Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. OJ06003810
McGuiness, P.J.
J.J. (appellant), born in August 1990, appeals from a dispositional and commitment order committing him to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He contends: (1) the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the DJJ because it based its decision on “unreliable and false information” and because it failed to make certain findings a court is required to make before committing a minor to the DJJ; (2) the court erred in denying his application for rehearing; (3) there was prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) the court erred in continuing previously imposed conditions of probation. Appellant has also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus (habeas petition) in which he contends he was provided with ineffective assistance of counsel. We agree with appellant’s fourth contention on appeal and therefore reverse the order continuing previously imposed conditions of probation. In all other respects, we affirm.
The record is inconsistent regarding appellant’s year of birth. Many documents indicate he was born in 1991 rather than 1990. The orders being appealed and the notice of appeal indicate he was born in 1990, and we shall do the same.
On August 18, 2008, we granted appellant’s motion to consolidate his habeas petition with his appeal. We hereby grant appellant’s request, which he made in his habeas petition, that we take judicial notice of the record on appeal.
Factual And Procedural Background
On October 9, 2007, a subsequent wardship petition was filed alleging appellant committed: (1) robbery (Pen. Code, § 211, count one); (2) assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1), count two); (3) driving and taking a vehicle without the consent of the owner and with the intent to deprive the owner of possession of the vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, count three); and (4) unlawfully conspiring with others to commit robbery (Pen. Code, § 182, subd. (a)(1), count four). The petition alleged an enhancement as to count one that appellant committed a violent crime against a vulnerable victim, a 97-year-old deaf woman. The petition alleged that appellant and others got into a stolen car, drove to a senior citizen center, located the victim, got out of the car, pushed the victim, stole the victim’s purse, and fled in the stolen car. The petition requested that in determining appellant’s maximum length of confinement, the court consider prior findings that appellant had previously committed second degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459) and reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103). The same day the petition was filed, the district attorney filed a motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707, subdivision (b), asking the court to find appellant unfit for juvenile court treatment.
The first finding was based on a petition that alleged, among other things, that appellant committed auto burglary. The second finding was based on a petition that alleged that appellant drove recklessly on a highway while fleeing and attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer. The record shows appellant was referred to probation on numerous other occasions for misconduct, including testing positive for marijuana and methamphetamines, being expelled from school, driving without a driver’s license on several occasions, truancy, failing to abide by his curfew, and cutting off an electronic ankle monitor.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
According to a police report, at about 6 p.m. on October 6, 2007, appellant and three other youths drove a stolen car to an area near Oakland Technical High School in Oakland with the intent to rob someone. All four of them got out of the car, and one of them, C.C., hit a 97-year-old woman from behind, pushed her to the ground, and took her purse. The four youths drove away and divided up the stolen money. Appellant, C.C. and another youth were arrested in the stolen car at a gas station. The fourth youth, who was the driver of the car, fled on foot and was arrested later that day. Appellant was identified as, and admitted being, one of the robbers.
According to a probation report, this incident was appellant’s eleventh referral to the probation department. At the time the robbery occurred, appellant was a resident at Camp Sweeney (Camp) and was on a weekend home visit from Camp. He was doing well at Camp, but shortly before his arrest he had received a negative behavior incident report for being involved in a physical altercation with other Camp residents and arguing with Camp staff. The Camp’s acting superintendent believed “it would [not] be a good idea to return [appellant] to Camp because he has not been adequately supervised at home during his weekend home visits, as evidenced by his current circumstances.” She stated appellant’s needs would be better served in a group home at a remote site where he would be more closely supervised for a longer period of time before being allowed to go home for a visit. The probation report recommended placing appellant in a suitable family or group home or private institution.
During an October 7, 2007, recorded interview, appellant waived his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436) and said his friends came by his house in a “newer,” grey, four-door car to pick him up at about 4 or 5 p.m. on the day of the incident. As appellant and three friends drove around, one of his friends, C.C., “talk[ed] about us going to hit a lick,” i.e., committing a robbery, in the Rockridge area of Oakland. They looked for someone to rob for about five minutes. They parked the car and all of them got out. Appellant became “scared” and got back in the car. When C.C. returned to the car with a purse, appellant asked him, “can I get $5?” C.C. gave appellant $10 to split with one of the other friends in the car. Appellant agreed that he and his friends had discussed a “plan,” which was for C.C. to rob someone and return to the car and for the others to “start the car up, then we’d go get it moving.” He also agreed that he and his friends “had talked about going over there and . . . went over in that area to look for somebody to rob.” Appellant said he did not know that the car in which he was riding had been stolen.
A transcript of the recorded interview is attached as an exhibit to appellant’s habeas petition. It is unclear whether the transcript was part of the record below, but the parties do not dispute the authenticity of the transcript or that it accurately reflects what was stated during the interview.
At a hearing on October 25, 2007, appellant admitted he committed robbery (count one). The enhancement as to count one and the remaining counts were dismissed on motion of the prosecutor. At the beginning of a November 8, 2007, dispositional hearing, the court stated it was considering committing appellant to the DJJ. Appellant’s attorney argued against a DJJ commitment, stating appellant “was not the instigator” and “tried to walk away at some point, walked away from the car, made the big mistake by returning to the car.” She argued that appellant “tried to sort of separate himself from the other kids” because “he saw what was happening . . . and the age of the victim really bothered him.” Appellant stated he was about a block away when C.C. took the purse. The victim’s son addressed the court and stated that as a result of being robbed on her “own street,” his mother now lived in fear of being attacked, could not sleep at night, was scared to go outside, and was “see[ing] people . . . over her back” and “imagining them” even though they were not there. He referred to a picture that showed the bruises she sustained and said that he felt a 97-year-old woman should not have to spend the “final parts of her life” in fear. The prosecutor argued for a DJJ commitment and dismissed appellant’s attempt to minimize his involvement in the robbery, stating, “To say [‘]I’m just standing there while someone else did it[’] means absolutely nothing.” Appellant’s attorney stated that although the four youths talked about committing a robbery, there was no discussion regarding targeting a vulnerable victim. She also stated that appellant returned to the car only because “it was his ride.” The following exchange then took place:
“The court: Let me ask you this, okay. Now let’s picture this whole scenario. We have four guys driving in a car that they’ve just stolen where they’ve agreed to steal a car for purposes of going somewhere where there’s old people so they could rob them. Are you trying to tell me that as they drive up it’s not a joint decision to rob this person? One of them says, oh, let’s rob her, and oh, no, no, we’re not going to do that; let’s rob somebody else. I mean, how do you get to the point that you’re making? I don’t get it.
“[Appellant’s attorney]: You said something that I don’t think is actually – you said they decided to go to where old people are to rob them.
“The court: I read that in the police report, that they had made a decision to go to that neighborhood in order to
“[Appellant’s attorney]: Well, that neighborhood has a lot of people walking by from the shopping center across the street, and I don’t think it’s because they were old people. I didn’t read that.
“The court: I got that from a report. [¶] . . . [¶] Not today’s report, one of the police reports.
“[Appellant’s attorney]: My understanding is they didn’t choose the area because there were old people. I think they chose the area because there were a lot of people going shopping that had money right there.
“The court: All right. Let’s assume that that’s correct.
“[Prosecutor]: Judge, it is written. They went there looking for vulnerable people to rob.
“The court: That’s what I remember reading.
“[Prosecutor]: Absolutely. That’s why they went there.
“The court: Well, no, my point is, when they drive up on this person, are they having an argument about whether to rob this particular woman? You know, it’s a joint decision all along. Everything from the start to the finish, to the end, is done together.”
Appellant’s attorney asked the court not to hold appellant to the same level of culpability as his friends. The court ruled: “I’ll find under [section] 734 that his mental and physical condition and qualifications are such that would render it probable he’d benefit from the reformatory educational discipline or other services provided by the Division of Juvenile Justice. [¶] He’s continued a ward, committed to the Division of Juvenile Justice with county pay, and specifically, the anger management that he holds and the victim rights that the Division of Juvenile Justice teaches is extremely appropriate for this young man, and I don’t believe he can get that in any other setting. I also believe that he has shown us by being in camp and then going home and committing a crime on a home visit that he’s not amenable to a non-locked facility for getting the rehabilitation that he needs because camp is not locked and neither would a placement be locked. So based upon that, the Division of Juvenile Justice is the only place that would be appropriate for him to get some further education and rehabilitation prior to becoming an adult.” The court set the maximum confinement period at five years.
Appellant filed an application for rehearing on November 19, 2007, stating: “I believe I am entitled to a new hearing because less restrictive dispositions were recommended by probation, but not duly considered. A referral to ROP or other program was the most appropriate solution. Plus, [appellant] has seen a counselor [and] has participated in drug treatment at Thunder Road. We are attempting to get those records. It appeared the Commissioner was unaware of this history.” The hearing was scheduled for December 18, 2007, and a copy of the notice of the hearing date was mailed to all parties on November 19, 2007.
At the hearing on December 18, 2007, the court noted it could not rule on the application because a reporter’s transcript of the dispositional hearing had not been filed. Appellant’s attorney agreed with the court that it would be “reasonable to put this over a couple of days for [the court] to get the transcript and review it before we come back.” The hearing was rescheduled for December 21, 2007. On December 21, 2007, the court indicated it had received and reviewed the transcript. After a hearing on the merits of the application, the court denied the application.
Discussion
The court did not abuse its discretion in committing appellant to the DJJ.
Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in committing him to the DJJ because it: (a) based its decision on “unreliable and false information”; and (b) failed to make a finding that a DJJ commitment would benefit him, or a finding that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. We conclude there was no error.
A decision of the juvenile court committing a minor to the DJJ will not be reversed absent a clear showing that the trial court abused its discretion in selecting DJJ as the appropriate disposition. (In re George M. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 376, 379.) To show that a lower court abused its discretion, the minor must show the court “exceeded the bounds of reason by making an ‘ “ ‘arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination. . . .’ ’’ ’ [Citation.]” (In re Sabrina H. (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1421.) “ ‘An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision . . . and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Tyrone O. (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 145, 151.) Although the record must demonstrate a probable benefit to the juvenile of DJJ commitment and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives, a DJJ commitment may be considered without previous resort to less restrictive alternatives. (In re Angela M . (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.)
(a) “Unreliable and false information”
Appellant contends the court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process and a fair hearing by relying on “unreliable and false information” that appellant and his co-participants “acted together throughout the robbery” and that they went to a senior citizen center in search of an older, vulnerable person to rob.
The record, including appellant’s admission, shows that although C.C. was the one who attacked the victim and took her purse, all four youths acted together in committing the robbery. After a discussion took place regarding a robbery, appellant did not leave the car, and instead accompanied his friends to an area in Oakland to commit the robbery. Appellant’s attorney argued that appellant was less culpable in part because he began to leave after seeing that the victim was an elderly woman. However, appellant did not leave and acknowledged he was part of a “plan” to “get the car going” as soon as C.C. returned. Further, as soon as C.C. returned to the car with a purse, appellant asked, “can I get $5?” He took the money given to him, thereby sharing in the spoils of the robbery. He fled together with the others in the stolen car and was arrested at a nearby gas station. It was reasonable for the court to state, based on these facts, that appellant acted together with the other youths in committing the robbery.
It appears the court was mistaken when it stated that it had read in “one of the police reports” that appellant and his friends targeted an area in Oakland “where there’s old people.” Although the petition alleged that appellant and his friends went to a senior citizen center searching for a vulnerable victim to rob, the only police report in the record that relates to this incident states that appellant and his friends went to an area near Oakland Technical High School with the intent to rob someone. Further, during his recorded interview, appellant said that C.C. talked about committing a robbery in the Rockridge area of Oakland. Nothing in the record indicates that there are any senior citizen centers located in either of these areas, or that there were any discussions among appellant and his friends regarding going to an area where there are a lot of older residents. Thus, the record does not support the court’s belief and the prosecutor’s statements that appellant and his friends went to a senior citizen center looking for old, vulnerable victims to rob.
Respondent suggests there may have been other police reports that are not in the appellate record that the court and the prosecutor may have read. We will not presume, based on respondent’s speculative statement, that there were other police reports that made reference to the youths targeting an area in Oakland for older, vulnerable victims.
The record does support an inference, as appellant’s attorney argued, that the youths targeted a specific area in Oakland where there are many “shopp[ers] that had money,” which indicates sophistication and planning.
However, the record also does not support appellant’s position that the court’s decision to commit him to the DJJ was error because it was based on this misinformation. The main issues discussed during the dispositional hearing were whether appellant was less culpable than his co-participants and whether the youths acted jointly in committing the crime. Appellant’s attorney disagreed with the court’s statement regarding a senior citizen center, stating instead that “they chose the area because there were a lot of people going shopping that had money right there.” The court responded, “All right. Let’s assume that that’s correct.” After the prosecutor interrupted to say that the youths did in fact look for “vulnerable people to rob,” the court stated, “Well, no, my point is,” and continued to discuss the issue of whether the youths acted jointly “all along.” The above statements reflect the court’s belief that the four youths acted jointly in committing the robbery and that appellant was as culpable as the others, not that all of the youths were collectively more culpable because they went to a certain area in Oakland looking for older, vulnerable victims.
Further, even if the court’s decision to commit appellant to the DJJ was based on the incorrect impression that the group was looking for vulnerable victims, any error was harmless under any standard. In making a dispositional determination, the court “shall consider, in addition to other relevant and material evidence, (1) the age of the minor, (2) the circumstances and gravity of the offense committed by the minor, and (3) the minor’s previous delinquent history. (§ 725.5.) At the time of the dispositional hearing, appellant was 17 years old. The offense involved four youths driving around in a stolen car, looking for someone to rob, and attacking a 97-year-old deaf woman and stealing her purse. Even if there had been no discussion or agreement among the youths to go to a senior citizen center, a senior citizen was, in fact, victimized and suffered greatly as a result. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 4.414(a)(3), 4.421(a)(3) [the “particularly vulnerable” status of a victim is an appropriate sentencing consideration in adult cases]; see In re Alex U. (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 259, 264-266; In re Christian G. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 708, 715 [there is no prohibition to the consideration of this factor in juvenile court].) The offense was, as appellant’s attorney acknowledged, a “heinous” one. Appellant had been referred to the probation department 11 times, and his history included numerous acts of misconduct, including auto burglary, reckless driving, marijuana and methamphetamine use, driving without a license, truancy, failing to abide by his curfew and cutting off an electronic ankle monitor. He was on a weekend home visit from Camp and should have been home instead of committing another crime. Thus, even if the court was mistaken about the youths’ targeting of a certain area of Oakland, and relied on that misinformation in committing appellant to the DJJ, other factors, including appellant’s age, his previous failures on home supervision and his criminal history provided sufficient support for the disposition.
(b) Failure to make certain findings
Appellant also complains that the court failed to make the necessary findings that a DJJ commitment would benefit him and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. However, the court did make these findings. As noted, when rendering its decision, the court stated that appellant’s “mental and physical condition and qualifications are such that [they] would render it probable he’d benefit from the reformatory educational discipline or other services provided by the [DJJ].” The court noted that the DJJ would help appellant address his anger management issues and would teach him about victim’s rights. The court considered less restrictive alternatives by stating that appellant would not be able to receive the benefits of the DJJ in “any other setting” and noting that a non-locked facility would not be appropriate in light of the fact that appellant committed a crime during a home visit from Camp.
Further, the court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. The two most important objectives focused on by juvenile law are: (1) protection and safety of the public; and (2) rehabilitation of the minor through care, treatment and guidance that is consistent with the minor’s best interest, holds him accountable for his behavior, and is appropriate for the circumstances. (§ 202, subds. (a), (b); In re Jimmy P. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1679, 1684.) The rehabilitative value in a DJJ commitment lies not only in the programs offered, but in the punishment inherent in such a commitment. (§ 202, subd. (b), see also In re Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.) Here, based on the factors we have discussed above, including appellant’s age and criminal history and his previous failures on home supervision and at Camp, the court could reasonably find that appellant would benefit from the rehabilitative programs at the DJJ and that a less restrictive alternative would not be appropriate. The fact that appellant was not “adequately supervised at home during his weekend home visits,” had “not yet learned to discipline himself adequately enough to avoid associating with negatively oriented peers,” and had failed to attend “community based programs” while under home supervision also supports the court’s belief that appellant would likely benefit from the structured and supervised environment of the DJJ.
Appellant forfeited his claim that the court erred in failing to rule on his application for rehearing within 20 days.
Appellant contends the court erred in failing to rule on his application for rehearing within 20 days after he submitted the application and that the application should therefore have been granted.
Section 252, under which appellant filed an application for rehearing, provides in part: “If an application for rehearing is not granted, denied, or extended within 20 days following the date of its receipt, it shall be deemed granted. However, the court, for good cause, may extend such period beyond 20 days, but not in any event beyond 45 days, following the date of receipt of the application, at which time the application for rehearing shall be deemed granted unless it is denied within such period.” Here, appellant filed his application for rehearing on November 19, 2007. The hearing on the application was scheduled for December 18, 2007, more than 20 days after November 19, 2007. Appellant argues that because the hearing was scheduled beyond the 20-day period, his application should have been granted by operation of law. Citing People v. Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343 [court determined whether probation should be revoked, after the probation term had expired] for the proposition that a court may determine certain matters even where the time to make that determination has passed, respondent argues the court had authority to continue the hearing after the 20-day period had passed. We need not resolve this issue because appellant forfeited his claim by failing to raise it below.
“Ordinarily, a criminal defendant who does not challenge an assertedly erroneous ruling of the trial court in that court has forfeited his or her right to raise the claim on appeal. [Citations.]” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 880.) “ ‘ “No procedural principle is more familiar to this [c]ourt than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, “may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine it.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pp. 880-881, quoting United States v. Olano (1993) 507 U.S. 725, 731.)
The record shows that the notice of the December 18, 2007, hearing was mailed to appellant’s attorney on November 19, 2007. Thus, appellant was aware the hearing had been scheduled for more than 20 days after the filing of his application, yet he did not object to the hearing date. Further, at the December 18, 2007, hearing, appellant did not object to a continuance of three days to secure the transcript. Appellant did not raise any objections to the hearing date when the parties returned to court on December 21, 2007. On appeal, he does not dispute that he failed to object, and does not contend that this is a claim he should be allowed to raise for the first time on appeal. Because appellant did not object below that more than 20 days had passed since the filing of his application, he has forfeited the claim.
Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.
Perhaps anticipating this court might find forfeiture, appellant argues in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus that his attorney provided him with ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object that more than 20 days had passed since the filing of his application for rehearing. This argument also fails.
To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant must show (1) his counsel’s representation was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and (2) he was prejudiced as a result of his counsel’s deficient performance. (People v. Hamilton (1988) 45 Cal.3d 351, 377.) Prejudice is shown when there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [Citation.]” (In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257.) Because the failure of either prong is fatal to establishing ineffective assistance of counsel, we need not address both prongs if we conclude appellant cannot prevail on one of them. (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 656, superseded in part by statute as stated in Jones v. Superior Court (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1210.) “ ‘In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the [appellant] as a result of the alleged deficiencies.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697.)
Here, even assuming appellant’s attorney’s failure to bring the 20-day deadline to the court’s attention constituted deficient performance, we conclude appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails because he has not shown he was prejudiced. Appellant argues only that the result would have been more favorable to him in that his application for rehearing would have been granted by operation of law and that a new dispositional hearing would have been held. However, he has not shown, and the record does not support the conclusion, that the ultimate result would have been different, i.e., that he would have received a more favorable outcome at a new dispositional hearing. As discussed above, the record contains ample evidence in support of the court’s decision to commit appellant to the DJJ. Appellant has raised no new arguments in connection with his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel to show he would not have been committed to the DJJ if a new dispositional hearing had been held. Thus, he has not shown prejudice.
We also reject appellant’s claim that his attorney was ineffective in “fail[ing] to investigate and to present evidence at disposition to establish the court’s understanding of the facts of the case was wrong.” Appellant complains that his trial attorney apparently failed to review the youths’ taped statements and present evidence from the taped statements showing the youths did not target an area in Oakland “where there’s old people.” In support of his claim, appellant has submitted a declaration from his appellate attorney and a transcript of the taped statements. Neither the declaration nor the transcripts support his position. Appellate counsel’s declaration states: “I . . . spoke with trial counsel about the statements of the boys taped by the police. Defense counsel told me she had no recollection of listening to the boys’ taped statements. She could not say whether she did or did not listen to the taped statements. When I asked to review the statements and asked for access to the taped statements[,] counsel had a difficult time locating the CDs of the statements. I eventually received copies of the CDs from [another minor’s] trial counsel.” The fact that a minor’s trial attorney does not have a specific recollection of reviewing certain evidence in a case she handled some time ago or had difficulty locating the evidence does not show she did not review the evidence or that she “failed to investigate.” Further, although none of the youths said in their taped statements that they targeted an area with older, vulnerable victims, they also were never asked why they went to a specific area in Oakland to commit the robbery. In any event, appellant suffered no prejudice because the court’s mistaken reliance on information relating to the youths targeting an area “where there’s old people” did not affect the outcome of the case.
The declaration does not state when appellate counsel spoke to appellant’s trial attorney but is dated August 8, 2008, many months after the dispositional hearing took place.
We conclude for the same reason that appellant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct fails. Even if appellant were to show the prosecutor committed misconduct by presenting incorrect information to the court regarding the minors’ targeting of a senior citizen center, the outcome of the case would not have been different, and thus, appellant has not shown prejudice.
Conditions of probation
Appellant contends the court erred in continuing the conditions of probation. Respondent concedes, and we agree, there was error.
Once a minor is committed to the DJJ, supervision of the child’s rehabilitation is a function for the DJJ, not the juvenile court. (In re Allen N. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 513, 515.) Thus, once a minor is committed to the DJJ, “the imposition of probationary conditions constitutes an impermissible attempt by the juvenile court to be a secondary body governing the minor’s rehabilitation.” (Id. at p. 516; see also In re Owen E. (1979) 23 Cal.3d 398, 403-405; In re Antoine D. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1314, 1325.) The court erred in continuing the conditions of probation after it committed appellant to the DJJ.
Appellant contends the cumulative effect of the alleged errors raised in this appeal denied his right to a fair hearing. In light of our conclusion that the court did not commit error, with the exception of its order continuing the conditions of probation, we also conclude that reversal on the ground of cumulative error is not warranted.
Disposition
The dispositional order shall be amended to strike the order continuing the previously imposed conditions of probation. The juvenile court shall send an amended commitment order to the Department of Juvenile Justice. In all other respects, the dispositional and commitment orders are affirmed.
We concur: Pollak, J. Siggins, J.