In both incidents Sroga disobeyed police officers' lawful orders that he not impede the towing of his car. E.g., People v. Sorrels, 389 Ill.App.3d 547, 329 Ill.Dec. 590, 906 N.E.2d 788, 792 (2009); In re Jerome S., 372 Ill.App.3d 642, 311 Ill.Dec. 220, 867 N.E.2d 1206, 1212 (2007); People v. Synnott, 349 Ill.App.3d 223, 284 Ill.Dec. 941, 811 N.E.2d 236, 241 (2004). Although merely arguing with a police officer does not violate the statute, People v. Weathington, 82 Ill.2d 183, 44 Ill.Dec. 496, 411 N.E.2d 862, 863–64 (1980); People v. Martinez, 307 Ill.App.3d 368, 240 Ill.Dec. 442, 717 N.E.2d 535, 538–39 (1999), Sroga both times went beyond argument by refusing to desist from behavior that was obstructing the efforts of the police to enable his car to be towed. E.g., City of Chicago v. Meyer, 44 Ill.2d 1, 253 N.E.2d 400, 402–03 (1969); People v. Gordon, 408 Ill.App.3d 1009, 350 Ill.Dec. 213, 948 N.E.2d 282, 287–88 (2011); People v. Ostrowski, 394 Ill.App.3d 82, 333 Ill.Dec. 139, 914 N.E.2d 558, 571–72 (2009).

As discussed, the police officers charged Stallworth with obstruction of a peace officer in violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), and unlike Vanessa, Garcia, and Brown, there are undisputed facts in the record that Stallworth committed a physical act or exertion when interacting with the police officers. See In re Jerome S., 372 Ill.App.3d 642, 647, 311 Ill.Dec. 220, 867 N.E.2d 1206 (Ill. 2007) (obstruction implies some physical act or exertion). In particular, Stallworth testified that during the altercation between the police officers and Marcus, he lunged at an officer to prevent the officer from using a taser gun during the arrest of Marcus and that his forearm contacted the officer's forearm.