will remand for the superior court to consider whether to construe respondent's petition for habeas corpus (and related briefings) as a motion pursuant to section 1203.01 and Cook, or whether respondent must file a new motion to obtain relief under these authorities.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. In general, section 1203.01 "provides that, postjudgment, the trial court may generate, collect, and transmit information about the defendant and the crime to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation." (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 447.)
BACKGROUND
Respondent is a prisoner serving an indeterminate term of life with the possibility of parole. Sentenced in 1987, he has been incarcerated since that time. Respondent committed the underlying offense at the age of 20. He has been in prison for over 30 years and he has already received at least six parole consideration hearings, conducted by the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board).
Following a plea agreement, respondent was convicted of first degree murder, and a firearm enhancement was found true.
Appellant had advised the superior court that respondent's next parole hearing "is tentatively scheduled for March 2029."
Because of his age when his crime occurred, respondent is entitled to a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051. Such a hearing is conducted by the Board "for the purpose of reviewing the parole suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or younger ... at the time of [his or her] controlling offense." (Id., subd. (a)(1).) "'Controlling offense' means the offense or enhancement for which any sentencing court imposed the longest term of imprisonment." (Id., subd. (a)(2)(B).) Among other factors, the Board must "take into consideration the diminished culpability of youth as compared to that of adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the individual." (Id., subd. (f)(1).)
As explained in Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th 261, a person who meets the eligibility requirements of section 3051 must be given a "sufficient opportunity to make a record of information relevant to his eventual youth offender parole hearing." (Franklin, supra, at p. 284.) Relevant "youth-related factors" include the prisoner's "cognitive ability, character, and social and family background at the time of the offense." (Id. at p. 269.) The term "Franklin hearing" is often used in reference to the marshalling and preservation of such evidence, but the California Supreme Court has advised that the "Franklin processes are more properly called 'proceedings' rather than 'hearings.'" (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 449, fn. 3.) "A Franklin proceeding gives 'an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender's characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to "give great weight to" youth-related factors [citation] in determining whether the offender is "fit to rejoin society" ....' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 449, fn. omitted, quoting Franklin, supra, at p. 284.)
In June 2018, respondent petitioned the Fresno Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus. He sought relief in the form of a Franklin proceeding. In November 2018, the superior court granted respondent's petition. Appellant then filed the present appeal.
Appellant's opening brief was filed in this court on March 25, 2019. The respondent's brief was filed on May 8, 2019. On June 3, 2019, the California Supreme Court issued the Cook opinion. On July 9, 2019, appellant filed its reply brief and addressed the significance of Cook.
On November 4, 2020, this court issued an order that treated appellant's reply brief as a supplemental opening brief regarding Cook. Respondent was granted leave to file a supplemental respondent's brief. On November 9, 2020, respondent filed a supplemental brief addressing Cook and its impact in this matter.
On November 13, 2020, respondent filed a letter with this court indicating the parties had reached a stipulation regarding the application of Cook that would resolve the only remaining issue in this appeal. On behalf of appellant, respondent requested a stay of the supplemental briefing previously ordered pending the filing and approval of the stipulated resolution in the trial court. The parties requested until November 30, 2020, to notify this court whether the resolution had been approved, which would occasion a request for dismissal of this appeal as moot.
On November 19, 2020, we issued an order staying further supplemental briefing, and we directed appellant to notify us on or before November 30, 2020, regarding whether a stipulated resolution had been approved in the lower court, and whether appellant would request dismissal of this appeal as moot.
On December 2, 2020, respondent submitted a letter with us informing this court that the superior court had denied the stipulated motion. On behalf of appellant, respondent alerted us that appellant would not submit a supplemental reply brief, and the matter was submitted. We turn to the merits of the parties' contentions.
DISCUSSION
In Cook, the California Supreme Court reversed an appellate court decision that had authorized a Franklin hearing for a prisoner who had petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 447-448.) The issue before the high court was "whether a sentenced prisoner whose conviction is final can seek the remedy of evidence preservation and, if so, by what means." (Id. at pp. 446-447.)
Unlike the present matter, the writ of habeas corpus at issue in Cook had been originally filed in the appellate court and not the superior court. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 447-448.)
Cook holds that in "cases with final judgments, section 1203.01 gives the trial court authority to conduct an evidence preservation proceeding as envisioned in Franklin.'" (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 452.) "The purpose of section 1203.01 parallels that of a Franklin proceeding." (Id. at p. 453.) Section 1203.01 gives a sentenced prisoner whose conviction is final "a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law that makes resort to habeas corpus unnecessary, at least in the first instance. [Citations.]" (Cook, at p. 452.) "In fact, section 1203.01's framework provides a more flexible, efficient, and suitable means of collecting information for the benefit of the Board than the rigid requirements of habeas corpus." (Id. at p. 456.) Therefore, a habeas corpus petition filed for the purpose of obtaining a Franklin proceeding should be denied unless the remedies available under section 1203.01 have already been pursued and exhausted. (Id. at pp. 452, 458, fn. 6.)
The Cook court held that, in addition to Penal Code section 1203.01, a trial court had authority under Code of Civil Procedure section 187 to conduct a Franklin proceeding. (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 454.) Code of Civil Procedure section 187 provides: "When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code." --------
Cook has provided a summary of the now required procedure:
"For inmates like [respondent] who seek to preserve evidence following a final judgment, the proper avenue is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and [the court's decision in Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th 439]. The motion should establish the inmate's entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred. The structure for the proceeding is outlined in Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 284, and further informed by the youth-related factors set forth in section 4801,
subdivision (c). The proceeding is not limited to the filing of statements referenced in section 1203.01. Rather, consistent with Franklin and the court's inherent authority, the offender shall have the opportunity to 'place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender's culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.'" (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458-459, quoting Franklin, supra, at p. 284.)
In the present matter, appellant asserts that Cook requires us to reverse the superior court's order granting habeas corpus relief. In contrast, respondent contends that Cook makes it clear he is entitled to a Franklin proceeding in the lower court, and nothing from Cook requires a reversal of the superior court's order. Respondent notes that his requested Franklin proceeding is already under way, and requiring him to refile a motion for the same proceeding is inefficient and a waste of judicial resources. He asks that we either (1) permit the existing proceeding to continue in the lower court or (2) deem his habeas corpus action as a postconviction motion under section 1203.01 and remand for the lower court to continue the proceeding.
We recognize that the posture of this case is unique because the superior court has already ordered a Franklin proceeding, which is consistent with Cook. That order, however, occurred on a petition for habeas corpus. Based on Cook, we conclude that the superior court order granting respondent's petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be reversed, without prejudice to respondent's ability to obtain the same relief under section 1203.01 and Cook. Accordingly, the matter will be remanded for the superior court to consider whether to construe respondent's underlying petition for habeas corpus (and related briefings) as a motion pursuant to section 1203.01 and Cook, or whether respondent must file a new motion to obtain relief under these authorities.
DISPOSITION
The superior court order granting respondent's petition for writ of habeas corpus is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.