Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK72101, Valerie Skeba, Referee. Affirmed.
Konrad S. Lee, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Judith A. Luby, Principal County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERLUSS, P. J.
Bryan C., the father of a seven-year-old girl, J.C., and a two-year-old boy, B.C., appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, sustaining allegations in the dependency petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b), (d) and (j), that Bryan C. was an “offending parent.” Bryan C. contends no substantial evidence supports a finding he was maintaining an unsanitary or dangerous home at the time of the jurisdiction hearing or the finding he knew or reasonably should have known the children were in danger of sexual abuse. However, Bryan C. does not challenge the court’s assumption of jurisdiction over his two children in light of the sustained allegations relating to their mother, J.J., nor does he contest the court’s disposition order, which removed the children from his and mother’s physical custody based on its finding by clear and convincing evidence that a substantial danger existed to the children’s physical and emotional health and safety and there were no reasonable means to protect them without removal from the home they share. We affirm.
Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
The children’s mother has not appealed from the jurisdiction or disposition findings or order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Initial Detention Based on a Filthy and Hazardous Home Environment
The children, together with their then-12-year-old half-brother and three first cousins, were detained on May 13, 2008 following a report from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department they were living in a filthy home. The dependency petition filed on May 16, 2008 contained a single count pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), alleging there was a substantial risk the children would suffer serious physical harm or illness through the failure or inability of their parents to supervise or protect them adequately. Specifically, the petition alleged Bryan C. and the mother “established a filthy, unsanitary and hazardous home environment for the children in that on or about 5/13/08, the home contained numerous electrical wires on the floors, piles of soiled clothing, water, trash, debris and decayed food on the floors.... The home contained a rodent, maggot and severe cockroach infestation. The kitchen stove contained decayed food.... The dishwasher contained cockroaches and a thick brown sticky substance. The bathroom contained an inoperable toilet which was clogged with toilet paper and cigarette butts. The bathtub was filled with dirt, objects and debris and there were piles of trash and debris on the bathroom floors. The home emitted a strong foul odor of urine and ammonia....”
The May 16, 2008 detention report contained descriptions of the deplorable conditions in the home from a deputy sheriff and one of the Department’s social workers who had inspected the home on May 13, 2008, confirming the allegations in the petition. Deputy Sheriff Mark Feickert described the house as “the worst I’ve ever seen” in terms of filth, noting, “There are bugs literally crawling everywhere... and a pile of trash in the kitchen with maggots crawling in it.... There’s animal and probably people feces on the floor. The urine and ammonia smell in the bedrooms is so strong you can hardly breathe.” The emergency response children’s social worker, Catherine A. Saei, found the home completely infested with cockroaches. “They were crawling on literally every surface of the home and numbered in the hundreds, if not more than 1000.” Saei also reported there was a pile of garbage and trash about two feet high on the floor in the kitchen with cockroaches and flies, including maggots, crawling through the trash and on the surrounding floor. In addition, the floor itself was filthy with spilled foods and liquids and dirt. Under the kitchen sink there was a large bottle of bleach and other cleaning supplies, which were not appropriate for a home with toddlers in Saei’s opinion. That area, too, was filled with cockroaches.
Bryan C. was present when Saei arrived at the home and confirmed he lived there. Following Saei’s inspection of the home all six children who resided there were taken into protective custody. The mother, but not Bryan C., was arrested and charged with child endangerment. (Mother pleaded guilty to one count of child endangerment on May 28, 2008.) At the initial hearing the juvenile court ordered the children detained and placed in shelter care. Bryan C. was found to be the presumed father of J.C. and B.C.
2. The First Amended Petition Alleging Sexual Abuse
On June 12, 2008 the Department filed a first amended petition, which repeated the initial petition’s allegations regarding the filthy and hazardous home environment and added allegations pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (d) and (j), describing sexual abuse of J.C. by her 12-year-old half-brother and one of her male cousins living in the home. The amended petition was predicated on a May 29, 2008 hotline referral from the children’s foster mother regarding ongoing sexualized behaviors among the children and a follow-up investigation by the Department during which the children told the social worker they had been exposed to sexually explicit material in the family home and stated their sexualized behaviors had occurred regularly when they lived with Bryan C. and mother. The children reported the sexual abuse (described in the petition as “the fondling of the minor’s vaginal area, humping movements on her while she was nude and clothed, and the exposing of [the two boys’] genitals to her”) to mother, who disciplined the two boys, but the sexual misconduct continued.
The sexual abuse allegations were repeated as an additional section 300, subdivision (b), count that was stricken at the jurisdiction hearing as unnecessary. The first amended petition also included allegations concerning the father of J.C. and B.C.’s half-brother, which are not relevant to this appeal.
When interviewed for the jurisdiction report, Bryan C. acknowledged the family home was filthy and admitted the house had been in that unacceptable condition for at least one month. However, he insisted he, mother and the maternal aunt who lived there were working on cleaning the house and believed the children should be returned.
With respect to the allegations of sexual abuse, after initially denying any knowledge of the behavior, mother admitted she was aware it had occurred and had punished one of the boys for sexually assaulting her daughter. She also admitted the behavior had not stopped and conceded the children were afraid of her son (J.C.’s half-brother) and would not report his misbehavior to her. The children all described various forms of inappropriate sexualized behavior, although there was some dispute whether it was only the half-brother who was the instigator/aggressor or whether, and to what extent, other male children (that is, J.C.’s brother and cousins) also participated. Bryan C. denied any knowledge of the sexual activity engaged in by the children.
As of June 6, 2008 the parents had made some progress in cleaning up the house. Because of the foster mother’s concerns about the children’s highly sexualized behavior, they were placed in a new foster home. They had to be removed from that new home, as well, after the half-brother made sexual advances toward the new foster father’s 10-year-old daughter.
A team decision making meeting was held with the family on August 14, 2008. The parents disclosed their home was in foreclosure and they were required to move out by August 25, 2008. A supplemental report dated November 5, 2008 indicated Bryan C. and mother had relocated to another three bedroom home; a total of six adults were living in the home at that time (the six children were still in foster placement). If the children were returned, J.C., B.C. and their half-brother would have to share a bedroom with their parents.
The Department also reported, “[T]here continues to be no documented progress with each parent’s case plan as it pertains to the central issue in this matter, the minors’ sexually acting out behaviors. The mother and father were provided referrals for counseling services to address the sexualized behavior that was previously witnessed by a foster mother and articulated by the minors and their cousins.... [¶]... [¶]... [T]hey have not provided evidence of parenting class enrollment, and they have not sought appropriate intervention or furthering education to aid their ability to combat the current issue of sibling sexual abuse in the home.”
A contested jurisdiction hearing was held on December 17, 2008, more than seven months after the original petition had been filed. An information-for-court-officer report prepared by the Department for the hearing stated mother had enrolled in an educational sexual abuse support group, but stated she did not know why she had been asked to participate in the course. As she had in the past, mother minimized the seriousness of the children’s sexual activity. Bryan C. still had not participated in a course on sexual abuse, and he too “continue[d] to deny the seriousness of the nature of the sexualized behaviors on the part of the minors and their cousins.”
At the initial detention hearing on May 16, 2008, the court set a pretrial resolution conference (PRC) for June 16, 2008. As discussed, the first amended petition was filed June 12, 2008. The PRC was thereafter continued from June 16, 2008 to July 1, 2008 and again to July 28, 2008. On July 28, 2008 a trial setting conference was scheduled for August 26, 2008. On that date a contested adjudication was set for September 25, 2008. However, the September 25, 2008 date was continued, first to November 6, 2008 and then to December 17, 2008 for the preparation and receipt of supplemental reports addressing the family’s housing situation and the parents’ progress in counseling.
Bryan C. testified at the hearing and said he was away from the family home from early in the morning (between 7:00 and 8:00 a.m.) until 5:00 or 6:00 in the evening and never saw J.C.’s half-brother (his stepson) act out sexually or observed any inappropriate sexual behavior between the children. (At the time of the initial Department intervention in the case, Bryan C. had said he was currently unemployed.) Bryan C. maintained neither mother nor any of the children had ever told him about inappropriate sexual behavior by the boys living in the house and explained the children were supervised by mother and her sister (his children’s maternal aunt).
Neither Bryan C. nor mother argued J.C. had not been the victim of sexual abuse. Bryan C.’s counsel insisted only there was no evidence his client knew or reasonably should have known his daughter was in danger of sexual abuse and, therefore, as to him, the allegation under section 300, subdivision (d), should be stricken. Counsel for mother also argued the section 300, subdivision (d), count was not justified, but conceded the evidence supported a finding under section 300, subdivision (b), based on mother’s failure to protect her daughter from the abuse in her own home. As to the allegations regarding the unsanitary and hazardous conditions in the family home, mother’s counsel argued it should no longer be an issue since the family had moved to a new home and there was no evidence the current home was dangerous or dirty.
The juvenile court sustained the allegations under section 300, subdivisions (b), (d) and (j). Although the family had moved and little was yet known about the condition of the new home, the court found, “[T]he evidence from the adults other than the parents [is] that they’ve had a lot of problems with a dirty home for a while.... I don’t know that just because the parents moved to a different home it takes away the problem. It appears that there’s just a general level of neglect here. And neglectful behavior does not go away when you move to a new residence. Neglectful behavior goes away when you realize what you’ve done is harmful to the children and you work to address it.”
With respect to the issue of notice of the sexual abuse of J.C., the court rejected Bryan C.’s argument he did not know, and could not have known, about the misconduct. The court explained the behavior described in the foster home was ongoing and that behavior “would put any reasonable person on notice that there’s a problem here with these kids.” “You have very young children acting out sexually on each other. And, apparently, everybody knows about it because all the children are discussing it. So I don’t believe this is a case where the parents really didn’t know. I think there was more than enough behaviors that were observed by other adults that should have put the parents on notice....”
At the disposition hearing, which immediately followed the jurisdiction hearing, the court declared J.C. and B.C., as well as their half-brother, dependent children of the court and removed them from Bryan C.’s and mother’s physical custody based on its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that a substantial danger existed to the children’s physical and emotional health and safety and there were no reasonable means to protect them without removal from the home. The court ordered that the children remain placed in foster care and directed the Department to provide family reunification services for Bryan C. and mother to include parenting education and individual counseling to address sexual abuse awareness issues.
Bryan C. filed a timely notice of appeal challenging only the court’s findings sustaining the petition’s allegations he was an offending parent with respect to the section 300, subdivisions (b), (d) and (j) counts.
“[A] jurisdictional finding good against one parent is good against both. More accurately, the minor is a dependent if the actions of either parent bring her within one of the statutory definitions of a dependent. [Citations.] This accords with the purpose of a dependency proceeding, which is to protect the child, rather than prosecute the parent.” (In re Alysha S. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 393, 397; see In re Alexis H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 11, 16; In re Jeffrey P. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 1548, 1553-1554.) Accordingly, the findings relating to the children’s mother provide independent grounds for affirming the declaration of dependency as to both children. (See In re Dirk S. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1045 [single basis of jurisdiction is sufficient to uphold dependency court’s order]; In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875-876 [where one basis for jurisdiction supported by substantial evidence, court need not consider sufficiency of evidence to support other grounds].) Nonetheless, we agree with Bryan C.’s argument the challenged jurisdictional findings may adversely affect him in subsequent proceedings and, therefore, his appeal is not moot. (See In re C.C. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1488-1489 [appeal from juvenile court order not moot if potential exists for adverse collateral consequences]; In re Dylan T. (1998)65 Cal.App.4th 765, 769 [“issue is not moot if the purported error infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings”].)
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition findings for substantial evidence. (In re David M. (2005)134 Cal.App.4th 822, 828; In re Kristin H. (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1635, 1654.) Under this standard we examine the whole record in a light most favorable to the findings and conclusions of the juvenile court and defer to the lower court on issues of credibility of the evidence and witnesses. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393; In re Tania S. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 728, 733-734.) We determine only whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, that supports the court’s order, resolving all conflicts in support of the determination and indulging all legitimate inferences to uphold the court’s order. (In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547; In re John V. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212; In re Eric B. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 996, 1004-1005.) “However, substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. [Citations.] A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on appeal. [Citation.] Furthermore, ‘[w]hile substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be “a product of logic and reason” and “must rest on the evidence” [citation]; inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding [citations].’ [Citation.] ‘The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record.’” (In re Savannah M., at pp. 1393-1394; accord, In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207, 216-217.)
2. The Jurisdictional Findings as to Bryan C. Are Supported by Substantial Evidence
a. Section 300, subdivision (b)
A juvenile court may determine a child is subject to the court’s jurisdiction if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness,” as a result of a parent’s “willful or negligent failure... to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.” (§ 300, subd. (b).) “The statutory definition consists of three elements: (1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820; accord, In re David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 829.)
As Bryan C. argues, when the basis for jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), is that the parent’s negligence or failure to adequately supervise creates a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the child, the evidence must support a finding at the time of the jurisdiction hearing that the child remains at risk of such harm. (See, e.g., In re David M., supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at p. 829; In re Savannah M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1396.) However, as applied in this case to the allegations of an unsanitary and hazardous home, the required showing is that the parents’ past neglectful conduct and inadequate supervision of the home environment have not been reformed and thus create a substantial risk of future harm, not necessarily that the filthy conditions themselves continue to exist at the time of the hearing.
This court recently held that evidence of prior serious physical harm or abuse is sufficient to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b) and (d). (In re J.K. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1426.) To the extent Bryan C. argues a finding of jurisdiction under these subdivisions always requires evidence the child faces a substantial risk of future harm at the time of the hearing, he is simply wrong. (See In re David H. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1644.)
The evidence before the juvenile court, essentially uncontested, was that the situation in the home in May 2008 was appalling: It was infested with rodents, maggots and cockroaches; trash and decayed food were on the floors; the toilet in the main bathroom was clogged; electrical wires were on the floors. Bryan C. conceded those conditions, making the house effectively uninhabitable, had existed for more than a month. Neither Bryan C. nor mother corrected the problem; they simply (and, apparently, involuntarily) moved away from it. The fact the family lost its home in foreclosure and their new home was not yet in an equally deplorable state does nothing to rebut the reasonable inferences from the evidence that Bryan C. and mother were unwilling—or unable—to maintain a safe and clean home for their children and that, as a result, the children were at substantial risk of serious harm. (Cf. In re Rocco M., supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 824 [exercise of dependency court jurisdiction under § 300, subd. (b), is proper when a child is “of such tender years that the absence of adequate supervision and care poses an inherent risk to [his or her] physical health and safety”].) Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), as to Bryan C.
b. Section 300, subdivision (d)
Section 300, subdivision (d), provides the juvenile court may adjudge a child a dependent of the juvenile court when the child “has been sexually abused, or there is a substantial risk that the child will be sexually abused... by his or her parent or guardian or a member of his or her household, or the parent or guardian has failed to adequately protect the child from sexual abuse when the parent or guardian knew or reasonably should have known that the child was in danger of sexual abuse.” Bryan C. does not dispute the juvenile court’s findings that his daughter was sexually abused by members of his household and that he failed to protect her from that abuse. He contends only that the evidence is insufficient to support the court’s finding he knew or reasonably should have known his daughter was in danger of sexual abuse.
Once again, ample evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings sustaining the section 300, subdivision (d), allegations. To be sure, there is no evidence Bryan C. actually knew of the ongoing sexual abuse of his daughter by her half-brother and cousin. But, as the court found, the pervasive nature of the age-inappropriate sexualized behavior exhibited by the daughter, her brothers and her male cousins, observed by a number of other adults and the frequent topic of conversation by the children, provides an adequate basis to conclude Bryan C. reasonably should have known his daughter was in danger of sexual abuse. No more is required to support jurisdiction. As previously noted, Bryan C. does not contest the further finding, upon which the order removing the children is based, that a substantial danger exists to the children’s physical and emotional health and safety and there are no reasonable means to protect them without removing them from Bryan C.’s physical custody.
c. Section 300, subdivision (j)
Section 300, subdivision (j), provides the juvenile court may adjudge a child a dependent of the juvenile court when the child’s sibling “has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” Bryan C.’s only challenge to the juvenile court’s jurisdiction finding pursuant to subdivision (j) is that, as to him, there is insufficient evidence to support the predicate determinations with respect to subdivisions (b) and (d). As discussed, however, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that the children were neglected as defined by subdivision (b), Bryan C.’s daughter was sexually abused by a member of Bryan C.’s household within the meaning of subdivision (d) and Bryan C. failed to protect his daughter even though he reasonably should have known she was in danger of sexual abuse. Accordingly, the subdivision (j) finding is also supported by substantial evidence.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings are affirmed.
We concur: WOODS, J., JACKSON, J.