Sappington, 123 Ohio App.3d at 455. See, also, In re Johnson (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 38 655 N.E.2d 247 (grandmother did not have the child's best legal interests in mind when she advised the court that confinement was the best solution for the child); In re Howard (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 201, 207 (colorable claim of conflict of child's penal interest arises when parent speaks against those interests); In re Spradlin (Dec. 1, 2000), Highland App. Nos. 99CA15 and 99CA19, unreported (grandfather of alleged delinquent told the court of other acts committed by delinquent that went beyond the allegations of the complaint); In Matter of Shaw (Sept. 27, 1996), Fairfield App. No. 95CA78, unreported (child represented by a parent who was the victim of alleged domestic violence committed against that parent). We view this distinction with trepidation, for it seems to us ill-conceived for the juvenile law to subordinate blindly a child's best interests to that of the child's best legal interests.

The role of a guardian ad litem in a delinquency adjudication is to ensure that the statutory rights of the juvenile are protected. In re Johnson (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 38, 42-43, 665 N.E.2d 247, 249-250; Lovejoy v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Human Servs. (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 514, 517, 602 N.E.2d 405, 407. The danger where the parent has sought the aid of the court against the child is that the interests of the parent may no longer be consistent with a role that properly protects the child's rights.

{¶ 25} The role of a guardian ad litem in a delinquency adjudication is to ensure that the statutory rights of the juvenile are protected. In re Sappington (1997), 123 Ohio App.3d 448, 454, citing In re Johnson (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 38, 42-43; Lovejoy v. Cuyahoga Cty. Dept. of Human Servs. (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 514, 517. Additionally, the guardian ad litem is responsible for investigating the child's situation and, based on that investigation, making recommendations to the court that would be in the child's best interests.

Although a juvenile may waive this right, the court must make a sufficient inquiry to determine whether the defendant is doing so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. In re Johnson (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 38. Specifically, the court must give close scrutiny to factors such as the juvenile's age, emotional stability, mental capacity, and prior criminal experience. Id.

This colloquy was insufficient, under the circumstances, to establish a knowing waiver of the right to counsel. {¶ 33} In In re Johnson (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 38, 665 N.E.2d 247, the court of appeals considered a nearly identical factual situation. A juvenile court referee asked Johnson if he understood that he had the right to counsel and that if he could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed for him.

, In re D.L., 999 S.W.2d 291 (Mo.App. 1999). See In re Johnson, 106 Ohio App. 3d 38, 665 N.E.2d 247 (1995). See, e.g., G.E.F. v. State, 782 So. 2d 951 (Fla.App. 2001).

But it is well settled that "[t]he parties may not, by stipulation or agreement, confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a court, where subject-matter jurisdiction is otherwise lacking." Fox v. Eaton Corp., 48 Ohio St.2d 236, 238, 358 N.E.2d 536 (1976), overruled on other grounds, Manning v. Ohio State Library Bd., 62 Ohio St.3d 24, 577 N.E.2d 650 (1991); see State v. Wilson, 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 46, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995); In re Johnson, 106 Ohio App.3d 38, 44, 665 N.E.2d 247 (1st Dist.1995). {¶12} Since the record transmitted to this court does not contain a judgment of conviction that satisfies Crim.R. 32(C), the appeal is dismissed.

Moreover, the "court must make a sufficient inquiry, encompassing the totality of the circumstances present, to determine whether the juvenile's waiver is given knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily." In re Shane (Jan. 26, 2001), Darke App. No. 1523, at *2; see, also, In re Johnson (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 38, 41. "In applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test to juveniles, courts must give close scrutiny to factors such as a juvenile's age, emotional stability, mental capacity, and prior criminal experience." In re Johnson.

Courts have stated that inherent in the trial court's analysis is whether competent counsel was appointed for the child. See In re D.M., 158 Ohio App.3d 780, 2004-Ohio-5858, 822 N.E.2d 433, citing In re Johnson (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 38, 665 N.E.2d 247; In re Nation (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 763, 573 N.E.2d 1155. See In re Dunham (Nov. 7, 1997), Hamilton App. Nos.

The court's inquiry must encompass the totality of the circumstances before the court can be satisfied that the offender knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived the right. In re Johnson (1995), 106 Ohio App.3d 38, 41. When applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test to juveniles, a trial court must give close scrutiny to factors such as a juvenile's age, emotional stability, mental capacity, and prior criminal experience.