Opinion
No. 2 CA-JV 2014-0107
01-26-2015
IN RE J.L.
COUNSEL Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney By Barbara Gelband, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson Counsel for State Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender By Susan C. L. Kelly, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson Counsel for Minor
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f); Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 103(G).
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. JV18799101
The Honorable Lisa Abrams, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED
COUNSEL Barbara LaWall, Pima County Attorney
By Barbara Gelband, Deputy County Attorney, Tucson
Counsel for State
Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender
By Susan C. L. Kelly, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Minor
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Presiding Judge Miller authored the decision of the Court, in which Chief Judge Eckerstrom and Judge Espinosa concurred. MILLER, Presiding Judge:
¶1 Appellant J.L. admitted to aggravated assault on a corrections employee and violating the conditions of his juvenile intensive probation by leaving a treatment facility without permission. The juvenile court adjudicated J.L. delinquent, found him to be in violation of his probation, and ordered him committed to the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections (ADJC) for a period not to exceed his eighteenth birthday. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297, 451 P.2d 878 (1969), and State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 2 P.3d 89 (App. 1999). See also In re Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JV-117258, 163 Ariz. 484, 486-87, 788 P.2d 1235, 1237-38 (App. 1989) (juveniles adjudicated delinquent have constitutional right to Anders appeal). Counsel states that, based on her review, there "is not a meritorious issue which can be argued in a formal appellate brief," and asks us to search the record for fundamental error.
In its minute entry from the July 29, 2014, trial review hearing, the juvenile court mistakenly referred to J.L.'s admission to disorderly conduct, a count which had been included in the original delinquency petition but was deleted from the amended petition before the court. Similarly, the disposition minute entry and commitment orders also erroneously refer to disorderly conduct. In a joint supplemental brief filed pursuant to this court's order directing counsel to address this inconsistency, counsel acknowledged "the disorderly conduct charge . . . was never part of the adjudication or the subsequent disposition."
J.L. will turn eighteen in June 2015.
To the extent counsel raises as a potentially "arguable issue" whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by revoking probation and committing J.L. to ADJC, the record does not support such a claim and counsel further concedes it is not "meritorious."
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¶2 We agree with counsel's assessment. The record supports the juvenile court's findings that J.L.'s admissions were knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and that he provided an adequate factual basis to support them. See A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(8)(a). Specifically, J.L. admitted that in July 2014 he had "punched" a "staff" member at the juvenile detention facility, and that in June 2014 he had left his residential treatment facility without permission, in violation of the conditions of his probation. And the record establishes the court appropriately exercised its discretion in ordering J.L. committed to ADJC. See A.R.S. § 8-341(A)(1)(e); In re John G., 191 Ariz. 205, ¶ 8, 953 P.2d 1258, 1260 (App. 1998) ("We will not disturb a juvenile court's disposition order absent an abuse of discretion.").
¶3 The juvenile court's adjudication, revocation of probation, and disposition are affirmed, and the July 23, 2014, minute entry and the August 20, 2014, disposition and commitment orders are corrected to delete any reference to disorderly conduct.