Opinion
(AC 32132)
The petitioner appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her neglect petition, in which she sought an adjudication that she was a neglected and uncared-for youth. Although the petition was filed when the petitioner was seventeen, the trial did not occur until approximately five weeks after she reached the age of eighteen. She claimed that the trial court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition and that it lacked statutory authority to order a retroactive commitment. Held that the trial court properly dismissed the neglect petition for lack of jurisdiction; even though the petition was filed when the petitioner was seventeen and the jurisdiction of the trial court did not cease merely because the petitioner reached the age of eighteen, the petitioner failed to establish the factual predicate required for jurisdiction pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46b-129 [j]), and there was no statutory authority for a retroactive commitment.
Argued September 22, 2010
Officially released December 21, 2010
Petition by a minor child to adjudicate the minor child neglected and uncared for, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Matters, where the court, Dannehy, J., granted the motion to intervene filed by the department of children and families; thereafter, the matter was transferred to the Child Protection Session at Middletown; subsequently, the court, Olear, J., granted the intervenor's motion to dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which the petitioner appealed to this court; thereafter, the court, Olear, J., granted the petitioner's motion for rectification of the record. Affirmed.
Sarah Healy Eagan, with whom was Stacey Violante Cote, for the appellant (petitioner).
Valeria Caldwell-Gaines, for the appellee (respondent mother).
Mary-Anne Z. Mulholland, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were Richard Blumenthal, attorney general, and Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (intervenor).
Opinion
The petitioner, Jessica M., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her petition seeking to have herself adjudicated as neglected and as an uncared-for youth, filed pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-129 (a). On appeal, Jessica claims that the court improperly determined that (1) it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition, (2) it lacked statutory authority to order a retroactive commitment, (3) the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply and (4) the capable of repetition yet evading review exception to the mootness doctrine did not apply. On the basis of our decision in In re Jose B., 125 Conn. App. 572, A.3d (2010), which we also release today, we conclude that Jessica failed to establish the factual predicate for the court's statutory jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing Jessica's petition.
The following facts and procedural history are necessary for our discussion. On November 5, 2009, then seventeen year old Jessica filed a petition in the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters in Hartford, alleging that she was neglected and uncared for as defined by General Statutes § 46b-120. On December 17, 2009, the department of children and families (department) successfully moved to intervene in the proceedings. The court also set a trial date of January 4, 2010, which was prior to Jessica's eighteenth birthday.
On January 15, 2010, Jessica filed an amended summary of facts in support of the neglect petition. Specifically, she alleged that her father had abandoned her and that her mother had lived at a different residence for the past two years and had not provided Jessica with financial or other support. Jessica also alleged that she had been diagnosed with major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder and was at great risk of injuring herself.
Because the commissioner of children and families acts on behalf of the department of children and families, references in this opinion to the department include the commissioner.
On that date, the court continued the matter due to (1) Jessica's failure to arrange for interpreters for two witnesses and (2) its granting of a motion in limine filed by the department. The court, on its own motion, transferred the case to the Child Protection Session in Middletown. Although a second trial date before Jessica's eighteenth birthday was offered, counsel for Jessica's mother was unavailable for that day. A trial date was scheduled for February 26, 2010, approximately five weeks after Jessica had reached the age of eighteen.
On January 13, 2010, Jessica's mother filed a motion to strike or dismiss the neglect petition. See footnote 7 of this opinion.
General Statutes § 1-1d provides in relevant part: "Except as otherwise provided by statute . . . the terms `minor', `infant' and `infancy' shall be deemed to refer to a person under the age of eighteen years and any person eighteen years of age or over shall be an adult for all purposes whatsoever and have the same legal capacity, rights, powers, privileges, duties, liabilities and responsibilities as persons heretofore had at twenty-one years of age, and `age of majority' shall be deemed to be eighteen years."
On February 5, 2010, the department filed a motion to dismiss the petition. It argued that the court, specifically, the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters, lacked jurisdiction over adults, individuals over the age of seventeen. The department further claimed that the court lacked statutory authority to adjudicate an individual over the age of seventeen as neglected or uncared for, even if the petition had been filed prior to the individual's eighteenth birthday. Last, the department argued that Jessica's petition was moot.
The court heard oral argument on the motion to dismiss and issued its memorandum of decision on March 16, 2010. The court concluded that it lost subject matter jurisdiction and that the matter had become moot as of Jessica's "ceasing to be a child or youth." Additionally, it stated that because the court was unable to issue any order committing Jessica to the custody of the department, or transferring guardianship over her to another person, the case was moot and no exception to that doctrine applied. Accordingly, the court granted the department's motion to dismiss the neglect and uncared-for petition. This appeal followed.
General Statutes § 46b-120 provides in relevant part: "(1) `Child' means any person under sixteen years of age . . . [and] (2) `youth' means any person sixteen or seventeen years of age. . . ."
The record reveals that no guardian had been appointed for Jessica.
As a result of this conclusion, the court declined to address the motion to strike or dismiss filed by Jessica's mother.
Today, we released our decision in In re Jose B., supra, 125 Conn. App. 572. That case involved a similar fact pattern in which a neglect and uncared-for petition was filed prior to but not adjudicated before the petitioner's eighteenth birthday. In that case, we concluded: "Guided by the reasoning set forth by our Supreme Court in In re Matthew F., [ 297 Conn. 673, 4 A.3d 248 (2010)], and our analysis of the relevant statutes, we conclude that the jurisdiction of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters did not cease merely because Jose reached the age of eighteen. Under the facts and circumstances of the present case, however, Jose failed to establish the requirements of § 46b-129 (j), namely, that the court could commit the eighteen year old Jose to the custody of the department. We conclude, therefore, that Jose failed to establish the factual predicate required for jurisdiction under that statute, and, accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. The trial court, therefore, properly granted the department's motion to dismiss." In re Jose B., supra, 583-4.
We conclude that, pursuant to our analysis in In re Jose B., Jessica failed to establish the factual predicate required for jurisdiction under § 46b-129(j). There is no statutory authority for a retroactive commitment. Id. The court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the petition and properly granted the department's motion to dismiss.
As a result of this conclusion, we need not reach the other claims raised by Jessica in this appeal. See In re Jose B., supra, 125 Conn. App. 580 n. 9.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.