Opinion
Case No. 20020022-CA.
FILED December 27, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)
Second District Juvenile, Farmington Department, The Honorable Diane W. Wilkins.
Attorneys: Aric Cramer, Bountiful, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Christine Soltis, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
J.G. appeals his conviction of theft by deception, a class A misdemeanor. J.G. argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over him because the State presented no evidence that the crime occurred within Davis County, Utah.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-104 states that "the juvenile court has exclusive original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning
. . . a minor who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal ordinance . . ., regardless of where the violation occurred, excluding traffic laws and boating and ordinances." Id. § 78-3a-104(1)(a) (2002). J.G. was charged with violating a state law while a minor; thus, the juvenile court had jurisdiction over him. J.G. also argues that no evidence concerning the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was presented. We disagree. The trial court verified that J.G. was a minor prior to beginning the trial. Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-118 (2002) provides that a trial court need not make findings of fact in the record to evidence jurisdiction in cases "within the provision of Subsection 78-3a-104(1)." Id. § 78-3a-118(1)(a).
Most importantly, while J.G. argues that the State should have presented evidence that the crime occurred within Davis County, he does not argue that the crime occurred outside of Utah. Thus, we conclude that J.G.'s claim, that the juvenile court lacked "jurisdiction," is more properly viewed as a claim that venue was improper in Davis County. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-111 (2002) sets forth the venue rules for juvenile proceedings and provides that "[p]roceedings in minor's cases shall be commenced in the court of the district in which the minor is living or is found, or in which an alleged violation of law or ordinance occurred."Id. § 78-3a-111(1). The default rule is that juvenile proceedings are heard in the venue where the juvenile resides. See Utah R. Juv. P. 16 (providing, generally, that juvenile delinquency cases are to be heard in the county where the juvenile resides).
J.G. argues that the State failed to prove that venue was proper in Davis County. We disagree. The State introduced evidence from which the trial court could have reasonably concluded that J.G. resided in Davis County. For example, the theft was reported to, and investigated by, the Woods Cross Police Department. The witness who informed S.S. that J.G. had possession of certain stolen compact discs resided within Davis County. The petition and other court documents recited that J.G.'s custodial parent resided in Davis County. See State v. Mitchell, 3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618, 620 (1955) (noting that venue may be shown "inferentially by circumstantial evidence"). This is sufficient evidence from which to conclude that J.G. resided in Davis County and that venue was proper.
J.G. next argues that his inculpatory statements should have been excluded pursuant to the corpus delicti rule.
The corpus delicti rule states that a person may not be convicted of a crime if no independent evidence, outside of the defendant's own [inculpatory] statement, exists. To satisfy the doctrine, the State must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injury or harm specified in the crime occurred and that the injury or harm was caused by someone's criminal activity.
State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1241 n. 23 (Utah 1993). J.G. claims that his inculpatory statements provided the only evidence that a crime had been committed. We are unpersuaded. S.S. testified that he left a bag containing seventy compact discs in the back of J.G.'s truck and that when he sought to retrieve the bag he was told by J.G., in a non-inculpatory statement, that the bag had been stolen by a third-party. S.S.'s claim, when coupled with J.G.'s non-inculpatory statement, provides sufficient evidence to conclude that a crime occurred, therefore, J.G.'s corpus delicti argument is without merit.
J.G. next claims that the State failed to make a prima facie case of theft by deception. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999), "[a] person commits theft [by deception] if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof." Id. § 76-6-405(1). J.G. argues that he did not commit theft by deception because "[t]here is no evidence . . . that J.G. induced S.S. to leave the CDs in the truck." J.G. argues that this means the deception did not occur simultaneously with the theft. See State v. Doe, 825 P.2d 681, 686 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (noting "that the use of the present tense in § 76-6-401(5)(a) limits the section's application to impressions of fact that are false `when the defendant created or confirmed the impression for the purpose of affecting the judgment of another in the transaction'" (citation omitted)). This claim is also without merit.
S.S. testified that he left a bag containing seventy compact discs in J.G.'s truck and that he called J.G. the next day to retrieve the bag and was told by J.G. that the bag had been stolen by a third party. J.G. testified that he relied upon J.G.'s claim and did not pursue the matter further until he learned from a friend that J.G. had some of his compact discs. Based upon this testimony, the trial court could have concluded that J.G. deceived S.S. into believing the bag was stolen by a third party so as to obscure his theft of the bag. This evidence is sufficient to satisfy the element of deception. Also, there was sufficient evidence from which the trial court could conclude that the theft occurred simultaneously with J.G.'s deceit of S.S. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401(5)(a) (1999) (defining "deception" as creating an impression of fact that is false and that the speaker does not believe to be true so as to "affect the judgment of another").
Accordingly, we affirm.
WE CONCUR: Judith M. Billings, Associate Presiding Judge, and Gregory K. Orme, Judge.