Opinion
1696 EDA 2021 1697 EDA 2021 1698 EDA 2021 1699 EDA 2021
04-04-2022
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L.B., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.M., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L.B., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.M., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: S.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.M., MOTHER IN THE INTEREST OF: S.B.M., A MINOR APPEAL OF: A.M., MOTHER
Appeal from the Order Entered July 22, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-51-DP-0003047-2017, CP-51-AP-0000488-2020, CP-51-DP-0003052-2017, CP-51-AP-0000489-2020
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
BENDER, P.J.E.
A.M. (Mother) appeals from the decrees and the orders, each dated July 21, 2021, and entered on July 22, 2021, that granted the petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human Services (DHS) to involuntarily terminate Mother's parental rights and to change the permanency goals from reunification to adoption for J.L.B. (Child), born in November of 2009, and S.M. (Child), born in November of 2017 (collectively Children). After review, we affirm.
By order, issued on September 22, 2021, this Court sua sponte consolidated these appeals because they involve related parties and issues. See Pa.R.A.P. 513.
S.M. is also identified as S.B.M.
J.L.B.'s father is M.B. S.M.'s father is R.M. Each father's parental rights to their respective child were involuntarily terminated at the same time as Mother's rights were terminated. Both fathers filed appeals to this Court. Their appeals are addressed in separate decisions.
In her brief, Mother sets forth the following issues for our review:
1. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner, … (DHS), had met its burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that Mother evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing her claim to the [C]hild[ren] or has refused or failed to perform parental duties, for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition[?]
2. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner, DHS, had met its burden of proof that Mother has shown repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal, or that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal causing h[er] child[ren] to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for the [C]hild[ren]'s physical or mental well-being[?]
3. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner, DHS, had met its burden of proof that the conditions and causes or any such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by Mother[?]
4. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner, DHS, had met its burden of proof that the conditions which led to the removal o[f] the [C]hild[ren] continue to exist[?]
5. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion in … determining that Petitioner, DHS, had met its burden of proof that the services or assistance reasonably available to Mother are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal of the [C]hild[ren] within a reasonable period of time and erred or abused its discretion in determining that DHS made reasonable efforts to reunify this family[?]
6. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion in … determining that Petitioner, DHS, had met its burden of proof that services or assistance were reasonably available to Mother[?]
7. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion in … determining that Petitioner, DHS, had met its burden of proof that termination of Mother's parental rights best meets the needs and welfare of the [C]hild[ren?]
8. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err or abuse its discretion in determining that Petitioner, DHS, had met its burden of proof that changing the [C]hild[ren]'s permanency goal[s] to adoption and terminating Mother's rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child[?]
Mother's brief at 6-7.
We review an order terminating parental rights in accordance with the following standard:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge's decision the same deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent evidence.In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so "clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue."Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)). The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Since Mother's last issue concerns the trial court's decision to change the goal for Children to adoption, we address that issue by applying the following standard of review:
In cases involving a court's order changing the placement goal … to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. In re N.C. , 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. 2006). To hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we must determine its judgment was "manifestly unreasonable," that the court disregarded the law, or that its action was "a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will." Id. (quoting In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 973 (Pa. Super. 2004)). While this Court is bound by the facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the court's inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a "responsibility to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal principles to that record." In re A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa. Super. 2006). Therefore, our scope of review is broad. Id.In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f), when considering a petition for goal change for a dependent child, the juvenile court is to consider, inter alia: (1) the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement goal for the child; and (5) a likely date by which the goal for the child might be achieved. In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 977. The best interests of the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court. Id. at 978.
We have reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the extensive and comprehensive opinion authored by the Honorable Allan L. Tereshko of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, dated October 8, 2021. We determine that Judge Tereshko's well-reasoned decision disposes of the issues raised by Mother. As for termination of Mother's parental rights, Judge Tereshko concluded that:
DHS has provided clear and convincing evidence Mother continues the incapacity to parent. She lies and manipulates information and lacks the ability to anticipate problems related to parenting. She may have decided to terminate the abusive relationship with R.M. and may be on the path to a better life, nonetheless [J.L.B.] has clearly expressed she does not feel safe with Mother. Mother's conduct has caused these Children to be without essential parental care and she continues to be unable or unwilling to remedy this incapacity. These Children have been out of the parental home for more than six months and the conditions that led to the removal and placement continue to exist. Mother has complied with some [Family Service Plan] objectives, but whether she can remedy the conditions which led to the removal of the Children in the foreseeable future is doubtful. The Children's lives cannot be placed on hold in the hope that Mother will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting. This [c]ourt finds that although the Children may have a bond with Mother, this bond however is not a parent-child bond that should be preserved.
Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 10/08/2021, at 37-38.
With regard to his determination to change Children's goals to adoption, Judge Tereshko concluded:
This [c]ourt finds the [r]ecord sustains the factual findings and legal conclusions regarding the Children's current placement, and
most importantly, the [r]ecord demonstrates that [r]eunification is not feasible and not in these Children's best interest. Competent, credible, persuasive evidence exists to change the [p]ermanency [g]oals of the Children from [r]eunification to [adoption. Once [r]eunification is ruled out, the second preferred permanency option is [adoption. Adoption has been clearly established as the appropriate goal in the best interest of these Children and is best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of these Children.
TCO at 42.
Because we conclude that Judge Tereshko's opinion properly disposes of the issues Mother raises in these appeals, we adopt Judge Tereshko's opinion as our own and affirm the decrees and orders appealed from on that basis.
Decrees and orders affirmed.
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[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.