In re J.N.H

6 Citing cases

  1. Snyder v. Beam Techs.

    Civil Action 20-cv-03255-NYW (D. Colo. Jun. 22, 2023)

    The Court looks first to the plain language of the statute, and if that language is clear, the Court's analysis ends there. In re J.N.H., 209 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo.App. 2009). But if the statutory text is ambiguous, the Court may look to other tools of statutory interpretation, such as legislative history, to ascertain the legislature's intent. Crow v. Penrose-St. Francis Healthcare Sys., 169 P.3d 158, 165 (Colo. 2007). The Court “will not adopt a construction that renders any term superfluous or leads to an unreasonable or absurd conclusion,” and instead “interpret[s] a statute so as to give all of its parts ‘consistent and sensible effect' within the statutory scheme.” J.N.H., 209 P.3d at 1223 (quoting Richmond Am. Homes of Colo., Inc. v. Steel Floors, LLC, 187 P.3d 1199, 1204 (Colo.App. 2008)).

  2. DA Mountain Rentals, LLC v. Lodge at Lionshead Phase III Condo. Ass'n Inc.

    409 P.3d 564 (Colo. App. 2016)   Cited 7 times

    We do not, however, adopt any interpretation that leads to an absurd conclusion or is at odds with the legislative scheme. In re J.N.H. , 209 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo. App. 2009) ; Bryant v. Cmty. Choice Credit Union , 160 P.3d 266, 274 (Colo. App. 2007). DA has not challenged any of the remaining 2012 Amendments under CCIOA other than the mandatory buyout provision, which we address in Part II.E.

  3. People v. Gallegos

    260 P.3d 15 (Colo. App. 2010)   Cited 33 times
    Holding that, although it is improper for a prosecutor to ask a jury to find a defendant guilty to “send a message to the community,” the statement was not so egregious in the context of the trial as to require that the conviction be vacated

    In analyzing the language of a statute, we determine legislative intent by giving the words of the statute their plain and ordinary meaning. In re J.N.H., 209 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo.App. 2009). "When a statute does not define its terms but the words used are terms of common usage, we may refer to dictionary definitions to determine the plain and ordinary meaning of those words."

  4. Cody Park v. Harder

    251 P.3d 1 (Colo. App. 2010)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that to prevail on a third-party beneficiary claim plaintiff must show he was a direct, and not merely incidental, intended beneficiary of the underlying agreement

    When interpreting a statute, a court should look to the plain language of the statute first. In re J.N.H., 209 P.3d 1221, 1222-23 (Colo. App. 2009). If legislative intent is clear from the plain language of the statute, then other rules of statutory interpretation need not be applied. Id. at 1223.

  5. People v. Nance

    221 P.3d 428 (Colo. App. 2009)   Cited 17 times

    When interpreting a statute, a court should first look to the plain language of the statute. In re J.N.H., 209 P.3d 1221, 1222-23 (Colo.App. 2009). If legislative intent is clear from the plain language of the statute, other rules of statutory interpretation need not be applied. Id. at 1223.

  6. Herrera v. City and Cty. of Denver

    221 P.3d 423 (Colo. App. 2009)   Cited 6 times
    Discussing the General Assembly's amendment of the CGIA in 2007 to add the definition of “motor vehicle”

    When interpreting a statute, a court should look first to the plain language of the statute. In re J.N.H., 209 P.3d 1221, 1222-23 (Colo.App. 2009). If legislative intent is clear from the plain language of the statute, then other rules of statutory interpretation need not be applied. Id. at 1223.