Opinion
F041588.
10-1-2003
In re JESSE G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JESSE G., Defendant and Appellant.
Rita L. Swenor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Jo Graves, Assistant Attorney General, Matthew L. Cate and John A. Thawley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Buckley, J., and Levy, J.
The juvenile court committed Jesse G. to a 5-year maximum period of confinement at the California Youth Authority (CYA) for committing sexual battery and corporal injury. (Pen. Code, §§ 243.4, subd. (a), 273.5, subd. (a).) On appeal, Jesse contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing him at CYA. We will affirm the disposition.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
BACKGROUND
The relevant factual background is taken from Jesses probation report.
A confidential victim (CV) reported to a Reedley police officer and district attorney investigator that she had been in a hostile sexual relationship with Jesse during the last seven months of 2001. The CV stated that in October 2001, Jesse hit her and bruised her arm because she wanted to go out with her friends. He also burned her with a cigarette for about one minute and told her that was how "bitches" deserved to be treated.
The CV added that on January 1, 2002, Jesse forced her into his bedroom and initiated sexual intercourse against her will. He stopped soon after she yelled for help and told him to leave her alone. Jesse cried and apologized for his actions; however, when the CV refused to hold Jesse, he punched her in the back of her head causing her to fall to the ground. Jesse then began to choke the CV and told her, "I want to kill you, I feel like killing you." Jesse twice told the CV to "die" while hitting himself on his chest. The CV eventually escaped through Jesses bathroom window. She contacted a police officer, who noticed her neck was red.
Jesse told a police officer the next day that he was angry with the CV and grabbed her by the neck and pushed her. He admitted he ripped off her shirt and pulled off her pants, but denied removing her underwear or raping her.
The CV also reported that on a night after January 1, 2002, she and Jesse had been drinking beer at a friends apartment. As she left, Jesse followed her out and told her he would throw her down the stairs. When the CV refused Jesses advances to hug and kiss, he became angry and grabbed her neck and slammed her against the wall.
The district attorney charged Jesse with 14 criminal violations. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) Under a plea agreement, Jesse admitted felony counts of sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)) and injury to a cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) with a 5-year maximum period of confinement and the prosecutions right to comment on the dismissed counts. (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595.)
Specifically, the district attorney charged Jesse with forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2)); counts 1 & 4), criminal threats (§ 422; count 2), battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); counts 3, 5-7, & 13); misdemeanor false imprisonment (§ 236; counts 8 & 9); corporal injury to a spouse, cohabitant, or childs parent (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 10-12), and sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a); count 14).
DISCUSSION
Jesse believes the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing him at CYA because his commitment does not serve the purposes of the juvenile court law. Jesse contends the juvenile court focused solely on punishment and public safety and failed to consider that less restrictive alternatives would have been effective, appropriate, and available forms of rehabilitation.
A juvenile court has broad discretion in imposing disposition upon a ward, and an appellate court may reverse the juvenile courts commitment decision only upon a showing the trial court abused that discretion. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 727, subd. (a), 730, subd. (a), 731; In re Todd W. (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 408, 416.) " `We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. " (In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53.)
In determining whether the juvenile court abused its discretion, a commitment must conform to the general purpose of the juvenile court law. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202; In re Todd W., supra, 96 Cal.App.3d at p. 417.) Legislation enacted in 1984 recognized punishment as a rehabilitation tool and shifted the "emphasis from a primarily less restrictive alternative approach oriented towards the benefit of the minor to the express `protection and safety of the public where care, treatment, and guidance shall conform to the interests of public safety and protection." (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1396, citations omitted.) The disposition must nevertheless evidence probable benefit to the minor and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 202, subd. (e); In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.)
While the juvenile court law contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of dispositions, there is no absolute rule that the court may not impose a particular commitment until less restrictive placements have actually been attempted. (In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.) "[I]f there is evidence in the record to show a consideration of less restrictive placements was before the court, the fact the judge does not state on the record his consideration of those alternatives and reasons for rejecting them will not result in a reversal." (Ibid.)
The record reveals the juvenile court considered less restrictive placement options, but found the alternatives inappropriate for Jesse. The court expressly commented that it reviewed Jesses probation report describing his prior robbery by threatening a victim with a knife and use of offensive words in public likely to provoke violence by threatening victims with a stick. (§§ 211, 415, subd. (3).) The probation report also summarized that the juvenile court previously placed Jesse on electronic monitoring, in an anger management program, on probation twice, and granted leniency by staying a commitment to a boot camp program. The evaluating probation officer emphasized Jesses violent nature as evidenced by his prior and recent conduct and concluded he failed to reform despite successfully completing his former terms of probation. Taking into account Jesses delinquent history, age, lack of suitable less restrictive alternatives, public safety, and need for accountability, the probation officer recommended placing Jesse at CYA.
The juvenile court also expressly stated that it "paid very close attention and ha[d] read a number of times" Jesses psychological report. The court emphasized that the psychological report found Jesse at a high risk for reoffending and recommended he "be placed in a structured facility where other individuals are not placed in the potential victimization role[,]" that his "contact with others is to be highly supervised[,]" and that he attend individual therapy, anger management classes, and educational training.
Jesse contends the record lacked sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that his preferred dispositional alternative of an addiction recovery program recommended by the Alternative Sentencing Program (ASP) would have been ineffective or inappropriate. However, the juvenile court specifically reasoned the recovery program failed to provide sufficient supervision to ensure the safety of others. As the juvenile court explained:
"I do have concerns about the current placement as recommended by the ASP report, given the fact - the facts of the current offense, the violence involved. As I see this, violence runs throughout this young mans life. Hes bright, hes intelligent. He can do very well in life, can still do very well in life. But the violence that [hes] exhibited here in my mind is persuasive.... [¶] ... [¶] I dont believe that placement would — the alternative placement, as recommended, would adequately protect others that would be placed within that facility or if [he] were placed in an alternative placement.
"Placement alternatives are limited in that his age is such that he no longer qualifies for our boot camp programs, no longer qualifies for court-mandated placement outside the home. Hes — weve tried other alternatives including the monitor, community service, anger management, no association with gang members, things of that nature.... [¶] ... [¶] But the bottom line as I see it is the danger. Until he gets adequate therapy and treatment, he poses to others not just this young lady whos here in court today, but others in general, whether they be that little boy on the bike in the past or others. Just — this is a serious problem."
The juvenile court then agreed with the probation officer that the current offenses were "so serious that they could warrant, without all the other factors I went through, a commitment to the Youth Authority."
In summary, the record demonstrates the juvenile court considered Jesses request for a placement less restrictive than CYA, but found the request inappropriate. (In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.) The juvenile courts disposition conformed to the purposes of the juvenile court law by taking into account Jesses best interest and particular needs while also considering public safety and recognizing punishment as a legitimate rehabilitative tool. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.