Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. FJ24922 Philip K. Mautino, Judge.
Linn Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Colleen M. Tiedemann, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MALLANO, Acting P. J.
Jermaine G. appeals from the order continuing wardship entered following his admission of felony unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) He contends that the juvenile court prejudicially erred in denying his motion for a supplemental expert examination. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A juvenile petition filed on July 12, 2006, alleged four counts against the minor based on an incident in which, following a traffic stop on July 11, officers determined that the minor had no driver’s license, the vehicle he was driving had been stolen, and he was in possession of a dirk or dagger. A probation officer’s report filed on July 27 reflected that the minor had had several contacts with law enforcement and had previously received camp community placement on a sustained petition. The report recommended commitment to the California Youth Authority, which in 2005 was renamed the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities (DJF). (See Pen. Code, § 6001.)
On or about August 1, 2006, the minor filed a request for up to $1,000 in confidential expert fees under Evidence Code sections 730, 952, and 1017 to enable Dr. Douglas Allen to perform “academic, intelligence and learning disability testing.” In a declaration in support of the request, counsel stated that such testing, at $100 per hour, would assist the court in determining whether the minor has special educational needs that could be met by the DJF. The court granted the request to a maximum of $350.
On or about September 15, 2006, the minor filed a request for up to $1,500 for a supplemental examination by Dr. Allen. In a declaration in support of this request, counsel stated in pertinent part: “In the case of the minor, the minor may suffer from a neurological impairment so great that he is considered mentally ill and therefore he may not be accepted by the Youth Authority. On September 5, 2006, Dr. Douglas B. Allen conducted a 730 evaluation of the minor. Said evaluation focused on the minor’s academic and intellectual functioning along with exploring any underlying issues. In his 730 evaluation report, Dr. Allen states that ‘Jermaine appeared to be functioning in the low-average range of intelligence and exhibited limited psychological insight.’ Dr. Allen found that the minor was in the 2nd percentile in the academic skills area of Mathematics ‘suggesting learning disabilities in this area.’ Dr. Allen notes that ‘past reports suggest that judgment and impulse control have been impaired.’ [¶] . . . Dr. Douglas Allen has informed me that he believes a neuropsychological examination is necessary for the purpose of assessing the minor’s special education needs. In his 730 evaluation report, Dr. Allen suggests such a need for a neuropsychological examination when he states the following: [¶] ‘Jermaine also acknowledge[d] a long history of substance abuse which has included the use of PCP. This may have resulted in some possible neurological impairment, although it is beyond the scope of this evaluation to proffer any more specific statements in this regard. Nonetheless, Jermaine also related a history of emotional disturbance which has required therapeutic intervention, psychotropic medication management, and one previous psychiatric hospitalization. Indeed, his general descriptions were strongly suggestive of an underlying mood disturbance, as well as a bipolar disorder. Thus, Jermaine’s ongoing substance abuse problems, as well as mood disturbance, may be at the root of his lack of success.’”
At a hearing on November 16, 2006, the court stated that it had denied ex parte the request for supplemental examination but invited further argument on the issue. Counsel for the minor essentially reiterated the points in the request. The court stated that DJF has psychologists and psychiatrists, so it did not see how further examination “is going to change things if [the minor] really needs help.” The disposition hearing was continued, and the court told counsel to “feel free to have Dr. Allen here and Dr. Allen can explain to me why this evaluation is needed and how we can provide care at the county level. I certainly would be happy to hear that.”
The dispositional hearing was conducted on December 7, 2006. Dr. Allen did not appear, nor was any mention made of further psychological examination. The minor was committed to the DJF.
DISCUSSION
The minor contends that denial of funds for the supplemental examination constituted an abuse of discretion. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1085 [orders regarding ancillary services reviewed for abuse of discretion].) He further asserts that this abuse deprived him of the right to effective representation of counsel at the disposition hearing. We disagree.
In his opening brief, the minor refers to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 710–715, which became effective on January 1, 2006. (Stats. 2005, ch. 265, §§ 3–7.) These statutes permit counties to establish programs to evaluate juveniles for mental or emotional disorders prior to disposition to enable placement where integrated treatment may be available. But as conceded by the minor, such a program must be approved by a county’s board of supervisors (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 710, subd. (a)), and no evidence was offered to show that such a program is operative in Los Angeles County.
Although it may be beneficial for juveniles to receive evaluations such as those contemplated by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 710–715, the reality of this case is that the minor has failed to establish that the confidential evaluation report which the court approved was inadequate per se or that the disposition ordered would have been any different had the request for supplemental funds been approved. Accordingly, the minor’s contention must be rejected.
DISPOSITION
The order under review is affirmed.
We concur: VOGEL, J., ROTHSCHILD, J.