Opinion
NO. COA11-112 Buncombe County No. 04 JA 231
08-16-2011
IN THE MATTER OF: J.H-S.
Charlotte W. Nallan for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Department of Social Services. Michael N. Tousey for Guardian ad Litem. Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender J. Lee Gilliam, for respondent-appellant mother.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Appeal by respondent-mother from adjudication order entered 15 September 2010 and disposition order entered 21 October 2010 by Judge Rebecca B. Knight in Buncombe County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 August 2011.
Charlotte W. Nallan for petitioner-appellee Buncombe County Department of Social Services.
Michael N. Tousey for Guardian ad Litem.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender J. Lee Gilliam, for respondent-appellant mother.
ERVIN, Judge.
Respondent-Mother Joan M. H.-S. appeals from adjudication and disposition orders finding J.H-S. to be an abused and neglected juvenile and granting Respondent-Father Raymond H.-S. sole custody of J.H-S. On appeal, Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court erred by making factual findings based on its own recollection of relevant events; finding that Jason was an abused juvenile on the basis of circumstances not alleged in the juvenile petition filed by the Buncombe County Department of Social Services, findings of fact that lacked adequate evidentiary support, and findings of fact that failed to support the trial court's determination; and ordering Respondent-Mother to admit that she had abused Jason. After careful consideration of Respondent-Mother's challenges to the trial court's orders in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that no prejudicial error occurred in connection with the entry of the trial court's orders and that the trial court's orders should be affirmed.
We will refer to J.H.-S. throughout the remainder of this opinion as "Jason," which is a pseudonym used for ease of reading and to protect the juvenile's privacy.
I. Factual Background
Respondent-Father is the biological father of Jason, who was born in July 1999. Respondent-Mother, who married Respondent-Father in 2005, is Jason's adoptive mother. DSS became involved with the family on 9 April 2009 after receiving a report that Jason had significant mental and emotional issues; that the family was not addressing those issues in an appropriate manner; and that Respondent-Mother was using inappropriate discipline techniques to deal with Jason's enuresis and unwillingness to eat.
After substantiating this report, DSS transferred the case from Social Worker Selena Saucier to Social Worker Erica Gillis and provided in-home services. Respondent-Father and Jason moved out of the family home in late April. DSS referred Jason to therapist Lois Bernard, requested that Jason obtain a medical examination, and requested Respondent-Mother to obtain a psychological evaluation.
Respondent-Mother began therapy with clinical psychologist Dr. Jay Fine in May 2009 and obtained a psychological evaluation from Dr. Robert D. McDonald in July 2009. According to Dr. McDonald, Respondent-Mother exhibited signs of Histrionic Personality Disorder with Narcissistic Traits. Ms. Bernard, who started therapy sessions with Jason in July 2009, recommended that there be no contact between Respondent-Mother and Jason until Respondent-Mother "can engage in therapy sessions during which she accepts responsibility for the emotional harm she has done to the minor child." Upon learning of Ms. Bernard's recommendation, Respondent-Father decided that Jason would receive therapy from Dr. Fine rather than Ms. Bernard because "Ms. Bernard's recommendations were damaging to his family."
On 27 August 2009, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that Jason was a neglected and abused juvenile. In its petition, DSS alleged that it would be very damaging to Jason in the event that Jason no longer received therapy from Ms. Bernard on the grounds that he made more improvements while working with her than he had made while working with other therapists and that, by changing therapists, Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Father "continue to avoid any responsibility for the way they have damaged their child, or to acknowledge their own mental health issues." As a result of the fact that Jason was living with Respondent-Father, DSS did not make any effort to take custody of the child.
On 20 January 2010, Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Father entered into a Consent Order in a parallel civil case initiated by Respondent-Mother. According to the Consent Order, Jason was to continue receiving therapy from Dr. Fine, with there to be no visitation or any other contact between Jason and Respondent-Mother in the absence of a recommendation from Dr. Fine. The Consent Order noted that DSS had voluntarily dismissed the juvenile petition without prejudice "on the condition that the parties fully comply with the court's orders[.]"
Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Father came before the trial court on 22 February 2010 for the purpose of obtaining a modification of the Consent Order in light of Dr. Fine's opinion that Jason should begin to undergo therapy jointly with Respondent-Mother. In the modified Consent Order, the trial court stated that "[Respondent-Mother] may participate in [Jason's] therapy and be involved in therapeutic visitation with [him] as recommended by the child's therapist, Dr. Jay Fine." Dr. Fine discontinued Respondent-Mother's involvement in Jason's therapy in March 2010 after Respondent-Mother repeatedly behaved in an inappropriate manner. Although Dr. Fine continued to provide Jason with individual therapy, he released the child from therapy on 10 May 2010 in part because he "was doing so well at home" and "at school."
Another modification to the Consent Order was approved on 19 May 2010. According to the modified Consent Order, Dr. Dan Cogswell would be Jason's therapist. Respondent-Mother was supposed to participate in the resulting therapeutic process, which was characterized as "mother/child" therapy. The modified Consent Order also provided that Respondent-Mother and Respondent-Father had agreed that Jason "would benefit from weekly visits with mother at this time."
On 21 June 2010, DSS filed another petition alleging that Jason was an abused and neglected juvenile. In its petition, DSS alleged that the 19 May 2010 modified Consent Order undermined the progress that Jason made under Dr. Fine's care and that "[t]here [was] no reason for [Jason] to be in therapy at [that] time as long as he ha[d] no contact with the [R]espondent-[M]other." In addition, DSS alleged that Respondent-Father had refused to sign a release of information permitting Ms. Gillis to speak with Dr. Cogswell concerning Jason's therapy. Once again, DSS refrained from taking Jason into its custody because he was residing with Respondent-Father.
The issues raised by the DSS petition came on for hearing before the trial court in August 2010. After hearing the parties' evidence, the trial court adjudicated Jason an abused and neglected juvenile. The trial court held the necessary dispositional hearing on 15 September 2010. At the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the trial court found that it was in Jason's best interest that sole custody be granted to Respondent-Father and that Jason not visit or have any contact with Respondent-Mother. Respondent-Mother noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's adjudication and dispositional orders.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Findings Based on Events Within Trial Court's Knowledge In her first challenge to the trial court's orders, Respondent-Mother argues that the trial judge erred by making factual findings based on its own recollection of specific events occurring during the hearing of the issues raised by the DSS petition. More specifically, Respondent-Mother challenges the trial court's finding that:
40. The respondent mother behaved in a very inappropriate manner during these proceedings. Twice she put social worker Gillis in fear of an assault. While Ms. Gillis was walking in a crosswalk to enter the courthouse the respondent mother drove her car up to Ms. Gillis and stopped it just before contacting Ms. Gillis and placing her in reasonable fear of being run over. She then waved her arms in a frantic, irrational manner. Later that day the social worker waited an extra thirty minutes after court was concluded before she left the courthouse in order to avoid the respondent mother and was accosted by the respondent mother who had parked her car near Ms. Gillis' car and jumped out and said "smile" "say cheese" while she was taking pictures of Ms. Gillis. The court notes she previously had taken pictures of the minor child in the therapist's office over the child's objections. The court entered a restraining order to prohibit stalking, assaultive and threatening behavior. The respondent mother had previously verbally abused and intimidated Ms. Gillis in a Child and Family Team meeting even with a neutral facilitator present.Respondent-Mother argues that the challenged finding of fact was made in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 605, which provides that "[t]he judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness" and that the trial court's error was prejudicial because "the trial court significantly relied on its own observations that [Respondent-Mother] is 'aggressive' and 'hostile' in reaching the conclusion that she was likely to abuse Jason in the future." We do not find Respondent-Mother's argument persuasive.
The respondent mother also intimidated and frightened one of the minor child's teachers, Wendy Barnes, when she approached her in front of the courthouse and asked her questions about Ms. Barnes' court case with DSS involving Ms. Barnes' child. Ms. Barnes informed her she had no court cases with DSS and that her daughter was a college student in California. Ms. Barnes felt threatened and intimidated and that her character had been attacked by the suggestion she had abused or neglected her own child.
The respondent mother was admonished by the court for making statements to two witnesses as they were leaving the witness stand that, in the court's opinion, were sarcastic and intimidating. The distance from the witnesses to the respondent mother when the statements were made was approximately 10 feet.
The court further observed the respondent mother's demeanor in court and noted a consistent pattern of long stares at attorneys, witnesses, court personal [sic] and the undersigned. The expression on her face was intensive and harsh and it appeared as if she were trying to intimidate people.
The respondent mother approached the undersigned from behind while the undersigned was waiting for an elevator outside the courtroom and started talking in a low voice over her left shoulder. It was very inappropriate to attempt to initiate the conversation with the trial judge and the content of her inquiry was inappropriate unless perhaps speaking with a close and personal friend. The bailiff ended the discussion and the court reported the ex parte communication to counsel on the record.
The above aggressive, hostile behavior and inability to respect reasonable boundaries is consistent with the respondent mother's statements, evaluation and the testimony of numerous witnesses. The respondent mother intimidates or attempts to intimidate adults when it is clearly contrary to her interests to do so. For example, she should expect the social worker to report her actions outside the courthouse and during the trial and she should know Dr. Fine couldn't provide her therapy if she couldn't follow simple rules. Yet, she either can't stop herself or won't stop herself and that makes the present risk of
continued emotional abuse and neglect of the minor child very high.
As we understand the record, the majority of the challenged finding does not rest upon or constitute testimony by the trial judge. On the contrary, the record clearly reflects that the trial court admonished Respondent-Mother for making inappropriate comments to witnesses and that Respondent-Mother's behavior at the hearing was a source of concern. The vast majority of the information set out in Finding of Fact No. 40 simply memorializes Respondent-Mother's conduct at the trial in a manner that is fully consistent with the record. In addition, the trial court's findings concerning Respondent-Mother's attitude and demeanor were based on the trial court's observation of Respondent-Mother's conduct in the courtroom and were well within permissible bounds. See In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 441, 473 S.E.2d 393, 399 (1996) (holding that "any of the findings of fact regarding the demeanor of any of the witnesses are properly left to the determination of the trial judge, since she had the opportunity to observe the witnesses"); State v. Harvey, 78 N.C. App. 235, 239, 336 S.E.2d 857, 860 (1985) (citation omitted) (stating that "[t]he principle is well-settled that evaluating the credibility and demeanor of a witness is a matter peculiarly reserved to the trier of fact."). As a result, the vast majority of the information set out in Finding of Fact No. 40 did not stem from or evidence any legal error on the part of the trial court.
We do, however, find that the trial court erred in making that portion of Finding of Fact No. 40 relating to out-of-court contact between the trial court and Respondent-Mother. As we have already noted, the trial court found that Respondent-Mother approached the trial judge at an elevator and attempted to engage her in conversation. The trial court found that it was "very inappropriate to attempt to initiate the conversation with the trial judge and the content of her inquiry was inappropriate unless perhaps speaking with a close and personal friend." This portion of Finding of Fact No. 40 involves an error of law because the underlying information does not, despite the trial court's suggestion to the contrary, appear at any point in the record. In the absence of information concerning the contents of Respondent-Mother's "inappropriate" inquiry, the propriety of her conduct and the appropriateness of the trial court's finding is not subject to meaningful appellate review. As a result, we conclude that the trial court erred by making that portion of Finding of Fact No. 40 referring to Respondent-Mother's contact with the trial court. However, we further conclude that the trial court's error was harmless given the much larger amount of information concerning Respondent-Mother's conduct during the hearing that the trial court properly included in the challenged finding of fact and our belief that the trial court would have reached the same ultimate conclusion had the erroneous portion of Finding of Fact. No. 40 not been made.
B. Evidence Outside the Parameters of the Petition
Secondly, Respondent-Mother contends that the trial court erred by finding that she was "aggressive and hostile towards outsiders" on the grounds that no such conduct was alleged in the petition, depriving her of "notice that [such contentions] would be part of her trial." We do not find Respondent-Mother's argument to be meritorious.
In Finding of Fact No. 28, the trial court found that "[R]espondent[-M]other can be aggressive and bullying with others in a socially inappropriate way." Similarly, the trial court stated in Finding of Fact No. 45 that Respondent-Mother had "exhibited bullying behavior" in Jason's presence. According to the trial court, Respondent-Mother's behavior "created an intimidating environment" and "provided an undesirable example of how an adult should act towards others." The trial court made similar factual findings relating to Respondent-Mother's interactions with Dr. Fine and Ms. Gillis. According to Respondent-Mother, the trial court erred by making these factual findings because she was "blind-sided" due to the absence of any allegations in the DSS petition to the effect that she exhibited hostility and aggression towards outsiders.
According to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-402(a), a petition alleging abuse, neglect or dependency "shall contain the name, date of birth, address of the juvenile, the name and last known address of the juvenile's parent, guardian, or custodian, and allegations of facts sufficient to invoke jurisdiction over the juvenile." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-402(a). As this Court has stated:
[T]he Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to Chapter 7B proceedings. Rule 8 requires that a pleading contain "[a] short and plain statement of the claim sufficiently particular to give the court and the parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]" Under the liberal standard of noticeIn Re L.T.R. and J.M.R., 181 N.C. App. 376, 389, 639 S.E.2d 122, 130 (2007) (citations omitted). In its petition, DSS alleged that "[t]he minor child has consistently shown a reluctance to be around the respondent mother and he is consistent that he is fearful of her." In addition, DSS mentioned the opinion of Dr. John J. Carter, Jr., who noted that Respondent-Mother "appears to be very hostile." As a result, we conclude that Respondent-Mother was given adequate notice that her attitude and demeanor toward others and their effect on Jason would be at issue at the adjudication hearing.
pleading, a claim is adequate if it gives sufficient notice of the events that produced the claim to enable the adverse party to understand the complaint's nature and basis and to file a responsive pleading.
C. Evidentiary Support for the Trial Court's Factual Findings
Thirdly, Respondent-Mother contends that several of the factual findings contained in the trial court's adjudication order lacked adequate evidentiary support. In reviewing a trial court's adjudication of neglect and abuse, this Court must determine "(1) whether the findings of fact are supported by 'clear and convincing evidence,' and (2) whether the legal conclusions are supported by the findings of fact[.]" In Re T.H.T., 185 N.C. App. 337, 343, 648 S.E.2d 519, 523 (2007), aff'd as modified, 362 N.C. 446, 665 S.E.2d 54 (2008) (citations omitted). As a result, the critical question that must be addressed in connection with each of the challenged factual findings is whether they have adequate record support. After carefully reviewing Respondent-Mother's challenges to the trial court's findings in light of the applicable standard of review, we conclude that none of Respondent-Mother's challenges to the trial court's factual findings justify an award of appellate relief.
1. Adoption Date
In Finding of Fact No. 7, the trial court found that the Respondent-Mother "adopted the minor child sometime in 2008." On the other hand, Respondent-Mother claims that the record evidence demonstrates that Jason's adoption occurred in 2005. According to Respondent-Mother, "[t]his fact is important because the record shows that [Respondent-Mother] made significant investments into her adopted child's well-being for four years before DSS became involved in the case." Although the recitation of the wrong date of adoption in the trial court's adjudication order constitutes an error of law, we believe, given other statements in the adjudication order, that the trial court was aware that Respondent-Mother's relationship with and "investment" in Jason began prior to 2008. As a result, we do not believe that this deficiency in the trial court's order prejudiced Defendant in any way.
2. Compliance with Treatment Recommendations
In Findings of Fact Nos. 18, 19, 31 and 41, the court discussed the identity of the various therapists and treatment providers who were engaged for the purpose of assisting Jason and the "family's lack of follow through with recommended family therapy[.]" The trial court found that "[R]espondent[-M]other manipulates and controls the family by constantly changing treatment providers when they confront and challenge her behaviors." In spite of Respondent-Mother's argument to the contrary, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the challenged findings.
The record demonstrates that Jason received therapy from Rudy Rodriguez beginning 15 September 2008. However, the therapy provided by Mr. Rodriquez was discontinued by Respondent-Father and Respondent-Mother on 17 November 2008. Although Respondent-Father and Respondent-Mother claimed to have discontinued Jason's work with Mr. Rodriquez for financial reasons instead of dissatisfaction with his work, Mr. Rodriguez noted that their implementation of his advice was "short lived." Dr. Cogswell, a clinical psychologist who had treated the juvenile while employed by the Pisgah Institute during 2005 and 2006, testified that Respondent-Father and Respondent-Mother discontinued Jason's therapy with him in 2006. In addition, Dr. Cogswell testified that Respondent-Mother would "stray" from Jason's treatment plans. On 17 March 2009, Dr. Carter noted that Respondent-Father and Respondent-Mother had "not pursued family therapy as recommended previously." Moreover, Finding of Fact No. 24, which Respondent-Mother has not challenged on appeal, details the hiring and firing of Ms. Bernard as a result of Respondent-Mother's disagreement with Ms. Bernard's conclusion that Respondent-Mother had emotionally abused Jason. The trial court found that the decision to terminate Jason's therapy with Ms. Bernard was "contrary to the minor child's welfare[.]" As a result, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court's determination that Respondent-Mother changed Jason's treatment providers on more than one occasion, that the family failed to follow through with recommended therapeutic options, and that these interruptions in therapy often stemmed from Respondent-Mother's disagreements with the treatment providers, a fact which adequately supports the trial court's finding that "[R]espondent[-M]other manipulates and controls the family by constantly changing treatment providers when they confront and challenge her behavior."
3. Conduct Relating to Dr. Fine
In Finding of Fact No. 26, the trial court found that Respondent-Mother "was extremely aggressive and intimidating with Dr. Fine[.]" Dr. Fine testified that he had to discontinue therapy with the family on several occasions for various reasons, including Respondent-Mother's failure to respect proper boundaries, as evidenced by the fact that Respondent-Mother secretly taped therapy sessions; that Respondent-Mother made baseless reports of alleged ethical violations by Dr. Fine to the North Carolina Psychology Board; that Respondent-Mother directed profane language to Dr. Fine; and that Respondent-Mother called Dr. Fine on his cellphone or his beeper in the absence of any emergency. As a result, we conclude, that the trial court had ample basis for finding that Respondent-Mother was "extremely aggressive and intimidating" towards Dr. Fine.
4. Appropriateness of Respondent-Mother's Parenting Methods
In Finding of Fact No. 29, the trial court found that Respondent-Mother "sincerely believes forcing food down [Jason's] throat or parading his soiled pants was good parenting." Similar findings regarding force feeding and exhibiting Jason's wet pants appear in Findings of Fact Nos. 38 and 42. On appeal, Respondent-Mother contends that the record is devoid of any evidence tending to show that she "forced" food down Jason's throat, "paraded his soiled pants," or thought that such actions constituted good parenting. However, Ms. Saucier testified that Jason told her that Respondent-Mother "would force feed him with a spoon until the point that it hurt [and] would give him a set amount of time to consume his food. If the food was not consumed in that period of time, then he would receiv[e] a spanking." A number of other witnesses also testified that Respondent-Mother forced Jason to eat. Additionally, Respondent-Mother has not challenged the trial court's finding that, after Jason wet his pants in school, Respondent-Mother "returned [Jason] to his classroom and lifted his shirt to show the teacher his wet pants" and that Respondent-Mother "acknowledged that there may have been peers around and she could have been talking loud enough that they heard." Although Respondent-Mother complains about the trial court's statement that Jason "soiled," rather than "wet," his pants, we conclude that "soiled" as used in the trial court's order can readily be understood as a reference to Jason's difficulties with enuresis. In addition, while "paraded" may not be the best description of Respondent-Mother's actions given the contents of the evidentiary record, the record clearly contains evidence tending to show that Respondent-Mother displayed Jason's wet pants in front of his classmates, resulting in considerable embarrassment to the child. Finally, the record clearly reflects that Respondent-Mother believed she was furthering Jason's best interests by forcing him to eat. For example, Dr. McDonald testified that Respondent-Mother told him" that force-feeding [Jason] was the right thing to do because he wouldn't eat properly otherwise[.]" Thus, these findings have ample record support.
5. Blame for Marital Stress
In Finding of Fact No. 38, the trial court stated that:
The respondent parents were under tremendous stress in their relationship and instead of accepting responsibility for their issues the family dynamic was to put all the blame and shame on the minor child.Similarly, in Finding of Fact No. 46, the trial court found that Jason was often "placed in the middle of his parents' marital controversies." Although the trial court's reference to the placing of "shame" on Jason due to his parent's marital discord may constitute an overstatement, the record contains ample evidence tending to show that Respondent-Father and Respondent-Mother blamed Jason for their marital difficulties and put him in the middle of their disputes. On 4 January 2006, Dr. Cogswell noted that Jason's "increased impulsivity and pressured hyperactivity" had "coincided with recent parental conflict which, admitted to by both parents, is overt and intense." On 30 May 2006, Respondent-Mother admitted resenting the fact that she had to "manage" Jason alone, an attitude "which is manifested in her contacts with [Jason], to which he is also responding negatively." On 11 September 2006, Dr. Cogswell noted that Jason was "clearly caught in the middle of [the marital] conflict." On 16 October 2006, Dr. Carter reported improvement in the marital relationship between Respondent-Father and Respondent-Mother. Respondent-Mother attributed this improvement "to the fact that [Jason] is having less problems." On 4 December 2006, Dr. Carter noted Respondent-Mother's admission that Jason's "behavior problems cause[] conflict between parents." On 14 November 2007, Dr. Carter noted Respondent-Father's and Respondent-Mother's report that Jason's "medication is not working. This is causing stress at home. It is affecting their marriage adversely." As a result, there is ample record support for the challenged factual findings.
6. Aggressive and Punitive Conduct
In Finding of Fact No. 41, the trial court found that Respondent-Mother is "consistently aggressive, hostile and unreasonably punitive to" Jason. In Finding of Fact No. 42, the trial court found that Respondent-Mother "subjected [Jason] to verbal abuse, intimidation, bullying threats and hostile behavior." In her brief, Respondent-Mother contends that the words "aggressive," "hostile," "unreasonably," "abuse," "intimidation," and "bullying" represent conclusions rather than factual statements. According to well-established North Carolina law, however, the trial court is required to find the ultimate facts needed to support its conclusions of law. In re Harton, 156 N.C. App. 655, 660, 577 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2003) (citation omitted). Although the trial court's descriptions of Respondent-Mother's demeanor and behavior may not constitute verbatim restatements of evidence adduced at the hearing, we conclude that the challenged findings accurately reflect the evidence concerning Respondent-Mother's conduct and have ample record support.
7. Worst Person
Finally, the trial court stated in Finding of Fact No. 42 that Respondent-Mother told Jason he was the "worst person." As Respondent-Mother notes, the relevant portions of the record demonstrate that Jason, rather than Respondent-Mother, referred to Jason as the "worst person." Simply put, there is no evidence that Respondent-Mother made a statement of the nature described in the challenged finding in Jason's presence. We do not, however, believe that the trial court's error had any appreciable impact on the outcome, since, as is discussed more fully below, the record contains ample support for the trial court's conclusion that Jason was an abused juvenile without giving any consideration to the trial court's erroneous finding.
D. Finding of Abuse
Thirdly, Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court's findings of fact do not support the adjudication of abuse. In essence, Respondent-Mother contends that the evidence and findings of fact do not support a conclusion that Jason suffered from "severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior toward himself or others." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1)(3). We disagree.
An "abused juvenile" is defined in part in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) as one whose parent inflicts upon the juvenile serious physical injury by other than accidental means, uses upon the juvenile cruel or grossly inappropriate procedures to modify behavior, or "[c]reates or allows to be created serious emotional damage to the juvenile; serious emotional damage is evidenced by a juvenile's severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or aggressive behavior toward himself or others." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1). In order for the trial court to properly conclude that Jason suffered serious emotional damage as a result of the treatment he received at the hands of Respondent-Mother, there must be evidence of "severe anxiety" or "depression" or "withdrawal" or "aggressive behavior toward himself or others." Id.; see Powers v. Powers, 130 N.C. App. 37, 42, 502 S.E.2d 398, 401, disc. review denied, 349 N.C. 530, 526 S.E.2d 180 (1998) (holding that the trial court's findings amply supported a determination of abuse where one juvenile " exhibited symptoms of depression and had entertained suicidal thoughts" and a second juvenile suffered from "severe anxiety"). Contrary to the argument advanced in Respondent-Mother's brief, the applicable law simply does not require that the "depression," "withdrawal," or "aggressive behavior" be severe.
In its adjudication order, the trial court found that Respondent-Mother publically humiliated Jason; was "consistently aggressive, hostile and unreasonably punitive toward him[;]" "mistreated [Jason] by unnecessarily and inappropriately force feeding him[;]" and "subjected [Jason] to verbal abuse, intimidation, bullying threats and hostile behavior." Moreover, the trial court found that Jason suffered from "self-destructive behavior and withdrawal" as the result of Respondent-Mother's actions. As a result, we conclude that the trial court's findings of fact adequately support its determination that Jason was an abused juvenile as defined in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1).
E. Acknowledgement of Abuse
Finally, Respondent-Mother argues that the trial court erred by requiring her to "acknowledge[] that she has emotionally abused the minor child" in the dispositional order. Respondent-Mother contends that, because DSS did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that she abused Jason, the trial court lacked the authority to order her to acknowledge that she had abused the child. Aside from the fact that we have upheld the trial court's determination that Respondent-Mother had abused Jason, we note that the trial court never ordered Respondent-Mother to admit having abused Jason in its dispositional order. Although DSS recommended that Respondent-Mother be ordered to acknowledge having abused Jason as part of the disposition that the trial court ordered, the trial court never incorporated any such requirement in its dispositional order. Instead, the trial court simply ordered Respondent-Mother to "engage in individual therapy to address her bullying and intimidating behaviors towards the minor child[.]" As a result, Respondent-Mother's final challenge to the trial court's orders lacks merit.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the trial court's adjudication and dispositional orders are free from prejudicial error. As a result, the trial court's adjudication and dispositional orders should be, and hereby are, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).