Opinion
No. 31620-0-II.
August 22, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 02-3-00921-1, Frank Cuthbertson, J., entered April 2, 2004.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Yoko Kugimiya Johnson (Appearing Pro Se), Tacoma, WA.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Dwayne Johnson (Appearing Pro Se), Apo, AP.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Quinn-Brintnall, C.J., concurred in by Armstrong and Penoyar, JJ.
Yoko Johnson appeals pro se from a dissolution decree ending her marriage to Dwayne Johnson. The couple married on April 1, 1993, while Dwayne was stationed in Japan. They have two children, who were seven and nine years old at the time of trial. On December 22, 2003, the trial court entered an oral ruling on the petition for dissolution of the marriage, divided the property, and entered orders for child support and maintenance. Final orders were presented on March 5, 2004. On March 15, 2004, Yoko filed a motion for reconsideration of the child support order, which the trial court denied on April 2, 2004. In this appeal, Yoko contends that the trial court (1) failed to provide her with a competent interpreter; (2) denied her adequate time to review final court orders; (3) excluded extraordinary expenses from child support; (4) distributed only a portion of the couple's personal property; (5) unfairly allocated the couple's debt; and (6) entered the parenting plan without reviewing the guardian ad litem (GAL) report. Because the record does not support these challenges, we affirm.
Yoko appeared without an attorney at the March 5, 2004 presentment hearing, stating that her counsel withdrew. But her attorney's notice of intent to withdraw was filed with the Court of Appeals on April 13, 2004, effective April 26, 2004.
We use the parties' first names for clarity.
ANALYSIS
We review a trial court's dissolution decree for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of McCausland, 129 Wn. App. 390, 406, 118 P.3d 944 (2005). The trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. McCausland, 129 Wn. App. at 406. We presume that a trial court's judgment is correct and will sustain it absent an affirmative showing of error. Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wn.2d 26, 35, 666 P.2d 351 (1983).
To obtain review of an error, the appellant must comply with all procedural rules, including providing a sufficient record to enable our review, RAP 9.10, and presenting adequate argument in support of any assignments of error, RAP 10.3(a)(5). See State v. Smith, 104 Wn.2d 497, 508, 707 P.2d 1306 (1985); In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993).
Interpreter
Because Yoko's native language is Japanese, Quan Chow interpreted for Yoko at the March 5, 2004 presentment hearing. The interpreter was introduced to the trial court and told the court that '[t]he Japanese language is not a certified language, and I am only qualified to interpret in that language; I'm not certified.' Report of Proceedings (RP) (Mar. 5, 2004) at 2. No order appointing an interpreter appears in the record. Yoko asserts that the trial court erred by providing her with an inadequate interpreter for both the December 22, 2003 and March 5, 2004 hearings. She maintains that because the interpreter was unqualified, she was unable to understand the proceedings. But the March 5, 2004 transcript contains Dwayne's counsel's representation as an officer of the court that Yoko had been represented by counsel at trial and that she had had an interpreter of her choosing throughout the trial.
When certified interpreters are not used, the interpreter must be a qualified interpreter. RCW 2.43.030(1). A ''[q]ualified interpreter' means a person who is able readily to interpret or translate spoken and written English for non-English-speaking persons and to interpret or translate oral or written statements of non-English-speaking persons into spoken English.' RCW 2.43.020(2). Before an uncertified but otherwise qualified interpreter is appointed, the court shall make a preliminary determination, on the basis of testimony or stated needs of the non-English-speaking person, that the proposed interpreter is able to interpret accurately all communications to and from such person in that particular proceeding. The appointing authority shall satisfy itself on the record that the proposed interpreter:
(a) Is capable of communicating effectively with the court or agency and the person for whom the interpreter would interpret; and
(b) Has read, understands, and will abide by the code of ethics for language interpreters established by court rules.
RCW 2.43.030(2).
In his briefing to this court, Dwayne states that Yoko approved the provided interpreter during the hearing. He asserts that Yoko is more proficient in English than she claims. And he maintains that Yoko understood the proceedings and that she had sufficient time to bring her lack of understanding to the court's attention. Our review of the record indicates that Yoko never told the court that she did not understand the proceeding. She did not object to the selection of interpreter, the quality of translation, or the absence of preliminary qualification of the interpreter. In her pro se briefing to this court, Yoko has signed the appellant's opening brief, the reply brief, and a certificate of mailing. We cannot address Yoko's belated challenge to the qualifications and quality of the interpreter on this record. RAP 2.5(a) (generally appellate courts will not review error that was not raised in the trial court); State v. Sengxay, 80 Wn. App. 11, 16, 906 P.2d 368 (1995) (finding that where a defendant failed to object at trial to the use of unsworn interpreters, review was precluded absent showing of an obvious error affecting the fairness of the proceedings); see also Olson, 69 Wn. App. at 625.
By asserting that Yoko chose her interpreter, Dwayne appears to be arguing invited error.
We note that the record of the presentment hearing does not indicate that the court administered an oath to the interpreter. It apparently believed that no oath was necessary because no testimony or evidence was going to be taken and the parties were 'just there for presentation of papers.' RP (Mar. 5, 2004) at 2. We note that rules and statutes governing the use of interpreters do not differentiate between a trial and a proceeding such as presentment of a final order. Unless the interpreter remains under oath, the better practice is for the court to administer the oath to fairly and accurately interpret as set forth in RCW 2.43.050.
Time to Read the Final Order
Without argument or citation to the record, Yoko asserts that the trial court should not have entered the final decree on March 5, 2004, because she only had a few days to read over the final orders before they were presented. Unsupported
We note that Yoko moved for reconsideration before the final orders were presented and the court denied her motion on April 2, 2004.
assignments of error are waived. State v. Goodman, 150 Wn.2d 774, 782, 83 P.3d 410 (2004). Nevertheless, we have reviewed the trial court's denial of Yoko's motion to reconsider for an abuse of discretion and find none.
Child Support
Yoko challenges the child support order claiming that the trial court erred by (1) failing to include expenses for the children's extracurricular activities and (2) miscalculating back child support.
Extracurricular Expenses
The children's extracurricular activities include classes in Japanese, ballet, and the martial arts. The trial court did not include these expenses in its child support calculations. In a dissolution action, a trial court has discretion to determine whether extraordinary expenses are reasonable and necessary child-rearing expenses in its order of child support. In re Matter of Yeamans, 117 Wn. App. 593, 599, 72 P.3d 775 (2003).
Yoko did not include her financial declaration or proposed order of child support in the record for our review.
RCW 26.19.080 provides in part:
(1) The basic child support obligation derived from the economic table shall be allocated between the parents based on each parent's share of the combined monthly net income.
. . . .
(3) . . . [S]pecial child rearing expenses, such as tuition . . . are not included in the economic table. These expenses shall be shared by the parents in the same proportion as the basic child support obligation. . . .
(4) The court may exercise its discretion to determine the necessity for and the reasonableness of all amounts ordered in excess of the basic child support obligation.
We review a child support order for an abuse of discretion. McCausland, 129 Wn. App. at 406.
Here, the final order of child support did not include expenses for the children's extracurricular activities. But a trial court does not abuse its discretion by deciding not to order additional child support to provide for life enriching, but nonessential, extraordinary expenses. RCW 26.19.080. The trial court ordered a six-month review of its child support order. We note that more than six months have passed and these issues may be moot.
In the facts section of her brief, Yoko also asserts that Dwayne should be responsible to pay for the children's braces. As with the other issues, she has failed to provide a factual record or any argument to support her position. Thus, we will not consider it. RAP 10.3(a)(5).
Back Child Support
The trial court set Dwayne's child support payment at $736.36 per month. It also found that Dwayne owed $4,281 in back child support for 2002 and 2003.
On appeal, Yoko asserts that the trial court miscalculated the back support award because Dwayne sent her numerous child support checks drawn on a closed account and consequently she never received that money. But the record contains no evidence of these alleged non-payments and we cannot address her contention here. A trial court does not abuse its discretion for failing to consider evidence it was never presented.
At the presentment hearing, Yoko told the trial court that she tried to tell her counsel about the bad checks, but her 'lawyers said don't worry about it, or it doesn't concern here, and he never brought that out, and I was just kept quiet.' RP (Mar. 5, 2004) at 6. She told the trial court that 'the biggest thing' she wanted to mention were the discrepancies between what her counsel told her and what was actually written in the final orders.
Yoko also asserts that Dwayne improperly received double deductions for previous rent payments. Again, we find no support for this argument in the record. RAP 9.10, 10.3(a)(5); see also State v. Wade, 138 Wn.2d 460, 465-66, 979 P.2d 850 (1999) (where the record on review is insufficient, the appellate court cannot properly determine whether the trial court's exercise of discretion was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds). In addition, the trial court found Dwayne's testimony regarding back child support credible and set the amount accordingly. We do not review a trial court's credibility determinations. In re Marriage of Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. 657, 667, 50 P.3d 298 (2002).
Yoko designated three pages in the Clerk's Papers from the Division of Child Support that list Dwayne as the obligor. These documents are dated December 2, 2003, January 5, 2004, and March 2, 2004, and respectively state that Dwayne owes $6,043.17, $6,351.07, and $6,966.87 in back child support. Apparently, these documents are the 'child enforcement' documents that she claims the trial court erred in deviating from. But the trial court awarded back support for 2002 and 2003. These documents show that the $6,043 is owed as of 2004. Therefore, these documents do not suggest that the trial court's 2002 and 2003 back support order is erroneous.
Starting Date
The child support order lists a starting date of February 1, 2004. Yoko maintains that January 2004 is the correct starting date. But the record does not support her argument.
The final decree of dissolution was not designated for the record on appeal but is contained on our spindle. We have reviewed it and note that it is silent regarding the starting date for child support, but it does state that spousal maintenance will begin February 1, 2004. To the extent that Yoko is claiming the date discrepancy is a clerical error, CR 60(a) is the proper vehicle for her to seek relief, not a direct appeal.
Property Division
The trial court's oral ruling provided that 'the household goods and furnishings which are valued at $2000 are awarded to [Yoko]. That includes the 32-inch television, the 2000 VW Golf, fair market value of $10,000 community property is awarded to [Yoko]. The Nissan Sentra is separate property of [Dwayne], and [its] fair market value is minus $2000.' RP (Dec. 22, 2003) at 5-6. The trial court ordered that each of the parties was responsible for their separate debt and divided the community debt equally.
Yoko contends that Dwayne had additional furniture and appliances that were not distributed in the final decree and that, except for the 2000 Golf automobile, the property distributed to her does not exist. She also argues that the trial court made an unfair division of the couple's debt. Dwayne asserts that Yoko illegally sold most of the community's personal property before the dissolution was final. He states that he purchased several of the contested items after the parties separated and that he never owned a television/digital video disc combination. Again, the record is wholly inadequate for us to address this issue. RAP 9.10, 10.5(a)(3); Wade, 138 Wn.2d at 465 (appellate court may decline to address a claimed error when faced with a material omission in the record); Fiorito, 112 Wn. App. at 669 (refusing to address inadequately briefed issue on appeal).
Yoko's brief suggests that the trial court ordered her to pay half of Dwayne's separate debt. The record does not support this claim. The trial court specifically ordered that each party be responsible for their separate debt.
Parenting Plan
On September 9, 2002, the trial court appointed a GAL to 'investigate and report factual information to the court concerning parenting arrangements for the children and . . . make recommendations based upon an independent investigation regarding the best interests of the children.' Clerk's Papers at 9. The final parenting plan, entered on March 5, 2004, contained no restrictions on the parents' contact with the children.
Yoko asserts that the parenting plan 'is not suitable for [the] children.' Br. of Appellant at 8. She argues that the trial court erred in formulating the parenting plan without first receiving and considering the GAL report that it ordered. She alleges that the GAL's report 'could have been critical to' her claims of spousal and child abuse and restricting Dwayne's visitations rights. Br. of Appellant at 8. The record does not include a GAL report and the briefs do not indicate whether a report was ever completed. But according to the record, Yoko did not object when the trial court entered the parenting plan without reviewing a GAL report and we cannot consider her untimely objection now. RAP 2.5(a) (appellate courts will generally not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal).
Based on our independent review of the record provided, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the final dissolution decree, property distribution, and child support orders in this case. Thus, we affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
PENOYAR and ARMSTRONG, JJ., concur.