In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 803 ; seeJordan , 325 S.W.3d at 723 ("[D]anger to a child need not be established as an independent proposition and may be inferred from parental misconduct even if the conduct is not directed at the child and the child suffers no actual injury."); In re J.J.S. , 272 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. struck) (stating that danger to child's physical or emotional well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct). Endangerment can occur through both acts and omissions.

Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.1987). A parent may be found to have engaged in conduct which endangers a child even if that conduct is not directed toward the child. Texas Department of Human Services v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533; In re J.J.S., 272 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, no pet.). Termination under subsection 161.001(1)(E) must be based on more than a single act or omission.

Termination under section E must be based on more than a single act or omission; what is required is a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct. In re J.J.S., 272 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex.App.-Waco 2008, pet. struck). The conduct does not have to occur in the presence of the child.

Cf. In re J.J.S., 272 S.W.3d 74, 79 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet. struck) (fact that mother "conducted herself in a manner, namely her abusive relationships, which exposed her children to a home where physical violence was present" was evidence of Subsection (E) endangerment); In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 819 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.)

; In re N.R.T., 338 S.W.3d 667, 674 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, no pet.); In re J.J.S., 272 S.W.3d 74, 83-84 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. struck); In re S.S., No. 11-05-00083-CV, 2006 WL 1285125, at *3 (Tex. App.—Eastland May 11, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.). Moreover, although Rutland and Sublett believed that Father intentionally injured the child, the Department did not ask Father to move out of the child's home so that she could return home.

Yet she did not access any domestic-violence classes until shortly before trial. Cf. In re J.J.S., 272 S.W.3d 74, 79 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. struck) (concluding fact that mother "conducted herself in a manner, namely her abusive relationships, which exposed her children to a home where physical violence was present" was evidence of endangerment under subsection (E)); In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 819 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (considering fact that mother "exposed her children to domestic violence" as evidence of endangerment under subsection (E)). The record also reflects that DFPS offered mother various types of assistance in addition to the domestic-violence counseling, first, without requesting conservatorship of G.M.M., and, again, after moving to terminate mother's parental rights.

In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 803 ; see Jordan , 325 S.W.3d at 723 ("[D]anger to a child need not be established as an independent proposition and may be inferred from parental misconduct even if the conduct is not directed at the child and the child suffers no actual injury."); In re J.J.S. , 272 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. struck) (stating that danger to child's physical or emotional well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct). Endangerment can occur through both acts and omissions.

The evidence further showed a history of domestic violence involving Mother and S.B. including during the pendency of the Department's cases. See In re J.J.S., 272 S.W.3d 74, 79-80 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. struck) (relying on trial court's finding that mother "conducted herself in a manner, namely her abusive relationships, which exposed her children to a home where physical violence was present" as support for upholding endangerment ground); In re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 819 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (considering evidence that showed that mother "exposed her children to domestic violence" as evidence of endangerment under subsection (E)); In re J.I.T.P., 99 S.W.3d 841, 845 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (stating that "the trial court could have considered the domestic violence . . . as evidence of endangerment to [the child]"). In addition to the evidence of domestic violence, the evidence showed that S.B. and Mother continued to spend time together during the pendency of these cases and while there was a protective order in place.

In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803; see Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723 ("[D]anger to a child need not be established as an independent proposition and may be inferred from parental misconduct even if the conduct is not directed at the child and the child suffers no actual injury."); In re J.J.S., 272 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. struck) (stating that danger to child's physical or emotional well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct). Endangerment can occur through both acts and omissions.

In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 803 ; seeJordan , 325 S.W.3d at 721 ("It is not necessary that the parent's conduct be directed towards the child or that the child actually be injured; rather, a child is endangered when the environment creates a potential for danger which the parent is aware of but disregards."); In re J.J.S. , 272 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet. struck) (stating that danger to child's physical or emotional well-being may be inferred from parental misconduct). Endangerment can occur through both acts and omissions.