Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. PDL20060170
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.
John H., a minor, appeals from a juvenile court order declaring him a ward of the court (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 602 & 725, subd. (b)) and finding that he committed felony battery (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d)). The minor raises two issues on appeal. First, he argues that there is insufficient evidence to support the finding that the victim suffered serious bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(4). Second, the minor contends that the terms of the court’s wardship order are inconsistent and therefore invalid. We shall affirm the order.
Hereafter, undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The wardship petition arose from an after school fight. At the contested hearing, the 14-year-old minor stipulated that he committed a battery against the victim, Chris M. The remainder of the hearing focused on the extent of the victim’s injuries.
The victim testified that the minor hit him in the face and back of the head during the fight. He lost consciousness for about 10 seconds, but could still hear people yelling and feel the minor hitting him after he blacked out. The victim stated that the minor continued to hit him in the back of the head after he fell to the ground. His nose was bloody and swollen after the incident.
The victim’s mother took him to the hospital about two-and-one-half hours after the fight. After taking X-rays, hospital personnel sent the victim home with aspirin and an anti-nausea medication. The victim received no special instructions on leaving the hospital. The court viewed photographs taken at the hospital. The People introduced no medical evidence at the hearing.
The court stated at the close of the hearing: “I’m satisfied from the evidence that this is serious bodily injury at the felony level. Loss of consciousness was proven. That’s a ground expressly provided for in the statute, 246(f)(4) [sic]. [¶] And just from the pictures, it does appear that his nose is swollen and different than how he appeared in court. I can’t say it’s broken just based on that fact, but I’m satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the injury qualifies under the statute. He said he blacked out, he could not see. As far as I’m concerned, that’s an element of loss of consciousness.”
I.
The minor challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the court’s finding that he inflicted serious bodily injury on the victim. We reject the minor’s challenge under familiar principles of appellate review.
“‘The test on appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the trier of fact, not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court must view the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment (order) to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the minor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In making such a determination we must view the evidence in a light most favorable to respondent and presume in support of the judgment (order) the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ [Citations.]” (In re Paul C. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 52.) Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could find persuasive. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1008.)
Battery may be punished as a felony when it results in serious bodily injury. (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (d).) Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(4) defines “serious bodily injury” as “a serious impairment of physical condition, including, but not limited to, the following: loss of consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ; a wound requiring extensive suturing; and serious disfigurement.” (Italics added.) “Injury” is “any physical injury which requires professional medical treatment.” (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (f)(5).)
The minor is correct that the terms “great bodily injury” found in Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (f) and “serious bodily injury” found in Penal Code section 243, subdivision (d) are described as “essentially equivalent” or having “substantially the same meaning.” (People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 11, 24, 26 (Taylor).) At the same time, the terms have “separate and distinct statutory definitions. . . . Unlike serious bodily injury, the statutory definition of great bodily injury does not include a list of qualifying injuries” and makes no reference to loss of consciousness. (Pen. Code, §§ 243, subd. (f)(4) & 12022.7, subd. (f); Taylor, supra, at p. 24.)
Here, there is uncontradicted evidence that the minor hit the victim in the face and back of the head approximately 15 times. The victim lost consciousness for approximately 10 seconds when he fell to the ground. The minor continued to hit him in the back of the head. The victim testified that he could not see during that time, but could hear voices and knew the minor was still hitting him. This evidence is sufficient to sustain the court’s finding that the minor inflicted serious bodily injury within the meaning of Penal Code section 243, subdivision (f)(4).
II.
The minor also argues that court’s order of wardship is contradictory and invalid. He contends that “[n]owhere in the applicable statutes or rules is there authorization for the court to declare wardship, order the dependent [sic] child removed from the physical custody of his or her parents, order the care, custody, control and conduct of the minor to be under the supervision of the probation officer, and then direct the probation officer to temporarily place the minor back into the home from which he or she was removed.” (See In re Damonte A. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 894, 899.) We conclude the order falls within the broad discretion granted to juvenile courts in fashioning conditions of probation.
Juvenile delinquency laws serve a dual purpose: “(1) to serve the ‘best interests’ of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and ‘enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community,’ and (2) to ‘provide for the protection and safety of the public . . . .’” (In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614.)
The Legislature authorizes the juvenile court “to place a ward on probation and ‘impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’” (In re Christopher M. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 684, 692, quoting § 730, subd. (b), italics added.) This includes placement in “[t]he approved home of a relative, or the approved home of a nonrelative, extended family member as defined in Section 362.7. . . .” (§ 727, subd. (a)(1).)
“Section 730 grants courts broad discretion in establishing conditions of probation in juvenile cases. [Citation.] ‘[T]he power of the juvenile court is even broader than that of a criminal court.’ [Citation.]” (In re Christopher M., supra, 127 Cal.App.4th at p. 692.) We will not disturb the juvenile court’s exercise of discretion absent “‘manifest abuse.’” (Ibid.)
In this case, the juvenile court order of wardship included the following conditions, which the minor claims are inconsistent:
“7. Continuance of the minor in the home of the parent(s) or guardian(s) would be contrary to the minor’s welfare; [¶] . . . [¶]
“22. The minor’s residence shall be the parental home.”
The probation conditions must be read in the context of this particular case. At the time of disposition, the minor had spent 33 days at juvenile hall or at home under electronic arrest. The court acknowledged the minor’s strong family support on at least two occasions. His parents and other relatives attended all the court proceedings. The court also cited the minor’s history of violence and marijuana use as “danger signs” that required “more intensive supervision than informal probation supervision” recommended by the probation department. The court fashioned an order that took advantage of the strong family support and provided for close supervision by the probation officer.
The minor cites three cases on the question of “inconsistent removal and placement orders.” (See Savannah B. v. Superior Court (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 158; In re Andres G. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 476; and In re Damonte A., supra, 57 Cal.App.4th 894.) Damonte A. holds that “removal from the parent’s physical custody can be made only on a showing by clear and convincing evidence that removal is necessary to avert a substantial danger to the physical health or well-being of the minor.” (In re Damonte A., supra, at p. 899.) The minor concedes that the cited cases involve juvenile dependency under section 300, but argues that we should apply the same reasoning in this wardship case.
The flaw in the minor’s argument is that the laws regarding juvenile dependency serve a different purpose than those addressing juvenile delinquency. The goal of proceedings under section 300 is to protect abused, neglected and at risk children, and to provide stable homes for children who cannot be reunited with their parents within a prescribed period of time. (See Sarah M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1008.) Here, the parental home poses no danger to the minor and the family may assist in the minor’s rehabilitation, but public safety concerns justify his continued supervision by the probation department.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: SIMS, Acting P.J., RAYE, J.