Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. Nos. JD224602, JD224603, JD224604, JD224605, JD224606, JD224607, JD224608, JD224609
DAVIS, Acting P. J.
Appellants, the mother and father of minors J.M., H.M., Br.M., M.M., Je.M., Bk.M., Jn.M., and A.M. (the minors), appeal from 12-month review hearing orders of the juvenile court continuing the minors in their out-of-home placement and also continuing reunification services for appellants. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.21, subd. (f), 395.) Appellants make numerous contentions of alleged prejudicial error. We shall affirm.
Hereafter, undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Some of the material in this section derives from our opinions in a previous appeal filed by mother (In re J.M. et al. (April 10, 2008, C055371) [nonpub. opn.]), and in an appeal filed by mother and father (In re J.M. et al. (Dec. 31, 2007, C054508) [nonpub. opn.]), of which we take judicial notice. (Evid. Code, § 451, subd. (a).)
On October 6, 2006, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed amended juvenile dependency petitions pursuant to section 300 on behalf of each of the eight minors, then ranging in age from one to 13 years old. Those petitions alleged the minors had suffered, or there was a substantial risk they would suffer, serious physical harm because of the failure of appellants to supervise the minors and to provide the minors with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. Each petition averred in part that appellants had failed to provide adequate care, support, and supervision for the minors, in that on or about July 17, 2006, the minors were found by law enforcement to be living in a substandard motor home in a business parking lot.
The petitions also contained two allegations pertaining to a history of domestic violence shared by appellants. According to the petitions, father was on probation for a conviction on domestic violence charges, and appellants had engaged in domestic violence in the presence of the minors.
The juvenile court sustained the amended petitions in part and adjudged the minors dependent children, ordering them removed from parental custody. As to visitation, the juvenile court granted appellants “regular visitation with the children, as frequent as is consistent with the well[-]being of the children. DHHS shall determine the time, place and manner of visitation, including the frequency of visits, length of visits, whether the visits are supervised and by whom they are supervised.”
The court dismissed the allegations of domestic violence.
The juvenile court ordered DHHS to provide appellants with reunification services. The elements of the reunification plan included counseling, one component of which was the effects of verbal and physical domestic violence on the minors, parenting education, and substance abuse testing for father.
DHHS placed the minors as follows: The three boys were placed in the home of their paternal aunt and uncle, while the girls lived with maternal cousins. According to the report prepared by DHHS for the July 2007 12-month review hearing, appellants visited with the minors only sporadically. That report stated that, although all-day visitation was scheduled, often appellants arrived for visits later in the day and stayed only for a few hours. In May 2006, the social worker suspended visitation after appellants persisted in discussing a criminal proceeding pending against mother. The social worker indicated he would establish a new supervised visitation arrangement.
In June 2007, the criminal proceeding was dismissed.
The social worker’s report concluded that appellants had “demonstrated a complete lack of willingness to participate” in reunification services. According to the social worker, appellants failed to appear for scheduled appointments with him, did not provide DHHS with an address, and failed to engage in counseling. Moreover, the social worker was unable to verify whether appellants had attended parenting education classes.
DHHS opined that the risk to the minors in returning them to appellants was “high.” According to DHHS, mother refused to accept responsibility for the removal of the minors from parental custody and blamed the social worker for her failure to participate in services, and apparently appellants had spent much time fighting the dependency system, rather than working to regain custody of the minors. DHHS recommended termination of reunification services.
At the 12-month review hearing, three of the four minors who testified told the juvenile court they wanted to return to parental custody. Social worker Steven Turoff testified he was the social worker assigned to the case. According to Turoff, appellants were required to receive counseling and parenting education and also to obtain “stable housing.” As for housing, Turoff told the juvenile court that mother advised him that she had obtained a one-bedroom apartment in a complex with which he was familiar. However, mother refused to provide Turoff with the apartment number. Turoff also testified he had indicated a willingness to assist appellants in the future with obtaining a larger residence. However, Turoff also admitted he had not personally offered appellants assistance pertaining to housing. Moreover, Turoff did not believe the apartment that mother had obtained was adequate for the family.
Turoff told the juvenile court he did not make a housing referral because he “had no idea what [appellants’] housing situation was on a week-to-week basis because they failed to come in to scheduled meetings.” He noted that DHHS previously had referred appellants to a housing workshop, “which they failed to attend.” According to Turoff, father had twice left messages on Turoff’s answering machine, and mother had done so nine times. He had obtained a telephone number for appellants in late January 2007, and had telephoned them five or six times. Turoff stated that often he was unable to reach appellants, sometimes because their telephone was disconnected.
Turoff testified he was unaware whether appellants had completed parenting classes. However, mother had provided DHHS with a sign-in sheet for classes, which Turoff could not verify. Moreover, Turoff acknowledged, there were some problems with the parenting education program. As for counseling, Turoff had prepared referrals for appellants, but appellants had not attended their initial intake appointments. Thereafter, mother refused to sign a form consenting to treatment, resulting in a closure by the counseling agency of the referral. Turoff also stated he had spoken with father about counseling, and that on three occasions he instructed father to contact the counseling agency. Although neither mother nor father ever appeared at a scheduled appointment with Turoff, he had seen them in his office on other occasions.
Turoff first testified that he had learned recently neither mother nor father completed the parenting education program. However, Turoff’s later testimony suggested mother had completed the program.
Turoff believed additional services for appellants would not be sufficient because they had failed to demonstrate “an understanding of the circumstances which led to the removal of the [minors] . . ., [they] have not demonstrated a willingness to even minimally participate in the court-ordered services, and [they] appear to blame every party . . . for [their] situation without accepting any of the responsibility for [themselves].” Turoff stated that inadequate housing was a “contributing factor” in the dependency proceedings. When asked why DHHS believed appellants remained a “threat” to the safety of the minors, Turoff replied: “Because [DHHS] has not been provided with any documentation or evidence that they’ve done anything to mitigate the circumstances which resulted in the removal of the [minors] from their care. The characterization that this is, you know, just a dirty or a slightly unsanitary living environment isn’t my understanding of the totality of, you know, what the living conditions really were. And they were very -- they were very basic services that [DHHS] was requesting [appellants] to complete. There shouldn’t have been any significant barriers to them completing them, and there appears to be a demonstrated pattern of unwillingness on the part of [appellants] to admit that there was a problem, to find out what the solution to the problem is and to implement that solution and safely raise their family.”
Mother testified she had attempted to engage in counseling, contacting both the counseling agency and social worker Turoff. Mother told the juvenile court she had attended all 13 required parenting classes. According to mother, because of a dispute over payment for the classes, the program refused to give her a certificate. As for housing, mother stated she lived in the one-bedroom apartment she had secured, and that Turoff had told her that the residence was too small for the family. Mother told the juvenile court that, if the minors were returned to her, she would attempt to obtain a larger residence. Although she preferred a four-bedroom place, mother suggested a two-bedroom apartment might work, with four children in each bedroom.
When asked if she continued to believe she had not neglected the minors, mother answered that in some respects she did, and also stated: “. . . I wouldn’t say that I was any danger, I would intentionally put my kids in danger.”
Father testified he had attended the parenting classes, and contacted Turoff about meeting with him. However, father admitted he was more concerned at one time about “[f]ighting the case” than meeting with the social worker. Father acknowledged that it was more important now to do the required services. Father had had surgery for cancer in the recent past, but did not believe his treatment had affected his ability to function.
At the conclusion of the September 2007 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court ruled that returning the minors to parental custody would present a substantial risk of detriment to the minors. However, the court ordered reunification services to continue and ordered DHHS to refer appellants to counseling and parenting classes. The court also denied requests by appellants to delete the domestic violence component of their reunification plans, and to appoint a third party to supervise visitation.
In making its rulings, the juvenile court stated in part: “As to the review report, the court cannot find by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services were offered. The main reasoning for this finding is that [DHHS] suspended visits for six to eight weeks with no court order to do so. The visit order was for visits to occur as arranged by [DHHS], and here [DHHS] took the role of the court and stopped visitation for a substantial period of time, effectively saying despite the court order you cannot visit. So this was much more than the regulation of the frequency and duration of the visits. It was effectively a no-contact order for a long time. It was not saying that due to certain circumstances visits will now be once every two or three weeks strictly supervised. It was you will not have visits. While it was understandable that to the extent [DHHS] did what they did, it was not legally justifiable. [¶] Also there was an order in January for [DHHS] to assist [appellants] with a housing referral and the evidence does not show that this was done. As well as to the father’s counseling, there was evidence this was a confusing situation and [DHHS] should have followed up to make sure the father got a new referral for services. [¶] For all these reasons there’s not clear and convincing evidence of reasonable services. At the same time this is not to say the kids are not going home due to [DHHS] solely. [Appellants] share considerable accountability and responsibility as well. They had a chance to do counseling. They didn’t do it in the first six months and they didn’t show up on January 31st. And then when [mother] showed up for counseling on April 2nd she refused to sign the consent for treatment. [DHHS] should have followed up on the father’s counseling, but it’s hard to share the father’s outrage over counseling when he failed to participate in counseling in the first months, did not show up on January 31st and [appellants] did not take advantage of the meetings offered by the social worker and have failed to take any responsibility for their actions. [¶] This court understands [DHHS’s] frustration here. [Appellants] were not cooperative, denied any responsibility for the case being in the juvenile court. They could have participated and made progress in services and had the opportunity to have the kids home and they were also insensitive to the caretakers regarding visits. Despite the frustrating behavior on the part of [appellants] and lack of cooperation, the law requires [DHHS] to push forward despite the obstacles and make services available. If [appellants] choose not to use them, that is their choice and then they must face the consequences of their choices. [¶] I have my doubts whether the father fully participated in parenting. The mother probably did, but what I’m going to do is order that both parents attend parenting classes, a class chosen by [DHHS] to make sure that they received the benefit of that particular instruction.”
The juvenile court also ordered appellants to participate in counseling.
Their appeals followed.
Discussion
I
Appellants contend the juvenile court’s finding that returning the minors to their custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the minors is not supported by substantial evidence. Asserting they substantially complied with the requirements of their case plans, appellants point to the failures by DHHS to assist them adequately in various areas as the reason they did not complete their plans. According to appellants, the record contains no evidence of a risk of harm to the minors posed by appellants. Moreover, appellants claim, their due process rights were violated by the failure of DHHS to promulgate objective standards with which to measure the progress of appellants, and the juvenile court improperly placed the burden on appellants to demonstrate they presented no danger to the minors.
Father joins in all arguments made by mother.
At the 12-month review hearing, the juvenile court must order a child returned to parental custody, “unless [it] finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (f).)
The juvenile court’s order must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. (Robert L. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 619, 625 (Robert L.).) In making this determination, we resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the prevailing party, recognizing that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16; In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547.)
Ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that returning the minors to appellants would have created a substantial risk of detriment to the minors. The record reflects that, although they had 12 months in which to do so, appellants had not completed all of the programs that were a part of their case plan. In fact, at the 12-month review hearing, father acknowledged that in the past he spent more time “fighting” with DHHS than doing the required services. More troubling was mother’s testimony at the review hearing, which included her statement that in some respects she continued to believe she had not neglected the minors.
This is a difficult case, as it involves a large family led by appellants, who love their children, but who have made decisions that jeopardized the health and safety of the minors. Previously, the juvenile court had found that appellants so neglected the minors by leaving them unattended, without adequate provision or direction, that the minors were placed at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. This court affirmed that finding, and also affirmed the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing the minors from parental custody. (In re J.M., supra, C054508.)
It is true, as the juvenile court found at the conclusion of the 12-month review hearing, that DHHS erred in suspending visitation without the court’s approval. DHHS also should have made more efforts to assist appellants in securing housing and in making arrangements for father to obtain counseling services. However, as the court also found, appellants bear a great deal of responsibility for failing to progress in their case plans and to demonstrate that they could safely parent the minors.
Instead of indicating a willingness to participate promptly in services designed to assist them in addressing the difficulties underlying this dependency proceeding, appellants refused to appear at scheduled meetings and failed to attend counseling sessions. Apparently, appellants’ dislike of social worker Turoff was so great that it interfered with their ability to focus on their central tasks: receiving the benefits of services so the minors would not be in danger if placed in appellants’ care. On this record, it is hardly surprising the juvenile court found that DHHS had established the requisite degree of detrimental risk posed to the minors if they were returned to appellants.
The juvenile court ordered DHHS to provide appellants with six additional months of reunification services, an order with which appellants do not take issue. The hope is that period of time will permit appellants to address their housing issue and engage in counseling, with the active assistance of DHHS. Contrary to appellants’ assertion that they had “remedied the major problem resulting in removal,” which they suggest was housing, the record reflects mother was aware that a one-bedroom apartment would not accommodate the needs of a 10-member family. Although it found their housing was inadequate, the court ordered DHHS to work with appellants on this matter. We reject their assertion that the court erred in relying solely or otherwise improperly on this factor, which the record shows was one among several cited by the court.
Appellants contend they had not been uncooperative with the social worker, but that any failure to cooperate and do services was the result of the social worker’s deficiencies. We disagree with that claim. The record contains uncontradicted evidence that appellants refused to attend regularly scheduled meetings, where presumably they could have obtained the information required to progress in services, and would have had the opportunity to ask questions and interact with the social worker about the elements of their case plans. The record also reflects appellants could have engaged in counseling well before the 12-month review hearing, if they had followed the instructions of the social worker and attended the initial sessions. Their refusal to do so cannot be attributed to any failure or negligence on the part of DHHS. Nor can the social worker be accused fairly of failing to make sufficient efforts to obtain the cooperation of appellants, as appellants allege. Finally, even assuming some of the contents of the social worker’s report were in error and social worker Turoff relied on that report, as appellants claim, we discern no prejudice to appellants occurred.
We do not consider appellants’ assertions that the juvenile court and DHHS violated their due process rights. Neither mother nor father raised that claim in the juvenile court. Therefore, both are precluded from tendering it here. (Cf. In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 402-403.)
Father’s claim that the juvenile court used an incorrect standard in making its detriment finding is not supported by the record. The record reflects the court made the proper finding; the “best interest[s]” language was used by the court in connection with its denial of a petition filed by father, a decision not challenged by appellants.
Despite their good intentions, and their wish for the minors to be returned to their care, appellants failed to satisfy the conditions necessary to achieve that outcome. On this record, it was well within the province of the juvenile court to conclude that returning the minors to appellants’ custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to them. (Robert L., supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 625.) Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding of detriment. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763-764.) Accordingly, the court’s decision to continue the minors’ placement outside of appellants’ custody was not an abuse of its discretion. (Cf. In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319 (Stephanie M.).)
II
Appellants claim the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying their requests to eliminate the domestic violence component of appellants’ reunification plans. Noting father’s probation following a 1998 domestic violence conviction had ended, and no recent incidents had occurred, appellants assert no substantial evidence supported the conclusion that domestic violence counseling was necessary to avoid a repetition of the circumstances resulting in the dependency proceedings.
In reviewing appellants’ claim, we apply the familiar substantial evidence test. (Sheila S. v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 872, 880-881.) When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value--to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination, we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (Jason L., supra, at p. 1214.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319.)
In denying the requests by appellants to delete the domestic violence component of their plans, the juvenile court ruled that appellants should have challenged the component previously. In any event, the court asserted, “[nothing] really [has] changed since [disposition].” Accordingly, the court ordered appellants to engage in counseling pertaining to all matters included in their original plans, of which domestic violence counseling was a part.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order. Mother had claimed she was a “long-time victim of verbal, if not physical, domestic violence at the hands of the father,” and even father had acknowledged there was “potentially verbal domestic violence between them.” Moreover, there was evidence of ongoing verbal abuse, in the form of statements made by the minors. In sum, there was no abuse of discretion.
III
Noting three of the minors testified they wanted to return to parental custody but that their counsel argued that they should remain in foster care, appellants claim trial counsel for the minors rendered ineffective assistance, requiring reversal of the juvenile court’s order denying return of the minors to appellants.
In order to show ineffective assistance of counsel, appellants “must demonstrate that counsel failed to perform with reasonable competence, and that it is reasonably probable a determination more favorable to the [appellants] would have resulted in the absence of counsel’s failings.” (People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 767; People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583-584; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425.) When a claim of ineffectiveness is made on appeal, we examine the record to determine if there is any explanation for the challenged aspects of representation. If the record sheds no light on why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged, the case is affirmed “unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation . . . .” (Pope, supra, at p. 426.)
In support of their argument, appellants rely primarily on section 317. That reliance is misplaced. Section 317 provides in part: “(c) . . . A primary responsibility of any counsel appointed to represent a child pursuant to this section shall be to advocate for the protection, safety, and physical and emotional well-being of the child. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (e) The counsel for the child shall be charged in general with the representation of the child’s interests. To that end, the counsel shall make or cause to have made any further investigations that he or she deems in good faith to be reasonably necessary to ascertain the facts, including the interviewing of witnesses, and he or she shall examine and cross-examine witnesses in both the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings. He or she may also introduce and examine his or her own witnesses, make recommendations to the court concerning the child’s welfare, and participate further in the proceedings to the degree necessary to adequately represent the child. In any case in which the child is four years of age or older, counsel shall interview the child to determine the child’s wishes and to assess the child’s well-being, and shall advise the court of the child’s wishes. Counsel for the child shall not advocate for the return of the child if, to the best of his or her knowledge, that return conflicts with the protection and safety of the child. . . .”
In re Zamer G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1265-1266, concludes that the primary duty of dependency counsel representing minors is to advocate for their best interests, rather than the wishes of the minors. We agree. In this case, as the record reflects, counsel for the minors did an exemplary job advocating the minors’ interests.
Counsel is not obliged to undertake futile or frivolous actions on behalf of a client. (Cf. People v. Constancio (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 533, 546.) As we have suggested, substantial evidence before the juvenile court supported its conclusion that the minors should remain outside of parental custody. Accordingly, even had minors’ counsel argued for the return of the minors to appellants, it is highly unlikely counsel’s argument would have prevailed. There was no ineffective assistance of counsel.
IV
Counsel for mother and counsel for the minors sought a bonding assessment to evaluate the relationships existing among the minors. Although the juvenile court did not rule explicitly on the request, none was ordered. Arguing it was critical for an evaluation to be done, and that the contents of such a report would be relevant to establishing a statutory exception to termination of parental rights, appellants assert that failure to order a sibling bond assessment constituted an abuse of the court’s discretion and a denial of due process.
For purposes of resolving the issue, we presume father properly can join in the claim on appeal, despite his failure to join it in the juvenile court.
The standard of review of the juvenile court’s decision whether to order a bonding assessment is abuse of discretion. Because the juvenile court is accorded wide discretion, its determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent “‘a manifest showing of abuse.’” (In re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067.) In applying this standard, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the juvenile court’s decision and determine whether that court reasonably could have refrained from ordering a bonding study. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341 (Lorenzo C.).)
As mother acknowledges, the record contains ample evidence of bonding among the minors. Social worker Turoff admitted the minors were bonded to each other. Moreover, several of the minors testified they wanted to live with each other. Therefore, the juvenile court had the benefit of obtaining substantial information about the nature of the bond existing among the minors. On this record, the juvenile court was entitled to conclude that a bonding assessment would not have been useful to the court or of assistance to appellants. (Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.)
The juvenile court is not obliged by statute or case law to order preparation of a bonding assessment. (Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.) Because the evidence in this case supports a conclusion that there was little, if any, benefit to be gained from ordering preparation of a bonding study, the court acted well within its discretion in not ordering a bonding assessment. (Cf. Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319; In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197.) There was no error.
V
Appellants’ penultimate claim is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in continuing the visitation schedule then existing among the minors. Arguing the minors were not visiting each other regularly, and that appellants had made clear their disagreement with the implementation of the sibling visitation order, appellants claim they can properly raise this challenge to the order.
The difficulty with the claim of appellants in this case is that the record does not reveal counsel for mother or father tendered in the juvenile court at the review hearing any objection to the juvenile court’s visitation order. The record reflects appellants had ample opportunities to bring that issue to the attention of the juvenile court if they had wished to do so. Yet appellants failed to avail themselves of that opportunity.
The California Supreme Court has stated: “‘“An appellate court will ordinarily not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings, in connection with relief sought or defenses asserted, where an objection could have been, but was not, presented to the lower court by some appropriate method . . . . The circumstances may involve such intentional acts or acquiescence as to be appropriately classified under the headings of estoppel or waiver . . . . Often, however, the explanation is simply that it is unfair to the trial judge and to the adverse party to take advantage of an error on appeal when it could easily have been corrected at the trial.”’ (Doers v. Golden Gate Bridge etc. Dist. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 180, 184-185, fn. 1 [151 Cal.Rptr. 837, 588 P.2d 1261], italics in Doers.) ‘“The purpose of the general doctrine of waiver is to encourage a defendant to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be corrected or avoided and a fair trial had . . . .”’ (People v. Walker (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1013, 1023 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 902, 819 P.2d 861].) ‘“No procedural principle is more familiar to this Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590, fns. omitted; cf. In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293, fn. 2 (S.B.) [stating that the correct legal term for loss of right based on failure to assert it in a timely fashion is forfeiture, not waiver].)
Here, as the record shows, at no time during the review hearing did mother or father tender an objection to the sibling visitation order. Thus, appellants are precluded from raising the claim here. (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502; In re Gilberto M. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1194, 1198-1200.) Appellants forfeited their claim. (S.B., supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1293, fn. 2.)
VI
The final claim of appellants is that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the request by appellants to appoint a neutral third party to supervise the visits between appellants and the minors. Citing evidence of conflicts and arguing that DHHS had not made sufficient efforts to ensure regular visits, appellants contend it was reasonable for the court to provide DHHS with guidelines pertaining to administration of the visitation order.
At the review hearing, the juvenile court decided to permit DHHS to have the discretion to select a supervisor. In fact, the court directed DHHS to consider father’s request that a relative of the family not be the supervisor. The court’s ruling was well within its discretion. It properly may delegate such details of visitation, which include time, place and manner. (In re Moriah T. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1373-1374.) As DHHS argues in its brief, for the court to specify a named supervisor might interfere with the flexibility needed by DHHS to manage visitation. There was no error.
Disposition
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: NICHOLSON, J., HULL, J.