Opinion
H12CP15016070A
02-08-2017
In re Jennalis J
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CORRECTED MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE PETITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL RIGHTS (CORRECTION TO MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DATED FEBRUARY 7, 2017 CORRECTION WAS MADE TO REDACT A PARTY'S LAST NAME)
Mary-Margaret D. Burgdorff, J.
In accordance with General Statutes § 46b-124 and Practice Book § 32a-7, the names of the parties involved in this case are not to be disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and only upon order of the Superior Court.
Before this court is the termination of parental rights petition filed by the petitioner, the Department of Children and Families (" DCF") in the interest of Jennalis J. (birth date: June 30, 2015). The termination of parental rights petition was filed on July 21, 2016. The respondents are Jennetta J. (" Mother") and Angel S. (" Father"). The respondent parents were properly served. Mother and Father appeared, were advised and appointed counsel. The child was appointed an attorney. The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction and there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor child. A judgment of default was entered against Father in August 18, 2016, for his failure to appear. This matter was tried to the court on December 7, 2016. Mother was present with her counsel for trial. Father did not appear. The child's attorney was present for trial. Mother was advised pursuant to In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 795, 120 A.3d 1188, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 921, 126 A.3d 1086 (2015). Thirteen exhibits were entered into evidence as full exhibits. These included two memoranda of decision, an affidavit from a social worker, specific steps for Mother and Father, the social study and addendum in support of the termination of parental rights petition, the social study in support of the permanency plan, curriculum vitae and report of Dr. Derek Franklin, Capitol Region Mental Health Center Discharge Summary and records from Wheeler Clinic. Eight witnesses testified including a supervisor from Capitol Region Mental Health Center (Capitol Region), a family support specialist from the Village for Families and Children (Village), a clinician from Wheeler Clinic (Wheeler), a consultant from Radiance Innovative Services (Radiance), the DCF social worker, a DCF social worker case aide, Dr. Derek Franklin, a clinical forensic psychologist, and the foster mother.
DCF filed a motion for judicial notice on November 2, 2016, which was granted by the court. The court, therefore, takes judicial notice of the following:
(1) Hearing on April 7, 2006, whereby the court sustained the order of temporary custody in the interest of the minor child, Jamar G.;
(2) Hearing held on May 31, 2006, whereby the court committed the minor child, Jamar G., to the care and custody of DCF;
(3) Hearing held on January 9, 2007, whereby the court transferred custody and guardianship of the minor child, Jamar G., to his paternal aunt;
(4) Hearing held on September 7, 2007, whereby the court sustained the order of temporary custody of the minor child, Derrick G.;
(5) Hearing held on January 22, 2008, whereby the court committed the minor child, Derrick G., to the care and custody of DCF;
(6) Hearing held on January 27, 2009, whereby the court terminated the respondent parents' parental rights and appointed DCF as the statutory parent of the minor child, Derrick G.;
(7) Finding of the court (Dannehy, J.) on September 3, 2009, in the interest of the minor child, Andre J., finding that the minor child was in immediate physical danger from his surroundings, that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of said child, that reasonable efforts to prevent removal were not possible, and that the temporary care and custody of said child be vested in DCF;
(8) Preliminary hearing held on September 9, 2009, whereby the court (Keller, J.) sustained the order of temporary custody and reviewed, approved and ordered preliminary specific steps for the respondent parents;
(9) Hearing held on March 19, 2010, whereby the court (Wollenberg, J.) adjudicated the minor child, Amier J., neglected, committed the minor child to the care and custody of DCF, and reviewed, approved and ordered final specific steps for the respondent parents;
(10) Order of the court (Epstein, J.) dated June 25, 2010, terminating the parental rights of the respondent parents and appointing DCF as statutory parent of the minor child, Amier J.;
(11) Order of the Appellate Court dated October 15, 2012, dismissing the respondent mother's appeal of the June 25, 2010 decision terminating her parental rights;
(12) Decision of the Supreme Court dated January 23, 2013 denying the respondent mother's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court;
(13) Order of the Appellate Court dated June 27, 2013, dismissing the respondent mother's May 15, 2013, motion for review of denial of visitation, setting aside judgment and petition for new trial;
(14) Filing of ex parte motion for order of temporary custody on November 29, 2013, in the interest of Jay-Lee S.-J., granted ex parte by the court (Dannehy, J.) and accompanied by affidavit of the DCF social worker;
(15) Findings of the court (Dannehy, J.) on November 29, 2013, in the interest of the minor child Jay-Lee S.-J., finding that the child was in immediate physical danger from her surroundings, that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of said child, that temporary care and custody of said child be vested in DCF, and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of said child were not possible;
(16) Filing of the neglect petition on November 29, 2013, in the interest of Jay-Lee S.-D., alleging the minor child was neglected in that she was being permitted to live under conditions injurious to her well-being;
(17) Preliminary hearing held on December 6, 2013, whereby the court (Burgdorff, J.) confirmed proper service on each respondent parent, found that the neither parent appeared for the hearing, sustained the order of temporary custody in the interest of the minor child, Jay-Lee S.-J., and reviewed, approved and ordered preliminary specific steps for the respondent parents;
(18) Hearing held on January 9, 2014, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) defaulted the respondent parents for their failure to appear, adjudicated the minor child, Jay-Lee S.-J. neglected, committed the minor child to the care and custody of DCF, and reviewed, approved and ordered final specific steps for the respondent parents;
(19) Hearing held on May 29, 2014, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) entered a finding of paternity and accepted the acknowledgment of paternity on file with the Department of Health, signed on November 23, 2013;
(20) Filing of petition for termination of parental rights on May 20, 2014, in the interest of the minor child, Jay-Lee S.-J., alleging that the respondent parents had abandoned the child and that the respondent parents had failed to rehabilitate;
(21) Hearing held on June 19, 2014, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) confirmed proper service of the petition to terminate parental rights on each respondent parent, found that neither parent appeared for the hearing, found that neither parent was a member of the military, and defaulted the respondent parents for their failure to appear;
(22) Hearing held on July 22, 2014, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) noted the respondent parents' first appearance in court, advised the parents of their rights and vacated the prior default;
(23) Decision of the court (Dannehy, J.) dated October 6, 2014, terminating the parental rights of the respondent parents and appointing DCF as statutory parents of the minor child, Jay-Lee S.-J.;
(24) Filing of ex parte motion for order of temporary custody on July 6, 2015, in the interest of the minor child, Jennalis J., granted ex parte by the court (Gilligan, J.) and accompanied by affidavit of the DCF social worker;
(25) Findings of the court (Gilligan, J.) on July 6, 2015, in the interest of the minor child, Jennalis J., finding that the child was in immediate physical danger from his surroundings, that continuation in the home was contrary to the welfare of said child, that temporary care and custody of said child be vested in DCF, and that reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of said child were made by the state;
(26) Filing of neglect petition on July 6, 2015, in the interest of Jennalis J., alleging the minor child was neglected in that she was being denied proper care and attention and that she was being permitted to live under conditions injurious to her well-being;
(27) Preliminary hearing held on July 10, 2015, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) sustained the order of temporary custody and reviewed, approved and ordered specific steps for the respondent parents;
Mother's final specific steps ordered on 10/20/15 included the following: cooperate and keep appointments with DCF and keep the department informed of her address; undergo individual and parenting counseling and make progress for the identified treatment goals and attend recommended treatment consistently and comply with all aspects of treatment plan, and to provide safe, nurturing parenting; cooperate with service providers recommended for parenting, individual and family counseling, in-home support services including continuing services at Radiance for domestic violence assessment and follow treatment recommendations, Radiance for one-on-one parenting and Wheeler for mental health and medication management; attend and complete appropriate domestic violence program if recommended per domestic violence assessment; cooperate with court-ordered evaluations or testing; accept in-home support services referred by DCF and cooperate with them; refrain from illegal drug use and not abuse alcohol or medicine, and refrain from involvement (cont.) with the criminal justice system; sign releases to enable DCF to communicate with service providers; get and maintain adequate housing and legal income; sign releases allowing child's attorney to review child's medical, psychological, psychiatric and/or educational records; immediately let DCF know about any changes in the make-up of the household; get and/or cooperate with a restraining/protective order and/or other appropriate safety plan approved by DCF to avoid more domestic violence incidents; visit the child as often as DCF permits; keep the child in the State of Connecticut while case is going on unless permission is received from DCF or the court to take child out of state and inform DCF of any person who father would like DCF to consider as a placement for the child and; tell DCF the names and addresses of the grandparents of the child.
(28) Hearing held on October 20, 2015, whereby the court (Burgdorff, J.) adjudicated the minor child, Jennalis J., neglected, committed the minor child to the care and custody of DCF, and reviewed, approved and ordered final specific steps for the respondent parents;
(29) Hearing held on May 17, 2016, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) approved the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption in the interest of the minor child, Jennalis J., as to the respondent father, and found that DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the plan as to the respondent father only;
(30) Hearing held on May 25, 2015, whereby the court (Dannehy, J.) approved the permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption in the interest of the minor child, Jennalis J., found that the plan was in the best interest of the minor child, and found that DCF has made reasonable efforts to achieve the plan;
(31) Filing of petition for termination of parental rights on July 21, 2016 in the interest of the minor child, Jennalis J., alleging that the respondent parents have failed to rehabilitate.
The court also takes judicial notice of the entire record of the prior nondelinquency proceedings including pleadings, petitions, social studies, status reports, evaluations, court memoranda and specific steps as well as the dates and contents of the court's findings, orders, rulings and judgments.
A court may take judicial notice of the court's records for their existence, content and legal effect. In re Amanda A., 58 Conn.App. 451, 452-53, 755 A.2d 243 (2000); State v. Gaines, 257 Conn. 695, 705 n.7, 778 A.2d 919 (2001). Connecticut Code of Evidence § 2-1, In re Natalie J., 148 Conn.App. 193, 207, 83 A.3d 1278 (2014).
All counsel, with the exception of father's counsel, participated in the examination of the witnesses and closing arguments.
The statutory grounds stated in the petition against Mother and Father allege that Jennalis J. was found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and that Mother and Father failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that, considering the ages and needs of the child, they would assume a responsible position in the life of their child. The petition also alleges that Mother and Father are the parents of a child under the age of 7 years who is neglected or uncared for and has failed, is unable or unwilling to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, that they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child and their parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the Commissioner of DCF. The petition further alleges that reasonable efforts were made to locate Mother and Father, that reasonable efforts were made to reunify Jennalis J. with Mother and Father or Mother and Father are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.
The court has carefully considered the termination of parental rights petition, the criteria set forth in the relevant General Statutes, the applicable case law as well as all of the evidence and testimony presented, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the evaluation of their testimony with all other testimony and documentary evidence, and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law. With regard to the termination of parental rights petition, the court makes its findings by clear and convincing evidence.
Mother
Mother was born on April 25, 1982. Mother's history with DCF began when she was approximately one year old due to maternal grandmother's substance abuse issues. Her history with DCF as an adult commenced in September 2006, for issues involving physical neglect, domestic violence, significant mental health, medication management issues, and instability. As noted above, Mother has three prior termination of parental rights judgments against her. Mother attended high school through the 10th grade. She attended adult education for approximately a year but never obtained her GED. Her employment history includes cashier jobs at CVS and Wal-Mart. She also worked in a warehouse and worked as a temporary worker. Mother reports that she is currently employed at Cheesecake Factory. Mother has no criminal history. She continues to reside in the apartment she has resided in since the inception of this case.
Mother has five children including Jennalis J. As noted above, Jamar G. was born on November 6, 2005, and was the subject of a transfer of guardianship. Derrick G. was born in August 23, 2007. His mother's and Amier's father's parental rights were terminated and he was subsequently adopted. Amier was born on July 9, 2009. His twin passed away at birth. Mother's and Amier's father's parental rights were terminated and Amier was subsequently adopted. Jay-Lee was born on November 23, 2013, to Mother and Father. Mother's and Father's parental rights were terminated as to Jay-Lee and Jay-Lee was subsequently adopted.
Mother is currently married to Father, Angel S., but reports that she is no longer involved in a relationship with him.
Mother's physical health is good. However, she has struggled with mental health issues for most of her life. She has had hospitalizations for depression from which she has suffered since the age of 15. In July 2009, she was hospitalized due to being psychotic and hearing voices. She was hospitalized again in June 2013, and September 2013, for auditory hallucinations and depression. She is currently on several medications for depression. She inconsistently attended therapy at Capitol Region Mental Health from 2006 until 2015 where she was offered weekly appointments. Mother was diagnosed with obsessive compulsive disorder, major depressive disorder, recurrent severe with mood congruent psychotic features and axis I borderline personality disorder. Mother reported that she had been through a very traumatic situation involving physical and sexual abuse. Mother disclosed Father's sexually, physically and emotionally abusive behavior toward her prior to her voluntarily leaving Capitol Region.
Mother was transported to the hospital on April 8, 2014, for evaluation, and was admitted due to exhibiting fearfulness and slight paranoia along with flashbacks and nightmares. Mother admitted that she could not return to her apartment on April 11, 2014, because she was fearful, unable to sleep and was scared. She also admitted to having flashbacks of abuse that happened in the apartment. After her discharge from the hospital, Mother agreed to a safety plan and contacted Interval House and entered New Horizons. On April 21, 2014, Mother walked into Middlesex Hospital asking for inpatient admission due to depression, confusion and difficulty coping. She remained hospitalized until April 25, 2014, when she returned to her apartment. Notably, Mother allowed Father to return to the apartment in May 2014. Mother refused help with filing an application for a restraining order against Father and made it clear that she did not want Father to be arrested or go to a shelter. Capitol Region attempted to continue to support Mother but she failed to show up for many of her appointments. Mother did seek crisis respite and left her apartment with the assistance of Capitol Region on May 20, 2014. Mother received assistance with transportation and finding a new apartment along with case management services while in respite. However, Mother voluntarily increased her contact with Father. Mother abruptly left crisis respite on June 7, 2014, after allowing Father back into the apartment. Capitol Region noted that this caused an increase in Mother's fear, anxiety, depression and trauma. Mother also reported that she and Father wanted to regain custody of Amier. Thereafter, due to lack of contact from Mother, Capitol Region staff responded to Mother's apartment with the assistance of the police. Mother was found to be emaciated and weak and had to be carried down the stairs. Mother reported that she had been raped by Father and was physically injured. She also reported that Father refused to allow her to leave the apartment. Capitol Region arranged for Mother's outpatient treatment and arranged for follow-up outpatient treatment in addition to admission into a domestic violence shelter. Mother refused to go to the domestic violence shelter and returned to the apartment she shared with Father. Notably, Mother and Father were married on September 4, 2014. On October 10, 2014, Mother presented to Hartford Hospital requesting an inpatient psychiatric stay. Mother reported she needed to get away and did not want to return to her apartment out of fear of what would happen with Father following news about the termination of their parental rights of Jay-Lee. Thereafter, Mother did not attend a scheduled appointment with her therapist and her attendance at Capitol Region became even more sporadic. On February 3, 2015, Capitol Region reported that Mother was struggling with severe depression, poor sleep and poor appetite. Mother disclosed that her marriage with Father was not happy. She was discharged from Capitol Region in July 2015, due to her failure to follow through. She last attended Capitol Region in February 2015.
DCF requested Mother to re-engage in treatment at Capitol Region after the birth of Jennalis J. but she refused. Mother self-referred to Wheeler Clinic where she currently attends individual counseling sessions. Her provider there has diagnosed Mother with major depressive disorder, recurrent, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Her provider also reports that mother is engaging consistently in treatment but continues to fail to acknowledge any issues with domestic violence with Father or in any other relationship. She has expressed the desire to ignore her domestic violence issues. Mother has a history of domestic violence in past relationships. Mother currently sees an APRN at Wheeler Clinic who provides antipsychotic and SSRI medication. She continues to have depression, anxiety and trauma. Her symptoms include difficulty sleeping, hypervigilance, and feeling distant and cut off.
Mother underwent a court-ordered evaluation on November 8, 2016, with a licensed clinical psychologist, Derek A. Franklin, Psy.D. Dr. Franklin's report was admitted as a full exhibit to the court. He also testified at the trial of this matter. He opined that Mother has low average cognitive abilities. Dr. Franklin confirmed Mother's diagnoses of depressive disorder with mood congruent psychosis, PTSD and unspecified personality disorder, in addition to chronic depressions resulting in emotional reactivity, poor self-esteem, poor motivation to achieve, episodic suicidal thoughts and low energy. He opined that her " hypervigilance, restlessness, poor sleep quality, recurrent intrusive thoughts and flashbacks characterize her PTSD condition, resulting in poor decision making. The diagnosis of unspecified personality disorder underscores [Mother's] rigid and inflexible thought processes and problems seeing how her behaviors negatively contribute to her problems. [Her] risk factors, poor judgment, lack of insight and minimally treated mood and personality disorder, suggest the potential for child neglect is high, indicating the need for intensive clinical intervention." The recommended treatment included dialectical behavior therapy (DWI) weekly to treat her borderline personality disorder which is not currently offered at Wheeler Clinic.
Dr. Franklin also opined that Mother required a minimum of six months of treatment but noted that " it is highly unlikely that [Mother] could obtain a level of personal rehabilitation that would support the conclusion that she is able to appropriately care for Jennalis. The absence of insight regarding DCF's past and current involvement underscores [Mother's] continued inability to fully appreciate how her actions and decisions may potentially negatively impact on her daughter's emotional well-being."
Dr. Franklin did not endorse reunification of Jennalis with Mother in light of Mother's continued struggle with untreated mood and anxiety problems and the long-term process of treating her personality disorder He was struck by the lack of interaction between Jennalis and Mother during his observation of them, and noted that Jennalis did not appear to recognize Mother as a relevant figure. He found no clear evidence of an overt bond between Mother and Jennalis. He did note that Jennalis has an emotional bond with foster mother. He also opined that Mother, at the time of the evaluation, was not able to independently care for the emotional, physical and psychological needs of Jennalis. He also noted that if Jennalis was returned to Mother's care, there was a significant risk for the emergence of emotional problems for Jennalis. He advised that Jennalis remain in her current placement due to her emotional attachment to her current caregiver.
Mother is currently involved with Radiance Innovative Services (Radiance). She successfully completed parent education on April 1, 2016, and began domestic violence services in July 2016. Mother disclosed a history of domestic violence with Father to the service provider but continues to be resistant to discussing her domestic violence issues with Father. Mother receives individual counseling from Wheeler Clinic and has been compliant with attending her sessions as well as medication management. Mother has not yet disclosed her domestic violence history to her therapist at Wheeler. On October 31, 2016, Mother began the Therapeutic Family Time Program at The Village for Families and Children. She consistently visits Jennalis weekly and the visits have been going well. Mother is attentive to Jennalis, changes her diaper and feeds her. She is engaged with Jennalis and expresses affection for her. Most recently, she has been ending the visits 15 minutes early. A referral was made by DCF to Therapeutic Family Time pursuant to Mother's request for additional visitation. However, that referral is pending while DCF waits for Mother to sign the necessary releases. Mother also attends Jennalis's medical appointments.
Father
Father was born on August 30, 1988. Father reported to DCF that his mother abused substances as a child. He was adopted as a child and reports that his adoptive parents were physically and emotionally abusive to him. Father attributes that abuse to his self-injurious behavior which includes cutting. Father's child protection history with DCF commenced in 2013 due to his mental health, substance abuse and domestic violence issues as well as instability. As noted above, he has judgment of termination of parental rights as to Jay-Lee. He reported that he has never received any mental health treatment. Due to Father's failure to maintain contact with DCF, little is known about his educational history. Father did report that he has had no involvement with the military. His work history includes employment at a dry cleaner and Stop & Shop. He is currently certified as a cab driver. He has no criminal history. He reports that he has used marihuana and drunk alcohol in the past. Father reports that Jay-Lee and Jennalis are his only children.
Father completed parent education through Radiance. He was referred for domestic violence treatment and individual therapy at Radiance and attended an intake session on March 8, 2016. He was ordered to attend a 26-week domestic violence program but attended only four of the sessions, and was unsuccessfully discharged. He attended two sessions but was discharged in July 2015, due to his failure to participate and engage in services. Father completed a substance abuse evaluation and no recommendations were made for additional services. Father began attending a domestic violence program in October 2015, through Radiance. Father reported that he does not have a history of domestic violence. Father attended four sessions and was terminated from the program in July 2016, for lack of attendance. Father failed to attend a court-ordered psychological evaluation with Dr. Franklin. He has also failed to engage in mental health services.
Father's current situation is not known as he has not been in contact with DCF nor has he seen Jennalis since May 2016. Prior to that time, he visited her on a consistent basis and interacted appropriately with her. He has not been in contact with his providers in several months. His current whereabouts remain unknown to DCF. Father did not appear for the trial of this matter.
Jennalis
Jennalis was born on June 30, 2015, and is presently one and half years old. She has never been in the care of her mother or father during the course of her short life. Jennalis was born with a hole in the upper and lower sections of her heart for which she receives treatment from a cardiologist. The hole in the lower part of her heart has closed up, however, she will need to undergo surgery by her third birthday to correct the upper section. She has no other medical issues and is developmentally on target. Her foster mother and day care provider report that she is doing well and recently began walking. She laughs and easily interacts with those around her. She is becoming more verbal. Jennalis was screened by Birth to Three services in July 2015, but was found not to need services as there were no concerns as to her development. Jennalis's foster mother continues to express her commitment to being a permanent resource for Jennalis and wishes to adopt her if she become legally free to do so.
Jennalis currently resides in the same foster home since her discharge from the hospital. She resides in the foster home with her sister, Jay-Lee, who was adopted by foster mother. They have a close relationship. She has a strong attachment to her foster mother and seeks her out for comfort and support. Jennalis does responds to and interacts well with mother and appears to have a positive relationship with her but they do not exhibit an emotional bond with one another. Jennalis has not seen Father in several months and DCF has been unable to assess their interaction with each other.
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The court must first determine whether DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of mother and father should be terminated. " A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition . . . In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child." (Citation omitted.) In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 629, 39 A.3d 727, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932, 43 A.3d 660 (2012).
A
Adjudication
Pursuant to section 17a-112(j), adjudication involves the court finding by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parent, and that one of the statutory grounds for the termination of parental rights exists.
1
Reasonable Efforts
Section 17a-112(j) provides in relevant part: " The Superior Court . . . may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] . . . if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) [DCF] has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parent . . . unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts . . ." (Emphasis added.) " [T]he department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate . . ." In re Gabriella A., 154 Conn.App. 177, 104 A.3d 805 (2014). " Thus, the department must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., 153 Conn.App. 584, 102 A.3d 141 (2014) citing In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191, 16 A.3d 1244 (2011); see also In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 837, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). " [I]n determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of the events preceding the date on which the termination was filed . . . [T]he court, when making its reasonable efforts determination . . . is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., id., citing In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 870-71, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923 (2014). See also Practice Book § 35a-7. In the present case, the petitions for termination of mother's and father's parental rights were filed April 2, 2015.
" [Section 17a-112] imposes on the department the duty . . . to make reasonable efforts to unite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department's efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act from which the requirement was drawn . . . [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible." In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 632, 847 A.2d 883 (2004). " [R]easonableness is an objective standard . . . and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 872-73, 83 A.3d 1264, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923, 86 A.3d 468 (2014). The department has a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts. In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 644, 809 A.2d 1119 (2002). But " [t]he department is required only to make 'reasonable efforts.' It is axiomatic that this does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476, 735 A.2d 893 (1999). In addition, " making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances . . ." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645. The court may also determine that the respondent parents were either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. See In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, 841 A.2d 274, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 924, 848 A.2d 472 (2004).
DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it used reasonable efforts to locate Mother and Father as contemplated by § 17a-112(j)(1). The evidence clearly established that Father and Mother were properly served with the termination of parental rights petition and were provided notice of the termination of parental rights trial. Mother and Father appeared for court proceedings prior to the trial of this matter. Mother was present for the trial of this matter and Father was previously defaulted for his failure to appear.
DCF has also proven by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Jennalis with Mother and Father. As discussed above, Mother was offered numerous services to aid in attaining reunification with Jennalis including case management services, mental health services and treatment including individual therapy and medication management, parent education and mentoring services, domestic violence services, supervised visitation, and bus passes. Father was offered a multitude of services including case management services, substance abuse and mental health services, domestic violence services, parenting services, supervised visitation and bus passes. Both Mother and Father have failed to successfully complete these services and change their circumstances, and both have failed to attain a level of stability to permit Jennalis to be safely placed in either's care. Father has ceased to engage in services and in visiting with Jennalis. Both Mother and Father have failed to gain the necessary insight needed to care for Jennalis. They have been unable to put Jennalis's needs ahead of their own and have been unable to do so for the majority of her young life.
Accordingly, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Mother and Father, and to reunify them with Jennalis and, further, that they are unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts.
2
Failure to Rehabilitate
In the adjudicatory phase, the court must next determine whether DCF has proved the statutory ground for termination of parental rights-failure to rehabilitate. " Failure of parent to achieve sufficient personal rehabilitation is one of six statutory grounds on which a court may terminate parental rights pursuant to § 17a-112 [See General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I).] " The . . . [grounds] alleged in this petition [are] that . . . mother and father failed to achieve rehabilitation pursuant to § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)(I) which allows for termination if a child has found to be neglected, and the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child." See In re Leilah W., 166 Conn.App. 48, 141 A.3d 1000, citing In re G.Q., 158 Conn.App. 24, 25, 118 A.3d 164, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 918, 118 A.3d 61 (2015).
" Personal rehabilitation . . . refers to the restoration of the parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent . . . {and} requires the trial court to analyze the [parents'] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time . . . The statute does not require [the parents] to prove precisely when they will be able to assume a responsible position in [their child's] life. Nor does it require [them] to prove that [they] will be able to assume full responsibility for [their child], unaided by available support systems." In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 507, 78 A.3d 797 (2013). " It requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the level of rehabilitation [the parents have] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [they] can assume a responsible position in [their child's] life." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Elvin G., 310 Conn. 485, 507, 78 A.3d 797 (2013) " The critical issue is not whether the [parents have] improved [their] ability to manage [their own lives], but rather whether [they have] gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue." In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 670, 6 A.3d 86 (2010). The ultimate question is whether the parents at the time of the filing of the termination petition are more able to resume the responsibilities of a parent than he or she was at the time of the making of the commitment. In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112, 614 A.2d 832 (1992). In making this determination, the court may properly rely upon events occurring after the date of the petition when considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the child's life within a reasonable time. In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230, 763 A.2d 83 (2000); In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748, 789 A.2d 1024 (2002). See also In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 858-59, 949 A.2d 1266, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923, 958 A.2d 150 (2008).
" A conclusion of failure to rehabilitate is drawn from both the trial court's factual findings and from its weighing the facts in assessing whether these facts satisfy the failure to rehabilitate ground set forth in § 17a-112(j)(3)(B)." (Emphasis omitted.) In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 587-88, 122 A.3d 1247 (2015)." Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying the child a safe and permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the biological parent] . . . continues to be incapable of providing such a home for the child. In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Supp. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999). In light of the statutory elements of this ground as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to Mother and Father.
The exhibits and testimony presented at trial as discussed in detail above prove clearly and convincingly the first element under the statute that Jennalis was found to have been neglected on October 20, 2015. Mother and Father were provided with court-ordered specific steps to facilitate the return of Jennalis to their care. DCF assisted Mother and Father by referring them to appropriate services. Father's minimal compliance with his specific steps was not sufficient to achieve sufficient rehabilitation. As discussed above, he only minimally engaged in his court-ordered services and has ceased visitation with Jennalis. See In re Vincent D., 65 Conn.App. 658, 660, 783 A.2d 534 (2001); In re Coby C., 107 Conn.App. 395, 406, 945 A.2d 529 (2008). Mother did engage in her court-ordered services but did so inconsistently. She failed to follow through with her services at Capitol Region and refused DCF's request to reengage in services there. Notably, she self-referred to Wheeler Clinic which does not offer the DBT treatment recommended by Dr. Franklin. Of great concern is Mother's ongoing denial of domestic violence in her relationship with Father, and her desire to ignore that issue. There is clear and convincing evidence that when the termination of parental rights petition was filed on July 21, 2016, Mother and Father had failed to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and needs of their child, they could assume a responsible position in her life. Mother and Father have failed to gain the insight and ability to care for Jennalis given her age and needs within a reasonable time. See In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999).
With regard to personal rehabilitation, as noted in detail above, Mother has attempted to engage in services for many years to address her ongoing issues with her mental health and domestic violence. The record is replete with instances of domestic violence between Mother and her intimate partners including Father over many years. Despite being to referred to domestic violence services by DCF, Mother has failed to reap any benefit or insight from these services. Notably, Mother allowed Father back into her home and into her life even after acknowledging that he has committed domestic violence against her. She has clearly failed to gain an understanding of the harmful effect of family violence on herself as well as Jennalis. As she has demonstrated in the past, Mother remains unable to benefit from the treatment and services she has received. Her four older children have been removed from her care as a result of these ongoing issues.
Father failed to engage in any services offered by DCF with the exception of parenting education and a substance abuse evaluation. He attended an intake session for domestic violence services but failed to follow through with the services. He did engage in supervised visitation with Jennalis for a period of time but has had no contact with her, or DCF, for the past several months. He has failed to make any gains whatsoever with regard to his ongoing issues. The court notes that this finding is supported by the judgment of default against Father for his failure to appear. Child protection proceedings are civil matters. See Practice Book § 32a-2(a). In civil matters, the entry of a default constitutes an admission by the defaulting party of the truth of the facts alleged in the petition and the court is permitted to take the facts contained in the pleadings and social studies to be true and to rely on those facts in making its decision. In re Natalie J., 148 Conn.App. 193, 83 A.3d 1278 (2014).
Despite DCF's reasonable efforts, both Mother and Father are unable to parent Jennalis and serve as her caretaker. They are both unable to meet the developmental, emotional, educational, medical and moral needs of Jennalis. They cannot provide for the shelter, nurturance, safety and security of the child. See In re Paul M., Jr., 154 Conn.App. 488, 107 A.3d 552 (2014). Neither Mother or Father has the stability in their own lives to enable them to care for Jennalis. Neither parent has made significant progress towards personal rehabilitation and clearly cannot assume a responsible position in Jennalis's life considering her age and needs. The court finds Dr. Franklin's report and testimony compelling as to Mother's need for intensive individual therapy including DBT treatment. While Mother and Father clearly love Jennalis, their attempts to reunify with her have failed. " [M]otivation to parent is not enough; ability is required." In re Paul M., Jr., id., citing In re G.S., 117 Conn.App. 710, 718, 980 A.2d 935, cert. denied., 294 Conn. 919, 984 A.2d 67 (2009). " The fact that the respondents may love the child does not in itself show rehabilitation." Id., citing In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 667, 769 A.2d 718 (" [a] parent's love and biological connection . . . is simply not enough"), cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001).
The legal obligation of a parent necessarily encompasses that fundamental right of a child to be safe-physically, psychologically and emotionally. General Statutes § § 46b-120(8) and (9) and 17a-112(j). See also In re Nelmarie O., 97 Conn.App. 624, 629, 905 A.2d 706 (2006) (trial court properly found that the respondent had failed to provide for the emotional well-being of her child). Our laws recognize that a child is legally entitled to some minimum standard of safety which should include a parent's desire to protect and keep their child safe in all ways including physically and emotionally.
In light of the above, the court finds that DCF has met its burden of proof that Mother and Father have failed to rehabilitate in that, given the age and needs of Jennalis, they cannot assume a responsible position in her life within a reasonable period of time. Both Mother and Father continue to fail to demonstrate the ability to rehabilitate despite being offered ongoing services.
Of paramount consideration to the court is the issue of stability and permanency for Jennalis. See In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 666-67, 6 A.3d 86 (2010). Jennalis's need for permanence far outweighs any remote chance that Mother and Father may rehabilitate in the far distant future. Both Mother and Father have, either because of lack of ability or lack of desire, failed to successfully accomplish what was needed to consider reunification as an appropriate conclusion. Jennalis cannot afford to wait for her parents to rehabilitate. DCF has presented compelling evidence that she needs permanency and stability now. She has the same needs of all children for permanency and stability in her life.
Thus, the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that as of the end of the trial of this matter, Mother and Father had not sufficiently rehabilitated themselves to the extent they could assume a responsible position in Jennalis's life in view of her age and needs, or within a reasonable period of time thereafter.
3
Ground E
As noted above, DCF alleges that Mother and Father are the parents of a child under the age of seven years who is neglected and uncared for or that they have failed, are unable or are unwilling to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the child, that they could assume a responsible position in the life of the child, and the parental rights of another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by the commissioner of children and families. General Statutes § 17a-112(j)(3)(E). The court incorporates by reference here all of the factual findings it has previously made in this memorandum of decision regarding Mother's and Father's failure to rehabilitate. In light of the statutory elements of this ground, as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to Mother and Father with regard to this ground. Mother and Father are the parents of Jennalis, who was born on June 30 2015, and, therefore is under the age of seven years. As noted above, Jennalis was adjudicated neglected on July 10, 2015. As also noted above, Mother and Father have a prior judgment of termination of parental rights with regard to their child, Jay-Lee S., entered on October 6, 2014, pursuant to a petition filed by DCF. The court also finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden of proving that Mother and Father have failed to achieve the necessary degree of rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Jennalis, they can assume a responsible position in her life.
Accordingly, the court finds that as of the date of the filing of the petition, by clear and convincing evidence, Mother and Father failed, or are unable or unwilling, to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of Jennalis, that they could achieve a responsible position in her life, and that their parental rights to another child were previously terminated pursuant to a petition filed by DCF.
B
DISPOSITION
For all of the above reasons, the court, having found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of the mother's and father's parental rights have been proven, the court must now consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in General Statutes § 17a-112(k). In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 641 A.2d 378 (1994). " In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the interest of the child . . . [T]he trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondents'] parental rights is not in the best interest of the [child]." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 97-98, 961 A.2d 1036 (2009). " The best interests of the [child] includes the [child's] interest in sustained growth, development, well-being and continuity and stability in [her] environment . . . In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings delineated in [§ 17a-112(k)]." Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 794-5, 952 A.2d 1280 (2008).
1
Findings Under § 17a-112(k)
The seven statutory findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent .
As discussed above, DCF offered timely and appropriate services to Mother and Father all in an effort to facilitate reunion with Jennalis. Mother was offered case management services, parent education, domestic violence services, mental health treatment and medication management. She was offered supervised visitation with Jennalis and bus passes. Father was offered case management services, substance abuse evaluation and services, mental health services, parenting services, supervised visitation and bus passes. All of the recommended services were appropriate and offered on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis.
2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended .
As discussed in detail above, reasonable efforts to reunify Jennalis with his mother and father were made by DCF pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. The services offered were appropriate and offered on a consistent and timely basis. Mother and Father failed to benefit from the services offered and provided. They failed to adjust their circumstance, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of Jennalis to return to the care of Mother or Father. They have each failed to demonstrate their ability to appropriately parent Jennalis. DCF has clearly made reasonable efforts toward family reunification.
3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order .
Mother has not successfully fulfilled her obligations pursuant to the specific steps ordered by the court in that she failed to rehabilitate to a degree that would allow Jennalis to be safely returned to her care. While Mother engaged in all services required of her, she has been unable to benefit from services as she has still not fully addressed her history as a victim of domestic violence. Further, while she has requested more visitation time with Jennalis, she has failed to take advantage of the additional time when offered to her. Thus, she has not sufficiently benefitted from the services she did in engage in and clearly has not made sufficient progress in addressing her longstanding child protection concerns. Father has not successfully complied with his court-ordered specific steps child protection concerns. He completed a substance abuse evaluation and parent education program, but was terminated from both individual counseling and domestic violence offender program due to lack of attendance and participation. He has not consistently attended visitation with Jennalis.
4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties .
Jennalis recognizes Mother and appears to have a positive relationship with her. She is comfortable with Mother and does not exhibit any adverse reaction during the visits or medical appointments when Mother is present. Father has not seen Jennalis in several months so their current relationship is unknown. Jennalis has developed a significant emotional bond and loving bond with her current foster mother. She seeks her foster mother out for comfort and support. Foster mother has presented herself as an adoptive resource for Jennalis.
5. The age of the children .
Jennalis was born on June 30, 2015. She is one and a half years old.
6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child's home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child .
Neither Mother nor Father have made sufficient efforts or adjustment to their individual circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of Jennalis to return to their care in the foreseeable future. They each continue to have unresolved issues that impede their ability to safely and appropriately provide care for Jennalis. Mother did start to address her history of domestic violence with Father, but she has denied that domestic violence existed between them from the inception of the case through July 2016. Further, despite recommendations from the court and DCF that mother continue treatment with Capitol Region due to her extensive mental health issues and their ability to meet her clinical needs, as well as her preexisting relationship with the provider, Mother refused and self-referred to Wheeler Clinic. While mother has maintained contact with Jennalis during her supervised visitation with her, she failed to adequately address her long-standing issues in order to demonstrate the ability to protect and safely care for Jennalis. Further, Mother requested an increase in her visitation time with Jennalis but ended the visitation time early for several weeks. Father was terminated from both individual counseling and domestic violence treatment due to his failure to engage in domestic violence treatment. As such, Mother and Father have not adjusted to their circumstances. Jennalis is currently residing in a special study foster home where she has been placed since her discharge from the hospital. Her biological sister, who was previously adopted by foster mother, is also in the home. Foster mother is willing to adopt Jennalis if she becomes legally free for adoption.
7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent .
There is no credible evidence that Mother or Father have been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Jennalis. No unreasonable act or conduct of any person including Mother and father have prevented either of them from a meaningful relationship with Jennalis. Their economic circumstances have not prevented them from having a relationship or visits with Jennalis. Mother and father were offered and provided programs and services at no cost to them to assist them with their issues. There has been no claim that mother or father were unable to obtain services due to lack of financial resources. Legal counsel was appointed for each of them at no cost to them.
2
Best Interests of the Child
Once the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court must find, also by clear and convincing evidence, that the termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998). " [T]he determination of the child's best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights has been established by clear and convincing evidence." In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738, 977 A.2d 247 (2009). The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare. In determining whether terminating mother's and father's parental rights would be in the best interest of Jennalis, the court has considered various factors, including her interest in sustained growth, developed well-being, and in the continuity and stability of her environment; Cappetta v. Cappetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985); In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 766 n.15, 23 A.3d 18 (2011); the ages and needs of the child; the length and nature of her stage of foster care; the contact and lack thereof that the child has with her mother and father; the potential benefit or detriment of retaining a connection with her biological mother and father; her genetic bond with her birth parents; In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999); and the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon. The court has also balanced Jennalis's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefits of maintaining a connection with her biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional wellbeing must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).
At the conclusion of the trial, the attorney for the minor child requested that the court terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father in light of their failure to rehabilitate as it is in Jennalis's best interest to do so. The court concurs.
The court finds that termination of Mother's and Father's parental rights is in the best interest of Jennalis. The convincing and clear evidence has established that Mother and Father are in no better position today to provide for her than they were at the time of her removal. The problems that led to the removal have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement are bleak especially in light of Mother's past history and ongoing mental health issues. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of the witnesses as well as the information contained in the exhibits presented at the time of trial.
Jennalis desperately needs the permanency and stability that she now has in her foster home. Termination of parental rights will bring that much needed stability and permanency to her and the opportunity to have a healthy and emotionally stable life. Jennalis's needs are those of all children. She has an interest in sustained growth, development, well-being, and a continuous, stable environment. Accordingly, based upon the clear and convincing evidence presented, it is in Jennalis's best interest to terminate the parental rights of mother and father.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence, and after due consideration of the child's need for a secure, permanent placement, it is accordingly ordered:
That the parental rights of the respondent mother, Jennetta J., and respondent father, Angelo S., are terminated;
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent of Jennalis for the purpose of securing her adoption as expeditiously as possible, with first consideration to be given to the current foster parent of Jennalis;
That a written report of the plan for the child shall be submitted to the court within thirty days, and such further reports shall be timely filed and presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.