Opinion
No. B166348.
10-28-2003
In re JOHN L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JUAN L., Defendant and Appellant.
Lori A. Fields, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Lloyd W. Pellman, County Counsel, and Kim Nemoy, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In November of last year, we denied a petition filed by a father to challenge the dependency courts termination of reunification services for him with regard to his son. The matter is now before us on the fathers appeal from an order terminating his parental rights. We affirm that order.
FACTS
A.
Juan L. and Gina L. were married in 1998, at which time Juan had custody of his adopted daughters from a former marriage, and Gina had custody of her son from a prior marriage. John L., the only child who is a party to these proceedings, was born in September 1999.
In 2000, one of Juans daughters complained to Gina that Juan had molested her. Gina confronted Juan, which led to domestic violence in front of the children, and Juan was arrested. The children were taken into protective custody by the Department of Children and Family Services, a petition was filed, and John was later placed with his paternal aunt and uncle, Mr. and Mrs. S. Juan enrolled in a domestic violence class and in a sexual abuse counseling program under the auspices of the Child Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (C-SAP), but his participation was interrupted when he was arrested and charged with committing a lewd act upon a child under the age of 14. He entered a no contest plea in March 2001 and probation was granted (with a year in jail). After his release, Juan visited John and completed most but not all of the programs ordered by the court.
In August 2002, by which time John was attached to Mr. and Mrs. S., with whom he had lived for most of his life (he was almost three at that time), the dependency court refused to extend reunification services for Juan. Juan filed a petition for a writ of mandate, which we denied. (Juan L. v. Superior Court (Nov. 21, 2002, B161195) nonpub. opn.].)
B.
In December 2002, the Department recommended termination of Juans parental rights so John could be freed for adoption by Mr. and Mrs. S. (whom John called "mommy" and "daddy"). Juan was regularly visiting John, with the visits usually monitored by Mrs. S. Although the visits went well, John became angry and disruptive each time his father left, and Mr. and Mrs. S. were concerned about the effect of the visits on John. Mr. and Mrs. S. wanted to adopt John but did "not want to have a kinship adoption agreement regarding visitation" with Juan (or, for that matter, with Johns mother). In February, the Department reported that the home study had been completed and that Mr. and Mrs. S. had been approved as adoptive parents.
A contested hearing was held in April. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.) Nancy Trejo, the social worker assigned to this case for more than a year, testified that she had monitored some of Juans visits with John, and that Juans behavior was positive and appropriate — but she also testified that John often cried when Mr. and Mrs. S. delivered him for his visits, and that John left the visits without resistance. Trejo opined that John had not bonded to Juan as a parent, but had bonded with Mr. and Mrs. S., whom he viewed as his "mom" and "dad." Although the child provided detailed accounts when describing the things he did with Mr. and Mrs. S., John had little to say about his visits with Juan, and seemed to view Juan as a friendly visitor, not as a parent. Trejo said it would be in Johns best interests to terminate Juans parental rights and to sever that relationship, and that the termination of Juans parental rights would not have any detrimental effect on John.
Mrs. S. (who in addition to her role as Johns prospective adoptive mother is also Juans sister) testified that she had monitored many of Juans visits with John, and that the visits had gone well. Juan played games with John and helped him with his household chores. She said Juans visits were consistent, and that he disciplined John when necessary. Mrs. S. testified that she provided Johns day-to-day care — feeding him, clothing him, caring for him when he was ill, taking him to school — and that John constantly needed reassurance that she was there when Juan visited. She said she and Mr. S. have a loving relationship with John, as did Juan.
Juan testified that he believed it was in Johns best interest to maintain a relationship with him, that (except when he was incarcerated) he had always visited regularly, that he read to the child and cared for him during their visits. He believes John would suffer from a termination of Juans parental rights.
Johns lawyer favored termination of Juans parental rights.
The dependency court terminated Juans rights and freed John for adoption by Mr. and Mrs. S., finding that the severance of Juans rights would not deprive John of a substantial positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed. The court found that, notwithstanding Juans visits, the child was bonded to Mr. and Mrs. S., not to Juan, and that Juan was more playmate than parent — as shown by the fact that, in Johns view, he went home to his "parents" after his visits with Juan.
DISCUSSION
Juan contends he shared a parent-child relationship with John, and that his parental rights should not have been terminated. We disagree.
The statutory presumption is that adoption is in Johns best interests (§ 366.26, subds. (b), (c)(1); In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1344; In re Heather B. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 535, 546), and in the absence of evidence that a termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, adoption is the permanent plan of first choice (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826-827). Although Juan claims his efforts at regular contacts with the child are sufficient to show that a continuation of the relationship would be in Johns best interests (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)), the evidence does not support that claim.
It is the quality of the relationship that must be beneficial to the child in the way that a parents role in a childs life is supposed to be beneficial, and it is not enough that the child enjoys the company of the biological parent. The mere existence of some relationship is not enough, and the burden is on the parent to show that termination of the relationship would be detrimental to the child in this context. (In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1534; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468; In re Melvin A. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1253; In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1343-1344.) On this appeal, the dependency courts decision that Juan failed to meet his burden must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Derek W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at p. 827; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
Substantial evidence — testimony by the social worker and by Mrs. S., and the approval of Johns lawyer — supports the dependency courts finding. In making these difficult decisions, the dependency court is "entitled to find the social worker credible and to give greater weight to her assessments and testimony. The evidence from the social worker provided substantial evidence to support the courts conclusion that no beneficial parent-child relationship existed such that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to [John]. [Juan is] essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence and to substitute [his] judgment for that of the trial court. We decline to do so." (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 53.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur: SPENCER, P.J., MALLANO, J. --------------- Notes: All section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.