Sewell v. Christison, 114 Okla. 177, 245 P. 632; In re Green's Estate, 114 Okla. 283, 251 P. 1008; Appeal of Sims' Estate, 162 Okla. 35, 18 P.2d 1077, 1083; Silmon v. Rahhal, 178 Okla. 244, 62 P.2d 501, 503; Woodruff v. Firestone, 182 Okla. 606, 79 P.2d 210. Cf. Powers v. Brown, 122 Okla. 40, 252 P. 27; Micco v. Huser, 185 Okla. 394, 91 P.2d 1069. The probate jurisdiction of the Okfuskee County Court is conferred by the Constitution and applicable statutes of Oklahoma, and must be exercised "in the manner prescribed by statute," and not otherwise. Art. 7, Sec. 13, Oklahoma Constitution; 58 O.S.A. ยงยง 1-7; In re Johnson, 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605; Ozark Oil Co. v. Berryhill, 43 Okla. 523, 143 P. 173; Carter v. Frahm, 31 S.D. 379, 141 N.W. 370; Oakes Oklahoma Probate Practice, Secs. 6 and 12; Bancroft's Probate Practice, Sec. 31. The residence of Peter Micco in Okfuskee County at the time of his death is prerequisite to the exercise of probate jurisdiction by the County Court of that County over his Estate. 58 O.S.A. ยง 5; Sewell v. Christison, supra; In re Davis' Estate, 171 Okla. 575, 43 P.2d 115; Woodruff v. Firestone, supra; Griffin v. Hannan, 185 Okla. 433, 93 P.2d 1078.
The assets were not distributed, and the proceeding was not closed. The order was interim in nature, and the petition to vacate it and surcharge the guardian was filed before any of the minors became of age. A county court in Oklahoma has jurisdiction, at any time prior to the majority of a minor whose estate is involved in a proceeding in such court, upon proper notice and for sufficient reasons, to modify or vacate an order or judgment made in the proceeding. Ozark Oil Co. v. Berryhill, 43 Okla. 523, 143 P. 173; Dunleavy v. Mayfield, 56 Okla. 470, 155 P. 1145; Twin State Oil Co. v. Johnson, 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605; In re Hickory's Guardianship, 75 Okla. 79, 182 P. 233. And that sweep of jurisdiction brings within its reach power to reopen and examine the accounts of a former guardian at any time prior to final termination of the guardianship proceedings.
See Kizziar, supra note 12 at 792. For the pertinent provisions of the present Article 7, see supra note 14. For examples of county court cases, see Cassina v. Jones, Okla., 340 P.2d 482, 484 (1959); In re Johnson, 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605, 607 (1919). 58 O.S. 1981 ยงยง 1[ 58-1] et seq. (amended by Okla. Sess Laws 1989, c. 276, ยง 1); Williams, supra note 13 at 1102; Kizziar, supra note 12 at 792.
The quoted provisions of the Judicial Article were repealed in 1967; the enactment of what is now Article 7 was proposed by Laws 1967, p. 698, H.J.R. No. 508, and adopted at an election on July 11, 1967. For county court jurisdiction see Cassina v. Jones, Okla., 340 P.2d 482, 484 (1959); In re Johnson, 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605, 607 (1919). Pre-1969 district courts, on the other hand, were courts of general jurisdiction.
The county court does not have such powers. Twin State Oil Co. v. Johnson et al., 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605; In re Mize's Guardianship, 193 Okla. 164, 142 P.2d 116; Twine, Adm'r, v. Edwards et al., 196 Okla. 382, 165 P.2d 143. It is also argued by counsel for appellant in this case that since the evidence shows that the guardian, O.B. Martin, was himself an attorney he had no right to employ counsel to institute and prosecute the action for recovery of the land.
It invoked the jurisdiction of the county court involving civil actions as distinguished from probate matters, and it is well settled that the jurisdiction of the county court in civil proceedings is only that granted by article 7, sec. 12, supra, and acts of the Legislature in harmony with that section. In re Johnson, 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605; Ozark Oil Co. v. Berryhill, 43 Okla. 523, 143 P. 173; Crump v. Pitchford, 24 Okla. 808, 104 P. 911. Our statutes do not confer any additional jurisdiction upon the county court in the granting of writs of habeas corpus, but 12 O.S. 1941 ยง 1333[ 12-1333] provides that: "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by any court of record in term time, or by a judge of any such court, either in term or vacation; and upon application the writ shall be granted without delay."
Title to the property involved in this action did not and could not pass until the sale attempted thereunder had been reported to and approved and confirmed by the county court. Estate of Flaherty, 69 Cal.App. 429, 231 P. 591; Farmers Nat. Bank v. Cravens, 93 Okla. 58, 219 P. 138. Defendants in error assert in their brief that the jurisdiction of the county court must be exercised in the manner prescribed by statutes, citing In re Johnson, 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605, and other cases, and that there being no provision in the Oklahoma statutes authorizing or permitting the county judge to accept an increased bid on the sale of personal property, or to confirm a sale to the person making such increased bid, the action of the county court in sustaining the objection of Bowdry to the confirmation of the sale, and the sale of the property to Bowdry, were beyond the jurisdiction and power of the court, and therefore void. We are unable to agree with this assertion.
The plaintiffs have perfected this appeal and urge, first, that all facts properly pleaded in their petition were admitted by the demurrers of defendants; and, second, that the petition of plaintiffs stated a cause of action against the defendants and each of them. The soundness of the first proposition is conceded and requires no discussion. The decisive issue is presented by the second proposition; thereunder the plaintiffs urge that since by statute (section 565, O. S. 1931, 12 Okla. St. Ann. ยง 985) executors, etc., may appeal in their representative capacities without giving a bond, and that where an appeal is so taken that it operates to supersede the judgment (Twin State Oil Co. v. Johnson, 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605; Blair v. Cone, 158 Okla. 234, 13 P.2d 128) it therefore follows that the bond given by the executor upon his appointment becomes a supersedeas bond in every case where such executor prosecutes an appeal on behalf of the estate represented by him. No authority is cited in support of the precise point sought to be made. Plaintiffs, however, cite Lowe v. City of Guthrie, 4 Okla. 287, 44 P. 198; National Surety Co. v. Craig, 94 Okla. 63, 220 P. 943; New York Casualty Co. v. Wallace Tiernan, Inc., 174 Okla. 278, 50 P.2d 176, which hold that executors' bonds and supersedeas bonds are statutory bonds and are to be construed and enforced in the manner provided by statute, and by analogy seek to interpret such holdings to mean that such executor's bond becomes a supersedes bond by operation of law when an appeal is prosecuted by an executor.
In the other three cases, Caulk v. Lowe, Forgy v. Lamphear, and Wheeler v. Bigheart, supra, the question herein involved was not there in presented. In the case of Twin State Oil Co. v. Johnson, 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605, in the 3rd syllabus, this court said: "County courts of this state have no jurisdiction where an oil and gas lease has been approved, and a bonus of $1,600 therefor has been paid to the guardian, to order the guardian to repay said sum to the lessee upon the ground that the guardian secured the approval of said lease by fraudulent misrepresentations as to a breach of the conditions of a former lease upon the premises by the lessee therein."
Under this statute, therefore, the county court has the authority and jurisdiction to reopen and examine the account. In the case of In re Johnson, 72 Okla. 174, 179 P. 605, it was said: "It is now well settled that county courts of this state have full control and jurisdiction of all probate matters, and may at any time prior to the majority of the minor whose estate is involved in any proceeding pending in that court, upon proper notice and for sufficient legal grounds, modify or vacate any order or judgment made by said court in the interests of said minor."